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Abstract 
 
Consideration of recruitment of Liberal politicians into the Conservative 
party, in the first third of the twentieth century, is an important but under-
explored aspect of the political realignment which saw the demise of the 
Liberal party and the rise of a new duopoly between the Conservative and 
Labour parties. A specific and detailed investigation of the phenomenon is 
necessary.   
This study provides an opportunity to appreciate the nature of how 
individual Liberal politicians reacted to changing political circumstances 
with the weakening of the Liberal party. It examines a range of relevant 
factors – both of a long-term and immediate nature – and undertakes 
comparative analysis of the careers of the relevant politicians, including not 
only prominent politicians but also less well-known ones to assist in 
ensuring that the topic avoids being merely a study of high politics.  
All findings point to a diverse range of issues which influenced 
political thinking about party allegiances, but broadly these relate to the 
growth of a shared political agenda, between Liberals and Conservatives. 
Some Liberals wanted positively to coalesce with Conservatives, forming 
relationships, both in Parliament and in the constituencies, which eventually 
brought them inside the Conservative party or close to it, whilst others, by 
contrast, almost fell into working with the Conservatives due to political 
pressures over time. All seemed to suffer some level of disaffection from the 
Liberal party, which was therefore a key ingredient in hastening their 
change of party.    
  
 
Nicholas Cott 
Newcastle upon Tyne, March 2015 
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Introduction 
 
The recruitment of Liberal Members of Parliament (MPs) into the 
Conservative party is an important element in the understanding of Liberal 
party disintegration and general political realignment in the first third of the 
twentieth century; however, it is one area of concern which has been under-
explored. In certain regards, it is understandable why this should be so, 
since studies of societal change, the rise of mass democracy and the decline 
of the Liberal party – both as a party in Parliament and in the constituencies 
– might seem to have provided adequate coverage of all the major issues. 
However, lacking in these studies has been a sense of the strain Liberal 
politicians themselves placed on the Liberal party and the wider party 
system, both individually and collectively, through changes to their party 
associations. Changes in party from Liberal to other parties (both Labour 
and Conservative) were a major occurrence in the period, so the importance 
of Liberal recruits in the political changes cannot be under-estimated.  
 At a microscopic level, one of the important aspects of examining 
the recruits is to be able to glean what affected them personally, with 
opportunities not only to examine the influence of, or reaction to, the major 
political issues of the day, but also to factor in more personal issues in how 
they furthered the prospects of Liberal decline and how unique personality 
characteristics impacted their decisions about party loyalties. This helps to 
appreciate the party system itself in a more personal way, with such unique 
factors being a corrective to any abstract view of the party system as simply 
representative of currents of opinion; indeed, it can be seen that politicians 
have very personal associations with party, not just those associated with 
particular political beliefs, but also loyalties to individuals or groups of 
people, or self-interest in seeking political office, as examples.  
 The case of Liberal recruits to the Conservative party, in particular, 
presents an opportunity to consider unique aspects of the party system. In 
the early twentieth century, the system of political parties was fluid, with 
currents of opinion moving across and between all three; the lines between 
party were blurred, and it becomes difficult to appreciate changes of 
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political association fully in the context therefore of formal changes in 
political loyalties, making recruitment a fascinating topic for historical 
consideration. It is interesting, for example, to see that many Liberal recruits 
did not see attempts to build cross-party connections with Conservatives in 
the period before their recruitment as a discontinuity with their Liberal 
associations; indeed, many thought that these were perfectly consistent. 
Working with the Conservatives was often deemed to be patriotic and a 
necessary reaction to the development of mass democracy and the 
challenges posed electorally to the party system. This situation was not 
unique. Since the late Victorian era politicians had tried to adapt the existing 
parliamentary system to a new electorate brought into being by extended 
franchise arrangements, seeking to build consensus between political parties 
to appeal to the electorate and prevent the rise of extremes; a number of 
Liberal recruits can be seen as a new generation of politicians imbued with 
these Victorian perspectives, albeit set in an early twentieth century context. 
 The neglect of Liberal recruitment is demonstrated in their only 
being a handful of studies available. The most detailed and compelling is 
Alun Wyburn-Powell’s recently published work.1 Wyburn-Powell’s 
investigations take a longer-range assessment – considering a century of 
developments (1910-2010) – and his research examines recruitment to both 
the Conservative and Labour parties.2 The publication is a phenomenal 
achievement, taking understanding of general issues in Liberal recruitment 
much further than was hitherto possible, placing it, at last, more centrally in 
the debates about realignment and Liberal party decline. However, there is 
still room for more specific and detailed examination of recruitment to the 
                                                          
1 Alun Wyburn-Powell, Defections and the Liberal Party, 1910-2010 (Manchester & New 
York, 2012). The published research relates to material presented for Powell’s University 
of Leicester Ph.D. thesis. Also see Alun Wyburn-Powell, ‘Defectors and the Liberal Party 
since December 1910’, Unpublished University of Leicester Ph.D. thesis (2010).  
2 Wyburn-Powell’s is not the only study which covers recruitment into the Labour party. 
An older study exists – Catherine Ann Cline, Recruits to Labour - The British Labour 
Party, 1914-1931, (New York, 1963). There is also a recent short journal article – John 
Shepherd, ‘The Flight from the Liberal Party – Liberals Who Joined Labour, 1914-1931’, 
Journal of Liberal History 67 (2010), 24-34.  
 
 
3 
 
Conservative party from the early part of the twentieth century up to 1935. 
Wyburn-Powell’s broad study does not enable him to provide sufficiently 
detailed coverage of the Liberal recruits in the period, or of the context of 
the party system in which they played a role.  
More specific coverage of the period is justified not only for reason 
of understanding of a neglected historical topic but also for a secondary 
consideration, lying in current interest in Liberal and Conservatives 
relations as a result of the creation of the Coalition government in 2010. A 
study such as this might well assist in understanding the historical context in 
which these relations can be viewed.  
 
Overall, this introductory chapter will focus on two elements. The first 
section will seek to consolidate existing appreciation of the topic of Liberal 
to Conservative recruitment through examination of a range of research with 
both direct associations with the issue, as well as wider research which 
creates a context for it, to ensure the focus is sufficiently holistic. The latter 
suggestion includes the need for assessment of relevant material referring to 
socio-political and cultural phenomena, political beliefs, and Liberal party 
politics. It is intended that this section will highlight critical findings and 
offer a view about gaps in assessment and the scope for further research. 
The second part of the chapter will set out the parameters for enquiry in this 
study, building on points made in this introductory section about the 
importance of Liberal recruitment and its place in appreciation of the party 
system and Liberal party decline. It will consider the methodology and 
sources to be examined and provide some details of the format of the 
discussion, particularly in terms of the balance of the discussion in its focus 
both on drawing together collective experience and also to discuss specific 
individual experience.      
 
I 
 
In beginning the examination of relevant existing research, a useful starting 
point lies in consideration of sources referring to the broad rise of class as a 
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determinant of party allegiance on an electoral level, and to comment upon 
the breakdown of traditional voting alignment along religious lines, as a 
result of the rise of collective working-class consciousness and the 
solidification of support of that section of society behind the Labour party. 
Linked to this is relevant work focusing on the growth of collective middle-
class consciousness, which helped to solidify support behind a modernised 
Conservative party.3 All such research points to the devastating impact class 
had on the Liberal party, tracing how it negatively affected socio-political 
structures associated with Liberal party support and electoral performance, 
and provides some vital context for the changes in allegiance of politicians 
relevant to this study. 
Some historians, including Keith Laybourn, Jack Reynolds and Ross 
McKibbin, have pointed to the consolidation of working-class interests in 
the workplace and local communities, which fostered a separate identity, 
pushing the working-class towards the Labour party and away from support 
for the Liberals in their representation of nonconformist interests.4 This 
process began in the later nineteenth century and was largely complete 
before the First World War, although it has been suggested that Labour’s 
                                                          
3 Chris Cook, The Age of Alignment – Electoral Politics in Britain (London & Basingstoke, 
1975); George Dangerfield, The Strange Death of Liberal England (New York, 1935); 
Barry Doyle, ‘Urban Liberalism and the ‘Lost Generation’: politics and middle class 
culture in Norwich, 1900-1935’, Historical Journal, 38, 2 (1995), 617-634; David Dutton, 
A History of the Liberal Party (Basingstoke & New York, 2004); Keith Laybourn & Jack 
Reynolds, Liberalism and the Rise of Labour, 1890-1918 (New York, 1984); Ross 
McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party, 1910-1924 (Oxford, 1974); Ross McKibbin, 
The Ideologies of Class - Social Relations in Britain, 1880-1950 (Oxford, 1990); Henry 
Pelling, Popular Politics and Society in Late Victorian Britain, (London & Basingstoke, 
1979); David Powell, British Politics, 1910-35 - The Crisis of the Party System (Abingdon, 
2004); David Powell, ‘The Decline of the Liberal Party’, History Review (2009), 45-50; 
Michael Savage, The Dynamics of Working Class Politics - the Labour Movement in 
Preston (Cambridge, 1990); Geoffrey Trodd, ‘Political change and the working class in 
Blackburn and Burnley, 1880-1914’, Unpublished University of Lancaster Ph.D. thesis 
(1978). 
4 Laybourn, Liberalism and the Rise of Labour; McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour 
Party; Pelling, Popular Politics and Society; Powell, ‘The Decline’, 45. 
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electoral strength was held back by the narrow nature of the electoral 
franchise until 1918.5 This version of events is, however, challenged by 
other historians who point to the narrowness of seeing the Liberal party 
merely as the party of nonconformity. Peter Clarke, Duncan Tanner, Neil 
Blewett, Roy Douglas, David Powell and David Dutton have pointed to the 
Liberal party’s adaptation to class politics, even providing examples of 
Labour party weakness and decline in the period, and thus casting doubt on 
the idea that the franchise restriction held back Labour’s strength.6 These, 
and some other commentators, point to more gradual erosion of Liberal 
party support and a less uniform process of Labour party growth, with 
Liberal party working-class strength sometimes manifesting itself well into 
the inter-war period.7 Moreover, older political traditions have been shown 
to have survived the arrival of class politics, casting doubt on some of the 
electoral strength of class as a factor in electoral alignment and the extent of 
its contribution to Liberal party decline.8  
                                                          
5 Laybourn, Liberalism and the Rise of Labour; Henry Matthew, Ross McKibbin & J. A. 
Kay, ‘The franchise factor in the rise of the Labour party’, English Historical Review 91 
(1976), 723-752; McKibbin, The Evolution of the Labour Party; Pelling, Popular Politics 
and Society. These positions may well have drawn from Dangerfield’s earlier study in the 
suggestion that the Liberal party’s political strength was undermined before 1914; see 
Dangerfield, Strange Death.   
6 Peter Clarke, Lancashire and the New Liberalism (Cambridge, 1971); Duncan Tanner, 
Political Change and the Labour Party, 1900-1918 (Cambridge, 1990); Duncan Tanner, 
‘Election statistics and the rise of the Labour party, 1906-1931’, Historical Journal 34 
(1991), 893-908; Neil Blewett, The Peers, the Parties and the People: The General 
Elections of 1910 (London, 1972), pp. 408-9; Roy Douglas, ‘Labour in decline, 1910-1914’ 
cit. Kenneth Brown (ed.), Essays in Anti-Labour History: Responses to the Rise of Labour 
in Britain (London, 1974), p. 125; Powell, British Politics, pp. 3-4; Dutton, A History of the 
Liberal Party, p. 42. 
7 See David Butler and Donald Stokes, Political Change in Britain: Forces Shaping 
Electoral Choice (New York, 1969), p. 250; Michael Childs, ‘Labour Grows Up’: The 
Electoral System, Political Generations and British Politics, 1890-1929’, Twentieth Century 
British History 62 (1995), 123-145; D. H. Close, ‘The Realignment of the British Electorate 
in 1931’, History 67 (1982), 404; Cook, The Age of Alignment, pp. 340-343. 
8 For general coverage see Cook, The Age of Alignment, pp. 340-343. For pre-war examples 
refer to Geoffrey Bernstein, ‘Liberalism and the Progressive Alliance in the Constituencies, 
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Consideration of Liberal decline in relation to the Conservative party 
has taken a similar route, albeit largely focused on the period after the First 
World War. Research by McKibbin, Barry Doyle and David Jarvis, in 
particular, reveals the existence of a kind of ‘middle-class ideology’, in 
which the Conservative party forged an electoral cohort based on emphasis 
of protection of property rights, deflation and anti-collectivism.9 Such 
                                                          
1900-1914: Three Case Studies’, Historical Journal, 26 3 (1983), 617-640; David Clark, 
Colne Valley - From Radicalism to Socialism (London, 1981), p. 3, pp. 17-20, 154; 
Nicholas Cott, ‘Liberal and Labour politics in three Lancastrian towns: Burnley, Stockport 
and Warrington, c. 1905-1912’, Unpublished University of Liverpool M.A. (1997), pp. 8-
10, 57-69; David Howell, British Workers and the Independent Labour Party, 1888-1906 
(Manchester 1993), pp. 226-227; Laybourn, Liberalism and the Rise of Labour pp. 1-10, 
46, 81-88, 120-124, 148-168; Pat Thane, ‘Labour and local politics: radicalism, democracy 
and social reform 1880-1914’, cit. Eugenio Biagini & Alastair Reid (ed.), Currents of 
Radicalism: Popular Radicalism, Organised Labour and Party Politics in Britain, 1850-
1914 (Cambridge, 1991), p. 188; Joan Smith, ‘Labour tradition in Glasgow and Liverpool’, 
History Workshop Journal 17 (1984), 39; Trodd ‘Political change’, pp. 340-341, p. 363; 
Savage, The Dynamics of Working Class Politics, pp. 138-143, 151; Kenneth Wald, 
Crosses on the Ballet: Patterns of British Voter Alignment since 1885 (Guildford, 1983), 
pp. 211-213; P. J. Waller, Democracy and Sectarianism: a Political and Social History of 
Liverpool, 1868-1939 (Liverpool, 1981), pp. 199, 243. Other studies, such as Laybourn, 
Liberalism and the Rise of Labour pp. 1-10, 46, 81-88, 120-124, 148-168, and Tanner, 
Political Change, have been connected with the class argument, but these too acknowledge 
that there were some legacies of tradition. For the existence of traditional politics into the 
later post-war period see Chris Cook, ‘A Stranger Death of Liberal England’ in A. J. P. 
Taylor, Lloyd George: Twelve Essays (New York, 1971), pp. 287-316; Close ‘The 
realignment’, 393-404; A. Michael Dawson, ‘Politics in Devon and Cornwall, 1900-1931’, 
Unpublished University of London LSE Ph.D. thesis (1991), p. 2; A. Michael Dawson, 
‘Liberalism in Devon and Cornwall: ‘The old-time religion’’, Historical Journal 38 2 
(1995), 425-437; Garry Tregidga, The Liberal Party in South West Britain Since 1918 – 
Political Decline, Dormancy and Rebirth (Exeter, 2000).  
9 McKibbin, Ideologies; David Jarvis, ‘The shaping of Conservative electoral hegemony, 
1918-1939’, in Jon Lawrence and Miles Taylor (ed.), Party, State and Society: Electoral 
Behaviour in Britain Since 1820 (Aldershot, 1997), pp. 131-152; Barry M. Doyle, ‘A 
conflict of interest? The local and national dimensions of middle class Liberalism, 1900-
1935’, Parliamentary History (1998), 131-140; Doyle, ‘Urban Liberalism’, 617-634. Also 
see Andrew Thorpe, The British General Election of 1931 (Oxford, 1991) for confirmation 
 
 
7 
 
studies stress how this middle-class consciousness was partly a reaction 
against working-class identity consolidation and also concerns about Labour 
socialism. The Liberal party, it has been claimed, lost middle-class 
supporters because of this development, and therefore it provides a reason to 
help understand the eclipse of the party’s electoral fortunes in more 
predominantly middle-class areas with some history of Liberal party voting 
strength.10 However, as with the rise of the Labour party, this change has 
sometimes been seen as gradual and lacking in uniformity, and, importantly, 
a significant minority of middle-class former Liberal voters do not appear to 
have been particularly prone to identification with the Conservative party, 
even by the 1930s.11 Middle-class opinion has been shown to be rather 
varied in its party inclinations, with a significant proportion of it actually 
remaining with the Liberal party where the Liberals continued to be an 
important electoral force. As in the case of more predominantly working-
class areas this has been linked to the survival of older traditions of voter 
alignment, but perhaps not entirely, since the Liberal party appears to have 
been able to adapt itself to emphasis on specific middle-class concerns and 
delay, or even prevent decline, in relation to the Conservative party in some 
cases by so doing. 
The relationship of these debates to recruitment of Liberal politicians 
into the Conservative party is not clearly established in these studies but it is 
important to understand what links there might have been to such socio-
political and cultural developments since it seems nonsensical to suppose 
that recruits were isolated from them. With this mind the research of both 
W. L. Guttsman and Martin Wiener provide some potential possibilities. 
With regard to the idea of the consolidation of middle-class support 
behind the Conservative party, this has been shown to be paralleled in 
                                                          
of the rise of Conservative fortunes after 1929 being related to its purchase of the Liberal 
vote due to the emphasis on economy, which appealed to middle class tax-payers. 
10 Maurice Cowling, The Impact of Labour, 1920-1924 (London, 1971), pp. 415-429; Cook, 
The Age of Alignment, (London, 1975); Powell, British Politics, p. 7.  
11 Cook, ‘A Stranger Death of Liberal England’, pp. 287-316; Close ‘The realignment of 
the British electorate’, 393-404; Dawson ‘Liberalism in Devon and Cornwall’, 425-437; 
Tregidga, The Liberal Party.   
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Parliament with Guttsman’s detailed study of the social make-up of the 
House of Commons.12 He reveals that, after 1916, middle-class MPs tended 
to lean to the right with his examination revealing increasing representation 
of the middle-class professions and entrepreneurs amongst the Conservative 
party ranks. His research is a reminder of the retention of Liberal middle-
class interests in the Liberal party, with the shrinking party becoming more 
middle-class in its composition, not unlike its electoral base.13 The research 
might be used to confirm that there were effectively two bourgeois interest 
parties, and with both representing similar interests it is a means to account 
for why Liberals ended up in the Conservative party as the Conservative 
entitlement to represent these interests grew with Liberal party decline. 
However, whilst there may be some value in such perspectives, there are 
objections; indeed, it is not really clear that Guttsman’s research relates to 
the electoral issues of class much at all, since the research undertaken tends 
to link consolidation of the middle-class interest in the Conservative party 
with self-interested aspirations of higher social status rather than some 
ideology of middle-class values. It may be true that the decline of the 
Liberal party encouraged middle-class politicians to choose a party more 
likely to achieve better personal social standing, but this is a different 
argument.  
Further doubt is cast on middle-class ideological identification with 
the Conservative party when considering the research of Wiener.14 Wiener’s 
study of political culture shows that the Conservative party, even after 1918, 
was rather antagonistic to middle-class business interests, particularly due to 
representation of concerns in society about the excesses of capitalism, 
prejudices against industrialism, and ideals of a pre-industrial and landed 
aristocratic variety. Nonetheless, there is a class argument to consider, 
although one rather different to that which has been explored so far. Wiener 
                                                          
12 W. L. Guttsman, The British Political Elite, (London, 1968), p. 94. 
13 Guttsman, The British Political Elite, p. 97. Also see Wyburn-Powell, Defections, pp. 14-
16 whose own social profiling of Liberal MPs confirms this point.  
14 Martin J. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980, 2nd 
Edition (Cambridge, 2004), pp. 96-100, 127-154.  
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shows that businessmen – including Liberal ones – were keen to improve 
their social standing by assimilation into the social sphere of the older 
landed establishment by purchasing country estates, and becoming rentiers, 
so at least, in part, abandoning their trades, and perhaps also their political 
affiliations in support of a Conservative party more properly representative 
of their new interests. However, the situation was more complex since many 
retained business interests, becoming more as ‘gentlemen-industrialists’, as 
termed by Wiener, holding directorships but playing little role in company 
affairs outside the boardroom. A number of the Liberal recruits can be 
associated with this ‘gentlemanly’ approach to capitalism, and it may be that 
there was something about Conservative politics which made it attractive to 
such interests, not least the more managerial and technocratic approach to 
government that the party adopted, modelled, to a large degree, on 
boardroom management. This suggests that whilst ‘gentrification’ of some 
middle-class Liberals might have brought them closer to the Conservatives, 
it was not necessarily the traditional landed aspect that was central to it.  
 
Another series of issues relevant to the topic concerns the long-standing 
debate to do with the polarisation of ideological perspectives between left 
and right in politics. In the first instance, at least, this relates to issues 
discussed in narratives of Liberal politics, such as those of Trevor Wilson 
and Michael Freeden, and, to some extent, of also Paul Adelman, David 
Dutton and David Powell.15 Such studies consider the enormous tensions 
within the Liberal party from wartime and into the post-war period as 
division lines developed between interventionist and socialistic left-wing 
perspectives, on the one hand, and individualist and anti-socialist right-wing 
perspectives, on the other. They point, firstly, to Liberal party decline, due 
to the difficulties these divisions had in enabling the party to present a 
coherent electoral brand, and secondly, to disaffection and disillusion 
                                                          
15 Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914-1935 (London, 1966); Michael 
Freeden, Liberalism Divided – A Study of British Political Thought, 1914-1939 (Oxford, 
1986); Paul Adelman, The Decline of the Liberal Party, 1910-1931 (London & New York, 
1995); Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party, Powell, British Politics.  
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amongst the Liberal MPs, who eventually sought to join the Conservative 
and Labour parties when their party proved incapable of satisfying either 
ideological perspective.16  
This narrative is somewhat reflected in studies commenting on 
specific Liberals who wished to formulate closer relations with the 
Conservatives aimed at resisting socialism. Such Liberals were eventually 
recruited into the Conservative party when the Liberal party seemed to be 
aligning itself closer to the left from 1924 onwards due to support for the 
1924 Labour government, and pursuit of state-interventionist policies in the 
years following.17 However, there is only limited evidence; it can only really 
be gleaned from research concerning a handful of Liberal recruits. A reading 
of wider research, although still rather limited in detail, suggests that the 
pursuit of anti-socialist political ideas could be opportunistic, and even 
disingenuous. Anti-socialism emerges from the research appearing more 
like a form of political posturing to assist in offering a separate political 
position from Labour, where distinction was required, largely for electoral 
purposes, and particularly aimed at retaining the support of the middle-
classes at election time. These ideas gain credence when one considers 
research showing how Liberal recruits’ positions oscillated over time with 
anti-socialism only being one of a number of ways of appealing to the 
electorate, moving between various political positions, including total 
distinction from left and right politics, as well as leaning either to the left or 
                                                          
16 At this point also refer to Michael Bentley, ‘The Liberal Response to Socialism, 1918-29’ 
cit. Kenneth Brown (ed.), Essays in Anti-Labour History: Response to the Rise of Labour in 
Britain (London, 1974), pp. 42-73; Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party, p. 98; Vernon 
Bogdanor, ‘Historical Perspectives on the Liberal Democrats. The Liberal Democrat 
Dilemma in Historical Perspective’, The Political Quarterly 78 1 (2007), 11-20.  
17 Martin Gilbert, Churchill – A Life (London, 2000), p. 456; Henry Pelling, Winston 
Churchill (London, 1974), pp. 255-7, 287; Richard Toye, Lloyd George and Churchill – 
Rivals for Greatness (London, 2008), p. 245; Geoffrey M. Bayliss ‘The Outsider: Aspects 
of the Political Career of Alfred Mond, First Lord Melchett (1868-1930)’, Unpublished 
University of Wales Ph.D. thesis (1969), pp. 128, 577-580, 586; John Campbell, Lloyd 
George - The Goat in the Wilderness (London, 1977), pp. 99-101; Bentley, ‘The Liberal 
Response to Socialism’, p. 63.  
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right at different times.18 An appearance of distinction from left and right 
was a political position that continued into the 1930s, being evident even 
amongst recruits to the Liberal National party, with recent research showing 
that they were not particularly eager to position themselves close to the 
Conservative party, as has been claimed in past; indeed, they were 
conscious of the need to protect an independent Liberal position and were 
then rather an obstacle to any such development.19  
Overall, commitment to the new politics of the right was rather 
lacking amongst recruits; however, this is not to say that recruitment could 
not be linked to it in any way at all. It is appreciated that many Liberals who 
pursued anti-socialism were locked into constituency arrangements with 
Conservatives through electoral compacts, so it seems reasonable to suppose 
that this might have assisted in drawing some of them at least away from 
Liberal politics, especially where studies have pointed to enthusiasm in 
                                                          
18 Paul Addison, Churchill on the Home Front, 1900-1955 (London, 1992), p. 228; John 
Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory – A Political Biography (London, 1993), p. 385; 
Roy Jenkins, Churchill (London, 2001), p. 377; J. Graham Jones, ‘Sir Alfred Mond, 
Carmarthenshire and the Green Book’, Welsh History Review Vol. 19 3 (1999), 492; 
Michael Bentley, ‘Liberal Politics and the Grey Conspiracy of 1921’, Historical Journal 20 
2 (1977), 461-478; David Dutton, Simon – a Political Biography (London, 1992), pp. 63, 
85-90; Jonathan Wallace, ‘The political career of Walter Runciman. 1st Viscount Runciman 
of Doxford (1870-1949)’, Unpublished University of Newcastle Ph.D. thesis (1995), p. 
304, 310-314, 326-329; Wilson, The Downfall, pp. 321, 331, 346. 
19 Nicholas Cott, ‘Tory cuckoos in the Liberal nest? The case of the Liberal Nationals: a re-
evaluation’, Journal of Liberal Democrat History 25 (1999-2000), 24-31; Roy Douglas, 
The History of the Liberal Party, 1895-1970 (London, 1971), p. 253; David Dutton, 
‘William Mabane and Huddersfield Politics, 1931-47: ‘By Any Other Names a Liberal’’, 
Northern History XLIII 1 (2006), 131-133; David Dutton, ‘Liberal Nationalism and the 
decline of the British Liberal Party: Three Case Studies’ Canadian Journal of History 
(2007), 440-461; Dutton, Liberals in Schism (London, 2008); Graham Goodlad, 
‘Communications – The Liberal Nationals, 1931-1940: The Problems of a Party in 
‘Partnership Government’’, Historical Journal 38 1 (1995), 139; Robert Skidelsky, 
Politicians and the Slump: The Labour Government of 1929-1931 (London, 1967), p. 385; 
Wilson, The Downfall, pp. 380-381; Wyburn-Powell, Clement Davies, p. 53, Wyburn-
Powell, Defections, pp. 2, 149. 
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doing so.20 However, not all such Liberal recruits were enthusiasts and it 
does seem unsatisfactory to suggest that what, in the manner described in 
this sub-section of the chapter at least, amounted to a fairly superficial 
connection between Liberal and Conservative could, in itself, have 
contributed to changes of allegiance; thus, the relationship is one to 
investigate further.    
The difficulties in ideological explanations may be amongst the 
reasons why in Wyburn-Powell’s recent examination of recruitment pays 
little attention to ideologies in explanations, and from this perspective he 
may have a point. But such suggestions should not be used to entirely reject 
the possibility that recruitment could be linked to any form of political ideas 
and beliefs; some research does draw attention to possibilities which have 
not been much considered in this context but do seem valid. Amongst such 
possibilities is the research of Martin Pugh and Geoffrey Searle who have 
presented a potential philosophical or intellectual emphasis guiding political 
outlook in the later nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, which may 
have conditioned ideas about party. Their research points to patriotic, 
pragmatic and managerial approaches which assisted in informing attitudes 
towards policy matters and forging political identity. Some of the ideas at 
least link to the view of Wiener about the growth of interest in technocratic 
government, with the managerial emphasis noted appearing to share 
commonalities.21 Moreover, their perspectives point to negative views 
existing about the party system itself, with distaste for party tribalism and a 
conception of the virtues of inter-party cooperation.  
With regards to Pugh’s work, of interest is his reference to what he 
defines as the ‘centrist tradition’ which was characterised by a patriotic 
approach to defence, foreign affairs and imperial questions, and a pragmatic 
managerial approach to the general conducting of government, rooted in the 
politics of the latter part of the nineteenth century, but with on-going 
                                                          
20 Wyburn-Powell, Defections, pp. 98-111, 131-137. 
21 Wiener, English Culture, p. 96.  
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relevance into the twentieth.22 Pugh’s examination of this outlook brings 
him to a view that advocates of this type of politics were poor party 
loyalists, with a sense that it contributed to party indiscipline, and even 
schisms and defections. The discussion of these issues is rather lacking in 
broad assessment of the individuals involved, but Pugh does provide some 
useful material for consideration of Lloyd George and, perhaps of more 
direct interest to this study, Winston Churchill, whom he shows to be 
conditioned by these centrist attitudes, even going so far as to suggest that 
Churchill’s moves between the Conservative and Liberal parties related to 
this thinking. Thus, in this way, Pugh has begun to set out an intellectual 
rationale for recruitment of Liberals into the Conservative party, although a 
much broader assessment of a range of individuals is needed if general 
importance is to be attached to this research; obviously, one should not 
assume that one individual is representative of the wider body.23  
To some degree, the essence of Pugh’s perspective is duplicated in 
the research of Searle, with a similar patriotic, pragmatic and managerial 
perspective, often antagonistic towards party loyalties observed; but, in 
other regards, Searle’s study is different, chiefly in that he presents this 
perspective within a wider body of political thinking which aimed at the 
creation of a ‘National Government’ – a ‘quest’ for National Government, 
as he boldly puts it – involving politicians from all political parties who 
shared common views about how governmental affairs should be run.24 In 
terms of issues relevant to this study, Searle shows how some Liberals were 
amongst the most enthusiastic advocates of this type of politics influencing 
the direction of the Liberal party in terms of pre-war social policy, as it 
moved away from traditional Liberal partisan concerns, and in the national 
                                                          
22 Martin Pugh, ‘Left in the Centre? Lloyd George and the Centrist Tradition in British 
Politics’ in Judith Loades (ed.) The Life and Times of David Lloyd George (Bangor, 1991), 
pp. 17-27; Martin Pugh, Lloyd George (London & New York, 1988).  
23 Indeed; even Pugh himself has suggested that Churchill was an untypical recruit; see 
Martin Pugh, ‘Churchill’s Strange Brew’, History Today 61 5 (2011), 33-36.  
24 Geoffrey Searle, Country Before Party – Coalition and the Idea of ‘National 
Government’ in Modern Britain, 1885-1987 (London, 1995), pp. 53-63, 69-77, 103-104, 
121-127.  
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reconstruction of the post-war Coalition period. Building on the previous 
research of Robert Scally and Colin Matthew, Searle provides an intellectual 
basis for this political thinking, rooted in the patriotic and cross-party 
imperialist movements of the late nineteenth century, particularly ‘National 
Efficiency’ and ‘Liberal-Imperialism’, but remodelled for a twentieth 
century context.25  
Searle’s detection of the survival of attributes of an essential 
nineteenth century perspective has implications for this study. Part of the 
impetus for these original movements was fear of the stratification of 
electoral politics around the issue of class and the movement of parties to 
embrace it in the interests of mass democracy and electoral competition.26 
National interests needed to be properly represented with disdain for narrow 
party interests. Politicians sought to work across party to build coalitions of 
interest, whilst others – thinking here of those within the Liberal Unionist 
party which has been understood as connected to this perspective – sought 
to break away from political parties to work with others when their existing 
party was deemed to be negating the national concerns. This can all be 
compared to what Searle discusses about Liberal advocates of National 
Government in the twentieth century. They were less closely ‘Liberal’ in a 
narrow partisan sense, and more prepared to make arrangements with 
Conservatives when interests ‘above’ party politics could forge cooperation; 
it can be most clearly demonstrated in support for the ‘fusion’ of the Liberal 
and Conservative parties, widely debated between 1919 and 1922. 
Importantly, Searle reveals that there was actually a coming together of 
thinking between the two parties rather than a move of Liberals into the 
Conservative camp per se, with Conservative advocates of National 
Government, also not unlike in the nineteenth century, being committed to 
                                                          
25 H. C. G. Matthew, The Liberal Imperialists. The Ideas and Politics of a Post Gladstonian 
Elite (Oxford, 1973), pp. 102, 120, 166, 244; Robert Scally, The Origins of the Lloyd 
George Coalition: The Politics of Social Imperialism, 1900-1918 (Princeton, 1975), pp. 97, 
277, 347-349. 
26 Jonathan Parry, The Politics of Patriotism: English Liberalism, National Identity and 
Europe, 1830-1886 (Cambridge, 2006), pp. 101-102; Ian Cawood, The Liberal Unionist 
Party – A History (London & New York, 2010), pp. 242-252.  
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building cross-party consensus. Indeed, he seems to suggest that 
Conservatives and Liberals were creating fresh territory, somewhere 
between their two parties. All this has implications for understanding the 
position of Liberals leaving the party in order to work with the 
Conservatives, some of whom seem to have been likely sympathisers of the 
idea of National Government. However, there is a difficulty in drawing too 
many conclusions from Searle’s research given that beyond consideration of 
Lloyd George and Churchill, his research does not engage very closely with 
Liberal opinion, and so the specific possibility that some Liberal recruits 
were motivated by a definite desire for National Government is very under-
developed.27 Nonetheless, there are signs that Searle’s research may have 
relevance with other sources alluding to some of the same suggestions.28 
One of the chief studies, that of Powell, has drawn attention to the 
connection of such politics to the disruption of the party system and the new 
duopoly between Labour and the Conservatives; an implication is that if 
Liberal recruits widely pursued National Government this would reduce the 
possibility of them being seen as converts to a straightforward Conservative 
party cause.29  
There is also what might be described as more straightforward or 
immediate evidence of convergence of Liberal and Conservative politics 
from within the party system itself. This convergence can be demonstrated, 
even before the First World War, with actual benefit to the Liberal party, 
with research showing wide business interests, professional middle-class 
and former ‘progressive’ ‘One Nation’ Conservative opinion becoming 
attracted by a new Liberal agenda of imperialistic attitudes to foreign 
affairs, wide domestic reform through government intervention, protection 
                                                          
27 Searle, Country Before Party, pp. 120-127. 
28 Paul Readman, ‘The Liberal Party and Patriotism in Early Twentieth Century Britain’, 
Twentieth Century British History, Vol. 12 No. 3 (2001), 269-302; Addison, Churchill, pp. 
22, 53, 61, 88, 107, 202; Robert Rhodes James, Churchill: A Study in Failure 
(Harmondsworth, 1973), p. 40; Pelling, Churchill, pp. 70, 104-105, 141-142, 245; Michael 
Bentley, ‘Liberal Politics and the Grey Conspiracy’, 461-478; Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, 
pp. 310-314; Bayliss ‘The Outsider’, pp. 28, 70, 82, 273, 280, 299-302, 341.  
29 Powell, British Politics, pp. 193-198.  
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of economic interests, and avoidance of class politics.30 After the War, it can 
be seen that it was not dissimilar perspectives which drew Liberal 
politicians closer to the Conservatives, with the party’s move into similar 
political territory. Some research begins to draw attention to the relationship 
of these developments to changes of party, with a sense that what made the 
Liberal party attractive in the pre-war period now made the Conservative 
party similarly attractive in the post-war, with Liberals being recruited into 
the Conservative party.31  
In showing how political ideas brought Liberals into the political 
sphere of the Conservative party there is a critical figure in Stanley Baldwin. 
Much research concentrates on Baldwin’s ‘New Conservatism’ which 
appeared as a moderate ‘One Nation’ and even ‘liberal’ perspective, 
balancing economic and social interests at home to avoid class conflict, 
whilst offering a foreign policy outlook which was patriotic in its defence of 
empire.32 There are some interesting variants of perspective, with Wiener 
emphasising Baldwin’s favouring of regulation of the economy and industry 
to avoid the worst excesses of industrial capitalism.33 Robert Blake’s study 
takes a similar view, but characterises Baldwin’s policy as a nascent form of 
                                                          
30 Geoffrey Searle, ‘The Edwardian Liberal Party and Business’, English Historical Review, 
98 388 (1983), 29-60; Bayliss ‘The Outsider’, p. 45; Wallace ‘Walter Runciman’, p. 32; 
Martin Farr, Reginald McKenna – Financier Among Statesmen, 1863-1916 (New York & 
Abingdon, 2008), pp. 46, 72; Charmley, Churchill, p. 34; Gilbert, Churchill, pp. 144-184; 
Jenkins, Churchill, pp. 79-88; Pelling, Churchill, pp. 78-85; Keith Robbins, Churchill 
(London & New York, 1992), p. 33.   
31 Stuart Ball, ‘The Conservative Party, the Role of the State and the Politics of Protection, 
c. 1918-1932’, History 96 323 (2011), 280-303; Bayliss ‘The Outsider’, p. 591; Charmley, 
Churchill, p. 190; Dutton, Liberals in Schism, p. 44; Gilbert, Churchill, p. 463.  
32 Robert Blake, The Conservative Party – From Peel to Major (London, 1997), pp. 205-
229; Alan Clark, The Tories – Conservatives and the Nation-State, 1922-1997 (London, 
1998), pp. 31-91; Cawood, The Liberal Unionists, pp. 249-252; Robin Harris, The 
Conservatives – A History (London, 2011), pp. 291-325; John Ramsden, The Age of 
Balfour and Baldwin, 1902-1940 (London, 1978) pp. 118, 133, 186-206, 327; Philip 
Williamson, Stanley Baldwin (Cambridge, 1999), pp. 129, 167-171, 179, 182, 271; Wiener, 
English Culture, pp. 100-109. 
33 Wiener, English Culture, pp. 100-109. 
 
 
17 
 
‘interventionist capitalism’ in which added to economic control was an 
interest in social welfare provision.34 Thus, Wiener and Blake reveal a 
position immediate to contemporary concerns, with deterioration of faith in 
laissez faire and the desire for more state intervention featuring strongly in 
general views about reconstruction of the economy and society in the inter-
war years.  
In examination of the attraction of Baldwin emphasis has been 
placed on the underlying values which shaped his politics. Blake suggests 
that he embodied the views of the nation, confirming an impression that he 
was actually ‘above party’, representing higher ideals in politics.35 For Ian 
Cawood, Baldwin’s values were shaped by actual legacy of involvement of 
Conservative party’s with Liberals themselves during the period of their 
turn of the century alliance with the Liberal Unionists; Baldwin, he 
suggests, was personally taking forward a Liberal Unionist ethic of 
representing the ‘whole national community’.36 Perspectives about personal 
ethics are developed in detail by Philip Williamson, who examines a moral, 
ethical, democratic, and business-like underpinning which shaped Baldwin’s 
perspectives and imbued thinking behind his vision of Conservative 
politics.37  Williamson shows how he stressed the need for a managerial or 
technocratic approach to the running of political affairs, greatly influenced 
by his own professional business background, with emphasis placed in 
responding to a moral national interest as opposed to a narrow and unethical 
self-interest which he believed had crept into political affairs.38 He favoured 
a ‘social contract’: there were rights and responsibilities of people in the 
country towards the nation and the local community and the government 
had obligations to maintain sound finance whilst ensuring that there was 
sufficient social spending to assist the working-classes. The values can be 
seen to be quite middle-class in orientation, which may well have 
                                                          
34 Blake, Conservative Party, p. 229. Also see Ball, ‘Conservative Party’, 280-303. 
35 Blake, Conservative Party, p. 216. 
36 Cawood, The Liberal Unionist party, p. 259.  
37 Williamson, Baldwin, pp. 103, 170-171, 179-275. 
38 For the connection to technocracy also see Wiener, English Culture, p. 96. 
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strengthened influence over middle-class politicians, whilst his appeals to 
the national interest might have influenced politicians wanting some form of 
the idea of National Government, although Baldwin’s position seemed more 
to turn the Conservative party into a ‘national party’ rather than to build 
cross-party combinations. Moreover, Williamson’s discussion of values is 
set greatly in the context of the language used to describe them. He, not 
unlike a number of current historians, has put great emphasis on how 
language and rhetoric can be used to purchase influence and there may be 
some merit in suggesting that Baldwin’s successful remoulding of his party 
was not only because of values but also how they were articulated.39   
The research focusing on Baldwin does, however, risk exaggerating 
his appeal to Liberals; it can be seen that there were some constraints on his 
ability to purchase their support. Despite his close proximity to some of 
their values his perspective was quite alien to Liberals in certain ways, with 
research highlighting the more authoritarian, paternalistic and even 
traditional ‘Tory’ nature of aspects of his idea for social and economic 
intervention by the state.40 Furthermore, alongside Baldwin’s inclusive 
politics was a seemingly contradictory strategy to pursue anti-socialism as a 
means to appeal to ‘villa Tories’ and to crush the Liberal politics.41 Some of 
these issues may explain why studies point to recruits’ desire to retain their 
Liberal separateness, even as they appeared on a trajectory towards alliance 
with Conservatives, and this must be borne in mind in further assessment of 
Baldwin’s influence in this study.42   
 
One more area for consideration is the relationship of recruitment to factors 
within the Liberal party, particularly in terms of the influence of the party 
                                                          
39 Richard Toye & Julie Gottlieb (ed.), Making Reputations – Power, Persuasion and the 
Individual in Modern British Politics (New York, 2005); Williamson, Stanley Baldwin. 
40 Ball, ‘Conservative Party’, 285; Blake, Conservative Party, p. 229; Wiener, English 
Culture, pp. 98-101. 
41 Blake, Conservative Party, p. 229; Dutton, Liberals in Schism, pp. 63-64, 74; E. H. H. 
Green, Ideologies of Conservatism – Conservative Political Ideas in the Twentieth Century 
(Oxford, 2002), pp. 114-135.  
42 Especially see Dutton, Liberals in Schism, pp. 63-64, 74.  
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leadership and the policies. There has been a lot of assessment of the 
divisions in the Liberal party due to policy and as a result of the conflict 
between supporters of Lloyd George and Asquith, but in terms of how these 
issues affected political allegiance there is far less detail, with only Wyburn-
Powell’s study really providing a sense of wide understanding through 
comparative assessment of number of cases.43  
In the sources available, attention is drawn to Lloyd George as the 
most crucial factor. He emerges as a divisive figure, being central in the 
various party splits and he became widely reproached for his political 
conduct, both in his dealings with colleagues and in pursuit of his political 
interests.44 Research shows evidence that negative sentiment towards him 
created disaffection, some of which can be seen to relate to changes in party. 
In this regard, an obvious point lies in concern about Lloyd George’s move 
towards Labour and his adoption of more left-leaning policies and 
rhetoric.45 However, more significant was personal animosity which 
coloured views about him and involvement with the Liberal party. 
Sometimes animosity arose out of policy issues, particularly where 
disagreement appeared to see Lloyd George turn on those who were critical 
of him, with evidence of his attempts to suppress their influence within the 
party, which left them disillusioned; however, wider points emerge which 
                                                          
43 Michael Bentley, The Liberal Mind, 1914-1929 (Cambridge, 1977); George Bernstein, 
‘Yorkshire Liberalism during the First World War’, Historical Journal 32 (1) (1989), 107-
129; Dutton, A History of the Liberal Party, pp. 3, 68-98; Roy Douglas, ‘The background to 
the ‘Coupon’ election arrangements’, English Historical Review, 86, 339 (1971), 318-336; 
Michael Hart, ‘The decline of the Liberal Party in Parliament and in the constituencies’, 
Unpublished University of Oxford D.Phil. (1982); John Turner, British Politics and the 
Great War: Coalition and Conflict 1915-1918 (New Haven & London, 1992); Trevor 
Wilson, ‘The Coupon and the British General Election’, Journal of Modern History, 36, 
(1964), 28-42; Wilson, The Downfall, pp. 87, 149, 219, 323-328, 353-354; Wyburn-Powell, 
Defections, pp. 19-21.  
44 Wyburn-Powell, Defections, p. 193. 
45 Campbell, Lloyd George, pp. 23-25; Toye, Lloyd George and Churchill, p.245; Wyburn-
Powell, Defections, pp. 19, 105, 119.  
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relate more directly to feelings about his personal character.46 This was no 
more in evidence than in the use of his Political Fund, which eventually 
united some former Coalition allies and post-war Asquithian opponents in a 
similar negative perspective. It is clear from research that he was believed to 
be acting unethically in utilising the Fund to buy influence, which left other 
politicians uneasy in working with him. This lack of trust appears 
significant since it encouraged separation from Lloyd George’s leadership, 
including through internal factionalism and through joint arrangements with 
Conservatives.47 The exact role this distrust played in changes of allegiance 
is not altogether clear, but there is some indication that it played a direct 
part.48 This idea gathers credibility when considering evidence about the 
potential role of Baldwin.49 Baldwin was a figurehead of anti-Lloyd George 
feeling in the Conservative party, having emerged as an important critic in 
the Carlton Club revolt of 1922, and he consolidated his credentials 
thereafter with continued criticism of Lloyd George’s political methods. 
Baldwin had positioned himself a moderate and more ethical alternative to 
Lloyd George, and this must have gained attention from disaffected Liberals 
as well as Conservatives, and even assisted in drawing them out of the 
Liberal party, particularly those attracted by Baldwin’s wider brand of 
ethical politics, values and rhetoric.  
However, despite the evidence, there is a danger of reading too much 
into the role of Lloyd George. It is clear that he was not unpopular with all 
Liberal recruits and some sources have alluded to dissatisfaction in Asquith 
                                                          
46 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, p. 542; Campbell, Lloyd George, pp. 99-102, 128, 210;  Dutton, 
Simon, pp. 20-22, 230, 244-246; Dutton, Liberals in Schism, pp. 19-39; Campbell, Lloyd 
George, p. 210; Jones, ‘Sir Alfred Mond’, 501-504; Pelling, Churchill, pp. 265-266; 
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47 Dutton, Simon, pp. 66-81; Hart ‘The decline of the Liberal party’, p. 392; Wallace 
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also, due to his weak leadership and policy agenda, so Lloyd George cannot 
be seen as the sole leadership figure involved in disaffection of Liberals 
from their party.50 Furthermore, one has to be aware of other issues, separate 
from the leadership, to do with electoral pressures, personal circumstances 
and political ambition, which have all been mentioned in the discussion of 
recruits and the relationships they had with their party.51 Wyburn-Powell 
has perhaps produced the clearest assessment although there is plenty of 
scope for further consideration of these issues as the assessment still is not 
very detailed.52     
 
Overall, an underlying issue is that much of the research useful for 
understanding recruitment was not actually constructed with the specific 
aim of appreciating the reasons for it; a lot of what can be gleaned about it is 
secondary to some other purpose of the author’s enquiry. Such research 
helps to set recruitment in the context of the background of realignment, 
class politics and the ideas that shaped political perspectives and it often 
assists in understanding some of the recruits’ immediate motivations, but 
there are too many uncertainties about the nature of these issues and relying 
on the material alone would be unsatisfactory; specific and unambiguous 
comparative assessment of recruitment is needed if the phenomenon is to be 
understood properly.    
 With some of these points in mind one is drawn towards Wyburn-
Powell’s recent study. His most useful and unique contribution has been to 
establish particular types of politicians who were recruits to other parties, 
pointing to common cultural, social and occupational backgrounds. For 
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instance, Wyburn-Powell, in particular, notes the strong representation of 
minority religious groups, lawyers, businessmen, members of the armed 
forces, the wealthy and Eton-educated.53 All this is very significant, 
particularly when one considers the relationship of the general findings to 
the specifics of recruitment into the Conservative party in the period of this 
study, where it is shown that of the forty-five recruits he identifies who 
moved ‘rightward’ in the period of this study, there seems to be a clear 
connection between them and the wider number he assesses, so Liberal 
recruitment becomes one aspect of a wider social phenomenon in movement 
from the Liberal party.54  
Wyburn-Powell identifies a number of political characteristics 
associated with recruitment, largely to do with some of the ideas and 
internal Liberal party difficulties assessed in the chapter already. This 
assessment allows him to draw together particular sub-sets of recruits whose 
recruitment can be seen to relate to immediate circumstances which 
encouraged the change in party.55 Thus, he refers to ‘Bonar-Law supporters’ 
(those in favour of working with Conservatives but not with Lloyd George), 
then ‘Fusionists’ (followers of Lloyd George) who wanted fusion of the 
Liberal party with the Conservative party, ‘Constitutionalists’ (who wanted 
to avoid triangular political contests), ‘Lloyd George policy objectors’ (but 
not hostile to Lloyd George), ‘Protection Convert Industrialists (basically 
business people and technocrats), ‘Faux Fusionists’ (those who used joint 
Conservative and Liberal labels but were basically Conservatives), and 
finally, ‘Proto-Liberal Nationals’ (those objecting to working with Labour 
but distinct from those who were Liberal Nationals after 1933 when the 
Samuelites joined the Opposition in the Commons). One particular benefit 
of this categorisation is that it establishes a chronology of recruitment types 
through to the early 1930s with each type linked to a particular point of 
                                                          
53 Wyburn-Powell, Defections, pp. 6-19, 196. 
54 The figure of forty-five is not one emphasised by Wyburn-Powell, but one which 
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time. Also, intertwined with this categorisation, is some valuable 
commentary about personal circumstances, which perhaps sharpened the 
resolve to leave the Liberal party; here, bringing into play issues such as 
future prospects, electoral concerns and relationships with other Liberals 
already emphasised as motivating factors in this chapter.56   
 However, Wyburn-Powell’s assessment still leaves plenty of space 
for additional enquiry in this study and summarising these is important in 
completing the assessment in this chapter section. In general, there do seem 
to be gaps.57 One such gap is in assessment of the impact of social 
background on changes of party. Wyburn-Powell does try to justify why 
particular backgrounds, such as religious, professional, business and 
educational, assisted in encouraging changes in party, but whilst his 
perspective is relevant, it is rather speculative and lacking in detail. It is, of 
course, difficult to draw exact links between social background and party 
loyalties but he might well have had more success in sustaining a persuasive 
argument if, for example, he had tried to link his research to studies 
explaining social class and cultural associations to political parties.58 The 
various perspectives of Guttsman and Wiener, in particular, have shown that 
there are a number of factors about the influence of class on allegiance to 
political parties, and the absence of discussion of these leaves a clear sense 
that consideration of the social aspects of recruitment remains under-
developed. 
Furthermore, there only seems to be a partial assessment of factors 
which shaped recruitment, with an absence of consideration of the medium 
and longer-term features which shaped such developments. Absent is 
assessment of the relevance of issues such as ideology and beliefs, including 
the favouring of National Government and cross-party working, or 
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consideration of the impact of changes to the Conservative party, including 
under Baldwin’s leadership.  
 Wyburn-Powell has done much better in his assessment of the 
immediate issues.59 However, his general characterisation of the short-term 
motivations could be open to debate; for example, in the distinction he 
draws between Liberal Nationals pre- and post-1933 (due to continuities 
seen in Liberal National politics over time), in defining a grouping of Lloyd 
George policy objectors who were not personally hostile to him (when there 
is evidence that some of them were), and in his dismissal of the so-called 
Faux Fusionists as really Conservatives (in two of the cases other historians 
have suggested that they did not really have strong political opinions about 
any party at all).60 It is useful to provide a framework, but such a tightly-
defined one is too rigid and open to criticism; one is left wondering if a 
looser framework would have served better. 
Overall there is reason to question the characterisation of Liberal 
recruits as ‘defectors’; Wyburn-Powell defines ‘defection’ as ‘falling away 
from allegiance to a leader or party’.61 This may be the customary way to 
describe changes of party but it may not be the best one here. With some of 
the evidence collected in this chapter revealing a sense in which changes of 
party were conditioned by a variety of phenomena connected to the longer-
term realignment of politics, the use of the term seems rather problematic, 
and that is why in all the discussion in this chapter ‘recruit’ or ‘recruitment’ 
has been utilised; these alternative terms refer simply to the mechanics of 
the change rather than implying some kind of political discontinuity.  
 
II 
 
This investigation of Liberal recruitment into the Conservative party will 
examine a broad time-period, from c.1906 until 1935. The focus on this 
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period is significant in electoral terms, between the highpoint of Liberal 
ascendency, in 1906, and the early twentieth century nadir of the 1935 
election. It is a period of transition between the old Liberal and 
Conservative duopoly and the new Labour and Conservative duopoly which 
replaced it. It has previously been stated that the realignment of politics is of 
major significance to this study, so the focus of the time-period is justified 
in these terms. With regards to these dates, it is also important to emphasise 
that this period was one of crisis to the political system, with a series of 
challenges to its integrity, described by David Powell as the ‘crisis of 
adaptation’ as it struggled to accommodate social and political change and 
the impact of the First World War.62 One aspect of this crisis, for Powell, 
and one that can be accepted here, was the challenge posed by the survival 
of the Liberal party and the instability it created for the party system. It can 
be seen that Liberal recruits are important to consider in this context, since 
their political activities – including involvement in intra-party conflict and 
building relations with other parties – were aspects affecting the smooth 
functioning of the political system and the emergence of the new duopoly. 
Of course, these points need to be set in the context of recruits actually 
helping to confirm the eventual stability created by the new duopoly through 
their eventual more formal associations with the Conservatives, but the 
points reveal the number dimensions in which these recruits’ contributions 
to the politics can be viewed. 
 In emphasising the issues, it should be pointed out that the first 
twentieth century Liberal recruitments into the Conservative party did not 
actually occur until 1918 but the longer-term antecedents – not just in terms 
of connection to realignment – but also in the political careers of the recruits 
themselves can be seen in a decade or more before in the cases of those with 
long careers. The discussion will start even before 1906 in the cases of two 
Liberal recruits who originally started out as Conservatives, since it is useful 
to compare their previous experience of change in party with their later 
one.63  
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In investigation of the reasons for Liberal recruitment a particularly 
intelligent appreciation of the primary sources and how to utilise them is 
necessary. It could be very easy to neglect sources which offer a significant 
contribution to understanding of the topic, as a lot of the evidence available 
comes as records of personality, behaviour, intrigue, gossip, preoccupations, 
and values, recorded in various forms of personal correspondence or in 
accounts of meetings and speeches, which might not, at first glance, seem to 
provide the most accurate, robust, or dependable sources of evidence. 
However, such evidence is critical since it can record the underlying human 
sentiments associated with political disaffection and change of party; 
indeed, changes of party, are not just about particular events but are also 
connected to human interactions and behaviours that lie behind them. 
Moreover, there is a semantical emphasis used in the language which is of 
historical significance; as Williamson, Toye and others have made clear, it 
is often not so much what is said but how it is said that is important, and 
examination of the detail of the language will assist appreciation of the 
nuances of feelings or emotions.64 Furthermore, examination of language 
also assists the task of understanding particular influences of values or 
rhetoric; for instance, to assess the association with the rhetoric of Baldwin 
which Williamson mentions in the context of influencing positive 
perceptions of his Conservative politics and negative perceptions of Lloyd 
George.  
All this kind of evidence emerges strongly in collections of personal 
papers, including letters, diaries and journal entries, which are amongst the 
major primary sources for the investigation. Such sources contain invaluable 
informal or private thoughts to be shared amongst friends, family and 
various political contacts and there is much in this material to appreciate the 
position of Liberal recruits in their affiliation to political parties. For 
examination of many of the recruits there are surviving collections of 
personal papers, which, in some cases, are extremely comprehensive, 
providing substantial opportunities for recovering personal information 
                                                          
64 See above, pp. 16-17.  
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relevant to the topic.65 Such collections often provide substantial details 
about the major issues of concern to them in political affairs, relationships 
with other politicians, and their political affiliations over time; the fact the 
papers are so immediate and personal to the individual concerned often 
enables a high level of understanding of the underlying personality traits and 
values of the person, often reflected in the language of the correspondence. 
However, it is not only through these personal collections that 
understanding can be derived; collections of papers by people with both 
personal and political connections to the recruits are also significant; some 
of these papers are available as published collections of correspondence.66 
These papers are particularly important in providing evidence of how 
contemporary figures viewed the recruits, with important perspectives on 
their personalities and their political choices over time. Such sources are 
those often most rich in references to behaviour, gossip, intrigue, personal 
and political conflicts involving recruits, particularly where the evidence 
comes from private journals and diaries.  
Furthermore, in terms of more public sources there are records of 
speeches. Many of these can be found in surviving newspaper records and in 
House of Commons debates. Such records can be seen as particularly 
noteworthy in their recording of rhetoric, political values, ideas and 
electoral concerns. Political speeches are noted for their tendency to place 
on public record various messages about people and party, but they also 
contain unwitting testimony, particularly about underlying anxieties, such as 
electoral concerns. The evidence contained in these speeches is especially 
important in examination of some of the less prominent recruits or those 
                                                          
65 The most comprehensive and useful surviving personal collections include those of 
Churchill, Alfred Mond, Walter Runciman, and John Simon.  
66 Personal collections examined include the papers of Asquith, Balfour, Baldwin, Lloyd 
George, Herbert Samuel, Archibald Sinclair and Rufus Isaacs. There are helpful published 
collections of diary entries, journals and letters, such as those of Bonar Law, Baldwin, 
Violet Bonham Carter, Austen Chamberlain, Charles Hobhouse, Churchill, J. A. Pease, C. 
P. Scott, Lord Riddell, Asquith and Lloyd George. 
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with few or no surviving personal papers.67 Reliance on sources of speeches 
and other public records is, however, a disadvantage as they lack the deeper 
sophistication of private correspondence, and this means that some recruits 
emerge from the assessment seeming much less understood on a more 
personal level than other individuals who were regularly discussed in 
private communication.  
All these sources have other uses too, not least to assist in 
understanding chronology and narrative about recruitment but other sources 
need to be considered for appreciation of more factual issues. In this regard, 
newspapers and periodicals are critical. National newspapers, including The 
Times newspaper which is used substantially in this study, can be utilised to 
understand a wider narrative behind the circumstances in which Liberal 
recruits found themselves. The Liberal periodicals, including The Liberal 
Monthly, Liberal Magazine and Lloyd George Liberal Magazine, are 
particularly worth highlighting, since they provide detailed information 
about the party disputes and the connection of some of the recruits to them. 
They also discuss party allegiances, passing judgement on circumstances in 
which some of the Liberal recruits changed party. However, of course, such 
sources are not completely factual; these accounts can be highly partisan, 
selective, speculative and rich in political innuendo, which is a good means 
of understanding some of the politics around the events, but it means one 
should be cautious about making assumptions about their reliability.  
Specific reference should be made to the contribution of regional 
and local newspapers. They share some of the same benefits and drawbacks 
of their national equivalents, but they have a particular role in helping to 
uncover the circumstances affecting, in particular, some of the less 
prominent recruits. Local newspapers help to understand the dimensions of 
local electoral politics, such as local pressures which conditioned electoral 
                                                          
67 They have been particularly useful for assessment of the Liberals specifically examined 
in the overview chapter (see below, pp. 32-36 for explanation of the structure of the 
chapters) and in the chapters to specific individuals, most particularly Hilton Young; the 
chapter on him has more of less been entirely constructed with the use of these type of 
sources.   
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fortunes and shaped sentiments about political allegiances which lie below 
the radar of national issues. This unique function of local newspapers is 
particularly strong at election time, with a lot of information to be gleaned 
about the character of election campaigns, and, in particular, the 
relationships between Liberals and Conservatives.    
 Overall, there are, of course, limited opportunities for use of oral 
evidence in a study such as this, due to passage of time; nonetheless, this 
study has been fortunate in obtaining information from an interview with 
John Grigg, son of Edward Grigg, before his death in 2001. His son’s own 
interest in politics and history meant the responses obtained from the 
interview were particularly valuable, being rich in appreciation of 
understanding of the broader context of his father’s perspectives.68 Some of 
the evidence helps to provide a very personal dimension to the political 
outlook of his father.69 
 
Overall, the discussion will be constructed around a series of case studies of 
recruits aimed at best understanding the unique and collective experiences 
and how they link to Liberal decline and realignment in the period. Focus on 
case studies is important to understand the situations affecting Liberal 
recruits more personally and to avoid generalisations. In order to achieve a 
suitable assessment, the discussion will begin with a large overview chapter 
exploring in comparative form the major issues related to the topic, 
identifying, in particular, collective understanding of the nature of relations 
with other Liberals and Conservatives over time and also the way these 
recruits connected to the political system, particularly in terms of their 
involvement in political work in Parliament and local constituency politics. 
The chapter will examine some of the characteristics associated with 
                                                          
68 John Grigg was an historical author whose works have included a four-volume biography 
of Lloyd George left incomplete at his death. 
69 The only disadvantage was a tendency to try to portray an overtly positive impression, 
particularly in relation to his father’s imperialism and racial perspectives, shaped by service 
in the British Empire, including the governorship of Kenya. The desire to influence the 
perspective of the interviewer is, of course, one of the disadvantages of oral testimony 
generally.    
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recruitment, developing ideas about connections of social background and 
personality to recruitment. Subsequent chapters will focus on individuals, 
profiling some of the most significant recruits in detail. A benefit here is to 
ensure sufficient coverage of the important personal aspects to recruitment, 
with more emphasis here placed on the minutiae of individual 
circumstances, relationships to other politicians and personality 
characteristics.  
There are potential objections to this structure of the discussion, 
however. In presenting the case studies, one might normally expect each to 
be structured in a similar way, with chapter sub-sections dealing with 
similar issues or time-periods between the chapters. However, it has not 
been possible to present the chapters in this way due to the differences of 
chronology and issues in individuals’ involvement in politics and the timing 
of the change in political allegiance. Moreover, a more thematic approach to 
the whole structure might have been an alternative, focusing the discussion 
around major ideas or characteristics associated with recruitment as opposed 
to case studies of individual recruits. There are merits in thematic 
assessment and it is intended that the large overview chapter will highlight 
the main characteristics in more thematic form (with different sections 
examining the major characteristics or themes in recruitment), but the 
personal nature of some of the recruits’ situations means that there is a 
danger of neglecting unique circumstances without some specific profiling 
of individuals elsewhere. 
This study has taken a different approach to that of Wyburn-Powell 
in the character of its assessment and selection of case studies. Rather than 
seeking to examine briefly all the ‘rightward’ recruits, to ensure more in 
depth coverage, it focuses on a much smaller number, selected due to 
understanding of the chronology of recruitment, different sectional interests 
within the Liberal party, the desire to assess both major and minor figures, 
and the suitability of available evidence. Of the thirty-six recruits to the 
Conservative party, noted by Wyburn-Powell, this study focuses in on the 
cases of seven of them, with four of them being the subjects of specific 
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chapters.70 It will also examine a number of Liberal Nationals. Wyburn-
Powell’s account of these Liberals is, however, not straightforward; he does 
not refer to many of them in his table of ‘defectors’ because of his 
distinction between those who he suggests ‘deliberately’ broke from the 
Liberal party and those who did not.71 However, as it is disputable that there 
is any such clear distinction in the party ranks, this study will select from the 
full number. There were forty-six Liberal Nationals elected between 1931 
and 1935, according to the data of F. W. S. Craig, and this study will make 
reference to around ten of them in total, with two in detail.72     
It will be seen that this study concentrates some of its assessment on 
Liberal recruits involved in politics within the Northeast of England, 
particularly in the cases of Liberal Nationals; the reason for this was partly a 
practical one, as it had originally been intended that this study might have a 
discrete regional focus, but it suits the purposes of the study, as it has 
become, in helping understanding the issues from a local constituency 
perspective. It is important to make reference to local electoral campaigns to 
test out the influence of political ideas or electoral strategies, such as anti-
socialism.  
 
                                                          
70 For the full list, see Wyburn-Powell, Defections, p. 23. This study will examine the cases 
of Churchill, Hamar Greenwood, Edward Grigg, Frederick Guest, Alfred Mond, Hilton 
Young and Edward Spears, with some specific chapters looking discretely at Churchill, 
Guest, Mond and Young. The investigation will also focus upon Reginald McKenna, who 
did not formally join the Conservative but he was a close political friend of Baldwin’s in 
the years after the First World War.  
71 Wyburn-Powell identifies Sir John Simon, Sir Robert Hutchinson and Ernest Brown as 
his deliberate ‘defectors’ in 1931, and adds three others in the period between 1931 and 
1935 (Joseph Hunter, Joseph Maclay and George Morrison); see Wyburn-Powell, 
Defectors, pp. 9-10, 23-4, 149, 157-158.  
72 Some of the references are only brief ones. The ten are: Sir Robert Aske, Sir Godfrey 
Collins, Aaron Curry, John Dickie, Arthur Harbord, Leslie Hore-Belisha, Ian Macpherson, 
William McKeag, Walter Runciman and Simon. Runciman and Simon will be referred to in 
specific profile chapters. An eleventh is included in Robert Bernays, who was closely 
aligned to Baldwin, although he did not become a Liberal National until 1936; see Wyburn-
Powell, Defectors, p. 158.  
 
 
32 
 
In terms of how the investigation specifically examines the issues of 
recruitment, this is best summarised by providing an outline of the nature of 
the coverage in each chapter. It is also a possible place to provide additional 
reasoning for understanding the choice of case studies and to highlight some 
of the broad points raised through the research: 
Chapter One: The Liberal Recruits. This overview chapter in 
exploring the major characteristics, will begin with an examining the social 
and cultural issues, building on ideas discussed in research concerning the 
social profiling of recruits. It will then go on to consider the role of electoral 
pressures resulting from the politics of realignment, and the level of 
significance of ideas and beliefs, particularly in light of evidence of 
convergence of Liberal and Conservative thinking, and factors internal to 
the Liberal party to do with dissatisfaction about political direction and 
personal political influence.  
Efforts have been made in this chapter to ensure that the focus is not 
confined to high politics, with a particular emphasis on issues emerging 
from constituencies and on lesser-known individuals.73 In achieving this 
broader assessment prominence had been given to examination of Hamar 
Greenwood, Edward Grigg and Edward Spears as recruits to the 
Conservatives, and a number of Liberal Nationals including Sir Robert 
Aske, Sir Godfrey Collins, Aaron Curry, John Dickie, Arthur Harbord, 
Leslie Hore-Belisha, Ian Macpherson and William McKeag. It has also been 
an opportunity to profile Reginald McKenna, whose political friendship 
with Baldwin eventually brought him into the Conservative political camp. 
In terms of some of the broad findings of the chapter, it will be 
shown that much of the decision-making about party was a reaction to 
circumstance, particularly in the  convergence of Liberal and Conservative 
party ideas and in the need to address local electoral pressures, with national 
and constituency dimensions both playing a role here. A clear sense of 
                                                          
73 Due to the nature of the chapter as an overview of the issues it will be seen that it is 
sometimes necessarily to allude to some of the case studies’ experiences too as it is difficult 
to isolate them from aspects of the issues being discussed, although detail will be left to the 
case study chapters. 
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public duty will be revealed, showing some relevance of tendencies towards 
patriotism in decision-making, as well as acceptance of the necessity for a 
bloc of opinion to be assembled with Conservatives and Liberals working 
together, as promoted by Baldwin. Some Liberals can be shown to have 
possessed long-term support for the idea of a national government, with 
closer arrangements with the Conservatives actually being seen as perfectly 
consistent with Liberal politics. Decisions were also influenced by 
perceptions of the Liberal party, not just electorally, but also due to 
sentiments about the leadership of the party, with a definite sense that Lloyd 
George pushed Liberals out. Personal prospects were also clearly important 
for more prominent Liberals who were frustrated by missing out on 
positions of influence at a high political level. 
The relevance of a reaction to political events as an explanation is 
confirmed by assessment of a number of issues which have been seen to 
have caused Liberals to reassess political loyalties over time. The specific 
factors can broadly be seen to be:  
 Pre-War controversies over social reform and military spending 
and political quarrels within the Cabinet;  
 The wartime split between Asquith and Lloyd George, and the 
political fallout of the ‘coupon’ election arrangements of 1918; 
 Post-War flirtation with Conservatives and conceptions of 
‘fusion’ between elements of both parties until 1923, which left a 
legacy of good relations between some Liberals and 
Conservatives; 
 The decision to vote Labour into office in 1924 which positioned 
the Liberal party close to Labour and went against the spirit of 
some Liberal constituency election promises;  
 Post-1924 concessions to socialism in terms of Liberal policies 
on land and the General Strike and particular conflict with Lloyd 
George over these issues; 
 The morality of Lloyd George’s Political Fund and controversy 
of the election debacle of 1924, where the Liberal rout was 
blamed, by some, on Lloyd George; 
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 For his allies, the retirement of Asquith from politics in 1926 
(and death in 1928), removing a link with a by-gone era of 
Liberal party strength and leaving Lloyd George as de facto 
Liberal chief; 
 The perceived ineffectiveness and unprincipled behaviour of the 
leadership of the Liberal party in Parliament, 1929-1930, and 
perceived weakness of Liberalism in the country, leading to 
discussion of pacts with the Conservative party and intended 
resignations at the next election;  
 The impact of the onset of the National Government in 1931;  
 The ‘crossing of the floor’ of the Samuelite Liberals and the 
effective isolation of the Liberal Nationals from what might be 
described imperfectly as the Liberal ‘mainstream’.   
Not all of these issues were directly related to specific departures from the 
party, but reactions point to a sense that a series of issues over time 
challenged continuing involvement with the Liberal party. The point is 
perhaps best illustrated with reference to Liberals with very long political 
careers who faced a series of challenges to their involvement in Liberal 
politics over time which gradually eroded their sense of belonging to the 
Liberal party.   
 Another point emerges in that a number of the individuals concerned 
were quite single-minded, disliked and ill-suited to involvement in party 
activity, witnessed through public disagreements over policy and tendencies 
towards oppositional tactics and sectional partisanship. This is quite an 
important factor to develop further since it confirms the existence of a 
personality type, which was prone to party disloyalty.  
Chapter Two: Winston Churchill. Churchill is the most scrutinised 
British politician of the twentieth century and much about his involvement 
in British politics is well known, but the circumstances of his decision-
making about where his political allegiances should lie have not been 
thoroughly considered. There are strong practical grounds for the selection 
of Churchill for specific investigation concerning the massive amount of 
personal correspondence contained in the Chartwell Trust collection as well 
 
 
35 
 
as material in a range of other collections of manuscripts, diaries and 
journals.  
Overall the chapter will build on views that Churchill’s commitment 
to the Liberal party was lacking in partisan sentiment and it was clear that 
he viewed it more as a vehicle to pursue his ‘One Nation’ and imperialist 
type of politics. Churchill felt strongly that the Liberal party in the post-war 
period should define a course which meant closer working arrangements 
with Conservatives, and it was the realisation that this would not happen 
which caused disenchantment with his chief ally, Lloyd George, and the 
party as a whole; nonetheless, he did not desert Liberals who shared his 
perspective and sought to work to secure an arrangement to enable them to 
survive with a separate identity within the Conservative party. Churchill’s 
ambition was also an important factor in changes in party, and he had 
always sought to identify positions which would give him most influence; 
over a long period of time he had seen his ambitions thwarted within the 
Liberal party. The tensions in this respect can be traced back even to his 
earlier career, with many controversies involving Churchill being identified 
in his pre-war positions on social and military expenditure. 
Chapter Three: Alfred Mond. Given his public stature and the 
importance of Mond to Liberal politics, his contribution to a study such as 
this can be seen to be highly relevant. There has been very little 
consideration of Mond as a figure in political history, despite his 
significance in British politics, and there is plenty of scope for additional 
enquiry to consider his political allegiances and his place in the politics of 
realignment. A range of primary sources exist. Of greatest importance is 
Mond’s collection of personal papers which are particularly useful for the 
period immediately adjacent to his departure from the Liberal party 
(archived at the British Museum). Other collections are also important; 
Mond was a regular correspondent with key political associates, chiefly 
David Lloyd George and Sir Rufus Isaacs (Lord Reading), so much about 
his politics can be yielded from the Lloyd George and Reading papers. 
Mond was an industrialist and a keen supporter of the imperialistic 
and technocratic approach to government of Lloyd George, but after the fall 
of the Coalition Mond became disillusioned with him. By 1924 he was in 
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disagreement over land policy, which eventually led him to resign from the 
party. Mond’s recruitment into the Conservative party can partly be seen in 
the context of this, but there is evidence which points to his self-interest in 
negotiations for a peerage. It is interesting that Mond would have joined the 
Conservative party since he was one of the main proponents of Liberal 
reunion in 1923, and had been quite antagonistic towards Conservatives, 
despite collusion with them at a constituency level. 
Chapter Four: Hilton Young / Chapter Five: Frederick Guest. These 
chapters focus on two less scrutinised politicians, but ones who are 
particularly important in profiling recruits to the Conservative party. 
Unfortunately, neither Young nor Guest has left extensive collections of 
papers, although there are a range of references to them in other collections. 
Young produced a collection of memoirs which although not providing 
much to help to appreciate his party allegiance do inform some 
understanding of his character.  
Young was a journalist by training, and amongst those professionals 
attracted by the ‘new’ Liberal politics of the Edwardian period, but he did 
not get elected until 1915. The War left him with a sense of patriotism, and 
following it, he fell in with Lloyd George, perhaps to support a leader who 
seemed to best represent the post-war patriotic forces in the country as 
opposed to his championing of Liberal politics. Young lost his seat in 1923, 
but he returned to Parliament in 1924 with Conservative support, following 
his pledge to support a Baldwin Government. Disagreement over policy 
direction, largely resulting from the compromise with the Conservatives, led 
to his resignation from the Liberal party in 1926, and a few months later he 
joined the Conservative party. 
Research shows that Guest, not unlike his cousin, Winston 
Churchill, had joined the Liberal party amid the controversy over tariff 
reform. He supported Lloyd George, becoming his chief whip under the 
Coalition, and became embroiled in both the intra-party troubles, 
particularly concerning the ‘sale of honours’ and the establishment of the 
controversial Political Fund, and inter-party negotiations with the 
Conservatives. During the Coalition years, he was an advocate of ‘fusion’ 
between the Conservative and Liberal parties, pledging support to Bonar 
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Law as well as to Lloyd George. Following Liberal reunion Guest became 
dissatisfied with Liberal party policy, arguing for closer working relations 
with the Conservatives in opposing socialism. After 1924, he worked in 
opposition to the Liberal leadership by offering general support for 
Baldwin’s government. The latter position was damaging to his prospects as 
a Liberal MP and, consequently, he was deposed as an ‘official’ Liberal 
candidate in his constituency. Following his exclusion from Liberal politics, 
Guest indicated his intention to join the Conservative party, seemingly 
because his desire to secure a plural Liberal and Conservative union had 
been thwarted.  
Chapter Six: John Simon. Simon is the first of two detailed case 
studies of recruits to the Liberal National party. 
The sources for consideration of the political career of Simon are 
extensive. A large collection of personal papers exists and there are also 
useful references to Simon in collections of other politicians, which give 
real insight into events and Simon’s character. His autobiography is useful 
in appreciating his motivation although there are particular signs of 
embellishment conditioned by the passing of time. Surprisingly perhaps, 
there have been few political studies of Simon, with only one 
comprehensive political biography (that of Dutton) available.  
Research shows that Simon’s position in Liberal politics had been 
one of falling too far between different sections of the party to be clearly 
identified with any individuals or factions, which left him seeming rather a 
detached figure for much of his career. Despite rapid promotion in the pre-
war period, his career stalled as wartime choices and difficulties in being re-
elected to Parliament after 1918 prevented him from gaining the political 
influence he sought until he became leader of the Liberal National grouping 
in 1931. Simon held very difficult relations with Lloyd George, due to the 
sense that he stood in the way of his political progression to high office. His 
difficulties did not make him a supporter of Asquith. He was more of a ‘free 
agent’, showing little inclination towards partisan Asquithian resistance to 
Lloyd George. Simon had been opposed to inter party cooperation with the 
Conservatives, but his emphasis on constitutional interests, largely due to 
his legal background in the mid-1920s, saw some links develop to Baldwin. 
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Simon was not well-liked by parliamentarians generally, as he was regarded 
as too nakedly ambitious and disingenuous; this did not encourage support 
from the Conservatives or Liberals, and even in the period after the creation 
of the National Government he struggled to motivate support amongst 
members of his own Liberal National grouping.  
Chapter 7: Walter Runciman. A second important case study of a 
Liberal recruit to the Liberal National party is Walter Runciman. 
There is a doctoral thesis which provides a detailed general 
assessment of Runciman’s career as a whole (by Jonathan Wallace), with 
some good coverage of his political outlook. However, there is still much to 
do in understanding the detail of his political perspective, and to appreciate 
it within the framework of the politics of realignment. Primary sources for 
Runciman’s politics are substantial. A huge collection of correspondence 
has been deposited in the Robinson Library, Special Collections (Newcastle 
upon Tyne). There is much commentary on Runciman in journals and 
diaries which helps considerably to build appreciation of his personality. 
Runciman’s significance for this study lies in his wide-ranging 
career in Liberal politics, having spent over thirty years in active political 
involvement by the 1930s, and helping to shape the fortunes of the Liberal 
party through that period. Important was his prominent role in the resistance 
to Lloyd George and the means in which he tried to circumvent his 
influence through internal party mechanisms, and his periodic desire to 
work with figures outside the Liberal party, eventually leading him into 
good relations with Ramsay MacDonald and to be a key member of the 
National Government. Runciman was a shipping magnate and MacDonald’s 
technocratic perspective mirrored his desire for a non-partisan business-like 
approach to government. Research demonstrates that Runciman showed 
very little interest in working with the Conservative party as a discrete 
political body, despite attractions to individual Conservatives, and this 
prevented a movement into a Conservative-dominated political circle until 
well into the 1930s. In the 1920s, it seemed that Runciman, not unlike 
Simon, had ambitions to lead the Liberal party, and some confidence in this 
respect possibly prevented a serious look at removing himself from Liberal 
politics altogether.  
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Runciman was very significant for the early years of the National 
Government, being an important architect of the system of Protectionism 
which was introduced; for him, Protection remained a short-term tactic, and 
he saw his role as a constraint on Conservative inclination towards more 
tariff barriers, so his was a liberalising influence on the government.  
Conclusion: The conclusion will consolidate understanding of the 
general arguments from the substantive opening chapter and unique insights 
determined from the case studies. Above all, it will place the central issues 
in the context of realignment of politics, revealing that Liberals’ change in 
party was affected by the challenges facing the party system in a period of 
political and electoral change with the arrival of class politics and the 
weakening electoral position of the Liberal party; Liberal recruits, it will be 
shown tried to adapt themselves to new political circumstances but, in so 
doing, were brought closer to the Conservative party.  
One factor to be drawn out will be to show that party boundaries 
were not static and political thinking and events pushed politicians between 
parties and into other ones when circumstances made this favourable; hence, 
the Liberals assessed in this study will be shown to be not completely 
wedded to party structures and organisations but rather more keen to 
develop alternative structures and join with Conservative organisation when 
circumstances made this appropriate. Despite a large number of Liberals 
moving into Conservative circles, often because of the influence of 
Baldwin, it will be concluded that there was not necessarily a great 
movement of opinion towards a recognisable Conservative perspective or 
intention to cooperate with Conservatives permanently, with decisions 
conditioned by immediate circumstances. Nevertheless, some Liberals 
conceived of politics without an independent Liberal party, sometimes 
based on views held over many years connected to a legacy of Victorian 
approach to non-partisanship which continued to hold influence, albeit 
reconstituted for a different political age.  
There will be a few conclusions drawn about the relevance of 
internal politics. The evidence of Lloyd George’s central role in 
destabilising involvement of Liberals within their party needs to be set 
against other evidence in assessment of personal gain in changing party; 
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Liberals whose ambitions for office and political influence were uncertain 
had the capacity to act self-interestedly, irrespective of Lloyd George’s 
supposed offences. In certain cases, there was enticement to join the 
Conservative party by Conservatives who flattered recruits’ egos.  
The conclusion will return to some of the methodological issues, 
pointing out, in particular, the overall utility of the case study approach in 
yielding important understanding of both collective and unique issues in 
political recruitment. It will be considered that utilising it has contributed to 
much better understanding of the place of recruitment in an understanding 
of Liberal party decline and general realignment of politics. There will also 
be points made about the good fortune in the availability of evidence, with 
approaches to assessment of it, including from the point of view of 
examination of messages in the language, being seen to be particularly 
significant in being able to draw out important ideas and arguments. 
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Chapter One: The Liberal Recruits 
 
 
An important starting place in examining Liberal recruitment is with 
consideration of the collective social and cultural profiles of Liberal recruits 
as these provide some context for appreciation of political allegiances. In 
assessment, what emerges is strong representation of the middle-classes.1 
This middle-class contingent consisted of businessmen, such as the 
industrialist, Alfred Mond, Walter Runciman, son of a shipping magnate, 
and also Godfrey Collins, a publisher.2 There were also other professionals, 
with trained lawyers, in particular, seeming well represented. John Simon 
was perhaps the most recognisable, but added to this were Ian Macpherson, 
Geoffrey Shakespeare, Leslie Hore-Belisha, Clement Davies, Hamar 
Greenwood and Reginald McKenna.3 Other professionals within this group 
included Edward Grigg, whose substantive career was in colonial 
administration, and Hilton Young, a distinguished journalist.4  
                                                          
1 W. L. Guttsman, The British Political Elite (London, 1968), pp. 88-92, 94-97, 169-189; 
Martin J. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980 
(Cambridge 2004), pp. 96-154; Alun Wyburn-Powell, Defections and the Liberal Party, 
1910-2010 (Manchester & New York, 2012), pp. 13-19. 
2 Frank Greenaway, ‘Mond family’, www.oxforddnb.com (accessed 11 August 2011); 
Martin Pugh, ‘Runciman, Walter’, www.oxforddnb.com (accessed 7 April 2009); Morrice 
McCrae, ‘Collins, Sir Godfrey Pattison’, www.oxforddnb.com  (accessed 5 March 2010). 
Collins was a founder of the Collins publishing enterprise. Runciman played a role in his 
father’s firm before going into politics.  
3 David Dutton, Simon – A Political Biography of Sir John Simon (London, 1992), p. 9; G. 
A. Waters, ‘Macpherson, (James) Ian’, rev. Marc Brodie, www.oxforddnb.com (accessed 5 
March 2010); Mark Pottle, ‘Shakespeare, Sir Geoffrey Hithersay’, www.oxforddnb.com 
(accessed 5 March 2010); Keith Robbins, ‘Belisha, (Isaac) Leslie Hore-Belisha’, 
www.oxforddnb.com (accessed 5 March 2010); Alun Wyburn-Powell, Clement Davies – 
Liberal Leader (London, 2003); Martin F. Seedorf, ‘Greenwood, Hamar,’ 
www.oxforddnb.com (accessed 18 June, 2009); Don Cregier, ‘McKenna, Reginald’, 
www.oxforddnb.com (accessed 18 June 2009).  
4 Wayland Kennet, ‘Young, (Edward) Hilton’, www.oxforddnb.com (accessed 12 March 
2010). He had been on the editorial team of both The Morning Post and The Economist 
before military pursuits and his election to Parliament; Kenneth Rose, ‘Grigg, Edward 
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 The recruits were often associated with religious and other minority 
groups in society. Both Mond and Edward Spears (formerly ‘Spiers’) were 
of Jewish-German émigré stock, whilst Leslie Hore-Belisha was a Sephardic 
Jew.5 There were a number of nonconformists including Runciman, who 
was a Wesleyan Methodist, Simon, who was the son of a Welsh 
Congregationalist minister, Shakespeare, who was the son of a Baptist 
minister, Clement Davies, and McKenna, who became a Congregationalist, 
following a conversion from Catholicism.6 The presence of nonconformists 
is significant since it shows that recruitment affected the Liberal party’s 
activist core, with such politicians having formed part of the backbone of 
traditional Liberal support.  
In one sense, it is not very surprising that representation came from 
such Liberals as the post-war Liberal party has been characterised by its 
middle-class professionals and minority groups, but it does seem to point to 
the relevance of the findings of Guttsman and Wiener in relation to the 
reasons for Liberal recruitment to do with the desire to improve social 
standing and because of common ideas and values.7 In relation to social 
standing, certainly some of these Liberals would have needed to overcome 
social prejudice – on account of race, religion and occupational background 
– to be accepted by a political elite still dominated by land-owning 
patricians. It is hard to gauge the extent to which any sense of social 
inferiority shaped changes of party allegiances directly, but there are 
indications it may have done where politicians seemed very aware of their 
standing, such as in the cases of three of the recruits of Jewish origin; 
indeed, it is well-known that Jews were widely discriminated against in elite 
                                                          
William Macleay’, www.oxforddnb.com (accessed 19 June 2009). Grigg had started out as 
a journalist working for The Times. He eventually became Governor of Kenya.  
5 For Spears see Max Egremont, ‘Spears, Sir Edward Louis’, www.oxforddnb.com 
(accessed 12 March 2010). 
6 On Shakespeare also see Barry M. Doyle, Urban Liberalism and the ‘Lost Generation’: 
Politics and Middle-Class Culture in Norwich, 1900-1935, Historical Journal 38 2 (1995), 
631.  
7 Guttsman, The British Political Elite, pp. 88-92, 94-97, 169-189; Wiener, English Culture, 
pp. 96-154. 
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social and political circles in the period.8 For instance, Spears had changed 
the spelling of his name to win social acceptance, and whilst this was not 
anything to do with party affiliations per se it does raise possibilities that 
someone who would do this might conceivably change party allegiance for 
similar reasons. There was also Hore-Belisha. David Dutton claims that he 
was not at all interested in political parties, simply seeing them as ‘a way of 
getting things done while furthering his own interests and ambitions’, which 
might provide evidence of his desire to move between parties to increase his 
standing.9 And finally, there was also Mond; he accepted Baldwin’s 
nomination for a peerage, in part to gain acceptability at an elite level.10    
In relation to the second point about ideas and values, there was 
certainly a possibility that middle-class Liberal recruits were influenced in 
their political affiliations by the shift in focus of the Conservative party, 
especially under Baldwin, to emphasise business ethics and interests, 
particularly the emphasis on technocratic and managerial approaches to 
governmental affairs, the protection of financial interests and moderate 
social reform which kept taxes low whilst at the same time conciliating the 
working-class with the intention to stem the rise of socialism.11 Liberal 
recruits often emphasised these same points, which suggests that they, not 
unlike the middle-class electorate as a whole, were being drawn towards 
Baldwin’s middle-class agenda, particularly as the Conservative party 
seemed able to represent these values more effectively than the Liberal 
party. It certainly creates a context for Liberal and Conservative joint 
working and, in some cases, even the movement out of the Liberal party 
completely.  
                                                          
8 For confirmation see Wiener, English Culture, p. 107. A trawl through a range of private 
contemporary correspondence, some of which will be mentioned later in this thesis, can 
also illustrate this point.  
9 The implications of Dutton’s points are much wider than just in terms of social standing 
but they do help to illustrate the point. See David Dutton, ‘A Liberal without a Home: the 
Later Career of Leslie Hore-Belisha’, Journal of Liberal History 65 (2009-10), 28.  
10 This was only part of the reasoning, of course. However, for the circumstances around 
Mond’s peerage and discrimination against him due to his race see below, pp. 124-153.  
11 See above, pp. 3-18.  
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It is useful to speculate as to the relationship of these developments 
in middle-class thinking to the characteristics of the nonconformist Liberals 
who became linked to Conservatives. There were traditional distinctions of 
this group from Conservatives, but in the post-war situation some of the 
values being espoused by the Conservative party in representation of 
middle-class interests, must not have seemed too far removed from those of 
nonconformist Liberals, particularly in emphasis of fiscal restraint and self-
help and this may partly account for the development.12 It is useful to note, 
however, that a number of such Liberals became Liberal Nationals rather 
than Conservatives, which suggests that their older associations were not 
entirely put aside when it came to their choices about their party affiliations; 
being Liberal Nationals illustrated continuing awareness of their 
separateness from Conservatives.   
Another characteristic of Liberal recruits was the tendency for them 
to possess close connections to the established social and political elite. In 
terms of education, Churchill, the Guests, Grigg, Shakespeare and Simon 
were all educated privately, and then there were those who held Oxbridge 
degrees (including Robert Bernays, Grigg, McKenna, Runciman, 
Shakespeare and Simon). There were also those with professional or 
vocational connections to the elite, including Grigg, with his background in 
colonial administration, or though military service, such as Grigg again (a 
Grenadier guard), Winston Churchill, Frederick Guest and Edward Spears 
(army officers), Collins (a Lieutenant-Colonel) and Young (a decorated 
naval reservist). Churchill and the Guests were perhaps distinctive, being 
from aristocratic and landed patrician backgrounds, and, of course, having 
previously been Conservatives, but their presence affirms the relevance of 
the characteristic.13 Involvement with the elite no doubt manifested itself in 
conditioning in cultural values, namely patriotism, with the desire to offer 
service to the nation and to promote and safeguard the interests of the 
                                                          
12 Stephen Koss, ‘Wesleyanism and Empire’, Historical Journal, 18 1 (1975), 105-118.  
13 By ‘the Guests’ the reference is to Frederick and Oscar who are both mentioned in 
Wyburn-Powell, Defections, pp. 98-100.  
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empire.14 On a political level, the implications were towards seeking 
alignment with others of a similar mind, which accounts for the emphasis on 
cross-party working  to defend the patriotic interests ‘above party’ and the 
desire for alignment with a party that emphasised and articulated these 
values most ardently, which in the period after the War, at least, was the 
Conservative party.15 There were a number of recruits whose major 
motivations included patriotism and loyalty to the empire, no doubt 
influenced by such elitist connections (definitely in the cases of Churchill, 
Guest, Grigg, Young and Runciman, it can be shown). However, 
involvement in parliamentary politics itself is of significance since it 
enabled politicians, with access to political institutions and the centres of 
constitutional power, to become imbued with the culture and values of the 
elite, irrespective of their previous background.16 This may explain why 
such values seem significant in political affiliations of Liberal recruits on a 
more general level as opposed to those with past close social connections to 
the elite.  
                                                          
14 There is discussion in empire history about the influence of empire on cultural thinking at 
an elite level, which provides a useful context; in particular see David Cannadine, 
Ornamentalism – How the British Saw Their Empire (London, 2001); Bernard Porter, The 
Absent-Minded Imperialists, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 2004); Peter Marshall, The 
Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire (Cambridge, 1996); Edward Said, 
Orientalism, Vintage Books (New York, 1979); Edward Said, Culture and Imperialism, 
Vintage Books (New York, 1993).     
15 See above, pp. 10-12. Also see Stuart Ball, ‘The Conservative Party, the Role of the State 
and the Politics of Protection, c. 1918-1932’, History 96 323 (2011), 292; Robert Blake, 
The Conservative Party – From Peel to Major (London, 1997), pp. 110, 121-122; Alan 
Clark, The Tories – Conservatives and the Nation State, 1922-1997 (London, 1998), pp. 35, 
107; Williamson, Stanley Baldwin, pp. 262-275. It should be remembered that patriotism 
was not always associated with the Conservative party. Martin Pugh’s assessment of 
Conservative recruits to Labour points to a sense in which it actually drew some politicians 
leftwards; see Martin Pugh, ‘‘Class traitors’: Conservative recruits to Labour, 1900-1930’, 
English Historical Review 113 450 (1998), 40-59. 
16 Wyburn-Powell’s point that recruits often had long political careers or experience of 
ministerial office helps to illustrate this position; see Wyburn-Powell, Defections, pp. 17-
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One of the most complex aspects of Liberal recruitment to the Conservative 
party was the relationship of the phenomenon to electoral politics, and 
particularly the fault-lines between left and right. In this regard, there is a 
need to build on discussion which has shown that movement of recruits 
towards the right in politics, through pursuit of anti-socialism in electoral 
campaigning, was not necessarily conceived of in this way.17 Anti-socialism 
did tend to emphasise connections of Liberals to Conservatives, particularly 
due to its associations with the preoccupations and values of the middle-
class, but pursuit of it was often more a negative, superficial and 
disingenuous campaigning tactic, motivated by need of creating clear 
electoral space from Labour, as opposed to a clear and genuine exposition of 
political principles. Many of the Liberal recruits stood in constituencies 
where their strongest challenge came from the Labour party, so 
demonstration of separation was very important. Nevertheless, anti-socialist 
campaigning saw a number of Liberals appearing like Conservatives through 
its pursuit, particularly where it led to the occurrence of political compacts, 
and it can actually be associated with changes of party, so it is a very critical 
issue for examination. 
Broadly, anti-socialist campaigning amongst Liberal recruits held a 
number of factors in common: firstly, the exploitation of middle-class 
grievances and anxieties about Labour and socialist politics; secondly, 
attempts to undermine the foundation of socialism’s social and industrial 
policy; and finally, a critique of the values of socialism, with references to 
ethical, moral and patriotic shortcomings. In all cases, there was very little 
intellectual substance to the criticisms, with attacks on socialism appearing 
rather clichéd or stereotyped.  
In terms of the middle-class dimension, it can be seen that there were 
various attempts to project a negative sentiment about socialism’s likely 
                                                          
17 See above, pp. 7-10.  
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negation of the rule of law and curtailment of political and economic 
freedom. There was also a desire to raise fears of high public expenditure 
and taxation. All, or some of these points, were addressed in political 
literature and in newspaper reports, depending on the nature of the local 
campaign, under warnings of the ‘socialist menace’ or some similarly coined 
phrase, as a rhetoric designed to entice voters to support the ‘anti-socialist’ 
Liberal candidates.18 As to some specific examples, Grigg, for instance, in 
one campaign spoke of the intention of the Labour party to declare ‘war to 
the knife against private enterprise’, whilst the County Durham Liberal, 
Aaron Curry, tried to exacerbate fears that Labour’s possible nationalisation 
programme would ‘increased the National Debt’; he also claimed that an 
elected Labour government would be ‘the stepping stone towards the 
creation of the Socialist State’, clearly trying to link voting Labour with 
extreme forms of socialism.19 Anti-socialism of the latter sort reached its 
zenith in 1924, amid the controversy of the Zinoviev Letter, with Grigg, in 
particular, making much electoral capital out of it in numerous references to 
the government’s supposed surrender to extreme socialism.20 But it 
continued well after in the shadow of the General Strike, with Curry using 
his Wallsend by-election platform (July 1926) for placing suspicion on the 
                                                          
18 Report, Edward Grigg speech, Oldham Evening Chronicle, 13 November 1922; Edward 
Grigg Election Address, Oldham 1922 & 1924 cit. Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 1010; 
Edward Grigg, Published statement, Oldham Evening Chronicle, 27 October 1924; Edward 
Grigg, Election advertisement, Oldham Evening Chronicle, 28 October 1924; Election 
report, Wellingborough Post & District Advertiser, 1 November 1922; Report, G. 
Shakespeare speech, Wellingborough Post & District Advertiser, 8 November 1922; 
Report, Hamar Greenwood speech, Newcastle Daily Journal, 28 October 1922; Reports, 
Aaron C. Curry speeches, North Mail & Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 28 November 1923, 1 
December 1923, Newcastle Daily Journal & North Star, 14 July 1926;  Report, Robert 
Aske speech, Newcastle Chronicle, 28 October 1924. 
19 Edward Grigg Election Address, Oldham 1922, Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 1010; 
Report, Aaron C. Curry speeches, North Mail & Newcastle Chronicle, 1 December 1923, 
Newcastle Daily Journal & North Star, 14 July 1926. 
20 Reports, Edward Grigg speeches, Oldham Evening Chronicle, 22 October 1924, 27 
October 1924, 28 October 1924; Edward Grigg Election Address, Oldham 1924, Grigg 
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industrial power of the unions in seeking a socialist state which would 
involve the overthrow of the country’s constitutional order.21  
Reference to socialism’s impact on industrial and social policy was 
chiefly directed at raising fears of a rise in industrial unemployment and the 
lowering of wages with a direct appeal to the working-class voters.22 These 
judgements on socialism evolved into direct criticism of the Labour party 
itself, following experience of Labour in power, after 1924, where such anti-
socialist Liberals tried to convince electors that alleged failures in policy 
were the result of Labour’s socialism. Macpherson, for example, in his 1924 
re-election campaign offered criticism of the Labour record on 
unemployment and housing problems.23 Robert Bernays, furthermore, poked 
fun at Labour’s record on unemployment; Labour had ‘arrived in the signal 
box’ but had ‘no idea which lever to pull to put the trains carrying the 
unemployed on the right track for prosperity’.24  
Appeals across the classes reveal evidence of a sense in which voters 
needed to be made aware of weaknesses of socialism’s ethical and moral 
dimensions, its lack of patriotism and its sectional partisanship, using a 
strong attacking rhetoric.  In his Wellingborough election campaign of 1924, 
for example, Shakespeare claimed that socialism was an affront to ‘man’s 
own personality and individuality’.25 Grigg and the Newcastle MP, Robert 
Aske, appealed directly to the public to voice their anger against an 
unpatriotic socialism, which would ‘destroy our national unity and 
undermine all patriotism’, whilst Greenwood suggested Labour should be 
                                                          
21 Report, Aaron C. Curry speech, Newcastle Daily Journal & North Star, 13 July 1926.   
22 Edward Grigg Election Address, Oldham 1922, Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 1010; 
Report, Geoffrey Shakespeare speech, Wellingborough Post & District Advertiser, 8 
November 1922; Report, John P. Dickie speech, North Mail & Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 
17 November 1923; Reports, George Lambert speeches, The Times, 18 February 1930, 5 
June 1930. 
23 Ian Macpherson, Election address, The Inverness Courier and General Advertiser, 21 
October 1924. 
24 Robert Bernays article, Liberal Forward, October 1929.  
25 Report, Geoffrey Shakespeare speech, Wellingborough Post & District Advertiser, 8 
November 1922. Also see Report, Aaron C. Curry speech, North Mail & Newcastle Daily 
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condemned for presenting a class policy which was ‘morally bad’.26 The 
latter point was also conveyed by County Durham Liberal, John Dickie, who 
posed an ethical critique of Labour’s class policy, claiming that this, and the 
related association with the trade unions, was actually an affront to political 
representation itself; in fact ‘their [Labour’s] avowed aim was not to 
advance the interests of the whole community, but to [advance] the interests 
of a particular trade union to whose funds they owed their return’.27 
The limits to the pursuit of anti-socialism also point to superficiality 
and disingenuousness. This can be seen, firstly, through evidence that anti-
socialism could be put aside in favour of a left-leaning electoral position 
when this seemed more beneficial. Some of the future recruits seemed to 
wish to placate or even cooperate with Labour at times; for instance, Dickie 
explained that Labour had a ‘constitutional right to take office’ whilst 
Lambert said that he wanted the chance to ‘work with Moderate Labour’.28 
Labour activists were not all to be distrusted as extreme socialists, it seems. 
On policy matters too there were inconsistencies. Aske had been one of the 
most assiduous anti-socialists, but, by 1929, he seemed very comfortable 
with Lloyd George’s socialistic loan-financed unemployment scheme: ‘no 
better way’, he said, ‘could be found of spending public money.’29 And most 
surprisingly of all was Greenwood, who, despite a supposed overwhelming 
post-war hostility to Labour and socialism, expressed views in favour of 
nationalisation of the railways and the mines.30  
                                                          
26 Report, Edward Grigg speech, Oldham Evening Chronicle, 13 November 1922; Report, 
Robert Aske speech, Newcastle Daily Journal, 1 December 1923; Report, Hamar 
Greenwood speech, Sunderland Echo, 23 November 1923. 
27 Report, John P. Dickie speech, North Mail & Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 4 December 
1923. 
28 Report, John P. Dickie speech, North Mail & Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 16 October 
1924; Report, George Lambert speech, The South Molton Gazette & West of England 
Advertiser, 25 October 1924. 
29 Report, Robert Aske speech, Newcastle Daily Journal & North Star, 18 May 1929. 
30 Report, Hamar Greenwood speeches, Sunderland Echo, 12 December 1918, 1 November 
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Limits to the importance of anti-socialism were also defined by its 
role as part of a desire for equidistance between both other parties on an 
electoral level. The character of the equidistance tended to provide 
variations on a narrative that Liberals were moderate, responsible, 
trustworthy and fair to all, in contrast to all their opponents – Labour and 
Conservative alike. At the most hyperbolic level, there were colourful 
metaphors to entice voters to observe a complete separation from the other 
two parties. Thomas Magnay’s Blaydon campaign, in 1929, for example, 
provided his electorate with a metaphor of ‘three political shops’ in which 
the Conservatives were accused of having nothing to ‘supply the needs of 
the unemployed’ whilst, at the Labour shop, customers were asked to only 
choose from ‘nationalisation, or Guild socialism, Syndicalism, or other 
Redism.’31 It was only at the Liberal shop where the ‘goods were ready to 
wear, and at the right price.’ Here an anti-socialist strategy sat alongside an 
anti-Conservative one, where Conservatives were presented as uncaring and 
dismissive of the needs of those in distressed circumstances. On a deeper 
electoral level, this equidistance was also about circumventing the rise of 
class politics, encouraging harmony between the classes, with Conservatives 
as well as Labour being derided in this respect. ‘The Liberal Party’, said 
Durham Liberal, William McKeag, ‘believed in cooperation between 
employer and employed’, whilst Curry put this in very inclusive terms in his 
claim that ‘Liberals stood for industrial emancipation and sought to bring the 
workers into partnership with the owners, giving them an effective voice, 
not only in the management, but the distribution also of the profits’.32 
Curry’s position is a fascinating one since his anti-Conservative perspective 
was very developed. He suggested that Conservative policy failures in 
stimulating trade, employment and a more equal distribution of wealth were 
linked to the rise of social discontent and the General Strike.33  
                                                          
31 Report, Thomas Magnay speech, North Mail & Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 29 May 
1929. 
32 Report, William McKeag speech, Durham Chronicle, 27 September 1924; Report, Aaron 
C. Curry speech, Newcastle Daily Journal & North Star, 13 July 1926. 
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Some equidistance strategies seemed rather retrospective in 
character. Lambert, Shakespeare, and Norfolk Liberal, Arthur Harbord, for 
example, pointed to how ‘the Liberal party stood between revolution on the 
one hand and reaction on the other’.34 There were clearly good reasons 
electorally for Liberals to present this kind of approach given that for some 
constituencies the older political controversies still carried electoral weight. 
Harbord contested elections in Great Yarmouth, a Norfolk coastal fishing 
town, with a weak Labour vote through the 1920s.35 This enabled him to 
position the Liberal party almost completely as an old-fashioned 
Gladstonian party, very separate from the other parties, with mention of 
industrial relations seeming less in evidence than the old cries of ‘peace, 
retrenchment and reform’, even as late as 1929.36 Lambert was similarly 
positioned in South Molton, Devon. He presented himself as an old 
fashioned Radical, although adapting himself to his contemporary age, being 
both anti-Conservative and anti-extreme socialist.37 Part of Lambert’s 
approach appeared to be to stop any haemorrhaging of moderate support to 
Labour and to stem a drift towards class politics, which accounts for his 
direct appeal to moderate working-class opinion in many of his election 
campaigns. Interestingly, he tried to outflank the left in the legitimacy of 
opposition to the Conservatives, so acutely so that by 1929 he was appealing 
                                                          
34 Report, George Lambert speech, The South Molton Gazette & West of England 
Advertiser, 11 May 1929; Report, Geoffrey Shakespeare, Northamptonshire Evening 
Telegraph, 9 November 1922; Arthur Harbord Election Address, The Yarmouth 
Independent, 25 October 1924.  
35 Labour did not even contest the election in 1923. See Election Report, The Yarmouth 
Independent, Gorleston Times and Flegg Journal, 24 November 1923. 
36 Arthur Harbord speech, The Yarmouth Independent, 11 November 1922; Election Report, 
Yarmouth & Gorleston Times, 11 November 1922; Arthur Harbord, Election Address 1923, 
The Yarmouth Independent, 1 December 1923; Arthur Harbord, Election Address 1924, 
The Yarmouth Independent, 25 October 1924; Arthur Harbord speech, The Yarmouth 
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37 Report, George Lambert speech, Manchester Guardian, 19 March 1920; Reports, George 
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for some tactical voting on the part of Labour-leaning voters, publicly 
claiming that ‘every vote for the Labour candidate would be a vote of 
security for Mr. Baldwin’ although he maintained his distance from 
socialism by his opposition to Labour’s spending commitments, tax policies 
and the record on unemployment.38 Dwelling on Lambert further, it can be 
seen that he even tried to outflank the Conservatives on the right as well; the 
Conservative party being insufficiently patriotic and moderate and too 
partisan.39 He pointed to Conservative irresponsibility on taxation and 
bureaucratic waste and, in 1929, compared the abolition of the Boards of 
Guardians to ‘the worst type of socialism’.40 Collectively, all this revealed 
evidence of a sophisticated electoral tactic, mixing traditional Liberal 
perspectives about state interference with more recent concerns of the 
middle-class.  
Generally, the lack of consistency about being anti-socialist and 
criticisms of Conservatives were not interpreted encouragingly by 
Conservatives, who tended to view Liberal tactics as cynical and this led to 
much cross-party conflict as opposed to the rapprochement that consistency 
in pursuit of anti-socialism might have secured. Aske was opposed by a 
Conservative candidate in 1924 having been amongst the supposed ‘anti-
socialist’ Liberals who had then voted Labour into office.41 Shakespeare was 
condemned for his general warmness to Labour. In Norwich, in 1929, a 
Conservative candidate concluded that Shakespeare and the Norwich 
Liberals could never again count on gaining Conservatives votes on account 
of their campaigning to appeal to Labour voters.42  
                                                          
38 Report, George Lambert speech, The South Molton Gazette & West of England 
Advertiser, 25 May 1929. 
39 George Lambert speech, 18 January 1924, HC Debates Vol. 169 1924 col. 469; Reports, 
George Lambert speeches, The South Molton Gazette & West of England Advertiser, 18 
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40 Report, George Lambert speech, The South Molton Gazette & West of England 
Advertiser, 18 May 1929.  
41 Election report, Newcastle Chronicle, 15 October 1924. 
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However, whilst the significance of anti-socialism does have its 
limits, there are examples of where the pursuit of it did impact on political 
affiliations since it encouraged a view that long-term or permanent 
cooperation against Labour should be propagated, for example, in the cases 
of both Greenwood and Grigg. With regards to Greenwood, it can be seen 
that he was a consistent advocate of compact arrangements with the 
Conservatives from 1918, viewing that relationships built at Westminster 
level, between the Lloyd George Liberals and Conservatives, should be 
propagated in the consistencies. This was his view of politics in his own 
constituency of Sunderland, but it was not one seemingly shared by many 
others there and he eventually lost his interest in the constituency as a 
result.43 He wanted to see a political union of two forces, Liberal and 
Conservative, positioned in opposition to socialism, so in 1924, he deserted 
Sunderland, joining Churchill in his pursuit of a new Constitutionalist force, 
made up of Liberals and Conservatives, putting himself forward for a 
vacancy at Walthamstow East.44 However, he ended up appearing more like 
an uncommitted Conservative since he only managed to obtain the backing 
of local Conservatives for his candidature; the Liberals had their own 
candidate lined up.45 His campaign, furthermore, positioned him actually 
against the Liberal candidate, especially in his claim that: ‘Anti-socialists 
[were] beginning to see clearly that a vote for the Liberal is wasted’, so it 
was unclear what the Liberal aspect to his positioning alongside the 
Conservatives was intended to be.46 Not all anti-socialists standing on a 
Constitutionalist platform were seen as antagonistic to the Liberal party, and 
indeed, in the months after the election, with the collapse of the 
Constitutionalist party, some of them were enticed to sit on the Liberal 
benches. Greenwood’s actions meant that he was separated from the Liberal 
                                                          
43 Reports, Hamar Greenwood speeches, Newcastle Daily Journal, 7 December 1918, 13 
April 1920, 28 October 1922, Sunderland Echo, 14 December 1918; Election reports, 
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44 Also see Election reports, The Times, 11 October 1924, 15 October 1924. 
45 Report, The Times, 15 October 1924.  
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party; he would now have to either sit as an independent or reconcile himself 
to the Conservatives and he took the latter option.47  
Grigg’s perspective was similar to Greenwood’s in wanting to 
‘consolidate the anti-Socialist forces throughout the country’.48 Much of his 
efforts were part of a wider project than a simple electoral one, but the idea 
he came up with for a renewed ‘Liberal-Unionist’ grouping was based on a 
reality he saw that the Liberal party would have to choose to position itself 
quite separate from socialism or face being absorbed by it.49 Grigg’s idea 
was to enable a body of Liberals to remain Liberal but sufficiently anti-
socialist to remain relevant. In all of this, working in partnership with the 
Conservatives was desirable and he looked to seek electoral compromises 
with them to secure anti-socialist unity. This seemed very similar to the 
Constitutionalist party idea of Churchill’s, but there was little support for 
Grigg’s position from inside the Liberal parliamentary party and this left 
him ever more reliant on Conservatives who encouraged his developing 
views. Eventually he was nominated by the Leeds Central Conservative 
Association as a candidate, with an agreement that he might be able to fight 
on a ‘Liberal-Unionist’ ticket for Leeds Central in 1931.50 In electoral terms 
                                                          
47 Report, The Times, 17 December 1924. 
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this made him effectively a Conservative, not unlike Greenwood, without 
any evidence of particular support from Liberal politicians in Leeds or 
elsewhere. Grigg, of course, never got the opportunity to stand in the 
constituency due to the establishment of the National Government and his 
agreement to stand aside in favour of the sitting ‘National’ Labour member, 
but it would be interesting to speculate whether he would, in any case, have 
been able to stand on the Liberal-Unionist ticket if there had been no 
National Government given that prominent Conservatives, like Neville 
Chamberlain, remained unconvinced that this would bring about a greater 
cooperation with supposedly committed anti-socialist Liberals.51 Anti-
socialism definitely seemed to have drawn Grigg into the Conservative 
camp in the sense that the act of allowing himself to be endorsed by a 
Conservative association on anti-socialist grounds showed it to have become 
more important than retaining a separate Liberal appeal. Like Greenwood, 
Grigg may not have intended this appearance but this was the reality, and 
from this perspective it appears that this is something which Grigg was soon 
to recognise, since he soon abandoned even the prefix of ‘Liberal’, 
contesting the Altrincham by-election as a straightforward Conservative 
candidate in 1933.  
For both Greenwood and Grigg there was a certain amount of choice 
in their pursuit of their strategies of anti-socialism, irrespective of the nature 
of the intended outcome. For other Liberals, however, the pursuit of an anti-
socialist strategy was arguably forced upon them. A very good example of 
this emerges from consideration of the position of Aske in Newcastle East; 
Aske was very affected by the weakness of Liberals in triangular electoral 
contests in the period. He first contested the constituency in 1923, without 
Conservative opposition, which enabled him to win, but only by a narrow 
margin.52 From then on, he faced uncertainty over his electoral position, 
being entirely reliant on Conservative non-intervention for any electoral 
success, with his defeat in 1924 in a three-way fight, providing good 
                                                          
51 Report, The Times, 17 October 1931. 
52 Aske scored 52.3 per cent of the vote to Arthur Henderson’s 47.7 per cent.  
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evidence.53 In 1929, he tried to distance himself from anti-socialism to some 
extent, wishing to avoid being forced into a compact with the Conservatives; 
he wanted a strategy to appeal to left-leaning voters, as his support for Lloyd 
George’s unemployment scheme is partly evidence of.54 His electoral 
distance from the Conservatives was not unnoticed, and he was lucky that a 
very poor showing by the Conservatives in 1924, discouraged a 
Conservative intervention in 1929, with a decision not to oppose him, even 
so, only being made at a late stage.55 As for 1931, the Conservatives 
threatened to fight the election again; having even selected a candidate to 
stand on a ‘National’ ticket in opposition to Aske, and it was only his 
eventual positioning in fully supporting the National Government, as a 
Liberal National, that prevented it.56 He took some time to decide to align 
himself with the Liberal Nationals and this raises questions about whether he 
would have preferred to have contested the election as a Samuelite.57 
Electoral interest perhaps played a part here since standing as a Samuelite 
would certainly have ensured his defeat, as the Conservatives would surely 
have carried out their threat to field a candidate in such conditions. 
Circumstances had shaped his position, although he may not have felt that 
he was being drawn into a conventional anti-socialist compromise with 
Conservatives due to the creation of the National Government. This latter 
point is strengthened by the sense, post-1931, that he still wished to avoid an 
active anti-socialist strategy, judging from his positioning as an internal 
opponent of the government.58 Nonetheless, not unlike other Liberal 
                                                          
53 Aske’s poll slumped to 45.1 per cent, just 1.3 per cent behind Labour, but the 
intervention of a Conservative scoring 8.5 per cent was crucial in his defeat. 
54 Reports, Robert Aske speeches, Newcastle Daily Journal & North Star, 17 May 1929, 18 
May 1929. It was a possible calculation that the best way of being elected would be by 
appealing to moderates on the left given the paucity of voters inclined towards the 
Conservatives.  
55 Election report, North Mail & Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 13 May 1929. 
56 Ibid., 1 October 1931.  
57 For a parallel case see David Dutton, ‘William Mabane and Huddersfield Politics, 1931-
47: ‘By Any Other Name a Liberal’, Northern History XLIII 1 (2006), 137-153. Aske’s 
position would not seem dissimilar to that of other Liberal Nationals in general.  
58 This situation will be considered in more detail the next section of the chapter. 
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Nationals whose positions were similar, Aske continued to pursue the 
electoral compromise aspect to anti-socialism into 1935, which underlines 
the sense that he had become absorbed into a Conservative bloc, although he 
had not been fully assimilated within it.59  
 
II 
 
The convergence of Liberal and Conservative politics related to wide 
common perspectives on a range of political issues and left some Liberals 
considering that there were no fundamental differences of broad political 
outlook. This was particularly true in relation to Liberals who joined the 
Conservative party itself, such as Churchill, Young and Guest, who are 
discussed in the case study chapters, but also in relation to others, such as 
Grigg and Greenwood. In reflecting on this situation generally it can be 
surmised that the catalyst was in pre-war and First World War policy-
making, which brought to the fore the common interests in attitudes towards 
world and domestic affairs, separate from old party grievances, creating a 
sense in which the two parties – or, more particularly, individuals within 
them – could cooperate with each other.60 Indeed, issues such national 
insurance and pressure for pursuit of more aggressive military interests in 
the pre-war era, as well as the need for mobilisation of the country for the 
war effort, particularly in the context of the debate about compulsion, 
revealed that there were issues of high importance, that required patriotic, 
non-partisan and more managerial solutions, in many senses opening the 
way for more permanent connections between Liberals and Conservatives in 
the years after 1918 in pursuit of mutually important issues. However, whilst 
the War and the years before it might have been crucial to assist the timing 
of a shift in the nature of Liberal and Conservative relations, the attitudes 
which conditioned these feelings, to a certain extent, need to be put in a 
more complex setting. In making this point, the noted identification of a 
                                                          
59 David Dutton, Liberals in Schism (London, 2008), p. 76. 
60 The influence of the war is critical in the positions of Churchill and Mond; see chapters 
below.  
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longer-term philosophical influence on cooperation between parties, much in 
the mould of the patriotic, imperialist and managerial approaches of an 
earlier generation of politicians, becomes significant, particularly in its 
agenda for the establishment of a national government ‘above party’ 
interests.61  
The relevance of the national government idea seems to be borne out 
from examination of the positions of Liberal recruits, whose political 
outlooks seem reminiscent of statesmen of the later nineteenth century in 
various respects, including Churchill, Guest, Mond, Runciman, Grigg, and 
even Lambert.62 There was an inclination amongst this group towards the 
need to free Parliament from the constraints of party politics, to implement 
policy in a more professional and pragmatic way, and to pursue 
unashamedly imperialist and patriotic approaches to politics. Not all views 
coincided exactly, such as in Mond’s and Churchill’s differences over Free 
Trade or Churchill and Runciman’s over war strategy, but the essence of the 
perspective was the same in that all were arguing for their case on similar 
imperialist and patriotic managerial grounds.63 And there was a sense of 
                                                          
61 Note that ‘national government’ is used rather than capitalised form of Geoffrey Searle’s 
‘National Government’ to recognise that the agenda was often about the form of 
government as opposed to a detailed policy agenda and also to differentiate it from the 
actual National Government from 1931.  
62 See various examples from the chapters below on Churchill, Mond and Runciman. For 
Lambert see Report, The South Molton Gazette, Devon & Somerset Chronicle, and the West 
of England Advertiser, 29 September 1900. Mond, Runciman and Lambert held 
connections to the Liberal Imperialist movement of the later century, whilst Churchill and 
Guest have been seen to have held connections to the politic of One Nation Conservatism, 
which was rooted in some similar perspectives.   
63 For details of the characteristics as a whole see chapters below on: Churchill, in his views 
on social and international policy before the War, favouring of compulsion, move towards 
imperial preference; Mond, see his favouring of welfare provision before 1914, his views in 
favour of conscription and imperial preference, and Keynesian planning and intervention 
from the mid-1920s; Guest, in war-time views; Runciman, in his defence of a limited war, 
and in his favouring a professional and managerial government in the midst of the 1931 
crisis. It is interesting to see various aspects of state intervention being recommended; such 
intervention could be a patriotic managerial tool for government policy provided that it did 
not hinder business or other private interests.       
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them wanting to secure these ends through mutual cooperation with 
members of other parties, by seeking to work with a range of politicians, 
most often linking Liberals and Conservatives; Conservatives being most 
likely to be similarly minded in relation to a shared understanding of the 
objectives of government policy and to be sympathetic to Liberal recruits’ 
patriotic notions of national government. This latter point underlines the 
extent to which national government brought Liberal advocates and 
Conservatives into proximity. But there was a further point of interest too, 
since it can be seen that favouring national government actually encouraged 
Liberals to look at more formal means to cooperate with Conservatives, and 
even to seek integration into the Conservative party itself.64 Advocates of 
national government needed a party, in a party system, to which they could 
be linked, and whilst there had been a sense before 1918 that the Liberal 
party offered that opportunity, it was towards the post-war Conservative 
party that they looked after that time; the party appearing almost itself as a 
national party, especially under the moderate and patriotic policy of 
Baldwin.65   
 In thinking about Liberal recruits who appear to reflect the profile of 
some of the perspectives mentioned so far, Grigg emerges as an important 
example. His political aspirations seemed very much linked to his 
professional connection to the empire and his pre-existing interest in the 
politics of Joseph Chamberlain and Liberal-Unionism; he seemed to have 
little interest in the traditional causes of the Liberal party.66 Thus, not unlike 
some of the other Liberal recruits mentioned, it seems that his political 
outlook placed him firmly at the margins of Liberal politics, even from the 
outset of his career.67 In fact, there is little known of why he actually got 
                                                          
64 Churchill’s, Guest’s and Young’s recruitments can be connected very clearly with their 
pursuit of national government; see chapters below.   
65 See above, pp. 12-18.  
66 Nicholas Cott, Notes of an Interview with John Grigg, son of Edward Grigg (July 2000). 
John Grigg claimed that his father had been an actual supporter of the old Liberal Unionist 
party. 
67 Churchill and Guest’s connections to Unionist politics, albeit of a Conservative nature, 
provide a useful parallel; see chapters below.  
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involved with Liberal party politics in the first place, other than that it arose 
from his admiration for Lloyd George, and a sense that the Liberal party, or 
at least a Lloyd Georgian section of it, was a vehicle for achieving the 
political end of creating a national government.68  
 Grigg held a very definite idea from his first entry into parliamentary 
politics (1922) about what good government should be, focusing his 
attention on the need for joint working with the Conservatives, trying 
everything possible, for example, in the months before the end of the 
Coalition to dissuade Conservatives from disbanding the coalition 
arrangements, using his professional connections to Conservatives to try and 
further this end.69 He set out in a paper entitled ‘The Objects of National 
Policy’ detail concerning the type of policy a joint administration might 
achieve, pointing to the need to revive trade at home and in the empire, as a 
priority.70 He seemed to be establishing the policy grounds for his pluralistic 
union idea, not dissimilarly to both Churchill and Guest, at this time, playing 
on the importance of placing ‘country before party’ in political 
discussions.71 To Grigg, the old political controversies between the two 
parties were apparently now ‘out of the field’, with a sense of a clear ability 
of Liberals and Conservatives to work together on important matters of the 
day.72 A good measure of this was that, in advance of some other Liberals, 
including Churchill and Guest, but in common with Mond, Grigg favoured 
                                                          
68 Cott, Interview with John Grigg. John Grigg seemed to view his support for Lloyd 
George to have originally related to his support for National Insurance in 1911 and then his 
success in the pursuit of War from 1916 to 1918. Not unlike Churchill, Guest and Young, 
he was very interested in social reform, as a patriotic cause, which the Edwardian Liberal 
party seemed to represent most strongly; see chapters below.  
69 Edward Grigg to Arthur Balfour, 5 March 1922, Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 999; 
Balfour Papers GD433/2/1/22; Diary of Leo Amery, 12 March 1922 in John Barnes & 
David Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, Volume I: 1896-1929, (London, 
Melbourne, Sydney, Auckland, Johannesburg, 1980), p. 283.    
70 Edward Grigg unpublished paper, ‘The Objects of National Policy’, dated 6 March 1922, 
cit. Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 999.  
71 See chapters below on Churchill and Guest; Report, Edward Grigg speeches, Oldham 
Evening Standard, 30 October 1922, Oldham Evening Chronicle 13 November 1922.  
72 Edward Grigg, Election Address Oldham 1922, Grigg Papers MSS Grigg 1010.  
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imperial preference.73 His favouring of imperial preference did not mean 
that he was a fully-blown Protectionist, but rather, in line with his political 
view of what was an appropriate patriotic, pragmatic interventionist 
response to the need to defend the empire and encourage the growth of 
trade.74 
The preparing of the ground for the union of the two parties was 
established at the expense of relationships that could have been developed 
with other Liberals around a political agenda, underlining the sense that he 
was never really connected to them. After having been elected for less than a 
year, Grigg was already seeking ways to distance himself from Liberals, 
outside what he regarded as the Lloyd George sphere, due to their supposed 
lack of commitment to the empire. In a report in the New York Times, he 
offered criticism of the ‘strong prejudice’ against a policy of imperialism 
within Liberal ranks, a policy which he claimed, in contrast to their 
supposed view, was for ‘the good of the whole world’ in providing 
‘progressive trusteeship’ over ‘backward peoples’.75 And not long after, he 
wrote to Lloyd George to explain explicitly that he could not work with the 
‘Wee Frees’ due to their anti-imperialism and ‘dogmatic Free Trade 
opinions’, which effectively declared him against the reunion of Liberal 
forces which was to follow soon after, and had even been favoured by the 
soon-to-be Conservative recruits, but also strongly imperialist Lloyd 
Georgian Liberals, such as Mond, Churchill and Guest.76  
After reunion, Grigg initially showed some support for Churchill’s 
new Constitutionalist force, a large measure of which was because of his 
                                                          
73 See below, pp. 124-153.  
74 Cott, Interview with John Grigg. 
75 Report, Edward Grigg speech, New York Times, 9 September 1923, cit. Grigg Papers 
MSS (Film) Grigg 1013. John Grigg pointed to his father’s paternalistic sentiments. He was 
very much in favour of Chamberlain’s ‘civilising mission’ of the British Empire, and he 
believed in concessions to national movements when they ‘proved’ they were ‘civilised’; 
Cott, Interview with John Grigg. 
76 Edward Grigg to David Lloyd George, 9 November 1923, Grigg Papers MSS (Film) 
Grigg 1001; Cott, Interview with John Grigg.  Also see chapters below on Churchill, Mond 
and Guest.   
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acceptance of imperial preference.77 However, he became disillusioned with 
Churchill’s position when it became clear to him that the Constitutionalist 
force was a sort of staging-post in Churchill’s journey back into the 
Conservative party.78 He told Churchill: ‘Whatever happens, Liberals will 
not become Conservatives’, which was a surprising statement given his own 
proximity to the Conservatives; but it was perhaps not so much a measure of 
his own view, it was rather of what he perceived of Liberal opinion more 
widely which still needed to be persuaded of the case for working closely 
with Conservatives, as well as reflecting his continuing desire for a 
pluralistic union between the two forces.79 His 1925 resignation from 
Parliament did not mean that he gave up on the enterprise of bringing 
Liberals and Conservatives together; on the contrary, he became bolder in 
displaying his Chamberlainite influences, seeking arrangements for his 
‘Liberal-Unionist’ faction to further these ends.80  
It was not until 1930 that he called for a formal split of likeminded 
Liberals from the Liberal party; prior to that it seems he forlornly thought 
that the whole party would come round to his way of thinking about a 
political union with the Conservatives. However, after this time the politics 
within the party must have looked very different with Lloyd George’s 
working arrangements with Labour thwarting any relationship of the party to 
the Conservatives, and the burgeoning financial crisis seemed to justify a 
new direction in the national interest. At the centre of the new party, he 
wished to see a commitment to cooperation with the Conservatives to secure 
                                                          
77 Edward Grigg to Vivian Phillipps, 5 March 1924, Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 1001; 
Cott, Interview with John Grigg. 
78 See below, pp. 92-123. 
79 Edward Grigg to Winston Churchill, 6 March 1924, Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 
1001; Edward Grigg to Lord Younger, 30 March 1926, Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 
1002. 
80 Edward Grigg to Lionel Hitchins, 6 May 1925, Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 1002; 
Edward Grigg to Lord Younger, 30 March 1926, Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 1002. 
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a new government to protect British and imperial financial interests, with a 
scheme for imperial preference at the centre of the government’s policy.81   
Grigg remained out of Parliament until 1933 and his return was as a 
Conservative. He said that he had joined the Conservative party because it 
now completely represented the outlook on politics which accorded with his 
own, mentioning the empire and trade issues, and that the Conservative 
party had become truly a ‘national’ party in its own right.82 In the context of 
discussion of his political objectives his justification does seem credible; he 
had little to separate him from Conservatives in outlook, and what is more 
surprising perhaps is that he remained outside the Conservative party for so 
long. It seems he had been reluctant to give up on his political union idea 
which was more in tune with a strategy of pursuing national government 
than simply joining the Conservatives.  
Beyond Grigg, there is evidence of further interest in the 
establishment of a national government and working with Conservatives, 
particularly from two Liberals with connections to Churchill – Greenwood 
and Spears. Greenwood had been Churchill’s private secretary, which 
suggests there was a bond of political friendship between them, no doubt 
arising from common interests in empire and also ‘patriotic’ social reform.83 
During the War, Greenwood became a supporter of Coalition arrangements 
under Lloyd George, describing the programme of the Coalition by 1918 as 
‘a patriotic, progressive and Imperial one’, and he mirrored Churchill in his 
hopes for a pluralistic union of the Liberal and Conservative parties, 
                                                          
81 Edward Grigg to Lord Islington, 30 June 1930, Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg; Report, 
The Times, 4 March 1931. 
82 Edward Grigg, Election Address Altrincham 1933, Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 
1010. In full Grigg said: ‘I joined the Conservative Party […] because I believe in its 
principles and because I regard its organisation as the country’s greatest safeguard against a 
return of that type of politics which brought us to the verge of ruin in 1931. The 
Conservative Party then declared itself a National Party in a new and broader sense. It went 
into close and loyal comradeship with those great elements in Liberal and Socialist Parties 
which were equally anxious to put Country above Party and to form a united national front 
against the danger and depression which were overwhelming us’.  
83 Reports, Hamar Greenwood speeches, Sunderland Echo, 28 November 1910, 1 
December 1910; see below, pp. 92-123.  
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demonstrated most strongly in his identification with the Constitutionalist 
party.84 In the period from 1918 until 1924, Greenwood demonstrated a 
degree of separateness from Liberal politics, firstly, by taking a very harsh 
view on war reparations; then, going on to endorse imperial preference, 
citing practical and patriotic reasons for rejecting Free Trade; and then, 
through his involvement in the affairs of Ireland, as the last Chief Secretary, 
playing an important role in defending British imperial interests there and 
overseeing the deployment of the controversial ‘Black and Tans’.85 As for 
Spears, he held few connections to Liberal politics, with his initial 
involvement arising out of the friendship he formed with Churchill and his 
friend’s influence upon him thereafter.86 Like Grigg, he came to politics 
only in 1922 and did not seem to develop any support for Liberal reunion.87 
He wished to maintain cooperation with the Conservatives, with evidence of 
his collusion with Churchill to secure a common patriotic platform with 
them in 1924, even if, again like Grigg, he opposed Churchill’s move into 
the Conservative fold that year.88  
However, the pressure for national government cannot altogether be 
seen in the uniform way described so far; in fact, there are dangers in over-
emphasising the sense in which desires related to a programme of 
government, separate from party. Support for national government also 
                                                          
84 Reports, Hamar Greenwood speeches, Newcastle Daily Journal, 3 December 1918, 7 
December 1918, 28 October 1922, Evening Standard, 28 October 1924.    
85 Reports, Hamar Greenwood speeches, Sunderland Echo, 6 December 1918, Newcastle 
Daily Chronicle, 13 December 1918; Reports, The Times, 27 July 1920, October 1, 7, 14 
1920, 31 August 1921; Report, Newcastle Daily Journal, 5 April 1920. Like Churchill, he 
seems to have returned to Free Trade in 1923, but this was not a sustained feeling and 
seems to be untypical of the general outlook on fiscal question over a longer period of time; 
see Report, Hamar Greenwood speech, Newcastle Daily Journal, 20 November 1923.  
86 Egremont, ‘Spears’. Spears struck up friendship with Churchill as military colleagues 
during the First World War. Churchill encouraged his involvement in politics thereafter and 
influenced his perspectives.  
87 Edward Spears, Unpublished note on Liberal reunion, 7 December 1922, Spears Papers 
SPEARS 1/76. 
88 Report, Edward Spears speech, Leicester Mail, 30 October 1922 cit. Spears Papers 
SPEARS ACC 545 6. 
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related, in a good number of cases, less to theoretical and more to short-term 
patriotic reasons concerned with immediate circumstances. This is 
particularly true of the position of the recruits to the Liberal National party, 
whose involvement in a political arrangement with the Conservative party in 
1931 was motivated by the financial and political crisis. Here, this study 
focuses on the case of Simon, who for much of his career, had been much 
more partisan by stressing Liberal political causes than other Liberal recruits 
mentioned so far, at least up to the later 1920s.89 Simon was greatly 
convinced of the need for cooperation in forming a national government, as 
a patriotic short-term measure to address the crisis. Of course, he went on to 
pursue closer links with the Conservatives from 1932, although the reasons 
for this were largely of an electoral nature – he was greatly concerned that 
his Liberal faction would not survive without a continuing compact 
arrangement with Conservatives – and in order to avoid loss of influence 
within the government, as opposed to a positive view in favour of closer 
integration. Even if his pursuit of a ‘Liberal-Unionist’ style political union 
with the Conservatives was not dissimilar in character to that envisaged by 
Grigg only a couple of years before, there is no real evidence that in any 
discussions, either with Conservatives or his critical Liberal associates, that 
there was much in his political outlook which pushed him in this direction.  
A further example of this short-termism comes from Runciman. He 
anticipated some kind of return to independent Liberal politics in the future, 
despite his close involvement in designing the system of Protection enacted 
by the government. Runciman had been rather inconsistent in his support for 
cross-party government throughout his career, having even retreated into 
Liberal factionalism in the mid-1920s, and a long-term interest in working 
with Conservatives was lacking, despite his desire to join the Liberal 
National party, in 1932, at the very time that party leaders was seeking more 
integration within the Conservative party.90 Thus, in many senses, there was 
a kind of circumstantial character to the integration of Liberal Nationals into 
the Conservative party bloc, which is an interesting consideration in the 
                                                          
89 See below, pp. 195-223.  
90 Ibid, pp. 193-218. 
 
 
66 
 
context of their recent rehabilitation as part of a genuine Liberal political 
force.   
The sense of short-term interest in the idea of national government 
for patriotic reasons is also emphasised in examining a wider body of 
opinion within the Liberal National grouping; in fact the sense of the need 
for maintaining Liberal independence was even more certain. There were 
some Liberal Nationals who, like Simon, got drawn into acceptance of 
integration within the Conservative party fold, such as Hore-Belisha, and 
perhaps even Dickie and Magnay, but these individuals seem untypical of 
the more independent-minded within the party.91 In character, Liberal 
Nationals were perhaps amongst the most patriotic of Liberals and 
supportive of the government as a means to deal with the immediate crisis, 
but they were partisan, in a Liberal sense, which reflects on the difficulties 
in their having been seen effectively as Conservatives.  
The patriotism of Liberal Nationals was reflected at the outset, with a 
number of Liberal recruits pointing to the defence of the national interest, 
with Harbord and Shakespeare being fairly representative in expression of 
their ‘duty to the country’ in October 1931.92 There was also a genuine sense 
amongst such Liberals of a need for a joining together of ‘experienced men’ 
who could restore the country’s fortunes through a business-like, 
independent and non-partisan approach in the immediate period, thus 
underlining the temporary nature of the arrangement, even if this looked 
superficially similar to justifications for working with Conservatives 
mentioned by Liberals who joined the Conservative party in the period 
                                                          
91 Leslie Hore-Belisha to Neville Chamberlain, 23 September 1932, Hore-Belisha Papers, 
HOBE 1/1/88-89; Reports, North Mail & Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 11, 12 April 1934. 
Dickie and Magnay both got into controversy for their support of a Conservative candidate 
in the Basingstoke by-election.   
92 Report, Arthur Harbord speech, The Yarmouth Independent, 17 October 1931. 
Shakespeare said: My watchword […] is ‘Country before party’. We are in for five very 
difficult years, even if the National Government is returned, and it will require the best 
brains of all political parties and the co-operation of men and women of all parties if we are 
to pull through […]; see Report, Geoffrey Shakespeare speech, Eastern Daily Press, 14 
October 1931.  
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before 1931.93 On issues such as tariffs there was also some support for the 
government’s position, although again, this was normally seen as a short-
term policy, and support for it was guarded.94 Lambert’s position is a good 
case in point. He had supported some form of tariff plan, even as early as 
November 1930, and, from 1931, this was an essential national policy in 
order to ‘rebuild our temporarily shattered fortunes’.95 He was, however, no 
true convert to Protectionism, publicly voicing his uneasiness in relation to 
the Ottawa plan of 1932, despite his ultimate support for the measure.96 Of 
course, such views brought him and other colleagues closer to the 
Conservatives, but this did not mean they had been assimilated within the 
Conservative fold, despite difficulties this created for them in legitimising 
their representation of Liberal politics.97 And ultimately, tensions emerged 
over their continuing support for the government, which illustrates the extent 
of the continuation of partisan feeling and the desire for separation from the 
Conservatives. There is a sense that some backbench Liberal Nationals 
wished to present themselves as offering an almost ‘independent’ position 
within the government benches; Aske, for instance, spoke of his willingness 
to oppose the government if it was ‘doing things against the interests’ of his 
                                                          
93 Report, Robert Aske speech, North Mail & Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 16 October 1931; 
Report, Ian Macpherson speech, The Inverness Courier & General Advertiser, 16 October 
1931. 
94 Some good general examples exist; see Report, Robert Aske speech, North Mail & 
Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 20 October 1931; Report, Arthur Harbord speech, The 
Yarmouth Independent, 17 October 1931; Report, William McKeag speech, Newcastle 
Journal, 12 October 1931; Report William McKeag speech, Northern Echo, 11 December 
1931 cit. Cuttings Book belong to the Estate of William McKeag.  
95 It appears that Lambert had argued for a ten per cent duty on import manufactures as 
early as November 1930; see Garry Tregidga, The Liberal Party in South West Britain 
Since 1918 – Political Decline, Dormancy and Rebirth (Exeter, 2000), p. 59. Also see 
Report, George Lambert speech, The South Molton Gazette & West of England Advertiser, 
3 October 1931.  
96 Report, The Times, 30 September 1932. 
97 Collins found himself in public difficulty, having spoken in favour of Protection in early 
September 1931 and then seeming to try to distance himself from his own words; see 
Reports, Godfrey Collins speeches, The West Coast Courier, 9 September 1931, 18 
September 1931; Report, The West Coast Courier, 16 October 1931.  
 
 
68 
 
constituents.98 And there was concern over various government policies; 
Macpherson condemned the 1931 National Economy Bill as ‘drastic and 
illiberal’; McKeag held criticisms of industrial, wages and means testing 
policies.99 Indeed, McKeag grew opposed to the emphasis on Protection, 
seemingly having even contemplated ‘crossing the floor’ with the 
Samuelites in 1933, with evidence of discussion with Herbert Samuel 
directly over the matter.100 Behind all the objections, it seems McKeag had 
concerns that the government had forfeited the title of ‘National’, and his 
reasoning for remaining within the ranks of the Liberal National grouping 
seemed to be related solely to its position on foreign policy, which was 
hardly a wide endorsement and reveals something of how close he was to 
leaving it. It seems that some of these concerns were in light of the drift of 
the Liberal National leadership towards the Conservatives and lack of a 
distinctly Liberal position which created a source of tension. This was even 
recognised by the Chief Whip, Shakespeare, who wrote to Simon seeking 
assurances that Liberal politics would be asserted within the government 
with a prophetic fear of ‘ultimate absorption within the Conservative 
                                                          
98 Report, Robert Aske speech, North Mail & Newcastle Daily Chronicle, 5 November 
1935; David M. Roberts, ‘Clement Davies and the Liberal Party, 1929-56’, Unpublished 
University of Wales M.A. (1974), p. 41.  
99 Ian Macpherson speech, 14 September 1931, H.C. Debates 1930-31 vol. 256 col. 562; 
Reports, William McKeag speeches, Durham Advertiser, 6 May 1932, Newcastle Journal, 
2 June 1932, Northern Evening Despatch, 11 May 1933 cit. Cuttings Book belonging to the 
Estate of William McKeag. 
100 Reports, William McKeag speeches, York Herald, 28 August 1932, Durham Advertiser, 
4 November 1932, Northern Evening Despatch, 21 August 1933, North Mail, 21 November 
1933, Durham Advertiser, 24 November 1933  cit. Cuttings Book belonging to the Estate of 
William McKeag; William McKeag to Herbert Samuel, 20 November 1933, Samuel Papers 
A/95. Of course, McKeag was not the only Liberal National in this position. Curry’s 
position was similar to McKeag’s and he actually did end up joining the Samuelites due to 
his opposition to many government policies. On Curry, see Geoffrey Shakespeare to John 
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Simon, 5 September 1932, Simon Papers MSS. Simon 73/48; Report, Manchester 
Guardian, 12 October 1932 cit. Simon Papers MSS. Simon 73/165; Reports, Newcastle 
Journal, 29 October 1935, 1 November 1935, 4 November 1935.  
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party’.101 Thus, it can be seen that Liberal Nationals often felt rather 
uncomfortable, with their expressions of discomfort and resistance revealing 
a sense that an incorporation of their party into a Conservative bloc was not 
going to be left unchallenged. The body of Liberal Nationals were in many 
ways the malcontented ‘cuckoos in the nest’ created by their Liberal 
political leaders in their partnership agreement with the Conservatives.102 
 
The other substantive influence on political outlook was the politics of 
Baldwin. His patriotic values won him support from Churchill, whose 
realisation of shared political perspectives in this respect was crucial in the 
timing of Churchill’s move back to the Conservative party.103 Guest, Young 
and Mond had similar feelings but also found particular attractions in his 
desire to avoid social disharmony and ‘moderate’ financial policy; they 
initially saw Baldwin as someone with whom Liberals could work in 
partnership, but he also seems to have been an encouragement in their 
journeys out of Liberal politics.104 Simon was also influenced by Baldwin, 
having warmed to Conservative policy over the General Strike and due to 
his appointment to the India Commission, but Baldwin’s influence was 
ultimately less of a positive inclination.105 In government, after 1931, the 
close alignment of Simon’s position with that of Baldwin was a major factor 
in the difficulties Simon had in separating himself and his party from the 
Conservatives, with nothing seeming fundamentally different from 
Baldwin’s liberal Conservatism and Simon’s attempted creation of a distinct 
                                                          
101 Geoffrey Shakespeare to John Simon, 23 September 1932, Simon Papers MSS. Simon 
73/79-82. 
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103 See below, pp. 92-123. 
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patriotic Liberalism. Working in partnership with Baldwin then could be a 
way of losing a separate identify, even if this was not the intended outcome.  
The influence of Baldwin on recruitment extended to other Liberals 
too. A good example lies with McKenna whose major criticisms of high 
levels of government expenditure brought him closer to Baldwin’s position. 
In the years following the War, McKenna had, in any case, been moving 
closer to the Conservatives, witnessed through evidence of his involvement 
in an intrigue to replace the Lloyd George coalition with one led by 
Birkenhead, and friendly relations he had with Balfour and Bonar Law, both 
of whom had tried to persuade him to forsake his city role at the Midland 
Bank in order to take governmental office as Chancellor of the 
Exchequer.106 With all this in mind, McKenna became central to Baldwin’s 
early leadership strategy of wooing anti-Lloyd George Liberals in order to 
increase the liberal credentials of himself and his party, and by so-doing, 
enabling the passage of a renewed trade tariffs policy that would be 
controversial.107 Thus, he offered McKenna a further chance to join the 
government as Chancellor with pressure being applied on the Conservative, 
Sir Frederick Banbury, to resign his City of London seat in Parliament to 
make the way for McKenna to return.108 The situation was not all about 
political strategy, however, as there appeared to be a personal relationship of 
mutual admiration and respect that existed between both figures, with 
McKenna’s ‘promise’ to serve as Chancellor demonstrating more 
commitment to Baldwin personally rather than to Conservative politics. 
There was no sense that McKenna was interested in actually becoming a 
                                                          
106 Report, Liberal Magazine, December 1920; Diary of George Riddell, 23 June 1921, 29 
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Conservative; in fact, he was only prepared to fight an election as a Liberal, 
and was thus unwilling to completely sacrifice his Liberal credentials, which 
means his position was not dissimilar to some of the other Liberal recruits 
considered in this chapter in only going part way along the line of 
coalescence with Conservatives.109 This continuing affinity with the Liberal 
party was the main reason why he never got to become Chancellor since 
Banbury’s refusal to resign was on account of McKenna’s unfavourable 
party affiliation.110 
In relation to others, the situation is less explicit, but Baldwin’s 
influence also appears strong. A good example is in relation to Bernays over 
the specific issue of him taking the government Whip after the 1935 
election. He had been a critic, certainly in private, of Liberals in government 
which had left him refusing to formally associate himself with either Liberal 
faction, but, in 1935, he wrote to Baldwin explaining that he would wish to 
associate himself with the government by taking the Whip. This may be 
dismissible as an act of courtesy on Bernays’ part in simply informing the 
Prime Minister of his intentions, but the sense exists that Bernays wished to 
show Baldwin that he perceived himself to be his ally.111 And then, one has 
to consider the position of the Liberal Nationals themselves; it has been seen 
that they were often partisan but a number held very clear concerns about 
the need for retrenchment of public finances, and Baldwin’s common 
                                                          
109 This situation does not seem too dissimilar from the circumstances of Runciman being 
offered a Cabinet post by MacDonald in 1931; see below, pp. 224-267. It was Runciman’s 
professional business qualities which MacDonald wanted to utilise in the Cabinet and, in 
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something in the success of MacDonald, in the case of Runciman, and Baldwin, in the case 
of McKenna, in courting two Liberals whose separation from Liberal politics meant that 
they were more amenable to their services being sought outside the Liberal sphere.     
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feelings in this regard must have encouraged their involvement with the 
Conservative party from 1931. Some Liberal Nationals, such as Lambert, 
had been consistent critics of government expenditure since the War, and it 
is likely that they felt encouraged to support the National Government, 
knowing that Baldwin had shared his broad inclinations in this regard.112  
 
III 
 
The final aspect of Liberal recruitment into the Conservative party relates to 
the internal factors within the Liberal party itself which assisted the change 
in political allegiance. In terms of longer-term pressures on allegiance, one 
can cite the progressive development of poor relations with party figures and 
on-going factional conflict, whilst more immediate issues include specific 
differences between Liberals in relation to policy and strategy, often 
heightened by personal animosity. In all these developments, a sense 
emerges that intra-party difficulties could be affected by personal ambition 
and calculations of self-interest, which perhaps inevitably emerge in 
political relationships but also complicate assessment of the relevant issues. 
Overall, it can be seen that there are connections with the sections of the 
chapter concerning convergence of Liberal politics with the politics of the 
Conservative party, since many disagreements related to supposed negation 
of the appropriate political direction the Liberal party needed to take. But 
internal factors should not really be taken as direct reasons for changes in 
                                                          
112 For Lambert’s experience see: Report, George Lambert speeches, Liberal Magazine, 
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allegiance; their role was more to create a context for them in assisting the 
breakdown of whatever political associations there were with the Liberal 
party so that movement towards the Conservative party became more 
possible.        
 
Circumstances which affected later party allegiances can be traced back to 
even before the First World War in the cases of Liberal recruits with the 
longest political careers. This can be seen in relation to both domestic and 
international policy issues, where Liberals soon found their political 
aspirations were thwarted by other prevailing perspectives which led to 
some disagreements.  
On the domestic front, there were some concerns about the tendency 
of government to appease Liberal dogmatists rather than to act on the more 
cosmopolitan interests. This can be seen in the position adopted by Churchill 
and to a lesser degree Mond, from 1908.113 Churchill’s views varied from 
the government on issues such as licensing, disestablishment, education, and 
Irish Home Rule, leading him into his difficulties with colleagues when he 
entered the Cabinet. In line with his desire for a national government, it can 
be seen that Churchill wanted less Liberal party politics and more emphasis 
on social reform, and he was keen to move forward with the plan for 
National Insurance, believing it was being delayed, in part, by excessive 
Liberal partisanship. All his problems with the Liberal party were an 
encouragement to him in seeking rapprochement and, indeed, coalition with 
the Conservatives in order to develop a consensus over important policies, 
underlining a detachment from political colleagues even at this early stage of 
his involvement with the Liberal party. With regards to Mond, his concerns 
were about the pace of social reform, and he too looked for combinations 
outside Liberal politics, although he seemed more set on working with 
moderate Labour than the Conservatives at this time. In both cases, there 
was a particular disappointment with Asquith in his failure to live up to the 
expectation of driving social reform, but this sentiment was also coloured by 
frustrated ambition, with both Churchill and Mond believing that they had 
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talents which could be utilised, but were not recognised, so the disaffection 
certainly had a personal as well as political edge to it.   
Other future recruits also had concerns about domestic issues, such 
as Runciman and McKenna.114 They too ended up in conflict with partisan 
Liberal opinion in relation to issues such as education in the desire for 
secularisation.115 And there were also similar criticisms of Asquith’s 
leadership.116 The criticism had a personal flavour, despite otherwise 
friendly relations, since they were affronted by Asquith’s lack of support 
against their Cabinet opponents and believed that he was deliberately side-
lining them from important appointments, in particular, McKenna from the 
Chancellorship of the Exchequer in Lloyd George’s favour in 1908, and, in 
Runciman’s case, being moved to Agriculture from the Board of Education 
in 1911. Their feelings led them to contemplate resignation from the Cabinet 
and to feel a sense of insecurity about their long-term prospects under 
Asquith. This insecurity probably fed the tension which emerged with other 
Cabinet members, such as Lloyd George and Churchill, towards whom they 
developed difficult relations over the costs of social reform, particularly the 
cherished old age pension and National Insurance schemes.  
Domestic policy revealed some precursors of the later and more 
fundamental troubles in Cabinet, some of which were to emerge in 
international policy. The first of these difficulties was to come during 
McKenna’s period at the Admiralty. McKenna, not unlike his ally, 
Runciman, was a clear ‘navalist’, and keen therefore to bolster the Royal 
Navy, bringing him to the very centre of a controversy over naval 
construction, in 1909. He clashed with Lloyd George and Churchill, and 
relations were not aided when it was found that his plans were based on 
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false intelligence.117 Not long after, there was the Agadir Crisis of 1911, 
attracting further criticism, especially when Lloyd George and Churchill 
were edging towards support for a war with Germany. Both incidents were 
seized upon as evidence of McKenna’s unsuitability for an Admiralty role, 
and Asquith seemed receptive to the views, moving McKenna to the Home 
Office, with Churchill replacing him at the Admiralty.118 Both incidents 
could not have left McKenna with fond relations with any of the three 
Liberals, particularly Churchill and Lloyd George, whom he believed had 
manufactured his demise.119 With regards to Asquith, McKenna saw the 
situation as another example of how he had taken sides against him, being 
too easily influenced by other opinions. He also believed Asquith’s 
leadership skills were in question in not seeking to devise a firmer line on 
whether he wished his Cabinet to pursue a navalist or ‘continentalist’ 
policy.120 However, the situation has been seen to have galvanised support 
for McKenna, against Churchill and Asquith, from Runciman, who rightly 
saw the post-Agadir policy as one which would bring British interests closer 
to France, antagonise Germany and involve Britain in a continental land 
war.121 Both McKenna and Runciman were then similarly alienated from 
colleagues and once again there is evidence that they considered yet another 
resignation from the Cabinet.  
 The rift in the Cabinet over naval issues showed no signs of abating 
in the period up to the War. Fresh controversy emerged over the naval 
estimates for 1913-14. Runciman and McKenna were joined in opposition to 
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the direction of policy by other Liberals in the Cabinet, including Simon.122 
All believed that Churchill’s estimates were unnecessarily high, although the 
reasoning varied, with McKenna’s view being based on the need to avoid a 
costly continental war, whilst Simon appeared more concerned about the 
limitations that expenditure would bring to the government’s domestic 
agenda.123 Churchill found himself in a similar position to that of McKenna 
at the Admiralty in the years immediately before, but with a faction 
organised against him now, with Simon and McKenna being at the forefront 
of plans to oust him from government – McKenna seemed to want his 
revenge – and there was talk of more threats of resignation, if Asquith did 
not accede to their view.124 Of course, Churchill was not ousted and there 
were no resignations, just more undermining of internal political unity. The 
whole incident made no impact on McKenna’s integration within the 
government and it even assisted in pushing Churchill closer to the 
Conservatives, with his approach to them about some kind of political 
deal.125  
 All in all, the battle lines seemed already drawn for the wartime 
conflict in the years previous to it, but the rift between the two factions was 
extended significantly further by the experience of war, largely due to 
differences about how the war should be fought which created personal 
conflict.126 McKenna joined Runciman and, to some extent, Simon in 
seeking to fight for the maintenance of a limited war, and waging of 
economic warfare on Germany, which they saw as representing the best 
means to restore pre-war economic conditions after the War was over.127 
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However, the creation of the First Coalition brought to the fore the views of 
Liberal and Conservative compulsionists and, by 1916, McKenna and 
Runciman feared that the War would have lasting negative economic 
consequences, leading McKenna even to recommend that there should be a 
negotiated peace.128 This led to some major internal conflict with 
McKenna’s attempt to try to destabilise Lloyd George, encouraging the 
rumours of his intent to depose Asquith and seize power for himself.129 
McKenna was obviously quite alienated from Lloyd George and from the 
government, which led to another of his now customary threats of 
resignation, although he decided to stay to enable him to remain as a fifth 
column against Lloyd George and his distrusted Conservatives allies. 
McKenna was certainly not moving in the direction of the Conservative 
party at this time. He appears to have disliked them more than ever due to 
their leaders’ association with Lloyd George.130 In all this, McKenna did not 
win himself any particular friends. Not unlike his colleagues, Runciman and 
Simon, his actions in government had lost him Liberal allies outside of 
power, and his obsessive attack on Lloyd George left him with few friends 
closer to government too, with Mark Bonham Carter summing this up well 
in say that ‘he almost damns himself to perdition by his animus against his 
opponent’.131 McKenna, Runciman and Simon were not to remain long in 
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government; Simon chose to leave in January 1916 with the other two 
pushed out in December. Lloyd George’s success was a humiliation for 
McKenna and Runciman, and the experience was to leave them feeling 
rather ill-treated, not only by Lloyd George, but also Asquith too, whose 
characteristically indecisive leadership and lack of unambiguous support to 
them, they believed, had contributed to his and their fall; their fate and his 
was inextricably linked and no doubt it convenient to blame Asquith for a 
plight, a large extent to which was their own making.132 McKenna was 
clearly left disillusioned, taking up employment at the Midland Bank, and 
therefore leaving frontline politics. He does not appear to have given up on 
the idea of a return in more favourable circumstances, but the experiences of 
the years in Cabinet, self-made or otherwise, could hardly have offered him 
much incentive to be part of it.133 His situation may well have created a 
context for his being approached by Conservatives for a return to politics 
within a few years. No longer being set on an unequivocal return to a party 
which was still divided and even more influenced by his wartime opponent, 
Lloyd George, this offer gave him a way back without having to endure 
close association with Liberals he disliked.134 It points to a very real way in 
which McKenna’s removal of immediate connections of association with the 
Liberal party body opened the way for more positive connections to the 
Conservative party. Fascinatingly, however, McKenna’s position appears to 
have contrasted to a large extent with that of Simon and Runciman, who, 
despite being part of the same controversies, losing office and then their 
seats in Parliament, decided to continue their involvement in the Liberal 
party. They continued to hold political ambitions as Liberal politicians, 
which helps to provide the explanation. Both were alienated from Lloyd 
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George, but they continued to associate with Asquith, despite their doubts 
about his leadership, hoping to position themselves as his successors.135       
 It was not only the anti-Lloyd George faction that was affected by 
the experience of war. Churchill also was, with his treatment by Asquith in 
the Dardanelles campaign being decisive in alienating Churchill from him 
permanently.136 The situation also encouraged the development of a faction 
around Lloyd George and Churchill, with some Liberals relevant to this 
study, through their involvement with the Liberal War Committee 
especially, offering support for their wartime policy, and thus taking sides in 
the Liberal conflict.137    
 
The wartime period was important in recruitment generally in terms of a 
legacy of lasting factionalism, between a cohort of Liberals congregating 
around Asquith and one around Lloyd George, which had an impact upon 
personal relations and sense of integration within the party.138 The 
disagreements of wartime remained unresolved and evolved into fresh ones 
in peacetime which confirmed a permanent split that even Liberal reunion 
was not able to heal.139 This factionalism helped to encourage drift away 
from the party in the period up until 1931 and it assisted political opponents 
in exploiting the difficulties in the party, particularly Baldwin, whose attacks 
                                                          
135 See chapters below on Simon and Runciman. 
136 See below, pp. 92-123.  
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on Lloyd George were designed in part to make political capital out of 
Liberals divisions.140   
 The negative impact of factionalism can be seen on both sides of the 
political divide. On the Asquith side, there was Runciman and Simon.141 
Both held ambitions to resist Lloyd George’s takeover of the party. There 
were collective concerns about Lloyd George’s ethical and moral character, 
with impressions formed in the War added to by further supposed outrages 
against his opponents in engineering their defeat with the Maurice debate, 
the coupon in 1918, the use of his Political Fund to buy him influence after 
1922, and his role in the Liberal electoral rout of 1924 featuring strongly.142 
In the early post-war years, both responded with rigorous opposition to the 
Coalition, which led them into electoral controversy, particularly Simon, 
who found himself involved in an unpleasant political contest in the Spen 
Valley, in 1919, where his opposition to Lloyd George met with resistance 
from Lloyd George Liberals, adding to his alienation from Lloyd George 
and his supporters. Runciman, however, sought to try to build a rival 
coalition through his involvement in the ‘Grey conspiracy’, which showed 
his alienation to the extent that he was ready to work outside the Liberal 
party to defeat his political rival. However, after reunion, tactics switched, 
particularly as it became clear that Lloyd George’s influence was growing, 
with Runciman’s retreat into sectional partisanship, as witnessed through his 
involvement in the Radical Group (1924) and then Liberal Council (1927) 
and Simon’s retreat into a measure of political isolation, appearing more like 
an independent Liberal in the House of Commons. Both set out their own 
separate strategy and policy agendas from Lloyd George, exploiting political 
controversy to do with Lloyd George’s new leftist direction, and putting 
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forward their own alternatives versions.143 Such tactics were pursued with 
great energy in many ways, but it showed that they were not comfortable 
within their party, and they might have sought to distance themselves from 
it, like McKenna, had they not thought there was scope to depose Lloyd 
George.  
For both Runciman and Simon, their hopes of replacing Lloyd 
George waned both with Asquith’s retirement from politics in 1925 and 
death in 1928, which removed a vital ingredient in continuing interest in 
internal opposition to Lloyd George, and with politicians taking seats in 
Parliament, after 1929, with fewer connections to the politics of factional 
split. With these issues in mind and their general discomfort within the 
party, it is hardly surprising that they eventually started to seek to distance 
themselves from it with Runciman’s decision to retire from politics in 1930, 
not unlike McKenna before him, to pursue his business interests. For Simon, 
it encouraged his political interests outside the party, such as his 
involvement with the India Commission, as an alternative political role. In 
doing this, both found the important political connections outside the Liberal 
party – Runciman to MacDonald and Simon to Baldwin. The factional split 
and views of Lloyd George had certainly changed their relationship to their 
party fundamentally. This change was very significant in the new 
circumstances after 1931, since it enabled Simon to channel his energies into 
the creation of a new Liberal faction to work with his Conservative contacts, 
whilst in the case of Runciman, it assisted in offering his assistance to the 
new government on a professional business rather than party basis, 
accepting his Cabinet post on MacDonald’s request rather than Herbert 
Samuel’s or even Simon’s.  
 The political factionalism also negatively impacted on the integration 
of Lloyd George’s supporters into their party. Churchill and Mond had 
almost completely separated themselves from Asquith and his supporters 
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after the War.144 In Churchill’s case this was perhaps an encouragement to 
continue to emphasise the importance of working with the Conservatives, 
helping to draw him into the Conservative party fold. Mond seemed, on the 
face of it, to wish to see some kind of reconciliation, from 1922, favouring 
an early Liberal reunion, but his view was actually more that the Asquithian 
section should be absorbed into an augmented Liberal party dominated by 
Liberals who had been associated with Lloyd George. After reunion, 
evidence shows that Mond’s relations with Asquithians actually deteriorated 
since he disagreed with them publicly over party strategy and, very 
significantly in relation to this study, he could not come to terms with them 
in resistance to Liberal land policy, in the mid-1920s, which contributed 
directly to his decision to leave the Liberal party altogether. Had Mond been 
able to find common cause, perhaps he would have been dissuaded from any 
change of party.  
 Other Liberals also joined Churchill and Mond in separation from 
Asquith and his supporters. Firstly, there was Grigg. It has already been 
shown how he sought to distance himself from the Asquithians due to their 
views on empire, which, just like in the case of Churchill, encouraged 
Grigg’s desire for working with the Conservatives. He was not in favour of 
Liberal reunion, and after it, Grigg possessed poor relations with both Simon 
and the Radical Group judging from a range of exchanges in correspondence 
sources.145 Secondly, there was Guest.146 In the period between 1918 and 
1922, as a key election strategist and activist for Lloyd George, he planned 
and executed political manoeuvring against Asquithians, most particularly 
against Simon in the Spen Valley controversy.147 He too was against Liberal 
reunion and his feelings overall encouraged him to seek to work with 
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Conservatives rather than to build bridges with his former anti-coalitionist 
Liberal opponents. Finally, there was both Macpherson and Greenwood. 
They were targeted electorally by Asquithians, often leading them into 
candidate selection problems.148 In Greenwood’s case, such opposition was 
heightened by his own interference in the Spen Valley by-election.149 There 
is no direct evidence that Greenwood was drawn more to working with the 
Conservatives by involvement in such conflict, but it did nothing to assist 
him in remaining active in Liberal politics, particularly when, even after 
reunion, it does not appear that former Asquith Liberals in his Sunderland 
constituency were very prepared to support him.150  
However, not all Liberals were anxious to align themselves with one 
or other of the Liberal leaders in the factional conflict. Firstly, there was 
Lambert. He had lost his position as Civil Lord of the Admiralty when the 
May 1915 Coalition was created and he had not been given the coupon in 
1918, so in some senses he seemed equally separated from both leaders.151 
In the immediate aftermath of the 1918 election, he did take the Asquithian 
Whip, but he quickly tried to assist in circumventing the split, playing a role 
in unity negotiations, between February and April 1919, culminating in his 
election as Sessional Chairman of the ‘non-official’ Liberal members of the 
House of Commons.152 He was keen to distance backbench Liberal opinion 
from the split at the highest level. Lambert did, however, change his 
allegiances, in a manner, in accepting the Sessional Chairmanship of the 
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Coalition Liberal party, when a separate faction was formed in August 1919, 
which, on the surface, suggested he was taking sides with Lloyd George’s 
supporters.153 However, this proved not to be the case, given various 
criticisms of government policy over the period of the Coalition, and he 
continued to campaign for reunion, even becoming chairman of the Liberal 
reunion group in November 1922.154 Lambert was not at all impressed with 
Asquith, or Lloyd George, or their chief factional supporters, characterising 
the whole dispute as a ‘Liberal Luncheon War’, and he poured scorn on the 
records of both Liberal leaders, eventually claiming that together they had 
both helped to destroy the Liberal party.155 He believed they had ruined his 
aspirations for a reunified party, and this caused him to become 
disillusioned; a manifestation of this being his retreat into local constituency 
politics and a distancing of himself from the party apparatus.156 For 
Shakespeare, this disillusion was even starker, in some senses, with the 
internal strife leading him to withdraw his candidature for the Warwick and 
Leamington constituency in 1926.157 In neither case did their feelings 
immediately affect their party affiliation, but their seeking of extrication 
from the main affairs of the Liberal party is a significant development in the 
context of the decline in association with it; they were still interested in 
Liberal politics but their relationship to the party had been tested and the 
consequence had been a negative one.  
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Aside from the factional dispute there were also problems within the section 
of the party supposedly most connected to Lloyd George. In many cases, his 
supporters eventually found that he, as the critical figure that had been a 
focus of their involvement in the Liberal party, presented shortcomings of a 
personal, moral and ethical nature – in fact not dissimilar from Baldwin’s 
and the Asquithian views of him – and his move electorally to the left sat 
uneasily with their various political outlooks. From this perspective, Lloyd 
George can be seen as very central to their views, but this comes with many 
caveats since disagreement with Lloyd George could sometimes be seen as a 
means to disguise changes which were motivated by other and self-
interested factors.  
 Most of the Liberal recruits to the Conservatives had been, or were, 
allied to Lloyd George at the time of the Coalition. All of them objected to 
an altered political strategy which saw Lloyd George edge towards Labour 
after 1922, and this concerned them, not least because of their wish to seek 
to position the party closer to the Conservatives, due to their political 
convictions and electoral assessments in the desire for national government 
and the pursuit of anti-socialist strategies, for example. In one case – that of 
Churchill – this concern led to decisive alienation from Lloyd George and 
the party. He objected to the decision to vote Labour into office, which 
seemed clear evidence of the new approach; an event which, on the surface, 
appeared to be decisive in moving him out of Liberal politics for good.158 In 
reality, however, Churchill had been moving much closer to the 
Conservatives since 1922, so voting in Labour was more important in 
making his recruitment to the Conservatives seem less personally 
problematic. 
Another case is that of Mond. His electoral situation had pushed him 
to seek distinction from the Labour party, leading him to pursue a similar 
sort of ‘Constitutionalist’ position to Churchill, although without the 
commitment to integration into the Conservative party, even if he wanted an 
electoral truce with Baldwin.159 Mond was most dissatisfied with the 
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decision to vote Labour into government and, after 1924, his were amongst 
the strongest fears of Lloyd George’s intention to seek fusion with Labour, 
which would be disastrous to him electorally. His increased concern related 
to emerging land policy which he equated with nationalisation. Mond had 
been appointed as Chairman of the Commission on the land issue, but Lloyd 
George used his influence within the party to marginalise Mond’s position, 
which alienated Mond from him personally now, as well as politically. The 
disillusion that Mond suffered seemed to suggest that he wished to leave 
public life altogether and his resignation from the Liberal party in early 1926 
is evidence of this, but he stayed on, and joined the Conservative party, 
having been promised his peerage by Baldwin in return for his support. 
There is much to reflect on about the reasoning behind accepting a place in 
the Lords, but one explanation is that it was in line with his thinking about 
separating himself from party politics; in the Lords, no matter by whose 
nomination he got there, he could use his professional skills and avoid being 
embroiled in party disputes; indeed, something very attractive for a man 
who wished to maintain his political interest but to retire from the political 
mainstream and escape the politics of Lloyd George.   
For Guest and Grigg, Lloyd George encouraged them in their own 
form of attempted factionalism. Guest developed particular concerns, not 
unlike Mond, about land policy and also the General Strike.160 In his 
constituency, he declared himself effectively as an independent Liberal 
because of his concerns and in Parliament he sought to create a new faction, 
alongside Grigg, to oppose the direction of politics. As in the case of 
Asquithians, such tactics were evidence of his displeasure within the party, 
which did not go unnoticed by Lloyd George and his supporters who 
engineered a plot to oust him as Liberal candidate in Bristol, which 
contributed to his electoral defeat in 1929.161 The circumstances surrounding 
this event do seem central to the timing of Guest’s change of party since it 
was met with unprecedented bitterness towards Lloyd George, and it 
deprived him of an opportunity to realistically propagate his preferred 
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renewed alliance in Parliament between Liberal and Conservative forces. 
However, whilst Lloyd George had pushed Guest into fuller integration into 
the Conservative fold, he was already part way into it, since his compromise 
with the Conservatives in his constituency marked him as effectively a 
Conservative in an electoral sense, in any case.    
In relation to Grigg, Lloyd George must certainly have affected his 
political affiliation, firstly, in his resignation from Parliament, in 1925, 
partly in despair at the policy of the party, and then in seeking to create the 
new faction which was to evolve into his Liberal-Unionist idea.162 
Interestingly, and almost uniquely in the body of recruits, Grigg remained on 
good personal terms with Lloyd George, perhaps because of absence from 
Parliament, from 1925 to 1933, which meant that he was separated from any 
personal involvement in party disputes.163 Nonetheless, he was still affected 
by them with the failure of convincing Lloyd George and others of the 
suitability of his Liberal-Unionist idea, doing nothing to improve his 
sentiment about Lloyd George’s political direction, and perhaps assisting in 
his move out of Liberal politics altogether.    
A new factionalism took hold from 1930 when a pact with Labour in 
Parliament caused great concern amongst a large number of Liberals, 
significantly amongst a number of recruits who were to largely become the 
mainstay of the body of the Liberal National grouping in later 1931. Various 
criticisms emerged of Lloyd George’s policy, as it became clear that 
government policy was severely open to criticism.164 There was particular 
concern over issues, such as the Coal Bill, where some Liberals were 
shocked by Lloyd George’s encouragement of dropping opposition to it, in 
1930, with commentators having pointed to Clement Davies being 
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particularly infuriated on a personal level, as he had been working up a 
Liberal alternative.165 The situation revived electoral concerns, after a 
disappointing but not disastrous election performance in 1929, with Lambert 
even pointing out that Lloyd George’s policy would cost him his seat, and 
Hore-Belisha feared challenges to the integrity of an independent Liberal 
party, feeling that policy was drifting away from prudently ‘judging 
measures on their merits’ to other political calculations, which lacked 
principle.166 Shakespeare said: ‘I believe this policy of general support of the 
government will mean that we shall become a wing of the Labour party in 
two or three years with pacts in the constituencies’.167 In this atmosphere, 
many disaffected Liberals sought to organise themselves to oppose Lloyd 
George’s policy direction, operating more or less as a new but recognisable 
faction within the Liberal party by the middle of 1930.168 Lloyd George had 
driven them into factionalism by his policy towards Labour, and in this 
context it seems understandable that a faction, involving the greater element 
of this group, would edge from the party in the circumstances of the 
financial crisis in 1931 and into a separate parliamentary faction, which 
promised a new approach to managing public affairs, without the Labour 
party, or indeed, Lloyd George. In all this, it is significant that such Liberals 
involved themselves with Simon, whose complete separation from Lloyd 
George and distinction from the party body made him a suitable ally for 
disaffected Lloyd Georgians, despite his previous unpopularity amongst a 
large section of the party. The Liberal National grouping, from 1931, has 
been described as a disparate group of Liberal opinion, but in one sense it 
was not, in that it was the coming together of some former Asquithians and 
Lloyd Georgians, united now, at least for a while, in favour of a new policy 
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approach.169 There was a sort of paradox here of the coming together of 
elements of the old factions, Asquithian and Lloyd Georgian, whilst also 
assisting in the forging of the new post-1931 ones.     
 
IV 
 
In this chapter, it has been seen that there are a number of very significant 
similarities amongst the Liberal recruits. The opening major section showed 
that there were common social and cultural characteristics, particularly 
around middle-class or connections with the established elite, which created 
a political context to understand social and political aspirations, and ideas 
and values espoused. It has also assisted in providing a view of how 
recruitment related to the wider dimension of realignment of politics in the 
period.   
 The middle sections referred to the impact of convergence of Liberal 
with Conservative politics. On the electoral side, it was shown that pursuit 
of anti-socialism, although often lacking in substance, assisted in aligning 
Liberals with Conservatives since they appeared to occupy similar electoral 
ground, making them seem indistinguishable from them, even where that 
was not the intention. In some cases, particularly those of Grigg and 
Greenwood, anti-socialism became so important that it was more significant 
than emphasis on other electoral issues, making it very central to their 
associations with the Conservatives party. It was also central to Aske’s, 
although he, not unlike others in similar situations, was forced into pursuit 
of anti-socialism due to Liberal weakness in triangular contests. On 
reflection it can be seen that the language utilised in anti-socialism seemed 
to mimic the sort of political discourse emphasised by Baldwin, which 
suggests that he carried political influence on electoral campaigns, 
unconsciously perhaps in some cases.  
In terms of political ideas, convergence occurred as a result of both a 
patriotic desire for national government and wider developments of common 
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views on policy matters, often linked to associations with Baldwin. In the 
first case, it can be seen that some of the recruits were not very committed to 
Liberal politics in a partisan sense, having been more interested in patriotic 
and imperialist approaches ‘above party’ interests, which seems clear in the 
cases of three profiled specifically here – Grigg, Greenwood and Spears as 
well as others – and their drift in the Conservative direction, therefore, does 
not seem remarkable in this context. However, there is also a sense of short-
term thinking drawing Liberals to patriotic sentiments, despite other 
attachments to party, with accidental connection to the Conservatives, 
shaped by circumstances, certainly in the cases of the body of Liberal 
Nationals. In relation to values and policies more widely, Baldwin’s 
moderate middle-class and patriotic domestic agenda would seem to have 
won him supporters, with some very close contacts achieved with Liberals, 
not least in the case of McKenna. The connections with Baldwin are not as 
apparent as they might have been if more emphasis had been placed on the 
experiences of individuals being profiled in the case study chapters but the 
discussion here has at least shown aspects of his influence and the 
consequences for political affiliations.    
 The final section highlighted the importance of internal factors in 
alienating Liberals from their party. It was rare that these factors, in 
themselves, caused changes of allegiance, but they were very important in 
opening the way for those new associations since negative experience of 
involvement in the Liberal party encouraged the desire for extrication and 
consideration of involvement in politics on the outside, especially perhaps 
when encouragement was given from Conservatives, like Baldwin, for them 
to find an alternative political home in a different party.  
It has been shown that for some Liberals, their alienation from the 
Liberal party was progressive, over a period of many years, with the 
factional conflict sustained over the period of consideration, being very 
important. Difficulties with political leaders emerged, particularly Lloyd 
George, which were central to their disaffection. For former supporters of 
Asquith, objections to Lloyd George were shaped latterly by his treatment of 
them from wartime onwards, and there was a lot of personal animosity, 
particularly where they felt personally victimised. Lloyd George also 
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alienated former Coalition supporters and other Liberals elected for the first 
time after 1922 by his leftist position, which from the middle of the 1920s, 
became a major issue for continued associations with the Liberal party. 
Lloyd George’s politics can even be associated with developments after 
1931, with the group of Liberals who had organised to oppose him forming 
a separate faction to work with the Conservatives.  
Some of the disagreements developed a very personal dimension of 
mistrust which meant that ultimately there was not always much difference 
in views about Lloyd George between recruits who had been Asquith’s 
supporters and the wider body. However, it would be misleading to suggest 
that it was Lloyd George alone who destabilised involvement in the party; 
there was a lack of common purpose and personal agendas, self-interest and 
rivalry, which encouraged inflexibility, single-mindedness and extremities 
of opposition to Lloyd George – none of which could have been helpful to 
continuing associations with Liberal politics. 
Overall, the chapter has shown that Liberal recruitment was 
multifactorial in character. In most cases, recruitment does not seem to have 
been part of a grand plan, but largely more a reaction to circumstances as 
they emerged sometimes, indeed, over a very long period of time. Through 
examining the long-term factors in recruitment, it can be seen that the 
phenomenon could have a very long gesticulation period, with immediate 
circumstances being insufficient in themselves as explanations of the actual 
change in party. Moreover, the circumstances of Liberal recruitment can be 
seen to be central to understanding of realignment, with the recruits’ actions 
helping to further the disintegration of Liberal politics through participation 
in intra-party conflict and through the pursuit of links to the Conservatives.
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Chapter Two: Winston Churchill 
 
 
Examination of Winston Churchill as a specific focus is important to the 
topic of recruitment of Liberals into the Conservative party but it also raises 
some complications. An extensive range of secondary source material exists 
commenting on various aspects of his personal and political life leaving 
apparently little scope for fresh enquiry and analysis. Thus, it could 
plausibly be suggested that there is very little point in producing more 
material since there is a clear risk of repeating the arguments already put 
forward and offering little in the way of originality. Moreover, there is also 
a question mark as to the applicability of Churchill as a subject in a 
comparative study such as this given his position in starting and ending his 
career as a Conservative  – something that can be seen to make him 
somewhat of an anomaly. However, both these suggestions, if accepted, 
would ignore important points. Firstly, there are weaknesses in some of the 
historiography on the issues surrounding Churchill’s character and his 
decision-making about where his political allegiances should lie. This is 
because no substantive studies exist which make Churchill’s recruitment 
into the Conservative party a primary focus – they may refer to it but it is 
often secondary to some other major issue for consideration. Secondly, it 
would be a mistake to assume that Churchill’s career was so anomalous, for 
whilst he was one of only a handful of the recruits to have started out as a 
Conservative in the first place there are a number of commonalities between 
Churchill’s position and the positions of other individuals recruited from the 
Liberal party but with no prior political involvement with the Conservative 
party.1 
 
I 
 
The various studies of Churchill do provide some important coverage of 
aspects of his personal and political character. One issue has been the level 
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of consistency or principle in his political decision-making, and more 
specifically whether he was motivated by broad political values or by 
opportunism. Some of this discussion, when consolidated, brings together a 
detailed profile useful as a context for assessment of political affiliations, 
but there have been some different emphases and perspectives.   
 In terms of assessment of consistency and principle in Churchill’s 
involvement in politics Gilbert claims that Churchill followed a 
‘philosophy’ which he describes as a ‘middle course’, characterised by the 
desire for progressive reform.2 This is helpful in determining why Churchill 
changed his political associations since it can be seen have placed him 
awkwardly outside the party-system, preventing the development of bonds 
of loyalty towards a political party. Such notions of consistency are backed 
by John Charmley, Robert Rhodes James, Roy Jenkins, Henry Pelling, 
Geoffrey Searle and Martin Pugh.3 Charmley and Pelling, for instance, 
connect him to ‘Tory Democracy’ or ‘One Nation Toryism’, ‘Whig-
Liberalism’ and ‘Liberal-Imperialism’, and, of course, for Martin Pugh and 
Geoffrey Searle, Churchill is essential to their respective emphasis of the 
belief in the value of a patriotic centrist or national government.4 However, 
some other studies, by Paul Addison, Ian Chambers, and Keith Robbins, 
have emphasised more the inconsistencies and opportunistic aspects of his 
position, particularly in examination of Churchill’s political ambitions.5 
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3 John Charmley, Churchill: The End of Glory – A Political Biography (London, 1993), pp. 
19-20, 22, 29, 34; Robert Rhodes James, Churchill: A Study in Failure, 1900-1939 
(Harmondsworth, 1973), p. 40; Roy Jenkins, Churchill (London, 2001); Henry Pelling, 
Winston Churchill (London, 1974), pp. 69-7, 91-93; Martin Pugh, ‘Left in the Centre? 
Lloyd George and the Centrist Tradition in British Politics’ in Judith Loades (ed.), The Life 
and Times of David Lloyd George (Bangor, 1991), p. 20; and Geoffrey Searle, Country 
Before Party – Coalition and the Idea of “National Government” in Modern Britain, 1885-
1987 (London, 1995). 
4 See above, pp. 12-15. 
5 Paul Addison, Churchill on the Home Front, 1900-1955 (London, 1992), p. 40; Ian 
Chambers, ‘Winston Churchill and Irish Home Rule, 1899-1914’, Parliamentary History, 
Vol. 19 3 (2000), 405-421; Keith Robbins, Churchill (London & New York, 1992), pp. 18, 
33, 42.  
 
 
94 
 
These studies have assisted in overcoming a tendency towards being 
uncritical of Churchill, but assessment of opportunism can lead to sweeping 
assumptions and it is not always clear that evidence justifies the claims of 
opportunism; some caution is needed when examining the findings of these 
studies in this regard.  
 More recent research by Richard Toye has built on ideas about 
Churchill’s character, acknowledging points of principle and values – 
particularly in the context of his outlook of imperialism, his associations 
with Tory democracy and distinction from political parties – but at the same 
time recognising the underlying ambition which informed his perspectives 
and influenced his actions.6 He also places emphasis on the centrality of a 
rivalry and difficult friendship he held with Lloyd George, which was an 
underlying issue for the development of his political character and how he 
pursued his political career.7  
 In examination of Churchill’s change of political allegiance, between 
Liberal and Conservative, most sources have tended to be focused only on 
very immediate issues – most commonly the decision to vote Labour into 
office in 1924 – bypassing the possibility of fuller assessment over a longer 
period and leading to presentation of a perspective on Churchill that he had 
simply moved to the right of British politics.8 This is problematic since it 
exaggerates the significance of his concerns about Labour, and it reduces 
the capacity to establish the connections of Churchill’s change in party to a 
context of his political outlook, his disagreements over Liberal policy and 
poor personal relations with other Liberal politicians over a longer period of 
time.9 Toye has perhaps come closest to such a contextual assessment in his 
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consideration of his relationship with Lloyd George over many years. It can 
be seen very clearly that the negative aspects of their relationship affected 
not only personal and political relations between the two of them, but also 
Churchill’s relationship to the Liberal party, as his on-going involvement 
with the party had much to do with Lloyd George. Furthermore, in the 
period more immediate to the change of party, Toye describes the manner in 
which ‘by a series of crab-like stages’ Churchill moved into the 
Conservative party which can be seen as related to the state of his 
relationship to Lloyd George, connections with Conservatives (both on a 
personal and policy level), and interest in bringing together Liberals and 
Conservatives into a political union.10 Examination of research suggests, in 
fact, that this characterisation could be extended to a wider part of his 
political career since an impression is that Churchill was edging back into 
the Conservative party from almost as soon as he left it.  
  
II 
 
Examination of Churchill’s entry into the Liberal party in 1904 leads to 
considerable understanding of what attracted him to the Liberal party, what 
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factors drew him out of the Conservative party, and of his general lack of 
political tribalism. One issue of importance was the identification by 
Churchill of Liberals with the broad principles that he espoused. However, 
in this it is possible to observe Churchill’s misconceptions about how much 
the Liberal party could offer an outlook on politics akin to his and how 
much influence he would personally have over the party’s political 
direction; there might have been some Liberals whose politics were similar 
to his, but by no means all, and it was an error of judgement on his part to 
assume that the party would distance itself from its party political dogma. 
Overall, it seems that Churchill joined the party for some wrong reasons and 
thus his long-term commitment to involvement in Liberal politics was open 
to question even at the outset of his involvement.   
 It can be observed that Churchill’s position in leaving the 
Conservatives and joining the Liberal party had a good deal to do with 
policy issues, with particular criticism of Conservative policy on tariff 
reform (Churchill was a strong advocacy of Free Trade in common with 
Liberal politicians) and army expansion.11 The tariff reform issues was 
decisive. However, it was not only the specific policy Churchill objected to. 
He construed Conservative policy as a negation of the creation of a broad-
based ‘national party’ of which he was a firm advocate.12 This emphasis on 
the importance of this national party idea is important since it provides an 
indication of Churchill’s underlying political outlook. Here, there is much to 
link Churchill with the views of historians in connecting him firmly to what 
became known as One-Nation Toryism. This is particularly plausible given 
that he presented himself as a defender of his father’s political position 
(Lord Randolph, of course, being the archetypal One-Nation politician), and 
                                                          
11 Winston Churchill to C. E. B. Webb, 19 October 1903, in Randolph S. Churchill, 
Winston S. Churchill – Companion Volume 2 Part 1, p. 241; Winston Churchill to Lord 
Hugh Cecil, 24 October 1903, Chartwell Trust Papers CHAR 2/8/105-107; Winston 
Churchill to J. T. Travis-Clegg,  24 April 1903, Chartwell Trust Papers CHAR 2/3/113-
117; Toye, Lloyd George and Churchill, p. 27. 
12 Winston Churchill to J. T. Travis-Clegg, 24 April 1903, Chartwell Trust Papers CHAR 
2/3/113-117. 
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where he praised the combination of Conservative and Liberal Unionists as 
an example of near attainment of the national party idea.13 
 
[…] the Conservatives and Liberal Unionists by this compact 
seemed almost to have attained that grand ideal of a National Party 
of which Lord Randolph Churchill dreamed and for which he 
toiled.14 
 
However, whilst his position might seem in defence of his father’s cause, it 
is doubtful that Churchill was connected to such thinking entirely since, as 
even Charmley acknowledges, One-Nation Tories were first and foremost 
Tories, and were more partisan in their attitudes than Churchill. Rather, 
despite obvious differences over Free Trade, it seems that his perspective 
may have been more heavily influenced by Joseph Chamberlain in terms of 
his attempts at coalition-building through the compact between the 
Conservatives and Liberal Unionists and in the pursuit of a managerial, 
imperialist and social-reformist policy distinct from party interests. Such a 
connection makes sense given Churchill’s praise of the Liberal Unionists, 
and also similarly-minded Liberals who were also influenced by 
Chamberlain or had previous associations with the strongly imperialist 
Rosebery faction and who, in the early years of the twentieth century, 
continued to pursue a brand of imperialist politics. Indeed, immediately 
prior to his change of party, Churchill had been hopeful that a coalition led 
by Rosebery might be established.15 A measure of this connection is 
reinforced by the experience of the Oldham election of 1900 where private 
correspondence points to friendly relations with his Liberal ‘Imperialist’ 
opponent at the election, Walter Runciman, hinting at some kind of political 
connection which would endure whatever outcome the election brought.16 
Churchill suggested that ‘the success of either of us need not necessarily 
                                                          
13 Charmley, Churchill, pp. 19-20. 
14 Winston Churchill to J. T. Travis-Clegg, 24 April 1903, Chartwell Trust Papers CHAR 
2/3/113-117. 
15 Toye, Lloyd George and Churchill, p. 37. 
16 See below, pp. 224-267.  
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mean the discomfiture of the other’ and commented that it was ‘a 
satisfaction to know that we don’t enter in this contest in any ungenerous 
spirit’.17  
 Not all of the reasoning to change party was based on a rational 
assessment of commonality over political outlook, however; one can also 
see the decision in the context of a tendency to make rash judgements. A 
Conservative mentor of Churchill’s in his early political years, Hugh Cecil, 
noted his ‘incalculable instability’.18 Cecil felt that Churchill shared little in 
common with the Liberal party beyond common views on Free Trade, 
wisely anticipating future problems for his relationship to the party. 
However, Churchill said that the Liberal party was to be recast as a buffer 
between the powerful forces of capital and labour, and, in a rebuke to Cecil, 
advised him to face the ‘real facts of the case and help to preserve a 
reconstituted Liberal Party’.19 But the Liberal party’s ability to be 
transformed in this way was wishful thinking since it was steeped in party 
tradition and with the political pendulum swinging back to the party in the 
years after the Khaki election of 1900 it was unlikely to seek to transform 
itself too greatly. Churchill had been prematurely anticipating realignment 
and thus his future in the Liberal party did not bode well since he was sure 
to be disappointed when he found that the Liberal party did not 
‘reconstitute’ itself in the way that he had anticipated, becoming in many 
ways more partisan as its partisan elements grew in confidence, despite the 
presentation of reformist policies in the Edwardian era. 
 Some of these latter points suggest a kind of idealism that shaped 
Churchill’s views, but there is a potential for overstatement here with his 
justification for joining the Liberal party potentially related to more 
                                                          
17 See Walter Runciman to Winston Churchill, 8 August 1900, Chartwell Trust Papers, 
CHAR 1/25/25. Some of the comments related to the context of potentially working 
together as the constituency elected two members, but the friendliness also indicates 
Churchill’s view that their political outlooks were not dissimilar. 
18 Lord Hugh Cecil to Winston Churchill, Undated December 1903, Chartwell Trust Papers 
CHAR 2/2/10/67-70.  
19 Winston Churchill to Lord Hugh Cecil, 24 October 1903, Chartwell Trust Papers CHAR 
2/8/105-107.  
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opportunistic motives in his strong desire to obtain political office.20 This 
point becomes important in assessment of the origins of the pre-war 
relationship between Lloyd George and Churchill. Churchill seems to have 
seen in him not only someone who shared his outlook on politics, but also 
someone with rising stature. Working with Lloyd George would 
undoubtedly assist Churchill’s own rise and thus cooperation with him was 
a means to aid the advancement of his own political ambitions. 
 
III 
 
On the surface, it might have appeared that suggestions of difficulties for 
Churchill’s relationship to the Liberal party were unfounded since he was 
able to pursue a political career as a prominent Liberal MP entering the 
Government as a junior minister in Colonial Office, in 1905, and, after 
1908, as a member of the Cabinet, often in pursuit of issues which suited his 
political outlook. Electorally too, his situation seemed more secure; he 
deserted his Oldham constituency in 1906 for Manchester North West, 
presumably so he could centre his campaign more successfully on Free 
Trade and, although he lost a ministerial by-election in April 1908, he was 
returned the following month in safer Liberal territory in Dundee. However, 
his position was not so comfortable given that he developed severe 
misgivings about the partisan elements in his new party and their ability to 
wreck the passage of legislation that he believed vital to the national 
interest. He also developed poor relations with Cabinet colleagues; in fact, 
this happened very swiftly on his arrival into government, with concerns 
surfacing about government policy. After September 1911, furthermore, he 
entered into a factious dispute with colleagues over naval policy, from 
which he was to emerge as a discontented loser.  
 Some understanding of Churchill’s awkward position can be gained, 
first of all, from examining the years prior to his Cabinet appointment. 
Churchill’s private papers during the period show that on questions, such as 
                                                          
20 Toye, Lloyd George and Churchill, pp. 27-35. 
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licensing, disestablishment and education, he was ambivalent, refusing to 
accept the Liberal line, and on Irish Home Rule he was more interested in 
defending Ulster.21 Churchill seemed only prepared to acquiesce with 
Liberal policies he agreed with, namely Free Trade, retrenchment (certainly 
in terms of military if not domestic spending), and Army reform. This 
reveals evidence of a consistency in his political principles but was a 
significant obstacle to his ability to fully integrate himself into the Liberal 
party.22  
 Whatever his sentiments about the Liberal party, potentially he 
might have become more contented following his appointment to the 
Cabinet in April 1908. Churchill initially seemed to be enthusiastic about 
the prospect, explaining to Asquith reassuringly, just before his appointment 
as President of the Board of Trade, that he would support him in ‘whatever 
you [Asquith] decide is best for the Government & is in the general 
interest’.23 However, the arrival of Churchill into the Cabinet revealed poor 
integration into the ministerial team. Some opinions of Churchill in 
government can be found, all pointing out negative characteristics in the 
desire ruthlessly to force through his own perspective, no matter the 
consequences for colleagues, and an inability to be reconciled to decisions 
he was not in favour of.24 Furthermore, some Cabinet colleagues saw him as 
a source of factionalism and disharmony, and undermining good working 
relationships, with Charles Hobhouse summing this up in saying that ‘the 
                                                          
21 Winston Churchill to Samuel Lamb, 26 March 1904, Chartwell Trust Papers CHAR 
2/16/94-95; Election address, 1 January 1906, in Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. 
Churchill – Companion Volume 2 Part 1, pp. 421-424; Chambers, ‘Winston Churchill’, 
411-415.  
22 Winston Churchill to Samuel Lamb, 26 March 1904, Chartwell Trust Papers CHAR 
2/16/94-95. 
23 Winston Churchill to H. H. Asquith, 14 March 1908, Asquith Papers MSS Asquith 11/10. 
24 Diary of Charles Hobhouse, 27 July 1908, 13 August 1912, in Edward David (ed.), Inside 
Asquith’s Cabinet – From the Diaries of Charles Hobhouse (London, 1977), pp. 73, 121; 
Journal of J. A. Pease, 19 July 1909, Cameron Hazlehurst & Christine Woodland (ed.), A 
Liberal Chronicle – Journals and Papers of J. A. Pease, First Lord Gainford, 1908-1910 
(London, 1994), p. 127. 
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whole Cabinet atmosphere [had] been upset by Churchill’.25 Part of this 
concern was the emergence of Churchill’s alliance with Lloyd George, 
which appeared as a challenge to Asquith’s leadership; Churchill was 
largely blamed for this new cleavage within the Cabinet, even though it was 
just as much of Lloyd George’s making as Churchill’s, which is testament to 
Churchill’s reputation.26  
 As well as poor relations in Cabinet, Churchill was not very satisfied 
with his portfolio, at least before 1911. Churchill had not been keen on a 
domestic portfolio, having hinted at replace Elgin as Secretary of State at 
the Colonial Office to carry on his work in winning support for what he 
termed ‘a policy outside party lines’.27 Here one can gain some 
understanding of his discontent in that he wished to avoid any office which 
would embroil him in Liberal partisan politics, maintaining the distance he 
had established since joining the Liberal party. And then, once in Cabinet, 
he found it hard to resist interfering in other ministers’ non-domestic 
portfolios, particularly to the detriment of relations with Asquith, to some 
extent, and Reginald McKenna over naval spending and the management of 
the Royal Navy.28  
 By the turn of the decade, it became clear that Churchill was keen on 
the possibility the government could be reconstituted as a coalition; 
suggesting that he had no faith in a single party Liberal government 
anymore.29 This was clear during the constitutional crisis of 1910 when he 
appears to have supported a coalition arrangement with the Conservatives in 
order to secure a range of policies which he had interests in, such as House 
of Lords reform to ease the passage of his National Insurance plan, Poor 
Law reform, and reform of the Navy in defiance of the direction set under 
                                                          
25 Diary of Charles Hobhouse, 7 March 1909, p. 73. 
26 Toye, Lloyd George and Churchill, pp. 38-120.  
27 Winston Churchill to H. H. Asquith, 14 March 1908, Asquith Papers MSS Asquith 11/10. 
28 Winston Churchill to Reginald McKenna, 19 September 1908, McKenna Papers MCKN 
3/17/8-10. His interference was in collaboration with Lloyd George; see Toye, Lloyd 
George and Churchill, p. 54.  
29 Alfred Mond was also greatly excited by the prospect of a coalition; see below, pp. 124-
153. 
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McKenna.30 And after the crisis, he continued to urge for more dialogue 
between the two parties. These sorts of sentiments emerged strongly in 
private correspondence with Asquith:  
 
I trust that some of the disappointment of defeat may be mitigated 
by a Liberal grant of Honours […] to prominent members of the 
Opposition […]. Then on policy – we shd offer to confer with the 
Conservatives not only on the reform of the House of Lords, but on 
[…] the Poor Law, on […] Labour […] I should like to come to an 
understanding with Balfour about the Navy… You will be strong 
enough to pursue a sober & earnest policy without the stimulus of 
undue partisanship: & it is my hope that after triumphing in the 
storms of faction Liberalism may acquire that measure of national 
approval wh is due to those who have not merely been successful 
but sight upon many of the great questions of the day.31 
 
It is useful to note that Churchill pointed out a need for a less partisan 
response, seemingly reaffirming a view that Liberal partisanship was a 
major barrier to reconciling the political parties and introducing reforms that 
represented a higher national interest.32  
 Despite all his perspectives, Churchill progressed within the 
government as Home Secretary in 1910 and then as First Lord of the 
Admiralty in September 1911, which perhaps marked a concession to his 
interest in foreign and imperial affairs and the desire for a non-domestic 
portfolio; however, this move created further tension with colleagues, 
particularly after the Agadir Crisis of 1911, when he argued that more 
resources should be directed to the Royal Navy to protect British 
                                                          
30 Charmley, Churchill, p. 66; Gilbert, Churchill, p. 217.  
31 Winston Churchill to H. H. Asquith, 3 January 1911, Asquith MSS Asquith 13/1-5. 
32 Toye suggests that there were some underlying tensions with Lloyd George over both 
coalition arrangements and National Insurance, however. Churchill, it is claimed, was being 
‘elbowed out’ of being given credit for the National Insurance policy, and he was 
suspicious that Lloyd George would desert him in a coalition deal; see Toye, Lloyd George 
and Churchill, pp. 57-8, 69. If either of these points is correct they could hardly have 
assisted Churchill’s sense of security in the Cabinet.  
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supremacy.33 The problem was that this argument did not carry much 
weight with Liberals of a more pacifistic variety, and this reached its peak in 
the controversy over the naval estimates for 1914.34 It was all very 
damaging to Churchill’s position and could have done little to assist a sense 
of comradeship; however, evidence shows that a sense of disillusion was 
further heightened by Lloyd George’s position in 1913. Lloyd George had 
given him private assurances that he would support him on the naval 
estimates, but when it came to it he reneged on this undertaking, effectively 
siding with the Churchill’s opponents, leaving Churchill now totally 
isolated.35 The problems created over the 1914 estimates had a clear impact 
upon Churchill’s position. For a second time, he sought to make contact 
with Conservatives in order to broker some kind of deal, possibly coalition, 
which would lead to support for his proposals.36 And in correspondence 
with Asquith he indicated the possibility that he might leave the 
government.37  
 Thus, by the end of the pre-war period, Churchill was disillusioned 
and it seems that he was regretting his involvement with the Liberal party. 
Churchill apparently stated: ‘Every politician makes one great mistake in his 
                                                          
33 In a sense, this was a departure from his previous view, but it was consistent with his 
national policy in its pragmatic focus on the protection of British imperial interests. The 
question was no longer about purely making military forces efficient; there needed to be 
expansion to deal with the threat. See Pelling, Churchill, pp. 150-153; Addison, Churchill, 
(London, 1992), p. 83; Gilbert, Churchill, p. 243; Jenkins, Churchill, pp. 202-204, 222; and 
Charmley, Churchill, p. 84. Also see above, pp. 74-75. 
34 Diary of Charles Hobhouse, 27 November 1912, p. 124; Diary of C.P. Scott, 15 & 23 
January 1914, in Trevor Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of C.P. Scott 1911-1928 
(London, 1970), pp. 73, 78; Winston Churchill to H. H. Asquith, 18 December 1913, in 
Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill – Companion Volume 3 Part 1 (London, 
1972), pp. 1857-1858.  
35 Winston Churchill to Lloyd George, 16 December 1913, in Randolph S. Churchill, 
Churchill – Companion Volume 2 Part 3 (London, 1969), p. 1833; Martin Pugh, Lloyd 
George (London & New York, 1988), p. 71; Diary of C. P. Scott, 15 January 1914, p. 73; 
Toye, Lloyd George and Churchill, pp. 104-105. 
36 Gilbert, Churchill – A Life, p. 269. 
37 Winston Churchill to H. H. Asquith, 18 December 1913, in Randolph S. Churchill, 
Churchill – Companion Volume 2 Part 3, pp. 1834-1835. 
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life. I made mine when I left the Tory party’.38 Furthermore, he went on: ‘If 
I hadn’t [left] I should be its leader’. This latter suggestion was unrealistic 
but it is useful in understanding Churchill’s state of mind more fully since it 
is a reflection on his unfulfilled ambitions in seeking a higher place for 
himself in politics. Churchill had risen to the Cabinet but he still lacked the 
influence over affairs that he sought; Churchill believed he deserved more 
and this had not been delivered through involvement in Liberal politics as 
he had anticipated.  
 
IV 
 
The early years of the First World War saw more disagreements. What a 
number of Liberals disliked was Churchill’s early and enthusiastic embrace 
of military conscription and the idea, building on his previous thoughts, that 
a coalition government was needed to manage the war effort.39 All this gave 
him a reputation as a war-monger, amongst a large section of opinion in the 
Liberal Cabinet and raised further suspicions about the extent of his loyalty 
towards the Liberal party.40 However, what was more significant for his 
integration within the party was a further deterioration of his relationship 
with Asquith, in particular, as a result of the failures of the campaigns, first 
in 1914, at Antwerp, and then, in 1915 in the Dardanelles in which, as First 
                                                          
38 Diary of C. P. Scott, 23 October 1913, p. 64.  
39 Journal of J. A. Pease, 25 August 1914 in Martin Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill – 
Companion Volume 3 Part 1 (London, 1972), p. 54; Gilbert, Churchill, p. 302; Charmley, 
Churchill: (London, 1993), p. 97. There are parallels here with the position of Mond; see 
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40 Diary of Margot Asquith, 8 May 1915, in Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill – Companion 
Volume 3 Part 1, pp. 849-850; Margot Asquith, The Autobiography of Margot Asquith, Vol. 
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Lord of the Admiralty, he played a key role.41 Churchill felt that Asquith did 
nothing to defend him, and this led to a feeling of great alienation.42  
 Grievances against Asquith can be traced back to the establishment 
of the First Coalition when Churchill was demoted to the position of 
Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster. Asquith’s decision was a personal 
blow.43 Churchill clearly felt that he was being unfairly treated and this was 
a sign that Asquith was intent on making him appear culpable for the failed 
campaigns.  
 
I do not feel that my judgements have been falsified, or that the 
determined pursuance of my policy through all the necessary risks 
was wrong. I wd do it all again if the circumstances were repeated 
[…].44 
 
A mixture of personal sorrow, indignation and frustration emerged and it all 
led him to become preoccupied with the need to prove his innocence of the 
charges against him, writing to Asquith on at least two occasions, urging 
him to publish documentation that he felt would help him, claiming that he 
was ‘in the shadow of utterly false opinions which are a serious injury’.45 
The fact that Asquith refused to do so only served to widen the gulf between 
                                                          
41 Pelling, Churchill, p. 216; Keith Robbins, Churchill (London, 1992), p. 69; Jenkins, 
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& Asquith papers, in Gilbert, Winston S. Churchill – Companion Volume 3 Part 1, pp. 454-
455 & pp. 849-850).  
43 Winston Churchill to Archibald Sinclair, 9 June 1915 in Ian Hunter (ed.), Winston & 
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them. Churchill came to believe that Asquith did not want to do this in order 
to hide his own role in ‘approving and agreeing at every stage’ in these 
campaigns.46   
 As if his relations with Asquith were not bad enough, other 
damaging situations came about. One issue was the general opinion that 
Churchill developed towards this coalition. He was critical of Asquith and 
his government, believing that there was a lack of direction, and he started 
to ponder the possibility of alternative governments under the headship of 
Lloyd George.47 His position on coalitions was known in Parliament and it 
was thought that Churchill was actively seeking to bring down the 
government, which hardly helped his relations with Asquith and his Liberal 
supporters.48 The view of Churchill’s conspiring was not an unreasonable 
opinion to possess given his renewed close working with Lloyd George (he 
had put aside his pre-war disagreements to some degree) in relation to 
controversial issues, such as conscription, which over the course of time 
were helping to undermine Asquith’s authority.49  
 Furthermore, Churchill had continued to covert a military portfolio 
and found it difficult to accept that he was not considered for a Cabinet post 
at the War Office, on the death of Kitchener, or for a place in the War 
Council. He found it so difficult in fact that it was another source of 
alienation, leading him finally to resign from the government in November 
                                                          
46 Winston Churchill to Clementine Spencer-Churchill, 2 January 1916, Spencer-Churchill 
Papers, CSCT 2/9/4. 
47 Winston Churchill to Archibald Sinclair, 30 July 1915, p. 18; Toye, Lloyd George and 
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1915.50 Churchill claimed privately that ‘I can feel no sense of loyalty or 
friendship for Asquith after the declaration of his utter indifference’.51  
 Poor relations with Asquith by this time could have seen Churchill 
seek to distance himself from the Liberal party too, and this occurred to an 
extent through further consideration of the alternative coalition 
arrangements he wished to be put in place. For him, hopes rested on an 
arrangement involving Lloyd George and Bonar Law, actually with no 
particular view about which of them should lead, indicating that Liberal 
party interests were subservient to other considerations in creating an 
effective administration.  
 
I have a feeling that B. L. and L. G. have a supreme chance now, if 
they have the resolution to act. It does not seem to me material 
whether B. L. is first or L. G. War or vice versa. Either place wd 
afford the basis of an effective war organisation - compared to wh 
nothing matters [...].52 
 
Of course, Churchill’s position was in part to improve his own political 
standing. Linking himself to Lloyd George was the only way he could ever 
return to office.53 There had been some lingering bitterness to Lloyd George 
as a result of the disagreements in the pre-war period and due to his lack of 
support for him on the Dardanelles, but these thoughts had to be cast aside if 
Churchill was to achieve his ambitions.54 However, it is clear that he was 
still not altogether positive about the possibility of cooperation with Lloyd 
                                                          
50 Winston Churchill to Archibald Sinclair, 9 June 1915, Thurso Papers THRS 1/1/2; 
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George given Churchill’s view of the personal challenges this would 
provide in suggesting that ‘distrust based on experience is a terrible 
barrier’.55 Thus, he was aware that cooperation with Lloyd George was not 
necessarily going to provide him with a political future which would make 
him any more content.    
 
V 
 
By 1916, Churchill seemed to have returned more clearly to his original 
goal of creating the new national party. What he envisaged was much 
greater co-operation between Liberals and Conservatives outside the main 
parties in the interests of winning the War and afterwards in pursuing the 
appropriate national policies for the post-war reconstruction.56 However, 
this new position was in many ways really a precursor to that after 1920 
when he came to advocate a policy of ‘fusion’ which was intended to 
solidify the arrangement formally by uniting the two coalitionist wings of 
the Liberal and Conservative parties, and thus truly putting into existence 
the national party.57 Thereafter, he predicted the establishment of a new 
alignment in politics whereby the new division would be between a national 
bloc (made up of the united coalitionists) and Labour. 
 
Mr. Churchill agreed that the old lines of cleavage had been 
obliterated by the war, and that new lines of cleavage had come into 
existence; that old causes of controversy are no longer operative 
[…]. 
 ‘[...] Why should it not be possible now, at this moment, 
when our difficulties are so great, when they call for our united 
exertions – why should it not be possible to combine the patriotism 
                                                          
55 Winston Churchill to Archibald Sinclair, 30 July 1915, p. 18. 
56 Report, Liberal Magazine, August 1919. 
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and stability of the Conservative Party with the broad humanities 
and tolerances of Liberalism?’. 58 
 
Fusion was also important in dealing with a threat to national stability that 
he suggested was posed by the Labour party by providing the necessary 
bulwark against it ever coming to power.59  
 
The advent of a Socialist Government to power would be a national 
and imperial disaster on the greatest possible scale. The Socialist 
Party have shown themselves […] quite unfit to govern. The 
calamitous strikes in which they have involved us, the open failure 
of their moderate leaders to control their extremists, have 
undoubtedly been a great aggravation of the suffering which had in 
any case to follow the war. The accession to power, now or in the 
next year or two, of a raw Socialist Government would utterly 
destroy the commercial credit and confidence upon which our hopes 
of economic revival can alone be based; and its mere menace would 
overhang business and enterprise like a black cloud.60 
 
The importance of the anti-socialist element should not, however, be 
overplayed since beyond the rhetoric there appears to be very little 
substance.61 Churchill had, of course, favoured collectivist measures in the 
pre-war period and his aim here was to use language to raise the profile of a 
supposed threat of socialism to bring Conservative opinion round to his 
view.62 Furthermore, on a more personal level there was likely to have been 
increasing anxiety at his position in Dundee where he was vulnerable to 
Labour and divisions within the Liberals meant that some direct appeal to 
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Conservative voters in Dundee was essential if he was to hold his seat in a 
post-war election.63  
 Churchill’s re-emphasis of the national party idea made him no more 
satisfied with his position in politics, however. There were a number of 
reasons for this chiefly relating to his relationship with Lloyd George.64 
Firstly, there were their personal relations, which quickly became tense, not 
in a dissimilar way to those between Churchill and Asquith in 1914 and 
1915, due to Lloyd George’s supposed lack of recognition of his talents. On 
the creation of the government, Churchill was not even included, largely due 
to his unpopularity with Conservatives, but it was Lloyd George who was 
deemed to be at fault, with Churchill believing that he had formulated some 
deal to his detriment with the newspaper baron, Northcliffe, over the 
composition of the government.65 He did, of course, soon obtain office, 
firstly as Minister of Munitions and then as Secretary of State for Air and 
finally as Colonial Secretary, which brought him more influence, and it has 
been claimed that these developments improved ‘his state of mind’, but 
there was always the sense that he wanted something more, and he again 
found fault with Lloyd George for not offering him the position of 
Chancellor of the Exchequer in 1921.66 With regards to this Chancellorship 
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appointment, there was suspicion that Lloyd George had colluded with 
Birkenhead in some way.67   
 Secondly, there were problems in relation to policy. Before the War, 
this appears to have rested purely upon discomfort over the composition of 
the government which Churchill suggested would not be able to pursue the 
necessary policies with enough vigour.68 However, after the War, they 
became more severe relating to domestic and foreign policy issues. 
 Of the issues in relation to domestic policy, two emerged, in 
particular, which pointed to the government’s weaknesses in a policy that 
would appeal to the national interest or indeed to safeguard electoral 
interests, and this led to appeals to Lloyd George for a change in direction. 
Churchill was critical of the government’s policies on war profits; he 
wanted them taxed as a pragmatic means of controlling debt and also a 
patriotic concession to the idea of equality of sacrifice in the post-war 
reconstruction.69 
 
The first and greatest mistake in my opinion was leaving the 
profiteers in the possession of their ill-gotten war wealth. Had 
prompt action been taken at the beginning of 1919, several thousand 
millions of paper wealth could have been transferred to the State and 
the internal debt reduced accordingly. The question was, however, 
deliberately held over and delayed until the moment was lost. Most 
of this war-made capital has faded as fast as it was created, but 
internal debt, which might so largely have cancelled and which was 
incurred in similar abnormal conditions, towers up over us like a 
precipice. The assets of taxation to which the State might have 
looked have vanished: the war debts of the State are consolidated 
and will even grow heavier as trade revives and money regains its 
purchasing power [...]. In looking back on this lost opportunity I feel 
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that it constitutes a very great and irreparable disaster to the 
country.70 
 
Free Trade was more significant. Churchill had backed the continued use of 
Protection in peacetime, as a pragmatic short-term measure to correct the 
imbalances that existed in trade, and he continued to emphasise that some 
measure was justifiable, even by the end of the 1918-22 Parliament.71 
However, his wider inclinations to Free Trade led him to be concerned that 
Liberals in the government were not honouring their pledges on its 
restoration with some electoral fall-out likely unless the government altered 
its position; he was unclear of the wisdom of safeguarding legislation as it 
emerged in the Act of 1921.  
 
I think we are forced to give further consideration to the working of 
the Safeguarding of Industries Act. I consider that we have been 
drawn and are being drawn a long way from the original pledges and 
undertakings which we gave our constituents at the General 
Election, and that very great injury will be caused in Coalition 
Liberal seats if this tendency develops. At the General Election it 
was understood that certain industries vital to our war-making 
capacity of which we had felt the need in the war should be fostered 
here. A very small number of industries were contemplated, and this 
position could quite easily be defended as a matter of practical 
administration without any derogation from the principles of Free 
Trade.72  
 
Such feelings about Free Trade may also have been on his mind when the 
Exchequer was filled by a Tory. As Churchill perceived himself to be a 
leading Liberal Free Trader in the government, his failure to be appointed to 
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the post was not just a personal blow but also a blow to the prospects of the 
reintroduction of a clear Free Trade policy.  
 In relation to foreign affairs, there were three major issues of 
contention. The first of these was in relation to the policy over Turkey 
where Churchill viewed the government’s pro-Greek policy as harmful to 
the integrity of the Empire due to the impact that this was likely to have 
upon Islamic opinion.73 However, there was also the attitude towards Soviet 
Russia. He regretted severely the lack of firm commitment to the White 
Russians and later the decision to open diplomatic and trade relations with 
Russia – something which significantly led to the thinly veiled threat of his 
resignation in July 1922.74 Whilst some of his criticism was probably 
tactical, with electoral considerations in mind, it also appears there was a 
genuine sense that Churchill believed there were severe dangers in 
appeasing Bolshevik activity in terms of the threat to imperial interests. 
 
I contend that the disasters in Russia are solely due to the 
Bolsheviks - a terrible sect of cosmopolitan fanatics, whose 
devastating doctrines of fierce execution have laid Russia low, and 
will lay low every nation in which they obtain ascendancy [...]. It is 
becoming increasingly clear that all these factions are in touch with 
one another, and are acting in consort - in fact, are developing a 
world-wide conspiracy against our country, designed to deprive our 
place in the world and rob us of the fruits of victory [...].75 
 
Also, linked to this were his views about Germany. Churchill felt that 
Germany should be treated less harshly and thus the terms of the post-war 
peace treaties should be altered.76 As a central European power, Churchill 
believed that it could be built up as a bulwark against Soviet advances into 
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Europe. Churchill, it appears, felt so strongly about this issue that he was 
prepared, at one point, to contemplate open defiance of the government.77  
 Finally, there were the army and naval considerations. Churchill was 
successful in fighting off attempts for the Geddes Axe to be wielded through 
his ministry (as Secretary of State for War and Air, January 1919 to 
February 1921), but not without a struggle. The existence of Bolshevism 
and the extra commitments to British mandated territories following the 
peace treaties convinced Churchill that this was not the time for sweeping 
economies and it seems that he felt that Lloyd George was lacking in 
judgement by thinking that this could be the case.78  
 All of these difficulties raise questions about why Churchill chose to 
co-operate with Lloyd George for as long as he did and the major 
explanation was that he was reliant on Lloyd George for political influence 
and it was the only means for him to be able to encourage a fusion between 
the Conservative party and the Coalition Liberals.79 Nonetheless, it did not 
stop him from seeking alternative political combinations for his association, 
witnessed through involvement in a plan to replace Lloyd George with the 
Conservative, Lord Derby, in 1920.80 Further evidence comes from some 
contemporary Conservatives noting Churchill’s decidedly ‘reactionary 
Tory’ perspectives.81 The suggestion of Churchill’s reactionary nature 
seems rather inconsistent for a politician keen on bringing together Liberal 
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and Conservative politicians, but it may have been an impression he wanted 
to give in order to win over support from Conservatives and enable him to 
loosen his ties to Lloyd George. References to his reactionary attitudes were 
not recorded in the most positive way, which suggests the impression was 
counter-productive, and from this point of view it makes Churchill’s appeal 
to Toryism seem ill-considered.   
 
VI 
 
The final twenty-six months or so from the fall of the Coalition in 1922 until 
Churchill’s recruitment into the Conservative party in 1924 were ones in 
which his ability to co-operate with Conservatives improved and he set 
about developing closer relationships with the Conservative party in order to 
create a new political home for himself and other similarly-minded Liberals. 
Much of his perspective was another manifestation of the desire to build a 
national party, but the need to reintegrate himself into the party system as a 
result of the end of the Coalition in 1922 and his subsequent electoral defeat 
in Dundee, meant that hopes rested on reaching accommodation within the 
Conservative party itself on national party lines rather than to build a 
separate alternative to it.82 Thus, much of Churchill’s efforts were directed 
to ensuring that there would be a place for him and other Liberals within a 
Conservative party on terms that were acceptable, and there is evidence that 
he tried to manipulate the advantages he held at his disposal in doing so. 
The emphasis here is different from other studies which have considered 
more short-term perspectives in the movement of Churchill into the 
Conservative party, such as the support of Liberals for the Labour 
government and his acceptance of imperial preference; these issues provided 
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evidence of some of the circumstances for his change of party but they need 
to be seen in a wider context.83 
Churchill’s view in favour of attaching himself to the Conservative 
party was expressed soon after his defeat in Dundee, despite his continuing 
involvement in Liberal politics, fighting the election in Leicester West as a 
Liberal candidate following the party’s political reunion at the General 
Election in 1923. In May 1923 he told George Riddell that he would be 
‘glad’ to be able re-join the Conservatives.84 Thus, his return to Liberal 
politics was certainly peculiar, but it can be accounted for on one level by 
the partisan position adopted by Conservatives in their call for a general 
system of Protection; it has been seen that Churchill was flexible on fiscal 
matters, but this was a step too far, drawing him to a position of separation 
from Conservatives in reaction.85 There was also some short-term self-
interest. In 1922-3, it was unclear that a reunited Liberal party would fail to 
become a significant political force and Churchill needed to present some 
semblance of association with it. This sort of situation is suggested from 
contact he had with Asquith’s daughter, Violet Bonham Carter, where, 
following the inconclusive result of the 1923 election, Churchill was at 
pains to push forward Asquith’s right to the Premiership.86  
The failure of Churchill’s re-election campaign in Leicester, and of 
the Liberal party to assert an effective political agenda in the hung 
Parliament of 1923, not least due to its support for a Labour government, led 
him quickly to a more definitive position of cooperation with the 
Conservative party, and he set out plans for a new formal political union 
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between Liberals and Conservatives.87 In this, there was much in common 
with his previous support for fusion in that he continued to believe in a new 
alignment between a national bloc and Labour. However, the difference was 
that Churchill now seemed more confident that such a union was possible. 
This was because of his view that the party controversies which had 
separated them had been resolved and, with this being highly apparent, there 
was nothing fundamental to separate Liberals or Conservatives. It was 
certainly clear to him after the 1923 election when the Conservatives 
dropped Protection meaning that a common national policy, focusing on 
shared views of commercial, business and imperial interests was a realistic 
possibility.88  
 
Now that the fiscal question has been decided by the late election, 
there is no difference of principle which separates Liberals and 
Conservatives. All the great issues on which they quarrelled before 
the war have been settled by agreement. Differences exist, no doubt 
of mood, of temperament, of degree; but they are not differences of 
fundamental principle, either in regard to domestic or foreign affairs. 
They are not comparable to the gulf which yawns between Liberal 
and Socialist doctrines.89 
 
In a sense then, it appears from the evidence that Churchill envisaged a 
much broader unification of forces than before 1922 when his policy had 
been more to unite chiefly coalitionist Liberal and Conservative elements. 
Now potentially all factions within the two parties could be brought together 
to face an electorally-distinct Labour force. Furthermore, there was an 
immediately pressing reason for co-operation. He was concerned about the 
impact the three-party system was having on political stability with a 
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succession of weak and minority governments likely which were clearly not, 
in his view, in the national interest.  
 
Our constitutional and party system is out of joint. The one security 
on which all our institutions have depended has been the good sense 
of the majority of people. But we have now entered a period of 
minority rule. The so-called three-party system is incapable of 
affording any solid or stable basis for our public life. Its continuance 
can only mean a succession of weak Governments […].90 
 
The continuing three-party system was also no doubt seen as a means for 
Labour to get elected to power given that Liberals and Conservatives were 
increasingly competing for the same sort of voters as their interests 
converged.  
Given all this thinking, it seems strange that Churchill was no longer 
a proponent of complete political amalgamation of the parties. However, the 
experience of the Coalition years appears to have taught him that Liberal 
and Conservative identities, despite commonalities, could not be completely 
overridden and he came to believe that Liberal and Conservative 
organisations should remain separate although in friendly co-operation. 
 
I think it of great importance that the Conservative and Liberal 
wings in this matter should develop separately and with clear 
determination to co-operate against a common foe when the time 
comes.91 
 
In terms of attitudes to politics Churchill now seemed very close to 
Baldwin and other Conservative leaders and this assisted in enabling 
communications with Balfour and Baldwin over proposals for what 
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Churchill termed ‘the Conservative and Liberal Union’.92 For Baldwin, 
Churchill had the potential to provide a liberal face for his Conservative 
strategy for political courtship of Liberal politicians and breaking the 
Liberal party, which perhaps accounts for why regular distrust of Churchill 
was put aside. However, Churchill was not prepared to simply join the 
Conservative party on the basis of shared perspectives, even if he now saw 
himself more clearly as a Conservative politician; he was attracted by 
remaining detached from the Conservatives to ensure that he maintained 
credentials for assistance with his political union idea. It seems that he was 
anticipating some form of schism and Churchill wanted to make sure that 
there was personal benefit that could be derived from it by appearing to be 
leading Liberal opinion into the Conservative party.93 Conservatives seemed 
tolerant of his approach, with Baldwin coming to view of Churchill’s 
importance to the acquisition of Liberal recruits, too influenced possibly by 
exaggerated predictions of the number of Liberals interested in the political 
union idea.94 Churchill’s desire to remain detached also explains why he 
sought to stand as a Constitutionalist at the Westminster Abbey By-Election 
in March 1924 and in the General Election at Epping later that year. 
However, it was also informed by his lack of complete trust of the 
Conservatives to maintain a position akin to a national party and in support 
of the political union idea: 
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Of course if I stood as a Cons. it wd almost certainly be a walk over. 
But I cannot do this & it is far better for all the interests we are 
safeguarding that I shall carry with me moderate Liberals.95  
 
Despite his preparations, Churchill’s desire to gain support from 
Liberals for his political union idea suffered blows of his own making. The 
Westminster Abbey campaign, despite the intention, presented Churchill 
more simply as a Conservative, and he made an error in suggesting that the 
Conservative party itself would become ‘the main rallying ground for 
opponents of Socialism’, for which he received complaints from Liberal 
sympathisers whom he hoped to broker an arrangement for within his 
union.96  
Churchill joined the Conservative party, not long after the General 
Election of 1924. Only a few Liberals standing as Constitutionalists had 
been elected (and fewer still came with Churchill into the Conservative 
party) and this fact, as well as the Liberal party’s own disaster at the polls 
meant that the whole idea of a political union was no longer credible; there 
were simply not enough Constitutionalists or Liberals with Conservative 
sympathies elected to make their position important in the direction of 
political affairs.97 For Churchill, it was not such a surprise that in these 
circumstances he would seek simply to re-join the Conservative party, given 
that he had already indicated his affinity with it during the course of 1924, 
and the failures of both the Constitutionalist grouping and the political union 
idea made it logical and inevitable. 
In his decision to work with the Conservatives in 1924, it is not 
absolutely clear as to the extent the Liberal party itself played a role given 
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that his alienation from it was apparent also before this time. But it is clear 
that he had not been happy with the party’s position on Labour, and this was 
a source of further dissatisfaction and led him to find the excuse for a 
decisive break and to legitimise his working with the Conservative party.98 
There is also the relationship to Lloyd George to consider.99 The usefulness 
of cooperation was less, with Lloyd George’s decline in political 
significance after the fall of the Coalition and through his support for 
Labour; thus, a factor in continuing involvement in Liberal politics had been 
removed. However, there is an ambiguity here with some evidence pointing 
to Churchill’s belief that Lloyd George might renege on his left-leaning 
perspective at some stage, encouraged potentially by contact over election 
strategy in 1924. Churchill still had hopes of incorporating Liberals into 
some kind of alliance, post his recruitment, and a revived relationship with 
Lloyd George to facilitate it was not unthinkable.100 It does not seem then 
that he had given up on working with Lloyd George altogether. 
 
VII 
 
From this analysis of Churchill’s career it can be seen that his recruitment 
into the Conservative party was part of a long process, with Toye’s 
characterisation of a later part of it as a series of crab-like movements back 
into the Conservative party being a fair description of his whole career from 
1904 to 1924, with a series of challenges to his involvement in Liberal 
politics always seeming to push him towards his original party. Like a 
number of the Liberal recruits, Churchill was not very committed to partisan 
causes, having been influenced by patriotic political influences which stayed 
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Churchill to H. G. Tanner, 5 February 1924, Chartwell Trust Papers CHAR 2/132/38-39. 
99 Toye, Lloyd George and Churchill, pp. 246-250.  
100 In his view of Lloyd George he was eventually to become disillusioned; see Winston 
Churchill to Edward Spears, Undated May 1927, Spears Papers  SPEARS 1/49. 
 
 
122 
 
with him in a desire to create a national party ‘above party’ interests, firstly 
through means of the Liberal party, then through coalition and fusion, and, 
then finally, by joining the Conservative party itself due to the 
circumstances of the political situations he faced over time. Churchill had 
very difficult relations with the Liberal party, and especially its leaders, 
partly because of disagreement over policy and strategy, but also on a 
personal level, where, as an ambitious politician, he felt that his political 
progress was being frustrated. These difficulties informed Churchill’s 
perspectives of where to position himself in politics and it is clear that he 
might have sought to sever his ties with the Liberal party on a number of 
occasions throughout his involvement with it. His relationship with Lloyd 
George was critical; whilst the relationship was often difficult, it was Lloyd 
George who sustained his involvement with the Liberal party, both because 
Churchill felt that they shared a similar outlook and because he was a means 
to provide him with political influence that he would not otherwise have 
possessed due to his unpopularity. In this context, it is important to 
understand that when Lloyd George was no longer perceived to be 
influential and their political outlooks started to diverge that Churchill 
decided to abandon Liberal politics completely.  
 Churchill’s decision to join the Conservatives was marked by an 
elaborate means of departure from the Liberal party in 1924. He only made 
his final decision formally to align himself to the Conservative party after 
the onset of the Labour government, and, even then, he only finally joined 
the party when his more detached position was no longer feasible. In 
aligning himself with the Conservatives, Churchill aimed at ensuring that he 
would be important to his new leaders and that he would overcome their 
previous prejudice towards him. On a more personal level, he had to seek to 
legitimise his position in having changed his mind about parties now twice 
and his elaborate means of reincorporation into his original party is evidence 
of his desire to resolve a problem for him in this situation. There was a 
difficulty; as he put it himself: ‘anyone can rat, but it takes a certain 
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ingenuity to re-rat’.101 The Liberal party’s support for Labour gave him the 
justification for changing party in some respects, but he needed to ensure 
that there was no perception of discontinuity with his general outlook on 
politics. From the perspective of creating a national party there was a lot of 
consistency, but in the framework of party politics, changing parties more 
than once was a potential problem for views of his integrity; he needed to 
address this difficulty if he was to be able to play a successful role in 
politics for the future and this was something that obviously played upon his 
mind. 
 Churchill accepted the position of Chancellor of the Exchequer in 
Baldwin’s government in November 1924 which from the point of view of 
dealing with the ‘re-ratting’ issue at least was not the right decision, since it 
encouraged a perception of Churchill’s disloyalty and inconsistency which 
affected his reputation and career until the Second World War and helped 
influence historical perceptions of him thereafter. If he had allowed more 
time before accepting office the situation may have been different but one 
can imagine that he was so anxious to fulfil his ambition of holding one of 
the chief offices of state that such thoughts probably did not occur to him.102 
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Chapter Three: Alfred Mond 
 
 
Alfred Mond is one of the major figures in recruitment into the 
Conservative party and he is often referred to in general texts on Liberal 
history, but as a specific focus there has been far less examination, with no 
major studies of him at all within the last forty years. Further detailed 
coverage of his political career is overdue.   
Mond first sat as the Liberal MP for Chester between 1906 and 
January 1910, and then Swansea from 1910 to 1918.1 After the War, he 
became the MP for Swansea West, serving between 1918 and 1923. Mond 
served in government; firstly as First Commissioner of Works from 1916 to 
1921; and then, as Minister for Health (with a seat in the Cabinet) from 
1921-22. Mond was a firm supporter of Lloyd George but became a 
prominent advocate of Liberal reunion after the fall of the Coalition; this 
position, however, did not reward him electorally since he lost his seat in the 
1923 election. Mond was not out of Parliament for long as he was returned 
as the MP for Carmarthen, following a by-election victory in 1924, and he 
continued in this role until 1928 when he was elevated to the House of 
Lords. In early 1926, Mond parted company with the Liberal party by 
joining the Conservatives. 
 Outside of politics, Mond was a major industrialist; he had an 
established career before he gained political office and his industrial 
interests remained an important focus of his life. He was the younger son of 
the German Jewish émigré industrialist, Ludwig Mond, and became a 
director in the family’s business interests which brought him into 
connection with the Liberal-Radical, John Tomlinson Brunner, who was a 
business partner of his father. During his life, Mond pursued various 
directorships alongside his political interests, which at times took 
precedence over his political work, such as the Mond Nickel Company, the 
International Nickel Company of Canada, the Westminster Bank and the 
Industrial Finance Investment Corporation. In business terms, his lasting 
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legacy was the role he played in the establishment of Imperial Chemicals 
Industries (I. C. I.); Mond was the first chairman.       
  
I 
 
There are two biographical studies of Mond; one provided by his official 
biographer, Hector Bolitho, and also the more scholarly Geoffrey Bayliss 
doctoral thesis of the late 1960s.2 Since then, there has been little specific 
focus beyond a very helpful journal article by J. Graham Jones, examining 
Mond in the context of Carmarthenshire and land politics in the 1920s.3 
These studies provide some understanding, but there are gaps in 
appreciation of Mond’s outlook on politics and in understanding some of the 
circumstances of his recruitment into the Conservative party.4  
In examining aspects of the literature, a useful starting point is with 
Bayliss’ view that Mond became essentially a Conservative from even as 
early as 1916.5 He supports his suggestions by pointing to Mond’s embrace 
of compulsion in wartime and the pursuit of anti-socialist and protectionist 
policies thereafter. However, there are various objections to this 
characterisation, some of which can even be gleaned from other details of 
Bayliss’s research. More consideration is needed of the impact of his 
political values and the effect of them on his party affiliations over time. 
Indeed, Bayliss’s research suggests that there is much to link him to 
prevailing middle class and business perspectives in the more practical, 
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technocratic and managerial approach to political affairs, which can be seen 
in support over time for state intervention in the economy and social policy.6 
Such political perspectives might have eventually drawn him close to the 
Conservative party, due to the convergence of Liberal and Conservative 
politics, but it does not necessarily follow that Mond was a Conservative. 
Mond’s anti-socialism should not be seen as evidence of his Conservatism 
either. Aspects of research to do with constituency campaigns suggest that 
pursuit of anti-socialism had a more electoral character to it in competing 
against the Labour party; in other words, it was an electoral shift as opposed 
to an ideological move to the right.7  
More consideration is needed of Mond’s outlook on the party system 
and the impact it had on his political affiliations. One overarching 
consideration was the lack of sustained commitment to party politics itself; 
Mond often looked beyond limited party combinations to bring together a 
broader range of opinion, so this limits the extent to which his change of 
party can be seen as a change in political perspective. Bayliss identifies that 
Mond was actually an advocate of a ‘centre’ or national party which, if true, 
places Mond’s politics on a similar footing to other later recruits in pursuit 
of the idea of a national government.8 The origins of this patriotism are not 
fully developed in the research but it is likely, in part, to have been 
motivated by the desire to overcome racial prejudice against his German and 
Jewish background, which impacted upon involvement in politics; research 
for this study suggests that Mond tried to over-compensate for his 
background which led him to extreme and exaggerated perspectives in his 
support for national interests.9 His background also influenced him in 
negative perceptions of the British system of parties for ‘muddling through’ 
when more decisive action was needed. It frustrated him that party politics 
                                                          
6 Bayliss, ‘The outsider’, pp. pp. 16, 25-28, 83, 156, 322, 502, 507, 521. Also see above, pp. 
7-9. 
7 Ibid, pp. 483-521. Also see relevant discussion of other Liberals and anti-socialism; see 
above pp. 43-57. 
8 Ibid, pp. 70, 81, 216, 284. 
9 See above, pp. 41-45. 
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got in the way of good decision-making.10 However, views need to be 
balanced against a tendency to sometimes retreat into party politics when 
electoral interests came to the fore.11 
Away from issues considering Mond’s political outlook is 
commentary related to internal Liberal party factors which can be linked 
directly to his decision to leave the party. One such point seems to have 
been poor relations with Asquith. Bayliss speaks of Mond’s exclusion from 
high office by Asquith, hinting at prejudice of a racial kind.12 Naomi 
Levine’s study of Asquith reveals his prejudices against Jews and this 
suggests that Bayliss has a point although this may not be an entirely fair 
characterisation, with prejudice against Mond also potentially related to 
Asquith’s suspicion of industrialists as materialists and profiteers.13 
Whatever the reasons, Mond was clearly sensitive to potential prejudice 
against him and has been shown to be unhappy with his exclusion from 
office; it is clear that it contributed to his seeking Asquith’s removal as 
Prime Minister on a couple of occasions.14 This feeling of distrust for 
Asquith needs further consideration because it remained with him, and it 
drew him into prejudice towards Asquith’s supporters in the damaging 
factional conflict after the War.  
The difficulties with Asquith have been shown to have assisted 
Mond in forming allegiance to Lloyd George.15 Bayliss points to good 
relations with Lloyd George over time due to a measure of faith in political 
                                                          
10 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, p. 70 refers to ‘his Prussian contempt for the entire party 
system’.  
11 Ibid, p. 341. 
12 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, p. 69. 
13 On Asquith’s anti-Jewish prejudices, see Naomi B. Levine, Politics, Religion and Love 
(New York & London, 1991), pp. 160, 177, 193-194, 199, 208, 306-309. This is also a 
factor that can be seen through a trawl of correspondence, particularly that contained in 
Michael & Eleanor Brock (eds.), H. H. Asquith – Letters to Venetia Stanley, Oxford 
University Press (Oxford, 1985) as a good example. On his anti-industrialist perspectives 
see Martin J. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980 
(Cambridge, 2004), p. 106.  
14 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, p. 120.  
15 Ibid, p. 69. 
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Liberalism but tempered by imperialism, and he shows that good relations 
endured over the years with support for Lloyd George’s leadership even 
after the fall of the Coalition.16 However, this view of positive relations is 
overstated since other research shows frustration with Lloyd George whilst 
in government, and the relationship between the two politicians does not 
appear quite as close as Bayliss’s impression suggests.  
There is substantial detail in discussion of the issues which led to 
Mond’s move out of the Liberal party. Not unlike a number of other recruits 
after the fall of the Coalition he favoured Liberal reunion, which Bayliss 
suggests emerged very early – actually before the fall of the Coalition – due 
to problems of working with the Conservatives and in order to exploit ‘Wee 
Free’ dissatisfaction with Asquith.17 He wanted Lloyd George to take over 
the party. It is also suggested he wanted the united party to position itself 
clearly against socialism.18 In Bayliss’s perspective, it was the failure of 
Liberal unity and to pursue an anti-socialist line after the 1923 election 
which led to tensions. Mond, it has been shown, was concerned about the 
decision to vote Labour into office and the subsequent pursuit of a left-
leaning political strategy which shattered any possibility of unity of purpose. 
It is also mentioned that he possessed concerns about Lloyd George’s moral 
authority, with his Political Fund being used to influence the party 
direction.19 All this led to a divergent path from Lloyd George’s, with 
evidence of favouring a move towards renewed relations with the 
Conservatives, both nationally and at constituency level, and to a clear line 
against policies which looked too far to the left.20 Research points to 
growing frustration and disaffection over the issues which reached their 
climax in relation to the development of the Green Book policy, which 
Mond opposed, confirming there could be no cooperation with Lloyd 
                                                          
16 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, pp. 32, 267-359. 
17 Ibid, p. 341. 
18 Ibid, p. 403. 
19 John Campbell, Lloyd George –The Goat in the Wilderness (London, 1977), pp. 99-102, 
128; Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, p. 586; Jones, ‘Sir Alfred Mond’, 501. 
20 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, p. 501; Jones, ‘Sir Alfred Mond’, 501.  
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George, so at that point Mond severed his ties with Lloyd George and the 
party.21  
The sequence of events which led to the departure from the Liberal 
party seem well scrutinised by historians but the swiftness of the movement 
into the Conservative party – only seven days after – seems less 
understandable and requires more consideration. Bayliss’s view implies that 
Mond simply came to the conclusion that he would have to join the 
Conservative party, as the only party now pursuing policies against 
socialism and which represented the ‘national’ interest.22Alun Wyburn-
Powell emphasises ‘ideological connections’ to the Conservative party 
which assisted the move, no doubt building on the research of Bayliss in 
emphasising Mond’s essentially Conservative outlook.23  Jones emphasises 
Baldwin’s offer to Mond of a peerage if he should join the Conservatives; 
Jones believes that Mond had succumbed to ambition in accepting this 
offer.24 These views need to be tested further in the context of additional 
evidence, particularly referring to the nature of the relationship with 
Baldwin as a critical figure in drawing Liberals to the Conservative party. It 
is not clear that the reasons for joining the Baldwin’s party have been fully 
demonstrated.   
 
II 
 
The early years of Mond’s parliamentary career reveal a propensity towards 
involvement with the party political concerns of the day. His first speeches 
in the House of Commons were ones of typical contemporary Liberal 
preoccupations; for example, the condemnation of the use of Chinese labour 
                                                          
21 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, p. 586. 
22 Ibid, p. 591. 
23 Alun Wyburn-Powell, Defections and the Liberal Party, 1910-2010 (Manchester & New 
York, 2012), p. 121.  
24 Jones, ‘Sir Alfred Mond’, 509. The point is also reiterated by Wyburn-Powell, 
Defections, p. 121.  
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in the Transvaal and the defence of Free Trade.25 In the latter case, his views 
seemed particularly partisan in his uncompromising Cobdenite perspective. 
He said: ‘Free Trade, which Cobden once dreamt would be extended to the 
whole world, is based upon the rock of economic freedom and on a sound 
principle’.26 Perhaps in such cases Mond was revealing the influence of the 
radical, John Brunner, on his early political outlook.27 A similar position 
existed in relation to Mond’s advocacy of land taxation although Liberal-
Radical prejudice against landowners seemed to work alongside the more 
business-like concerns about competition and efficiency, perhaps adding 
some credence to the position of Geoffrey Searle in his identification of 
business Liberals, like Mond, with the desire to build a broad pan-class 
alliance of working people against unearned wealth.28 Thus, Mond’s 
position was not necessarily one to connect with party political perspectives 
so completely. 
In other areas of politics, there were some early tensions in Mond’s 
relationship with the political process, such as over the pace and 
development of state intervention in welfare provision; his impatience 
accounted for on the basis of his interests in the social aspects of 
imperialism.29 This view can be seen especially amid discussion of national 
insurance in 1911 where Mond hinted at frustration with political colleagues 
as well as foes in Parliament:   
 
[…] For years I have been advocating compulsory insurance against 
unemployment and invalidity, and for years I have been told that 
any such scheme was quite impossible. I was told that nobody 
                                                          
25 Alfred Mond speech, 26 February 1906, HC Debates 1906 Vol. 152 col. 653-657.  
26 Alfred Mond speech, 8 February 1911, HC Debates 1911 Vol. 21 col. 391. 
27 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, pp. 15, 29, 148. 
28 Alfred Mond letter, The Times, 17 June 1909; Geoffrey Searle, ‘The Edwardian Liberal 
Party and Business’, English Historical Review, 98 388 (1983), 29-60; Bayliss, ‘The 
Outsider’, p. 32. There are similarities with the position adopted by Runciman here; see 
below, pp. 224-267. 
29 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, pp. 25-28. The frustration is similar to that felt by Churchill at 
this time; see above, pp. 92-123.  
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would submit to a compulsory system, that it might do for the 
Germans and other countries, but it would never do here […].30 
 
And there were further tensions in 1914, this time in relation to Liberal 
colleagues specifically, when, as Bayliss has shown, Mond appealed for 
lower defence spending to secure funding for social reform.31 The only 
difficulty Mond ever seemed to have over the welfare agenda appeared to be 
in relation to minimum wage legislation. Mond had distaste for compulsion, 
but when legislation came before Parliament in 1912 he reluctantly 
supported it as a practical measure although still feeling it was necessary to 
voice criticisms, particularly of the rush to get it through Parliament.32  
A limit to Mond’s association with partisan causes can be seen in 
some tendency towards consensus, like in his views on welfare reform and 
in the non-partisan tenure of some of his speeches, and against adversarial 
party activity which was confirmed, especially in the constitutional crisis of 
1909-10, where he became critical of other parliamentarians.  
 
But the constitutional issue is of much greater importance than any 
mere party triumph, and it ought to receive more thoughtful 
treatment from all interested in the future conduct of the government 
of this country that it appears to be now doing amid the din of party 
polemics.33    
 
It seems that, at least on important issues of state, he wanted to see parties 
working together in the national interest which, amongst other things, 
possibly accounts for his advocacy of proportional representation.34 Bayliss 
                                                          
30 Alfred Mond speech, 29 May 1911, HC Debates 1911 Vol. 26 col. 820.  
31 In this context it is also interesting to note his position by 1914 as Vice President of the 
Naval League and thus was a keen supporter of the protection of British naval supremacy. 
However, this has to be balanced against the importance of social reform and also his desire 
to avoid war with Germany which he believed would be a disaster for trade; see Bayliss, 
‘The Outsider’, pp. 129, 149. 
32 Alfred Mond speech, 21 March 1912, HC Debates 1912 Vol. 35 col. 2111, col. 2115.  
33 Alfred Mond letter, The Times, 1 October 1909. 
34 Alfred Mond speech, 4 November 1912, HC Debates 1912 Vol. 43 col. 998. 
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takes Mond’s commitment to non-partisanship much further in identifying 
his desire to create a ‘centre’ party or national party. Supporting this 
possibility is a record of a private meeting hosted by Mond with Lloyd 
George in 1912 in relation to forming some kind of coalition involving 
moderate Labour and Liberals and the Liberal-Radical newspaper magnate, 
Sir Henry Dalziel, but other evidence suggests that he was not closely 
connected to these discussions.35 Rather it would seem that Mond had heard 
rumours of coalition talks and sought to opportunistically exploit the 
possibility that one would bring to affirm a relationship with Lloyd George 
and gain him some higher political office, working in Lloyd George’s 
service. 
 
I read of rumours of changes in the Government of course they may 
mean nothing but I should just love it if there was a chance to 
become your right hand man, as Financial Secretary to the Treasury 
[…]. I write to you because I know I understand you and we could 
work together, I have always loyally backed your ideas and fought 
for them […] and you want people with courage to support you for 
your great work of the future.36 
 
Thus, it is possible that Mond was very interested in realignment of the 
party system but there were clearly possibilities of self-interested motives in 
seeing this happen.  
It is also unclear as to the extent to which Mond wished to work 
directly with other parties, as can be seen in his attitude towards Labour 
electorally. Bayliss himself provides an example in Mond’s contrasting 
actions during the Mid Glamorgan by-election of March 1910 and the 
Gower election in December 1910.37 In Mid Glamorgan, he actively 
supported a Liberal candidature, despite the compact with Labour supported 
by the central party organisation, whilst in Gower Mond opposed a Liberal 
renegade on the basis that he was a threat to Liberal-Labour relations. It 
                                                          
35 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, p. 81. 
36 Alfred Mond to Lloyd George, Undated December 1912, Melchett Papers AP3/1.  
37 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, pp. 70-78. 
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seems that Mond’s position was dictated by the peculiarities of local 
circumstances; Labour was only tolerable insofar as it was not a threat to the 
Liberal party’s electoral interests.  
A final issue for consideration at this point was Mond’s personal 
relations with his party leader, Asquith. Potentially there were a number of 
reasons why Mond was not rated by Asquith, including the prejudices 
against him, and due to an involvement with Lloyd George, but possibly 
also some unattractive personal qualities, such as his naked ambition, his 
single-mindedness and outspokenness in parliamentary debates; he needed 
to be seen as less self-interested and more of a party loyalist.38 Whatever the 
reasons, Asquith’s disregard detracted from any respect he might have 
otherwise had, reflected in his eventual support for Lloyd George to replace 
him. Poor relations with his leader were not issues that left him feeling 
disaffection from his party as a whole, but they could not have made him 
feel very integrated within it.   
 
III 
 
Mond’s imperialist and pragmatic instincts came to the fore in 1914, 
witnessed in his abandonment of Liberal principles of voluntarism and 
laissez faire and in his acceptance of a rigorous and interventionist wartime 
policy.39 In particular, his acceptance of conscription is of critical interest 
given the view of Bayliss that it brought him to a Conservative view of 
politics. Despite the questionability of this suggestion, it is undeniable that 
Mond’s political judgement on the issue brought him closer to the 
Conservatives, even if this is viewed solely as a practical response to 
circumstances.40  
 
The reluctance of the military authorities in this country compared 
to those of our Allies to release skilled men is probably not a little 
                                                          
38 See above, p. 127 for prejudices against Mond.  
39 Mond’s swift embrace of compulsion mirrored that of Churchill; see above, pp. 92-123. 
40 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, p. 164.   
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dictated by the fact that with our voluntary system of recruiting the 
authorities can never be sure whether or not the vacancies can be 
filled up, whereas with a properly organised system of military 
service all this proceeds automatically.41 
 
It was not, of course, only on conscription that Mond’s views seemed to 
have evolved; on Free Trade too there were developments; his views 
changed somewhat after 1915 in calls for allied preference during wartime, 
and in the aftermath, Dominion preference, and then finally, Safeguarding.42 
In relation to these perspectives there were some mitigating 
circumstances which demonstrate his pragmatism and other considerations 
of principle. The issues surrounding conscription are perhaps most clear in 
these regards with Mond’s letter in The Times clearly referring to wartime 
policy as a short-term justification, not some general scheme of policy for 
the longer term, which tends to support Matthew Johnson’s contention that 
early support for conscription, like Mond’s, did not necessarily mark a 
wholesale abandonment of Liberal principles.43 Not unlike other members 
of the Liberal War Committee, Mond supported conscription as a means to 
secure an ‘equality of sacrifice’ during wartime, with an echo of his greater 
interest in policies wider than simply a narrow partisan position. This 
pragmatic and egalitarian position is evident from a speech in the Commons 
‘General Compulsory Military Service’ debate in May 1916: 
 
I am glad that the Prime Minister, even at the eleventh hour, has 
agreed upon a scheme of general compulsion. I was one of the few 
who, a long time ago, in opposition to the political traditions of the 
                                                          
41 Alfred Mond Letter, The Times, 15 September 1915. 
42 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, pp. 166, 175; Report, Alfred Mond Speech, 10 January 1916, 
HC Debates 1915-16 Vol. 77 col. 1325; Report, Liberal Magazine, February 1919; Report, 
Alfred Mond speech, Liberal Magazine, July 1921. There were some parallels with the 
views of Runciman here who on fiscal questions, at least, adopted a similar perspective; see 
below, pp. 224-267. 
43 Matthew Johnson, The Liberal War Committee and the Liberal Advocacy of 
Conscription in Britain, 1914-1916’, The Historical Journal 51 2 (2008), 399-420.  
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party to which I belong […] urged that we should adopt a rational 
and equitable and a fair scheme of compulsory military service.44  
 
In relation to Free Trade, there were a number of considerations. In the first 
place, there was the tone. A characteristic of jingoism can be identified, 
which appears closely connected to the need for Mond to appear 
unquestionably loyal to the British and imperialist interests in a period when 
his background seemed to be subject to particular public scrutiny as to 
whether he was truly loyal to the allied and imperial cause; there were those 
who were keen to smear his reputation.45 As a politician, it is clear he felt 
the need to deal firmly with these suggestions, accounting for the 
forcefulness of his rhetoric.46 
 
The Germans may be quite certain of one thing, that no mistaken 
kindness to them is going to be exercised either by this House, by 
the Government, or by the country at the end of the War, and if they 
can imagine that they can commit unparalleled atrocities, break 
every rule and law of civilised warfare, that they can ride roughshod 
over what everyone has held holy, and that at the end of that, at their 
own moment, they can come back and take up their position as 
citizens and have the same civil life or the same trading life as 
before, and that their goods will have the same open markets in our 
                                                          
44 Alfred Mond speech, 2 May 1916, HC Debates 1916 Vol. 81 col. 2621-2622, 2655.  
45 Asquith reported an attack by Ormsby Gove on Mond’s racial allegiances in 1915; see H. 
H. Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 15 March 1915, in H. H. Asquith – Letters to Venetia 
Stanley (Oxford, 1982), pp. 480-481. Also see Report, The Times, 6 December 1918. The 
report suggests that he had been attacked as a ‘source of pro-German influence in the 
Government and likely to weaken the determination of this country to exact from Germany 
the fullest terms of reparation for the wrong committed by her during the war.’ And also 
Report, The Times, 13 January 1920. Mond won a libel case against H. H. Beamish for 
suggesting that he was a traitor in his business affairs in dealing with the Germans after the 
War. A reading the evidence points to the potential for some kind of coordinated campaign 
against Mond, although the source of this seems very unclear. 
46 Diary of George Riddell, 5 May 1921, in John McEwen (ed.), The Riddell Diaries, 1908-
1923, (London, 1986), p. 343. 
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Empire or among the Allies, I think they will find themselves rudely 
mistaken.47 
 
Secondly, in his acceptance of allied, and then Dominion, preference there 
was some short-term expediency involved, with a wish to see the restoration 
of Free Trade sometime in the future. Mond was not a convert to 
Protectionism; he obviously felt, perhaps from his first-hand business sector 
knowledge as well as political influences, that wartime had reduced the 
capacity of some industries to compete openly in a market environment and 
that these had to be assisted in these circumstances. 
 
These industries to-day are not yet in a position to stand on their own 
two feet. From my own knowledge I can say that, if they are simply 
left to the free play of competition, they will disappear.48 
 
As part of the move back to pre-war Free Trade conditions duties should 
first be reduced to assist the restoration of trade with Britain’s closest allies. 
 
How anyone can contend that a reduction of existing Duties can be 
an infringement of the principles of Free Trade quite passes my 
comprehension, because it is obviously a movement towards Free 
Trade and a very strong movement. If you abolish all the Duties 
existing in all the Dominions and in this country, then you will have 
absolute Free Trade, and obviously a reduction of duties must be a 
movement towards Free Trade.49 
 
His position was not evidence of the conversion to the ‘Chamberlainite 
Zollverein’; in Mond’s own terms he was still a good Free Trader.50  
                                                          
47 Alfred Mond Speech, 10 January 1916, HC Debates 1915-16 Vol. 77 col. 1325. There 
are parallels here with the position adopted by future recruit, Hilton Young; see below, pp. 
154-174.  
48 Report, Alfred Mond speech, Liberal Magazine, July 1921. 
49 Report, Alfred Mond speech, Liberal Magazine, June 1919. 
50 Mond’s position was not dissimilar to that of other Liberals, like Runciman, found 
themselves in in the 1930s in arguing for ‘freer trade’; see below, pp. 224-268. 
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Mond’s adaptation to changing circumstances was reflected to a degree in 
relation to attitudes towards the political complexions of governments, 
certainly at the start of this period. He initially became an enthusiastic 
supporter of Coalition politics seeming to be rather disillusioned with the 
party scene, no doubt fuelled by the desire to protect his view of the national 
interest and due to his dislike for Liberal politics as led by Asquith.51 It also 
seemed to be that he believed party politics itself was a casualty of war and 
that it would not return; adaptation to a new type of politics was essential. 
 
I hope that I have learnt – and I think many in this House have learnt 
– that there is another way of governing a country besides the old 
way of parties in and out of office opposing each other, not on 
principles but on party lines, and after the War, it is perfectly certain 
that neither the country nor the House of Commons will revert to 
these ancient methods which have broken down in war.52 
 
He again sought a system of proportional representation, which he saw as a 
means to enshrine such cross-party working or coalitions into the normal 
fabric of government.53  
 Yet despite the emergence of coalition arrangements, Mond did not 
appear very satisfied with them leading ultimately to disillusion in the whole 
idea. In the first instance there was the experience of the Asquith 
Coalition.54 He disagreed with Asquith’s policies over the management of 
the War effort, inspired particularly by his early impatience for a policy of 
compulsion. And then he was dissatisfied with the Lloyd George Coalition, 
despite promotions which gave him a say in governmental affairs, leading 
him into Cabinet office in 1921 as Minister of Health. Mond had concerns 
about policy under Lloyd George, and these surfaced after the War in 
                                                          
51 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, p. 216. 
52 Alfred Mond speech, 4 July 1917, HC Debates 1916-17 Vol. 95 col. 1215-1223.  
53 Alfred Mond speech, 4 July 1917, HC Debates 1917 Vol. 95 col. 1222. 
54 This is very similar to the position of Churchill in his feelings about Asquith. The War 
appeared to be pushing Mond into a similar camp of disaffection; see above, pp. 92-123. 
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thoughts about Welsh Church disestablishment, economies to health 
spending, Ireland and foreign policy, despite evidence of acquiesce in some 
of these issues to bolster Lloyd George’s position.55 However, his concerns 
were also rooted deeply in the very complexion of the Coalition itself, 
manifesting themselves in criticism of the Conservatives who were pushing 
the government in the policy direction with which he was unhappy and 
costing the Liberal party support amongst the electorate.56 This sentiment 
surfaced strongly after the War, in his recommendation that the Coalition 
should be reorganised so that it became ‘more a real joint body and less of 
two separate forces’ under Lloyd George.57 Such words could be interpreted 
as evidence of a movement in the direction of a policy of fusion of the two 
forces, but viewed in the context of Mond’s fears about the Conservative 
influence it seemed more a call on Lloyd George to exercise greater political 
leadership and to lead the Coalition in an alternative direction less closely 
associated with the Conservative party.  
 In regards to Mond’s fears there was definitely a more local 
perspective which fed his anxieties. In South Wales, Mond feared electoral 
fall out for Lloyd George and the Liberal party, as he told Rufus Isaacs in a 
private letter, suggesting that Lloyd George was ‘by no means too popular 
in South Wales and he must be under no delusion as to the Coalition not 
being a very popular stunt [...]. The Liberals in this part of the world look 
upon him as having sold himself to the Tories’.58 Such opinion was perhaps 
related as much to mobilising activists as much as the feelings of the 
electorate as a whole but both were linked in terms of Liberal fortunes. 
However, this more provincial thinking was not only an assessment of 
                                                          
55 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, pp. 268, 273, 284, 299; Kenneth Morgan, “Lloyd George’s Stage 
Army: The Coalition Liberals, 1918-1922’ in A.J.P. Taylor (ed.), Lloyd George: Twelve 
Essays (London, 1971), pp. 225-254. Also compare this position to that of Churchill’s; see 
above, pp. 92-123. 
56 Alfred Mond to Lord Reading, 12 December 1918, Reading Papers MSS Eur F118/58/5-
6. This distanced Mond from Churchill who was actively seeking fusion of the Coalition 
forces in the period; see above, pp. 92-123.  
57 Alfred Mond to Lloyd George, 15 March 1919, Lloyd George Papers F/36/6/46. 
58 Alfred Mond to Reading, 12 December 1918, Reading Papers MSS Eur F118/58/5-6.   
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regional fortunes it also had a personal perspective for Mond in his Swansea 
constituency. Here there was great competition with the Conservatives and 
Liberal votes appeared to be haemorrhaging to Labour and it seems that 
Mond also acutely felt a sense of his own electoral vulnerability as a 
supporter of an unpopular government.59  
 Added to the concerns about the Coalition’s character was Mond’s 
dissatisfaction about his own place in politics. On a number of occasions he 
revealed his frustrated ambitions.60 A measure of these emerged as early as 
1918 in a letter to Rufus Isaacs complaining about the lack of recognition of 
his acumen for high office and also his greater deserving than other 
promoted individuals, with even some resentment of Lloyd George over the 
issue.61 
 
Without being conceited I do not think that George sufficiently 
realises that the business world looks upon me as a much more 
important person than Auckland Geddes, Fisher, Albert Stanley and 
a number of new men whose ability I do not want to deny who have 
been shoved over my head by George […]. For the sake of our 
families it would probably be much more sensible for me to give up 
                                                          
59 Jones suggests that Swansea West Conservatives opposed Mond for racial reasons as 
well, so there was no question of a local pact between the Conservatives and Coalition 
Liberals as was the case for other Coalition Liberal colleagues; see Jones, ‘Sir Alfred 
Mond’, 489. The election results in 1918 and 1922 show Swansea West to have yielded 
small majorities over the Conservative party of 2 per cent and 3 per cent respectively. The 
Conservative vote at around a third of the votes polled remained static. Mond was right to 
be fearful of a defection of Liberal support to the Labour party. The Labour vote increased 
from a quarter of the votes in 1918 to just under a third in 1922 at the expense of the 
Liberal party. The unpopularity of Lloyd George which he perceived may also have raised 
in his mind the potential for the emergence of an Asquithian rival which, given the electoral 
situation, would have almost certainly cost Mond his seat; see Alfred Mond to Lord 
Reading, 12 December 1918, Reading Papers MSS Eur F118/58/5-6: ‘There are many more 
Asquithites about than he [Lloyd George] thinks, even in South Wales and Swansea […]’. 
60 This mirrors the position of Churchill in feeling under-valued by Lloyd George, and thus 
disaffected; see above, pp. 92-123. 
61 See Alfred Mond to Lloyd George, Undated, Lloyd George Papers F/36/6/60, as an 
indication of such feelings.   
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office and devote myself again to business. Therefore unless I can 
get in office something worth doing I shall naturally after the 
election have very seriously to consider where I stand.62 
 
It is important to note the suggestion that he might have withdrawn from 
Parliament, which may be interpreted as a form of petulance on Mond’s 
part, but also is a reminder of his wider business interests which he 
continued to pursue, even as an MP.63 Mond always had an alternative 
occupation option and Lloyd George, he felt, should have seen his presence 
on the Liberal coalitionist benches as being very fortunate and something to 
nurture rather than to risk losing. It was not only his business talents, 
however, for which he believed Lloyd George should promote him; he even 
felt that it was only having men like him on the ground which kept Lloyd 
George in office, pointing out, for instance, his invaluable contribution to 
keeping the Coalition Liberals in business in places such as Swansea, even 
going so far as to suppose that there were ‘men here who would support me 
[Mond] and would not support him [Lloyd George].64  
There was a certain amount of conceit in Mond’s position, despite 
his protestations, and it is unclear that he fully appreciated the extent of the 
perceptions of him as an outsider, and as someone who was disliked, which 
constrained Lloyd George’s position. Lloyd George later alluded to this 
unpopularity in setting out how he had promoted him – eventually to the 
government - ‘in spite of very serious protests’.65 He also stated that Mond 
‘was loathed by the Conservatives’ and also Liberals, who ‘knowing him 
better, liked him even less’. Some of these points can possibly point to 
exaggeration on Lloyd George’s part, as at the time of this speech they were 
no longer political colleagues, but it does at least assist in providing insight 
into Mond’s situation and how he was quite an isolated figure. 
                                                          
62 Alfred Mond to Reading, 12 December 1918, Reading Papers MSS Eur F118/58/5-6. 
63 A trawl through the Index to The Times shows many more references to Mond’s business 
interests than his political ones, in fact.   
64 Alfred Mond to Lord Reading, 12 December 1918, Reading Papers MSS Eur F118/58/5-
6. 
65 Report, Lloyd George speech, The Times, 18 March 1929.  
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 Overall then, it can be seen that Mond became hostile to coalition, 
with the electoral concerns, disagreements over policy, frustration about 
Conservative influence and his lack of promotion all leading him to believe 
some alternative was necessary, and it was these issues collectively which 
prompted him to seek a reunion of Liberal forces to replace the Coalition in 
1921. He had, for the moment, lost faith in cooperating with other political 
parties and this reveals that by the early 1920s any future link with the 
Conservatives seemed a very distant prospect.  
 
IV 
 
Mond was one of the first advocates of Liberal reunion, not only due to the 
desire to find an alternative to coalition but also his electoral concerns due 
to self-interested considerations in his Swansea constituency, where he 
feared electoral difficulties as a result of involvement of Liberals in the 
Coalition.66 In a letter to Lloyd George he claimed that Liberal unity was his 
best chance locally of avoiding ‘annihilation’ and he publicly called for the 
setting aside of sectional differences.67  
Evidence reveals that Mond was also preoccupied with how the 
reunited Liberal party should be positioned between Conservatives and 
socialism. In a sense, his position was a retrospective one, emphasising the 
role of the Liberal party as progressive force for democratic reform, as a 
continuation of an historical role prior to the War.68 There was an anti-
socialist lean to the right, however, with a specific attack on socialism, at 
least in public, contrasting a moderate Liberalism with the ‘disaster to this 
[…] country’ that pursuit of socialism would bring which gave an 
                                                          
66 Churchill and Guest also returned to favouring a separate Liberal appeal at this time; see 
above, pp. 92-123; see below, pp. 176-194. The Swansea West election in 1922 saw Mond 
gain only 35.5 per cent of the vote to 32.4 per cent for the Conservatives and 32.1 per cent 
for Labour. This was down some five percentage points on 1918 to the benefit of Labour 
which was up some seven percentage points – by then almost equal with the Conservatives. 
67 Alfred Mond to Lloyd George, Undated 1922, Melchett Papers AP5. 
68 Report, Alfred Mond Speech, The Times, 28 October 1922. 
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appearance of closeness to the Conservatives.  This aspect should more be 
seen in the context of the challenge posed by socialism to the Liberal party, 
and should not necessarily be seen as evidence of intended positioning close 
to the Conservative party; rather, he saw a new role for the Liberal party as 
a moderate national party, independent from either of the other two parties.69  
Mond’s post-coalition outlook revealed much continuity with the 
period before since he envisaged the reassembled force being led by Lloyd 
George; in fact, it was in some ways really his desire to see an expanded 
Lloyd George Liberal party rather than a true reconciliation of two sides. In 
private correspondence, he suggested that Asquithians should be 
marginalised in the party, referring to how ‘Asquith and his little clique 
must either be brought in or swept aside’.70 This view of Asquithians 
pointed to ill-feeling towards them and is significant both in the context of 
Mond’s inability to reconcile himself to Asquith and in terms of how even 
proponents of reunion, like Mond, were not truly committed to it. More 
speculatively, one might also suggest that Mond saw Asquithians as 
potential rivals for political office within the party, particularly those such 
as John Simon or Walter Runciman whose return to united Liberal politics 
might eclipse Mond’s standing; therefore, it was in his interests to keep 
them away from the centre of political influence within the party.    
 Mond’s thinking about the positioning of the Liberal party was not 
mirrored by any particular change in policy perspective. He did, however, 
maintain his perspective on Dominion preference, but his justification 
continued to be in Free Trade terms and his Free Trader credentials were 
intact in other areas with his argument in favour of the abolition of the 
McKenna duties and sugar tax.71 On public spending, too, Bayliss has 
shown continuities with Mond’s advocacy of increased spending. Rather, 
the main change was a clear deterioration in relations with an Asquithian 
                                                          
69 This drew Mond very close to the position of Churchill at this time; Mond even wrote to 
Churchill to offer collaboration with him over the issue; see Alfred Mond to Churchill, 29 
October 1922, Chartwell Trust Papers CHAR 5/28A/48-49. 
70 Alfred Mond to Churchill, 29 October 1922, Chartwell Trust Papers CHAR 5/28A/48-49. 
71 Report, Lloyd George Liberal Magazine, October 1923; Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, p. 439. 
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section of the party which could hardly have helped his integration within 
the Liberal party. Mond held a rather patronising attitude towards 
Asquithians which could not have aided relations, but it seems that he felt 
that they were deliberately frustrating the attempts to secure unity; 
something which Asquith himself was most guilty of and this led to public 
condemnation in May 1923.   
 
[…] Mr. Asquith in his speech at Bournemouth on May 4, expressed 
with much emphasis his desire to secure Liberal reunion, and 
nobody doubts his sincerity in this matter. But, as one who made 
Liberal reunion the first plank in his platform at the last election, and 
who has been working towards this end ever since, I would like to 
ask Mr. Asquith whether he really thinks that he and those 
associated with him are taking the best steps to bring about the 
desired object. It is quite true that such a movement cannot be 
brought about by ‘manipulations of leaders and Whips’, but must 
come equally from the rank and file in the country. The rank and file 
in the country are doing their part […]. What they are asking is, not 
unnaturally, what is preventing Liberal leaders and their followers in 
the House of Commons from carrying out the expressed wish of the 
rank and file that they should work together? 
No one can say that Mr. Lloyd George and those closely 
associated with him have not done, and are not prepared to do, 
everything humanly possible to achieve this cooperation. A very 
important section – indeed, the majority of the Liberal Party in the 
House of Commons – proposed the practical step that Mr. Asquith 
and Sir John Simon should meet Mr. Lloyd George and myself in 
consultation to endeavour to arrange for closer cooperation. Mr. 
Lloyd George expressed himself as perfectly prepared to adopt such 
a course, but the proposal was deliberately declined by Mr. Asquith 
or those associated with him […].72 
 
                                                          
72 Alfred Mond Letter, The Times, 8 May 1923. 
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These remarks drew him into controversies with Asquith’s supporters over 
supposed past misdemeanours, such as the record of the Lloyd George 
Coalition and conscription, finding himself in public disagreement with 
individuals he might have needed to conciliate to secure a successful 
reunion, such as Simon.  
 
Mond’s confidence in a resurgent Lloyd George-dominated Liberal party 
emerging as a post-Coalition alternative to Conservative and Labour was, 
however, shaken in December 1923 when he was defeated in the Swansea 
West election.73 He found a new constituency to fight, Carmarthen, in 
August 1924, but the campaign tactics were different from his previous 
election battles. Mond had by this time been out of Parliament for eight 
months and he seemed to have learnt from the experience of other by-
election candidates, such as Churchill at Westminster Abbey in March 1924, 
since his emphasis seemed to be on the same sort of ‘constitutionalism’ and 
thus more anti-socialist rhetoric; as a loser in 1923 Mond felt keenly how 
the forces of political realignment were rallying against the interests of the 
Liberal party. In the by-election, an aggressive anti-socialism, which even 
went so far as to suggest that Bolshevik agents were present in the South 
Wales coalfield, was pursued, with Mond attempting to exaggerate the 
distinctions between Liberalism and socialism in order to build legitimacy 
as the chief non-socialist candidate.74 As Bayliss has shown, this 
exaggeration was particularly important in undoing the disastrous decision 
for Liberals in voting the Labour party into office, and was highly 
successful in that it delivered Mond a sizeable, although not spectacular, 
                                                          
73 Mond was edged out by 115 votes in a close three cornered fight. Labour polled 34.8 per 
cent of the vote, Mond polled 34.3 per cent and the Conservatives polled 30.9 per cent. The 
Liberal vote held up reasonably well but in a three way marginal the Labour party was able 
to come up from third place, polling only some 3 percentage points more than in 1922 – 
two thirds of which seems to have come from a decline in the Conservative poll but the 
underlying trends may have been more complex.  
74 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, pp. 492-494. 
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victory.75 Thus, at the following General Election, Mond stuck with his 
constitutionalist and anti-socialist message, but he sought to take the anti-
socialism further by hinting at his probable support for a Conservative 
government, albeit still choosing to maintain his separate Liberal 
credentials.  
 
In the circumstances he was glad to accept frankly the assistance of 
the Conservatives and those who believed in government by 
gentlemen. Although he would like to see a Liberal Government in 
power, he would support any decent Government which would give 
this country stability to carry on its work honestly and under which 
they would have security to carry on their daily work […].76 
 
Such a situation was no doubt motivated by the weakness of the Liberal 
party but it brought Mond much closer to the Conservative party.  
Mond’s relations to the Conservative party at a local level were also 
reflected nationally where, as Bayliss has shown, he was in touch with 
Stanley Baldwin in order to try to propagate an electoral truce between the 
Conservative and Liberal parties on an anti-socialist ticket.77 And there was 
certainly evidence of this desire in both election campaigning and in later 
parliamentary attacks on socialism.78  
 
You will not succeed in converting those who oppose the idea of the 
abolition of private enterprise or private initiative, what we consider 
the inherent right of the individual to develop himself to the best of 
                                                          
75 The result was Liberal 44 per cent, Labour 28.8 per cent and Conservative 27.2 per cent. 
Mond had a more comfortable majority of some 4,400 votes. The relatively modest victory 
was more use to him than was immediately obvious since the more or less equal split of 
votes between the other two parties seems to have convinced the local Conservative party 
that it should not seek to contest the seat at the forthcoming General Election which came 
within three months of the campaign. 
76 Report, Alfred Mond speech, The Times, 20 October 1924. 
77 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, pp. 501-503, 507.  
78 Report, Alfred Mond speech, The Times, 20 October 1924; Alfred Mond speech, 7 April 
1925, HC Debates 1924-1925 Vol. 182 col. 2163-2172. 
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his ability, with the greatest liberty. That is why we say Socialism is 
opposed to liberty; because under it nobody could start an industry in 
this country, nobody could start a shop, nobody could start any 
enterprise, nobody could start an idea. That is what every Socialist 
State finally involves. That is why we are passionately opposed to 
Socialism – in the interests of humanity, in the interests of the 
development of the human race, and in the interests of liberty, for 
which our party has always stood.79 
 
It seems that Mond even played a leading role in trying to topple the Labour 
government, with evidence existing of negotiations with Tories in so 
doing.80 Yet, in spite of this evidence, Mond was not settled on working 
closely with Conservatives since at least at the end of 1924 he was also 
contemplating an alliance with moderate elements of the Labour party, 
should circumstances enable Labour moderates to be drawn away from the 
‘Socialist wing’.   
 
There may be a division at a not distant date between moderate 
Labour and the Socialist wing. This may bring some kind of 
rapprochement between what you and I used to know as the Lib-
Labs and other Liberals. This may be the best hope at present of the 
re-creation of what we might call the Progressive Party – but when 
and how this will happen no-one can foresee […].81 
 
It seemed that Mond was looking to an Edwardian-style cross-class 
progressive alliance, a view which is strengthened when evidence of his 
                                                          
79 Report, Alfred Mond speech, 7 April 1925, HC Debates 1924-1925 Vol. 182 col. 2163-
2172. 
80 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, p. 502; Jones, ‘Sir Alfred Mond’, 500; Campbell, Lloyd George, 
pp. 89-95. There were other Liberals involved including two future recruits, Henry Mond 
and Ian Macpherson. There was support also from Freddie Guest and apparently, Lloyd 
George, although this seems difficult to appreciate given his conciliation of Labour in the 
period even allowing for disingenuousness on his part. 
81 Alfred Mond to Lord Reading, 24 November 1924, Reading Papers MSS Eur 
F118/58/29-32. 
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criticisms of Conservative policies on deflation, Free Trade, for the 
unemployed and his preference for the introduction of Keynesian economic 
planning in the period are considered.82 It seemed that he may well have 
preferred this possibility to working with the Conservatives. Mond showed 
no inclination to foster relations with Baldwin beyond the immediate 
electoral ones which reinforces this impression.83  
 
Given the distance of Mond from the Conservative party in 1924, it seems 
incredible that he could so quickly join it; however, in January 1926 he 
swiftly changed party. The main reason was underlying dissatisfaction with 
Lloyd George, shaped by his post-1924 left-leaning electoral and policy 
stance, but which came to a climax at the very end of 1925 and in the 
opening weeks of 1926.84 The specific issue was the development of the 
Liberal Green Book policy. Mond had chaired the important committee on 
the land policy, but it seemed that Lloyd George wished to disregard 
Mond’s concerns about the loss of owner occupation, using the financial 
levers he held over the party’s finances to assist bringing the party to his 
own view.85 Mond believed the policy amounted to land nationalisation and 
he criticised its alleged illiberal character.  
 
To me, Liberalism implies individual freedom. To me, the man on 
his own land is the freest man in the world – in fact, he is the only 
free man in the world. Therefore, for the sake, not merely of 
agricultural progress, but for the sake of the development of 
individual character, I attach the greatest value to freehold.86 
 
                                                          
82 Bayliss, ‘The Outsider’, pp. 521-537; Alfred Mond speech, 11 June 1925, HC Debates 
1924-1925 Vol. 184 col. 2308. 
83 Some other recruits have been shown to have developed personal relations with Baldwin 
as well as political ones; see above, pp. 69-72; see below, pp. 154-174. There is no record 
of him having discussed any cooperation on policy issues either.  
84 Campbell, Lloyd George, pp. 49, 99-102, 128. 
85 Alfred Mond to Alderman John Lloyd, 1 February 1926, Melchett Papers AP5/12.  
86 Alfred Mond, Notes of a speech, 6 January 1926, Melchett Papers AP5/11. 
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But his concerns were not credibly due to an ideological attack on 
Liberalism contained in the policy, no matter what he said in public or 
private. Given his pragmatism to political issues, what is known of his 
interests in collectivism and Keynesian planning this idea seems rather 
dubious, but there was a credible sense that he viewed the policy as going 
too far in the direction of interventionism and that it gave the appearance of 
a class policy and being close association with socialism, which his electoral 
strategy was set against. It also would do nothing to restore Liberal fortunes 
in that it was likely to extend an antagonism amongst the divided internal 
Liberal party body. There was, therefore, some bewilderment that Lloyd 
George was putting so much at stake to achieve this policy.  
A feeling of hopelessness and despair set in as Mond struggled to 
come to terms with what was a serious breakdown of commonality with the 
person he had regarded as his chief and the impact that the policy would 
have, as he viewed it, on Liberal fortunes.  
 
The position of the Liberal Party has been steadily drifting from bad 
to worse. The unity which we have striven for and which I did my 
best to promote has, in fact, never been achieved, and all efforts to 
revivify and re-organise the Liberal forces have been rendered 
hopeless by the introduction by Mr. Lloyd George of a land policy 
which has produced a new profound cleavage and embarrassment in 
the Liberal ranks.87 
 
Not understanding the sense of Lloyd George’s position Mond became 
convinced that Lloyd George was trying to take the Liberal party into some 
form of left wing alliance with radical elements of the Labour party, in an 
effort to cynically ‘climb back into office’, marginalising Liberals with 
concerns, like himself, and this prompted him privately to seek some 
element of rapprochement with Asquith and other anti-Lloyd George 
                                                          
87 Alfred Mond to H. H. Asquith, Undated November 1925, Melchett Papers AP5.  
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Liberals in the hope of resisting the policy.88 However, this too he soon 
regarded as futile, being unable to develop meaningful relations with 
prominent Asquith Liberals, and he thus sought to separate himself from the 
party, being totally disaffected.89 
 
I did not feel I could continue in the ranks of the Liberal Party, 
carrying on internal warfare, fighting a perpetual battle with one of 
its most powerful leaders, who, though from the very inception of 
this policy, well aware of my views, insisted on forcing his policy on 
the Party […].90 
 
One cannot under-estimate the personal feelings against Lloyd George too. 
He felt incredibly dissatisfied with Lloyd George’s treatment of him 
personally, which sharpened his resentment and resolve to distance himself 
from his former chief.91 
In all these circumstances, it needs to be made clear as to how Mond 
ended up joining the Conservative party rather than, for example, for him 
simply to retire from public life or to sit as an independent. The public 
justification was a presentation of one of principle: that he could not support 
the land policy and that he must look for an alternative party to office 
service to as result; the former perhaps more understandable than the 
latter.92  
 
[…] It has become absolutely clear to me that this is a fundamental 
issue of principle and not of detail which no attempt to compromise 
can overcome or disguise […]. I have therefore, after the most 
careful thought and consideration decided that the only course for 
me to take is to sever my lifelong connexion with the Liberal Party 
                                                          
88 Bayliss, ‘The outsider’, p. 586; Jones, ‘Sir Alfred Mond’, 509; Hart, ‘The decline of the 
Liberal party’, p. 275; Alfred Mond speech, 14 March 1929, in Campbell, Lloyd George, p. 
128.   
89 Report, Walter Runciman speech, Liberal Magazine, February 1926. 
90 Alfred Mond to Alderman John Lloyd, 1 February 1926, Melchett Papers AP5/12.    
91 Campbell, Lloyd George, p. 128. 
92 Bayliss, ‘The outsider’, p. 586. 
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and, if I am to be able to render any further political service to the 
country, join the party with whom I feel I can most usefully 
cooperate – the Conservative Party.93 
 
There is also some suggestion – indeed, backing Bayliss’s point about 
Mond’s immediate motives – that if Lloyd George was seeking for the 
Liberal party some kind of radical left wing course there was no possibility 
of opposing him and forces opposed to socialism had to be united in 
opposition outside of the Liberal party.94  
 
[…] I have asked no one to follow my course, unless they feel with 
me how incompatible, how impossible, is the position which has 
been created by Mr. Lloyd George; how essential it is that those who 
oppose the Socialist doctrine should make their position absolutely 
clear, and work together with those who have no weakening or 
compromise in this direction.95   
 
However, some of this does seem a rather elaborate form of self-
justification. Jones has examined this point in his suggestion that Mond had 
succumbed to ambition.96 Mond was, of course, keen to achieve high 
political office, and his political prospects would certainly have been more 
secure as a Conservative. There is also the issue of his acceptance of a 
peerage from Baldwin, which he conceivably accepted to give himself 
security of political office without even needing to fight elections, pointing 
to self-interest and lack of principle.97  
Nonetheless, there are some mitigating circumstances. For instance, 
it seems incredible to suppose that a keen politician such as Mond would 
simply remove himself from public life because he disagreed with Lloyd 
                                                          
93 Alfred Mond letter, The Times, 26 January 1926. 
94 This was also Young’s view; see below, pp. 154-174.  
95 Alfred Mond to John Lloyd, 1 February 1926, Melchett Papers AP5/12.  
96 Jones, ‘Sir Alfred Mond’, 509. 
97 Stanley Baldwin to Alfred Mond, 21 June 1926, Baldwin Papers 161/171-2 in Philip 
Williamson & Edward Baldwin (ed.), Baldwin Papers – A Conservative Statesman 1908-
1947 (Cambridge, 2004), p. 183; Report, Lloyd George speech, The Times, 18 March 1929.  
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George; he believed he had a lot to offer politics and wished to continue to 
work with those who might respect him and secure him some kind of role.98 
He had not created the land policy dispute; it had been manufactured by 
Lloyd George and events had forced his action, it can be argued. 
Furthermore, despite antagonism towards the Conservative party over the 
years, his electoral view on anti-socialism, flexibility on issues such as Free 
Trade, and a desire for a moderate social policy meant that there was some 
common ground, especially, it must be said, with Baldwin’s developing 
liberal conservatism which could not have been totally unattractive. And 
then there is the context of the peerage itself. As a peer, Mond would have 
had freedom from the constraints of party controversy, allowing him an 
opportunity to offer advice and assistance in areas of his professional 
competence and perceived skill, sometimes on a cross-party level; this is 
certainly the role he took when he was finally elevated to the Lords, 
becoming respected in relation to his expertise concerning industrial policy, 
trade union relations and House of Lords reform. Joining the Conservative 
party was not necessarily something to be seen in the context of a change of 
political perspective then but more of a pragmatic means to do more of the 
work he wanted, not now being able to do so in the frontline nor within his 
first political party of choice. The months after his departure from the 
Liberal party revealed his impatience to get into the Lords, not wishing to 
spend any time longer than he had to in the Commons, which may be taken 
as evidence of this situation.99 It is also certain that his business interests 
were pressing; supporting the declining Liberal party must have been a drain 
on time and energy and a place in the Lords would give him more time for 
outside interests.  
 
V 
 
                                                          
98 This sense of having limited options but to seek rapprochement with Conservatives is 
also common to the position of Guest; see below, pp. 176-194.  
99 Stanley Baldwin to Alfred Mond, 21 June 1926, Baldwin Papers 161/171-2, p. 183. 
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Alfred Mond’s political career can be characterised as one of many 
contradictions, being at various times imperialist and radical, Liberal but 
also non-partisan and, in the end, a Conservative politician, but seemingly 
not a Conservative. All these contradictions reveal something of the 
difficulty he had in working within a party political system – particularly in 
a period of his original party’s decline – and the challenges he faced in 
developing a suitable role for himself in politics. Despite views in other 
research there is little to suggest that Mond was essentially Conservative in 
character through his career up until 1926. Links to Conservative politics 
can be seen in the context of the convergence of the Liberal and 
Conservative perspectives in the period so shared perspectives were due to 
the accident of circumstance. Mond was consistent in his views about a 
patriotic and classless political stance, which was one of the factors that 
ultimately drew him out of the Liberal party with Lloyd George’s supposed 
concession to class politics. Significantly, there was no inclination towards 
any involvement with the Conservative party before the 1924 election and 
involvement with the Liberal party remained quite critical until that point.  
Not unlike some other Liberal recruits, there were longer-term 
tensions in his relations with Liberal party politicians, which create a 
context for his departure. His unpopularity, the lack of respect awarded to 
him by two Liberal leaders at different times, and difficulties over policy 
and direction affected his level of integration into the party. However, in 
Mond’s case the departure from the Liberal party needs to be viewed mainly 
in terms of factors in the period immediate to his departure. The post-1924 
period saw a change in perspective largely because of the party’s electoral 
position, party divisions and Lloyd George’s character and political 
perspective, which caused him disillusion on a grand scale. As an ambitious 
man, he chose to be in politics to exert influence over political 
developments and by the mid-1920s his efforts were appearing to have 
reached their nadir. He had worked to support Lloyd George but the loss of 
faith in him brought him to a break with both Lloyd George and with the 
party.  
The reasons for Mond’s joining the Conservative party were 
complicated.  This flirtation with Baldwin was a lot to do with electoral 
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convenience and whilst Baldwin’s political outlook on domestic affairs was 
similar to Mond’s it does not appear to have been the major reason for his 
seeking to work with Baldwin; there is also no evidence of them holding 
particularly close personal relations. This theme of convenience that 
characterised the cooperation suggests that the offer of a peerage may have 
been a significant aspect in Mond’s decision, not necessarily because he had 
succumbed to ambition but because it gave him a measure of influence on 
politics whilst enabling him to distance himself from a Liberal party of 
which he had grown tired. For Baldwin, Mond’s recruitment marked 
another success in his strategy of conciliating Liberals to break the Liberal 
party; Mond’s presence in his party, even on a non-partisan basis, was 
convenient to him in projecting the desired moderate image for his 
Conservative party. 
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Chapter Four: Hilton Young 
 
 
Since there is an absence of surviving personal correspondence concerning 
Young, reliance is placed upon other historical records (particularly regional 
newspapers) which assist in focusing the detail of this discussion more 
around political involvement within a context of constituency politics. This 
is certainly not a weakness because opportunities are provided in 
understanding recruitment of Liberals into the Conservative party from 
more the perspective of the various local electoral circumstances; local 
politics, it will be shown, drew Young into cooperation with Conservatives 
and it can be seen how the local circumstances were a constraint on political 
choice and party allegiances.  
 
(Edward) Hilton Young was third son of Sir George Young (third baronet) 
and his wife, Alice Eacy, neé Kennedy.1 He was educated at Eton College, 
University College, London, and Trinity College, Cambridge. At 
Cambridge, he served as President of the Union (1900) and as editor of the 
Cambridge Review. After his graduation, with first class honours in natural 
sciences, Young trained and worked in the law, being called to bar at the 
Inner Temple in 1904, but his interests in writing, economics and finance, 
and in the Liberal party, quickly led him towards a seemingly parallel career 
in journalism and into political activism. As a journalist and writer Young 
held prominent positions as assistant editor of The Economist, from 1908 to 
1910, and, from 1910, as the City editor of the Morning Post and the 
London financial correspondent of the New York Times. In 1912, he wrote 
Foreign Companies and Other Corporations, a sizable work of corporate 
law with an intellectual flavour, in which he sought to consider the issue of 
personal liability in corporate business.2 On a political level, Young 
organised Free Trade unions in Yorkshire and the City of London, and 
                                                          
1 Wayland Kennet, ‘Young, (Edward) Hilton’, www.oxforddnb.com (accessed 12 March 
2010). 
2 E. Hilton Young, Foreign Companies and other Corporations (Cambridge, 1912).  
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unsuccessfully contested elections to Parliament twice in 1910, at Eastern 
Worcestershire (January 1910) and then Preston (in December).  
 Young’s career was interrupted in 1914 by the outbreak of war. He 
joined the Royal Naval Volunteer Reserve and he found himself in the 
forefront of naval battles for which he was awarded the DSC and the Croix 
de Guerre. In 1918, he volunteered for the blocking of Zeebrugge, and he 
also served in Russia, for which he received a further honour in his 
appointment to the DSO. Despite all his wartime preoccupations, Young 
still found time for writing, producing his second book, The System of 
National Finance (1915) in which he examined the workings of the British 
economic and financial system, revealing an intellectual grasp of capitalism 
which provided the context for his attitudes towards national policy after the 
War.3      
 Young was first elected to Parliament unopposed in February 1915 
as the junior member for the electoral borough of Norwich. He was re-
elected in 1918, being helped by the maintenance of the two member 
borough status and by his conciliatory position towards the Coalition, 
despite not having received the coupon.4 After the election, Young aligned 
himself with Lloyd George whose patronage enabled him to become 
Financial Secretary to the Treasury in 1921 and Chief Whip of the Coalition 
Liberals in the period before Liberal reunion. During this time, he developed 
a reputation as an ardent patriot and for great appreciation of financial 
matters.  
 Young lost his Norwich seat in 1923 when the Conservatives put up 
two candidates against him. He was returned to Parliament again for 
Norwich in 1924, still as a Liberal, but now with Conservative support. In 
Parliament, he disagreed with the policy direction of the Liberals and this 
eventually led to his resignation from the Liberal party in February 1926. In 
June that year, he joined the Conservative party, motivated by the General 
Strike. After his recruitment, Young continued to serve as an MP for 
                                                          
3 E. Hilton Young, The System of National Finance (London, 1915). 
4 Young did not, however, receive opposition from a rival Coalition candidate. 
 
 
156 
 
Norwich, but he chose not to seek re-election there, choosing instead to 
stand in Sevenoaks where he was elected as a Conservative in 1929.5 
  
I 
 
There are no specific studies of Young’s political career, and this makes it 
very difficult to determine the precise role he played in the affairs of the 
Liberal party and in the wider realignment of political forces. Some very 
brief references to Young are, however, identifiable in a number of studies 
of Liberal politics, and these do provide a starting point for analysis since 
they concern the specific issue of his decision to join the Conservative party. 
What they suggest is that Young’s politics had moved to the right, using his 
concerns over Liberal land policy and his cooperation with Conservatives, 
particularly after 1924, as evidence.6 However, as none of these views form 
part of a substantive study of Young, there is a certain sense of a 
circumstantial character about some of them; thus, there is immense benefit 
for a more detailed and holistic assessment of the issues in the context of 
Young’s wider career and of the detail of the immediate circumstances in 
his departure from the Liberal party.   
 Research for this study suggests Young’s political outlook held 
much in common with that of some of the other Liberal recruits, particularly 
in a consistent and enduring non-partisan approach to politics in defence of 
a patriotic ‘national’ policy and a preference to seek cross-party 
                                                          
5 Young remained as M. P. for Sevenoaks until 1935. 
6 John Campbell, Lloyd George – Goat in the Wilderness (London, 1977), p. 111; Don 
Cregier, Chiefs Without Indians (Washington, 1982), p. 171; Barry Doyle, ‘Business, 
Liberalism and Dissent in Norwich, 1900-1930’, Baptist Quarterly 35 5 (1994), 243-250; 
Barry Doyle, ‘Urban Liberalism and the ‘Lost Generation’: Politics and Middle Class 
Culture in Norwich, 1900-1935’, The Historical Journal 38 3 (1995), 632; Barry Doyle, ‘A 
conflict of interests? The local and national dimensions of middle class Liberalism, 1900-
1935’, Parliamentary History 17 1 (1998), 134; Michael Hart, ‘The Decline of the Liberal 
Party in Parliament and the Constituencies’, Unpublished University of Oxford University 
D.Phil. (1982), p. 272; Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914-1935 
(London & Glasgow, 1966), pp. 170, 324, 328. 
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combinations rather than to work within the confines of a single party and 
this is, therefore, of important consideration in the chapter.  
Another consideration is the extent to which Young’s relations with 
the Conservatives were shaped by electoral factors. In this regard, the 
research of Barry Doyle concerning Norwich’s socio-political character 
during the period is particularly useful. Doyle’s perspective is that the 
Liberal party’s dominance over the city politically was weakening, despite 
strength in the persistence of a strong nonconformist tradition, and he shows 
that it was only through cooperation with the Conservative party that Liberal 
electoral representation could be assured, with evidence of positive pursuit 
of arrangements with Conservatives amongst local Liberal party officials 
and candidates.7 In light of the research, it is important to consider the 
extent of the prevalence of such thinking in Young’s cooperation with the 
Conservatives; if it played a large role, for example, it might suggest there 
were pragmatic electoral reasons for Young’s cooperation with the 
Conservatives and electoral appeals with an anti-socialist flavour. Doyle’s 
focus is not specifically on the electoral situation itself which means there 
are only a few references to Young, but one of the most important of them is 
his identification of dissatisfaction amongst radical and left-leaning sections 
of Liberal opinion in the city for Young’s tendency to seek arrangements 
with the Conservatives, with evidence of loss of support to Labour because 
of them.8 This factor points to a sense that Young’s positioning of the local 
Liberal party closer to the Conservatives was undertaken in spite of loss of 
further support; it would not appear that he viewed alienation of support on 
the left as significant as the advantages that could be gained from appealing 
to the right. A rightward appeal in such circumstances would confirm 
Young’s movement in the direction of the Conservatives. Electoral forces in 
Norwich can be seen to have been forcing Young to adopt tactics which 
                                                          
7 Doyle, ‘Business, Liberalism and Dissent’, 243-250; Doyle, ‘Urban Liberalism and the 
‘Lost Generation’, 617-634; Doyle, ‘A conflict of interests’, 131-140; Doyle, ‘Business, 
Liberalism and Dissent’, p. 245; Doyle, ‘A conflict of interests?’, 133. 
8 Doyle has revealed unpopularity amongst traditional Radicals and ‘newer’ Liberals 
attracted by Lloyd George’s policies post-1922; see Doyle, ‘A conflict of interests?’, 133-
134. 
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assisted his election but reduced his capacity to be seen unambiguously as a 
Liberal candidate in the period before his recruitment into the Conservative 
party.    
 
II 
 
Young’s entry into Liberal politics was not necessarily one which might 
have been envisaged from his aristocratic background but it would seem 
probable that his belief in Free Trade led him in that direction.9 Before the 
War, Free Trade appears to have been one of his chief motivating political 
concerns as witnessed in his active role in establishing Free Trade Unions 
and his electoral battles in contests where it was a significant issue: Eastern 
Worcestershire (January 1910) was the electoral bastion of the tariff-
favouring Austen Chamberlain, and Preston (December 1910) was a 
Lancashire textile centre. He held an internationalist outlook, which no 
doubt informed his attitude to the Free Trade system, and also came to the 
fore in his pre-war interests in the subject of international relations and 
national self-determination.10 In certain senses, Young was characteristic of 
a social type. Despite his elitist origins, his employment as a journalist and 
family interests in publishing associated him with middle-class 
professionals attracted by a reconstituted and less narrowly partisan 
Edwardian Liberal party, witnessed in its patriotism, its desire to avoid class 
disharmony and interest in social reform.11 There is, in fact, some evidence 
                                                          
9 See above, pp. 41-45. There is a degree of commonality with the position of Churchill and 
Freddie Guest in their entries into the Liberal party; see above, pp. 92-123; see below, pp. 
176-194. 
10 Part of the interest emanated from his studies of international law in Freiburg; see 
Wayland Kennet, ‘Young’, E. Hilton Young letters, The Times, 7 January 1908, 31 July 
1914. This interest continued into the wartime period with a particular concern for the 
possibility of self-determination for the Serbs; see E. Hilton Young letters, The Times, 25 
September 1916, 28 September 1916.  
11 There are parallels to the position of Alfred Mond and Walter Runciman here especially; 
see above, pp. 124-153; see below, pp. 224-267. Also see Geoffrey Searle, ‘The Edwardian 
Liberal Party and Business’, English Historical Review, 98 388 (1983), 29-60. 
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that Young’s selection to contest Preston had much to do with his profile in 
this regard; the Liberals there needed a candidate who was not overtly 
connected to partisan Liberal traditions but had definite interest in social 
reform to assist in overcoming traditional Conservative strength and to build 
support for the Progressive Alliance in this two member borough.12 It is also 
useful to note the part he played to maintain Liberal and Labour relations, 
which reinforces an impression that Young was not favourably disposed 
towards the Conservative party, with a very clear contrast to his later 
position.    
 
Young was not elected to Parliament until February 1915, and this fact 
together with his military responsibilities meant that initially he had little 
opportunity to make much impact on political affairs. After being elected, 
he wrote occasional letters to the national press on international issues, but 
beyond this there is little evidence that he spent much time fulfilling his 
parliamentary duties; there was an absence of involvement in parliamentary 
debates. It was not until after the War that Young’s political career was to 
get itself in motion. 
 
III 
 
The 1918 election campaign in Norwich saw Young pursue much in 
character of what might have been seen as a firmly ‘Liberal’ election 
campaign. On the home front, Young argued for the early restoration of 
personal liberties, including the ending of conscription, and the need to 
repeal the Defence of the Realm Act; he also revealed himself to be in 
favour of self-government for Ireland, albeit without coercion of Ulster, 
self-determination for national groups in Europe, and a League of Nations, 
which also saw him affirming an interest in international law.13 However, 
                                                          
12 Michael Savage, The Dynamics of Working-Class Politics – The Labour Movement in 
Preston, 1880-1940 (Cambridge, 1987), p. 161.  
13 Campaign report, The Times, 7 December 1918; Campaign reports, Eastern Daily Press, 
11 December, 13 December 1918. 
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his political position seemed rather more overtly patriotic and imperialist 
than was perhaps expected of a Liberal candidate, with even The Times 
providing him faint praise in its characterisation of his position as 
‘Liberalism vitalised by patriotism’.14 This was particularly notable in his 
pronouncements concerning the threat of Bolshevism, showing evidence 
here of a very early identification with the politics of anti-socialism, and 
most seriously in his desire for retribution against Germany and against 
pacifism.15  
 
Retribution carried with it full and complete reparation and 
restitution, in so far as it could be made to the great rivals of 
Germany, whom she had injured. We must exact from her such 
indemnities as she might be able to pay [...]. At this juncture we did 
not want men who were tarred with the brush of Pacifism. Who 
should we have to make peace for us - those who would go to the 
peace conference under the banner of the Union Jack or those who 
would go under the white flag?16 
 
However, it could also be seen in his attitude towards Free Trade, where he 
suggested that he even might be prepared to consider the argument for 
Colonial Preference if ‘it was for the good of the Empire as a whole’.17 
 What these examples in some ways showed was that Young was 
prepared to put pragmatic national interests above all else; wartime enemies 
must be punished abroad whilst at home there was a need to suspend party 
controversies for the greater good. He called for ‘equality of sacrifice’ 
across the classes to avoid what Young feared could be a ‘war of class’ 
which seemed to reflect something of the resurrection of the pre-war 
                                                          
14 Political commentary, The Times, 7 December 1918. 
15 Campaign report, The Times, 3 December 1918; Campaign report, Eastern Daily Press, 
12 December 1918. There were parallels with the position of Mond; see above, pp. 124-
153. 
16 Report, E. Hilton Young speech, The Norwich Mercury, 14 December 1918. 
17 Campaign report, Eastern Daily Press, 11 December 1918; E. Hilton Young speech, The 
Times, 13 December 1918. Again, a parallel with the position of Mond; see above, pp. 124-
153. 
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emphasis on promoting social harmony but more clearly now as patriotic 
duty and national necessity.18 However, intriguingly none of these ideas 
seemed to bring him any closer to a view about which political faction he 
might connect himself to, refusing to align himself with Asquith or Lloyd 
George, or any other politician for that matter, claiming that such a question 
was a distraction from the immediate issues in the election; remarkably, he 
claimed he had still to make up his mind about what the future prospects of 
his allegiances might hold and he was very circumspect about whether his 
interest in suspending party controversies would lead him into supporting 
the Lloyd George Coalition government in the longer-term.  
 
We must keep together until we are out of the wood. But, when the 
wood is passed, I do not pledge myself to follow the Government 
until I know whither it is going to lead.19  
 
Thus, Young seemed to be giving the impression almost of appearing 
completely unaligned, an independently-minded political voice, it might 
even be argued, building on the pre-war perception of him as an untypical 
party candidate. 
Young’s detached perspective may have been inspired by electoral 
considerations, however. Looking at the 1918 election campaign as a whole, 
in fact, what is striking is his attempt to seek support widely across the 
electorate: the desire for retribution appealing to the right, class unity and 
patriotism to the middle-class, social reform to the working-class, flexibility 
on Free Trade to Conservatives and freedom from state coercion chiefly to 
Liberals; all of which pointed to a desire not only to build a coalition of 
interests behind his patriotic but independent-minded position, but also to 
address his political insecurities and calculations. He had not stood in a 
contested election in the city before and he had not spent much time there 
due to the War, so he had had little opportunity to familiarise himself with 
the local political environment. Furthermore, there was the complication of 
                                                          
18 E. Hilton Young speech, The Norwich Mercury, 14 December 1918. Churchill’s view 
was similar; see above, p. 92-123.  
19 E. Hilton Young letter, The Norwich Mercury, 14 December 1918. 
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the two member borough status of Norwich. Young’s Labour MP colleague, 
George Roberts, was contesting Norwich again, but now as a Coalition 
Labour candidate entrusted with a coupon. There were no Conservative 
candidates and one ‘un-couponed’ Labour candidate. Thus, there were three 
candidates and whilst the absence of Conservatives, in particular, was no 
doubt helpful, Young judged that his appeal needed to be to a broad section 
of opinion to gain a large turnout of voters for him; he felt he could not risk 
appearing too close to any particular political faction. Amongst the biggest 
fears must have been so-called ‘plumping’ for a single candidate or 
abstentions which could let in the ‘un-couponed’ Labour candidate at his 
expense. If he appeared too close to Labour, even a Coalition Labour 
candidate, he risked abstentions from Conservatives, whilst appearing too 
close to the Coalition might push traditional radicals and social-radicals 
within Liberal circles towards Labour.20 Clearly, there were many tactical 
dilemmas.  
Although Young and Roberts ran completely separately their 
campaigns became linked since they pursued the same kind of political 
issues and there was no evidence of them opposing each other; thus, a very 
informal patriotic compact came about which created confusion with some 
local press controversy as to whether Young was really a Coalition 
candidate.21 Nonetheless, the situation did not appear to harm Young’s 
election prospects and may have even improved them amongst some voters; 
he took the second seat, finishing comfortably ahead of the losing Labour 
candidate.22 And it set a precedent of successfully contesting elections 
outside true party lines. 
 
                                                          
20 Norwich had in the past a tradition of the ‘progressive’ candidates working together as in 
many two member boroughs. 
21 The Times reported that Young was a Coalition supporter, something which he was quick 
to deny but it does underlined the confusion over the issue; see Campaign report, The 
Times, 7 December 1918; Campaign report, Eastern Daily Press, 13 December 1918; 
Campaign report, The Norwich Mercury, 14 December 1918. 
22 Overall, Roberts gained 45 per cent, Young, 43 per cent and the ‘un-couponed’ Labour 
candidate, merely 12 per cent.  
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IV 
 
Following the 1918 election, Young seems to have aligned himself with the 
Coalition very quickly.23 There were pressing issues which, for Young, 
demonstrated the need for cooperation with the government, particularly 
around dealing with national debt, public spending, and high levels of 
taxation and unemployment, which were issues of major concern to him.24 
Thus, Young reconciled himself to Lloyd George’s government, which 
enabled him to win Lloyd Georgian favour leading him to be appointed, 
firstly, as a member of the Select Committee on War Profits, established in 
November 1919, and, secondly, as Financial Secretary, where he was able to 
influence and oversee the sweeping economies in public spending between 
1921 and 1922. However, he retained his non-partisan character, with a 
sense that his independence of mind and his analytical skills in 
understanding financial questions won him respect, significantly amongst 
senior Conservatives, such as Austen Chamberlain.25 
 Young’s support for the Coalition did not mean that he did so 
seeking to encourage the complete integration of Coalition forces into a 
single body, however. He was, perhaps surprisingly, distinctly Liberal with 
some inclination for retaining Free Trade, despite the previously noted 
flexibility over the issue and his closeness to ‘safeguarding’ during his time 
at the Treasury.26 He also appealed for the end to Liberal party disunity and 
                                                          
23 Research suggests that Liberal opinion in Norwich fell quickly behind Lloyd George and 
this may have encouraged him in his response. Doyle has shown that this enthusiasm was 
so clear that by 1922 Norwich Liberals were closely involved in the establishment of the 
Eastern Counties National Liberal Federation; see Doyle, ‘A conflict of interests’, 134. 
24 Reports, The Times, 27 November, 18 December 1919, 4 August, 31 August 1920; Lloyd 
George Liberal Magazine, May 1921.  
25 Austen Chamberlain: ‘He is attractive, very able & has made several short but very 
effective speeches on [financial] questions’; see Diary of Austen Chamberlain, 3 April 
1921, in Robert C. Self (ed.), The Austen Chamberlain Diary Letters – The 
Correspondence of Sir Austen Chamberlain with his Sisters, Hilda and Ida, 1916-1937 
(London, 1995), p. 157. 
26 Report, The Times, 7 December 1920.   
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there is no evidence of any particular interest in the idea of fusion with 
which other future recruits became associated. Thus, to some degree he 
could be seen to be moving away from the appeal to national unity. But 
despite this evidence, certainly his interest in cutting national expenditure, 
preoccupation with reducing taxes and promoting the interests of the private 
sector seemed to bring him into greater proximity to Conservative 
perspectives.27 Support for such measures was not necessarily, however, 
evidence of a deliberate intention to position himself close to the 
Conservative party at Westminster; indeed, his calls for Liberal unity might 
point to it being an unconscious one. Furthermore, Young’s appointment 
into the government came at a time when the demand for public economies 
was at its height, and, as Financial Secretary, he was unsurprisingly one of 
the ministers at the forefront of implementing a financial programme with 
support from Liberals in the Coalition as well as Conservatives, so it is 
difficult to see this situation so certainly in the context of proximity to the 
Conservative party exclusively, whatever the impression might have been 
from the outside.   
The positioning of Young’s political interests close to the 
Conservatives was even more apparent at a constituency level, where he 
actively sought rapprochement; this saw him, by the end of 1922, offering 
some general support for the new Conservative government, despite obvious 
personal irritation of having been turned out of office by a section of 
Conservative ‘diehards’.28 Young may well have held some genuinely warm 
feelings towards some Conservatives, but it is clear that he had inclination 
towards his electoral position where he seemed keen to prevent a 
Conservative intervention which would secure re-election almost certainly. 
And he was rewarded for his efforts since his offer seems to have secured a 
Conservative decision not to oppose him.29 Electoral considerations were 
also apparent in the 1922 campaign in his attack on the Labour party and 
                                                          
27 E. Hilton Young article, Lloyd George Liberal Magazine, May 1921. 
28 Report, The Times, 21 October 1922.  
29 Report, Eastern Daily Press, 26 October 1922. 
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socialism in defence of the economy, the financial system and class unity.30 
This latter point is a significant one since the extremity of anti-socialism 
does point to exaggeration, as in other political campaigns mentioned in this 
study, to reinforce a position entirely independent from the Labour party in 
an appeal to Conservatives to support him.31 Young was not the champion 
of individualism that he seemed to wish to communicate to some audiences 
since alongside his attack on socialism, he also showed some desire to 
intervene in the economy, favouring taxation of excessive profits, and only 
opposing a formal capital levy because he believed it could not be 
efficiently collected, which hardly suggested that he was completely set on a 
course totally hostile to socialistic legislation.32  
In the campaign, Young found himself working to some degree 
again in harness with Roberts, standing now as an independent candidate on 
a national unity and anti-socialist ticket reminiscent of his own. They issued 
a joint address to Conservative voters which did much to highlight the 
centrality of Conservative opinion and anti-socialism to their perceived 
election chances.33 However, the campaign was not without an appeal to 
Liberal support, even if it appeared to be a much smaller part of it. Young 
did remain a little circumspect in his offer of support for a Conservative 
administration, affirming a commitment to the principles of the Liberal faith 
and also to offer his support for Liberal reunion.34 
 
He [E. Hilton Young] stood as he always stood, as a Liberal. He 
believed in the principles of Liberalism. They were principles which 
                                                          
30 Reports, Eastern Daily Press, 1 November, 7 November, 13 November 1922. 
31 See above, pp. 43-57.  
32 Report, Eastern Daily Press, November 7 1922. 
33 Election address, Eastern Evening News, 13 November 1922; Report, Eastern Daily 
Press, 17 November 1922. 
34 Report, Eastern Daily Press 7 November 1922; Campaign report, Norfolk Chronicle 10 
November 1922; Report, Eastern Daily Press 4 November 1922. The reference to 
interventionism noted earlier might also have been an appeal to left-leaning Liberals.  
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were going to pull this country though its difficulties. He recognised 
no dividing line between Liberals […].35 
 
But such an appeal may have seemed a little superficial given the focus of 
the campaign as a whole. This certainly seems to have been confirmed in 
the minds of at least some voters in the election; Young increased his 
numerical poll, but his percentage poll and majority were substantially cut 
with some Liberal opinion moving over to the two Labour candidates who 
contested the election.36 Young’s election strategy had been successful in 
returning him to Parliament but at the expense of impressions of him as an 
unequivocal Liberal, despite what he claimed about his allegiances; whilst 
Young was not a Conservative, as at Westminster, there was now an 
impression that he was moving in that direction.  
  
After the 1922 election, Young was briefly enticed towards independent 
Liberal politics; it also seemed to reinforce the idea that he had not moved 
into the Conservative party camp.37 His advocacy of reunion emerged by the 
middle of 1923 when he called for the healing of past divisions, and when 
reunion came he decided to fight an election unambiguously on a Liberal 
ticket for the first time in his political career. However, his optimism 
seemed misplaced since the circumstances of the election meant that there 
was no possibility of a compact with the Conservatives and the contest was 
set for a six candidate election with the three parties fielding candidates for 
both vacancies.38  
                                                          
35 Report, E. Hilton Young speech, Eastern Daily Press 4 November 1922. 
36 In 1922, Roberts again came top, but only by a few votes. Both candidates scored almost 
thirty-four per cent of the votes to Labour’s seventeen and sixteen respectively. Young’s 
large majority was cut by about three thousand votes. Allowance must be made for the 
higher turnout and the change in the number of candidates between the elections, but even 
so there appeared to be a loss of support. 
37 See above, pp. 92-154 & see below, pp. 176-194 for the experiences of Churchill, Mond 
and Guest. 
38 His fellow M. P. colleague, Roberts, had now joined the Conservative party, and found 
himself selected by his new party to oppose Young.  
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Young tried to convince the voters that Liberals offered a middle 
way between the two other parties in some ways seeming to indicate a view 
that the Liberals themselves now singly represented the patriotic national 
interest he had made central to his previous campaigns, due to the party’s 
dual representation of Free Trade interests and opposition to socialism; no 
doubt he hoped that all patriotic and moderate opinion would coalesce 
around the Liberal party as it had previously done for him.39  
 
Liberals were asking the country to stand for Free Trade and against 
Socialism. It was quite clear there was going to be a tremendous 
majority for Free Trade in Norwich, because Liberals and Labour 
were Free Traders [...]. It was quite clear there was going to be a 
tremendous majority against Socialism. That was made clear at the 
last election, and it was going to be made clear at this election, 
because Conservatives and Liberals were both against Socialism 
[...]. If Norwich returned Labour members, it would be 
misrepresented on Socialism. If Norwich returned Conservative 
members, it would be misrepresented on Free Trade, and the only 
way Norwich could get its representation in his opinion was by 
returning two Liberal members [...].40 
 
However, to the voters, particularly Conservative-leaning ones who had 
supported him in the past, it must have seemed that he had reneged on his 
commitment to non-partisanship and that he was presenting an anti-
Conservative policy, which cost him their support and no doubt aided his 
defeat with the move of many former supporters to the Conservative 
candidates.41 Thus, in distancing himself from the Conservative party in 
1923, it could be seen that Young had wrecked his chances of election.  
                                                          
39 See parallel positions to the cases of Churchill and Mond here; see above, pp. 116-117, 
141-144. 
40 Report, E. Hilton Young speech, Eastern Daily Press 22 November 1923. 
41 Young’s percentage vote total halved and he was relegated to third place behind the two 
winning Labour candidates. As well as loss of support to the Conservatives, it also seems 
likely there was further loss of Liberal support to Labour although it is impossible to be 
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V 
 
Young’s defeat in 1923 brought him to a complete loss of faith in 
independent Liberal politics, and to seek instead to link political fortunes to 
that of the Conservative party.42 Evidence does not show that he was 
seeking to abandon Liberal politics, but because of a mixture of electoral 
tactics, and a growing judgement that he shared much in common with 
Conservatives politically, he felt that a very large degree of cooperation 
between the parties was necessary.   
The change in perspective was evident after Young’s reselection for 
the 1924 Norwich election, where he and representatives of the Liberal and 
Conservative political associations agreed the first formal compact in the 
constituency.43 The compact took the form of one candidate per party for the 
two parliamentary seats and a joint campaign with common appearances at 
campaign venues and a show of fraternal spirit on both sides.44 It revealed 
evidence of a careful tactical campaign that would lead to the defeat of both 
Labour candidates and secure representation for Young, as a Liberal, even if 
it would compromise the independence of him and his party; Young did not 
believe the Liberals capable of winning an election without a clear 
compromise with Conservatives.45  
                                                          
certain about the numbers. Overall, the Labour candidates were collectively able to poll 
over 40 per cent the vote between them, with the Liberals 31 per cent and the Conservatives 
29 per cent.  
42 See above, pp. 116-120; 144-145 & see below, pp. 176-194 for similar experiences 
amongst the recruits.  
43 In 1918 and 1922 the Conservatives did not field candidates but there was no formal 
arrangement made for joint campaigning; this was new. 
44 Campaign reports, Eastern Daily Press 10 October 1924, 24 October 1924. The degree of 
cordiality was made more possible by the two-member status of Norwich.  
45 The election saw the defeat of both Labour candidates and the return to Parliament of 
Young alongside the Conservative, J. G. Fairfax, with over 12,000 more votes and a 
majority of over 5,000. Nevertheless, the Labour vote had also grown by another 3,000 
votes as Liberal support continued to haemorrhage. Overall, Young gained 28 per cent of 
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The 1924 campaign projected Young’s anti-socialist credentials, 
possibly as previously revealing evidence of exaggeration in order to 
distance himself adequately from Labour and to highlight commonality with 
the Conservatives.46 He did try to appeal to Liberals to bring them round to 
his point of view, but this seems to have been done by drawing crude 
distinctions between Liberals and socialists, so much so that it rather 
unwittingly confused the practical means of securing Liberal representation 
he wanted to impress upon them with ideological convergence between his 
brand of Liberalism and that of the Conservative party; this was hardly a 
very helpful means to appeal to Liberal perspectives.  
 
[...] Socialism was the very opposite of Liberalism. Liberalism 
looked to the individual, looked to raising up the individual and the 
powers of the individual; the individual capacities and opportunities 
of men, women and children [...]. Let him put it in a single phrase. 
The idea of Liberalism was to level up to the best. The idea of 
Socialism often seemed to him to be to level down to the worst 
[...].47 
 
Thus, from a standpoint of retaining Liberal support his campaign was not 
very effective; he should have identified positive Liberal issues to campaign 
on.48 A clear Liberal perspective was even more vital when considering 
evidence that Liberal voters threatened to support the old radical, but now 
sitting Labour MP and candidate, Walter R. Smith.49 However, the 
appearance of closeness to the Conservatives was not altogether Young’s 
fault since his compact had its constraints; appealing too much to Liberals 
                                                          
the votes cast with Fairfax just behind on 27 per cent. Labour’s candidates gained 23 and 
22 per cent respectively.  
46 Campaign reports, Eastern Daily Press 10 October 1924, 28 October 1924; Campaign 
reports, The Times 14 October 1924, 29 November 1924. 
47 Report, E. Hilton Young speech, Eastern Daily Press 10 October 1924. 
48 The prospects of doing so would have been a challenge, however, given the lack of 
coherence of Liberal politics at the time.  
49 Campaign report, The Times 29 October 1924. 
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might compromise Conservative support as well, so Young was effectively 
caught between two political camps.50 
1924 saw continuity existing with previous campaigns in Young’s 
appeal to the national interest, and he tried to link this to the compact 
arrangement referring to the ‘happy combination’ presented in this regard 
by the united Liberal and Conservative forces, working in partnership.51 
This reveals a sense that compromise with the Conservatives was not 
intended to be a capitulation and that some semblance of Liberal politics 
was needed. However, not dissimilarly to the manner of the projection of his 
anti-socialism, a Baldwin-like emphasis on ‘safety for the country’ which 
did not appear very different from Baldwin’s own ‘safety first’ campaign 
theme hardly reinforced the impression that it was not a capitulation, and 
this illustrates another problem which Young faced in appearing as a 
legitimate Liberal candidate.52 But the reference to Baldwin was an 
important one for another reason too; it seemed to reveal a liking of Young 
for him, and although there has been no evidence found of any personal 
contact between them it does seem that the national position was an 
influence upon Young’s political perspective, with the echo of Baldwin 
suggesting he might have been keen on a wider compromise between 
Liberals and Conservatives organised nationally under Baldwin’s 
leadership.53  
The integration of Young into the Conservative fold locally was also 
reflected in the parliamentary position after the election was won when, 
following the pledge made to his electors and his own liking for Baldwin, 
Young acted on giving support to the new Conservative administration.54 
Furthermore, his pre-election pledge was legitimised by the result of the 
General Election as a whole which had shown that the Liberal party was too 
                                                          
50 A similar sense has been noted in the experience of Guest; see below, pp. 176-194.  
51 Campaign report, Eastern Daily Press 28 October 1924. 
52 See above, p. 43. 
53 Young’s perspective provides another example of how Liberal recruits became attracted 
to Baldwin in the period immediately before leaving the Liberal party; see above, pp. 69-
72; also see below, pp. 176-194.  
54 Report, E. Hilton Young speech, The Times 29 November 1924; see below, pp. 176-194. 
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weak in the country at large to operate independently in Parliament. Thus, in 
the national interest he needed to cooperate with the Conservative 
government, and this, to him, was perfectly compatible with Liberal politics.   
 
As he interpreted his duty to the country and to his constituents, it 
was that he should not be in opposition; that he should not compete 
with the Socialists for the means to embarrass the Government, but 
that, while maintaining the best of his ability the principles of 
Liberalism, he should direct his efforts to helping, and not hindering, 
the Government in carrying out the programme which they laid 
before the nation at the election.55 
 
However, in being true to his electorate, he looked detached from the 
Liberal politics by his perspective, and this appearance increased in the 
coming months in his support for the government on issues such as Empire 
Preference and opposition to the direction of Liberal party policy which 
made him seem ever more like a Conservative.56 His private correspondence 
revealed this detachment even more in his expressed preference for working 
with the ‘modern Conservative party’ in whom he found ‘much to agree’ 
over and above some of his Liberal colleagues whom he came to view 
dismissively as ‘living on a tradition, and nothing else.’57 The truth was that 
whatever he said about his affinity with Liberal politics, it was to Baldwin’s 
Conservatives that he looked for direction, and although he was not a 
Conservative he was firmly in the Conservative camp.58  
The growth of affinity with Conservatives in Parliament was in 
contrast to the decline in support for Liberals and Liberal party policy under 
Lloyd George, the latter of which can be seen to have directly impacted on 
                                                          
55 Report, E. Hilton Young speech, The Times 29 November 1924. 
56 Report, The Times 19 June 1925. 
57 E. Hilton Young to Rufus Isaacs, 15 January 1926, Reading Papers MSS Eur 
F118/94/11-12.  
58 Alun Wyburn-Powell presents Young after 1924 as a ‘somewhat suspect member of the 
Liberal party’; see Alun Wyburn-Powell, Defections and the Liberal party, 1910-2010 
(Manchester & New York), p. 123.  
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Young’s decision to leave the Liberal party. One major factor was the land 
policy which seemed to be a concession to the level of state interference 
which he had rejected at the 1924 election and was a barrier to closer 
relations of Liberals to Conservatives, justifying the step of resignation of 
the Liberal Whip in February 1926.59 But land policy was, in fact, only one 
of a number of issues which concerned him over a period of time. In a letter 
to Rufus Isaacs, he hinted at more general concerns about policy direction, 
and his sense that the party was moving towards some kind of compact with 
the Labour party.60  
 It is significant that Young chose at first simply to resign the Whip 
and to sit effectively as an independent which seems to reinforce a sense 
that he was not seeking to become a Conservative directly. However, his 
resolve in this regard was to be negated in June when he took the step of 
joining the Conservative party. This event was due entirely to the General 
Strike in May which offended his long-term position in promoting of class 
harmony and the patriotic national interest and created in his mind a sense 
that there should be no political divisions amongst likeminded politicians.61  
 
My action was the result of that convulsion in our politics, the 
greatest but the war in our time, the general strike. That, that alone, 
and that for the first time, made it clear to me, then an independent 
member, that it was a public duty to support the Prime Minister 
henceforward unreservedly. A formidable struggle for individual 
liberty and the constitution has begun. We lovers of liberty and the 
constitution must fight it out with every resource at our disposal.62 
                                                          
59 E. Hilton Young to Lloyd George, 25 August 1925, Kennet Papers MSS Kennet 78/1/a; 
E. Hilton Young speech, February 18 1926, Kennet Papers MSS Kennet 78/6; E. Hilton 
Young to Lloyd George, 13 February 1926, Kennet Papers MSS Kennet 78/2b-k; E. Hilton 
Young to Lloyd George, 19 February 1926, Lloyd George Papers G/10/14/21.  
60 E. Hilton Young to Rufus Isaacs, 15 January 1926, Reading Papers MSS Eur 
F118/94/11-12. See above, pp. 147-152 & see below, pp. 176-194 for similar views from 
Mond and Guest. 
61 E. Hilton Young to Baldwin, Open letter, The Times 2 June 1926; E. Hilton Young to 
A.J. Copeman, 6 June 1926, Kennet Papers MSS Kennet 78/14/a-d.  
62 E. Hilton Young to A. J. Copeman, 6 June 1926, Kennet Papers MSS Kennet 78/14/a-d. 
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The Liberal party, under Lloyd George, had moved firmly in a direction 
against his political outlook and thus joining the Conservative party in such 
circumstances was the necessary course.63 It does not seem, however, that 
this decision was made entirely for negative reasons, however, with his 
praise for Baldwin in becoming ‘the effective champion of the basic ideas 
that [he] have ever held and advocated’.64 This evidence suggests that 
although it was the event of the General Strike which decisively brought 
Young into the Conservative party, this could not have happened without 
Baldwin who provided him with a positive reason to become a Conservative 
and not just a partner of the Conservative party. 
   
 
VI 
 
Hilton Young’s political outlook was strongly influenced by patriotism and 
a strong sense of what he regarded to be in the national interest which made 
him almost always appear as a detached figure, not only from the Liberal 
party, but the party system itself. He had been much better suited to the 
politics of the Coalition years where he had been able to achieve some 
respect as an authority on economic and financial affairs and to serve as one 
of Lloyd George’s governmental team; during this period he seemed keen 
that Liberals and Conservatives should work together in the national interest 
and favoured the consolidation of the two political forces into an electoral 
bloc although he was not in favour of the complete fusion of the two parties. 
Despite his non-partisanship and his friendly view of Conservatives, until a 
very late stage Young viewed the Liberal party as being crucial as a vehicle 
for pursuing his political interests, but this was put under pressure with the 
re-emergence of party politics; he had only been elected under coalitions 
                                                          
63 It is intriguing to entertain the possibility that Young’s decision to join the Conservative 
party might not have occurred had it not been for the General Strike although the 
experience of other Liberal recruits suggests if it had not been the General Strike another 
issue would have emerged. 
64 E. Hilton Young, Open letter, The Times, 2 June 1926. 
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and he was not easily able to adapt to it without unwittingly finding himself 
appearing to be moving away from Liberal politics as he reacted to a series 
of political events. He did try to integrate himself more fully into Liberal 
politics in 1923, marking a discontinuity with his more detached position 
and close relations with Conservatives, but the failure of this move 
electorally led him to become even more convinced than ever that Liberals 
needed to work alongside likeminded individuals in the Conservative party.  
From 1924, there seems to have been a genuine patriotic sense of the 
need to consolidate Liberals and Conservatives into a single force which 
took his view of the integration of the two forces much further, particularly 
as he seemed to envisage such a force being led primarily by Conservatives. 
His growing admiration for Baldwin and despair of Lloyd George, saw the 
nature of the relationship with the Conservative party evolve in such a way 
that he saw the future of the Liberal party as kind of junior partner to the 
Conservative party. It was a preference for him to remain as a Liberal under 
such an arrangement but this position became increasingly difficult to 
maintain with the development of Liberal land policy and fears of a Liberal 
alliance with Labour, leading to his resignation from the Parliamentary 
party. However, despite all he may well have stayed as an independent had 
it not been for the General Strike; this seemingly tumultuous event was 
crucial in bringing him into the Conservative party; it offended his 
patriotism, creating in his mind a view that there should be no political 
divisions himself and the similarly-minded Conservatives.  
In all the manifestations of political campaigning the sense that 
Young was drifting towards the Conservative party could usually be 
countered by other factors revealing his electoral position remained 
consistent with his firm political outlook. Yet his campaigning, particularly 
in 1924, seemed to bring him so close to the Conservatives that he appeared 
almost indistinguishable from them, although this was certainly 
unintentional; he had wanted to affirm an electoral position as a patriotic 
Liberal. The closeness to the Conservatives was perhaps heightened due to 
the involvement in a double-member borough; it provided a legitimate 
means of cooperation in a formalised partnership arrangement, in theory 
assisting the cause of Liberal politics through retaining a candidature for the 
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election, but in practice actually giving an outward impression of the 
complete fusion of Liberal with Conservative politics through the formality 
of the joint arrangements. 
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Chapter Five: Frederick Guest 
 
An examination of Frederick [‘Freddie’] Guest’s political career places it 
very centrally to the recruitment of Liberals into the Conservative party. 
Whilst in many ways he was not one of the major recruits, issues including 
his family connections to Churchill, his distinction from traditional Liberal 
dogma, and involvement with Lloyd George and factional conflict make 
him a very appealing character for specific consideration as a case study.  
Guest was first elected to Parliament in January 1910 as the Liberal 
member for Dorset, East division.1 However, his election was short-lived 
due to a petition which unseated him. The East division was where Guest’s 
family held their Wimborne country seat, and his brother, Henry Guest, 
retained the seat for the family in the by-election that followed (July 1910), 
but stood aside, in favour of Freddie, when an election was again called in 
December. Guest subsequently held the constituency until 1922.  
Guest came to prominence in 1915 in his support for Lloyd George’s 
Liberal faction. For his loyalty, he was rewarded with two offices: Coalition 
Liberal Chief Whip, 1917-21, and Secretary of State for Air, 1921-22. 
During this time he became embroiled in both Liberal intra-party troubles 
and inter-party negotiations with the Conservatives. From 1919, he became 
an advocate of fusion between the Conservative and Liberal parties, 
pledging support to Bonar Law as well as to Lloyd George. 
Guest returned to Parliament as the Liberal Member for Stroud in 
1923, but he became dissatisfied with Liberal party policy and again argued 
for closer working relations with the Conservatives. In 1924, he was elected 
in Bristol North without Conservative opposition; he had deserted Stroud 
for a constituency where he could stand openly on a ticket of Liberal and 
Conservative cooperation. Following the election, he worked in opposition 
to the Liberal leadership in Parliament by offering general support for 
                                                          
1 Geoffrey Searle, ‘Guest, Frederick Edward, 1875-1937’, www.oxforddnb.com (accessed 
12 March 2010). Guest contested Staffordshire, Kingswinford, in 1906, Cumberland, 
Cockermouth, on 1 August 1906 and Lincolnshire, Brigg, on 25 February 1907 before his 
eventual election to Parliament in East Dorset.  
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Baldwin’s government. This was damaging to his prospects of retaining 
support from his party and, consequently, he was deposed as the official 
Liberal party candidate, which led to another electoral defeat. Following his 
effective exclusion from Liberal politics, Guest indicated his intention to 
join the Conservative party and, in 1931, he secured selection for the 
Plymouth, Drake constituency, as a Conservative. 
 
I 
 
There is very little historiography of Guest’s political career, perhaps 
because of the apparent absence of personal papers, which has rendered him 
a rather neglected figure. The commentary that does exist has tended to 
focus largely on Guest’s contribution to coalition politics, and there is a 
general sense that such involvement led him into political arrangements 
with Conservatives, particularly when he became concerned about the rise 
of socialism, eventually leading him to join the Conservative party.2 
Furthermore, as an early advocate of wartime conscription, Guest’s 
reputation with some historians has suffered from a sense that he was really 
a Conservative, at least in a philosophical sense, by the middle of the War.3 
However, the balance of the argument against such sentiment has been 
strengthened in the article by Matthew Johnson on the Liberal War 
Committee (LWC); Johnson profiles Guest specifically, pointing to moral, 
egalitarian and patriotic sentiments which were central to his interpretation 
                                                          
2 Kenneth Morgan, ‘Lloyd George’s Stage Army: The Coalition Liberals, 1918-1922’ in A. 
J. P. Taylor (ed.) Lloyd George: Twelve Essays (London, 1971), p. 233; Martin Pugh, ‘Left 
in the Centre? Lloyd George and the Centrist Tradition in British Politics’ in Judith Loades 
(ed.), The Life and Times of David Lloyd George (Bangor, 1991); Geoffrey Searle, Country 
Before Party – Coalition and the Idea of “National Government” in Modern Britain, 1885-
1987 (London & New York, 1995), Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 
1914-1935 (Collins, 1966), pp. 131, 150-3, 262, 268, 288-9.  
3 For some references see Wilson, The Downfall, p. 36; Michael Freeden, Liberalism 
Divided – A Study of British Political Thought, 1914-1939 (Oxford, 1986). There is a 
parallel here with an historical perspective of Mond; see above, pp. 125-129. 
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of a twentieth century Liberalism, together with a sense of the rightful 
patriotic interests of the country for the duration of the War.4  
 Johnson’s research, whilst only dealing with a small part of Guest’s 
political career, has also impacted on understanding of his political career 
more generally since if he was consistent in his philosophical approach in 
1916, then surely there is a similar possibility at other junctures, and this 
needs some assessment. Central to any such examination is the problem of 
Guest’s identification as a ‘Liberal’ from 1904 to 1930. Like his cousin, 
Churchill, it seems that his original involvement with the Liberal party was 
because it was perceived to be moving away from party politics, and there 
was no real sense of a connection to Liberal partisan causes, other than Free 
Trade. Research for this study suggests that he was really not much 
enamoured by the prospect of either Liberal or Conservative partisanship; 
thus, it would be difficult to suggest that Guest’s recruitment into the 
Conservative party meant that he had simply become a Conservative. He did 
not really have a comfortable political home and Guest’s career was 
dominated by his attempting to build support for political combinations 
involving both Liberals and Conservatives which would emphasise political 
interests above party politics.  
 Given the distance from the prevailing party political structures, it 
seems inconsistent that Guest should simply join the Conservatives in 1930. 
Evidence suggests, however, that events drove him out of the Liberal party; 
major ones being his exclusion from the Liberal party electoral organisation 
in 1928-9 and deteriorating relations with Lloyd George. Furthermore, it 
does seem that Baldwin’s liberal conservatism could have been influential.5 
Guest had aligned himself with Baldwin from 1924, particularly in the 
common desire to promote class harmony and avoid socialism, which meant 
                                                          
4 Matthew Johnson, ‘The Liberal War Committee and the Liberal Advocacy of 
Conscription in Britain, 1914-1916’, The Historical Journal 51 2 (2008), 399, 420. There is 
a similarity to the position of Mond and Churchill in their situations; see above, pp. 104-
105, 133-135.  
5 See above, pp. 16-18. 
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they were not dissimilar in political outlook, helping to draw Guest towards 
the Conservative party.  
 
II 
   
Guest’s early life had not necessarily suggested that he was destined for 
political office with his military involvement suggesting that a career in the 
army was a more likely pursuit. He obtained a commission in the First 
Battalion of the East Surrey Regiment in 1894, joined the First Life Guards 
in 1897, and received a Queen’s medal with five clasps for service during 
the Boer War.6 However, such a record may well have encouraged a desire 
for patriotic public service in politics, a sense no doubt heightened by 
Guest’s exposure to politics as a blood-relation of the Spencer-Churchill 
family. A decision to stand for Parliament as a Liberal seemed an unlikely 
one given his aristocratic background; Guest originally considered himself 
as a Conservative although, in parallel to his cousin, Churchill, he joined the 
Liberal party at the time of the tariff controversy.7  
In the years which followed his election, until 1915, it is not 
absolutely clear what issues most motivated Guest politically. It is clear that 
he was a convinced Free Trader and that he offered some support electorally 
for Liberal causes such as self-government for the Transvaal, but he was an 
obscure figure in national politics, tending to play only a low key role as 
Churchill’s assistant private secretary.8  
Guest’s low profile did not mean that he made no impression in 
political circles; some evidence shows that he did make one on a personal 
level and this was not positive, with concerns about his ethical character. J. 
A. Pease alluded to this, pointing out that ‘he was not acceptable in many 
                                                          
6 Obituary, The Times, 29 April 1937.   
7 Report, The Times, 16 May 1910.  
8 Report, The Times, 16 July 1906. 
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quarters. Asquith told me to keep my eyes open.’9 Evidently, Guest was 
seen as a rather devious political character by some Liberal politicians, a 
perception not aided perhaps by the circumstances in which he found 
himself, having been unseated by electoral petition for ‘corrupt and illegal 
practices’ in 1910.10 The offence created a further narrative of 
untrustworthiness around him. Thus, Guest was a fairly isolated figure, even 
at an early stage of involvement in Liberal political affairs. He could not 
have felt much of a sense of being fully integrated within the party. 
 
The early wartime seemed to mark a change in Guest’s political position 
and to some extent his reputation, with him gaining more prominence in 
Parliament through his concern about the management of the war effort 
under Asquith. Disturbed by the lack of success of the early years, he soon 
made his concerns public, something he felt qualified to do given 
experience gained as extra Aide-de-Camp to Sir John French in France from 
the outbreak of the War until 1916, which, as he himself explained, put him 
near enough to the conflict to ‘have one’s wits sharpened’.11 Guest’s own 
experience, together with distress at Asquith’s ineffectual war management, 
helped Guest establish himself as a political figure in his own right, still 
allied to Churchill, particularly in common concerns about the War, but also 
distinct.   
Of immediate concern to Guest was the perceived inadequate supply 
of men and munitions which were held to have left the War hopelessly 
under-resourced and he became amongst the first parliamentarians to argue 
for conscription.12 None of his views led to any diminution of his affinity 
with the Liberal party; on the contrary, they seemed to reinforce, or perhaps 
even create a sense of purpose to his involvement, bringing him into contact 
with other Liberals from all sections of the party for the first time, 
                                                          
9 Journal of J. A. Pease, 25 June 1908, cit. Cameron Hazlehurst & Christine Woodland 
(ed.), A Liberal Chronicle – Journals and Papers of J.A. Pease, 1st Lord Gainford, 1908-
1910 (London, 1994), p. 48.  
10 Report, The Times, 16 May 1910.  
11 Frederick Guest speech, 23 June 1915, HC Debates 1915 Vol. 72 col. 1212-1215.  
12 Geoffrey Searle, Corruption in British Politics, 1895-1930 (Oxford, 1987), p. 299.  
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particularly through the Liberal War Committee.13 It did, however, bring to 
the fore some interventionist instincts, as well as patriotic ones, with 
conscription being seen as vital to the managing of the War.14 His public 
statements pointed to the short-term nature of his advocacy of conscription 
which suggested some attachment towards the principles of voluntarism in 
more normal times, and hence, a reason for involvement in the on-going 
affairs of the Liberal party.  
The concerns about the management of the War were not just about 
supply of men but also related to egalitarian concern about equality of 
sacrifice.15 As well as voluntary recruitment Guest targeted taxation of war 
profits and luxury goods as key issues of inequality. The War, he felt, 
demanded class unity, and there could be dangers of class fragmentation 
which justified such taxation.16 Guest was advocating a role for the Liberal 
party to continue the pre-war emphasis on social and political equality.17  
There may well have been a personal dimension to Guest’s 
criticisms of Asquith. From private correspondence, it can be shown that 
Asquith continued to dislike him incredibly, proclaiming him to be unstable 
as ‘a foolish and adventurous maker – a regular gambler’; he also disliked 
his tendency for ‘begging and pushing’, which revealed an unattractive 
ambitious side.18 The latter point related to Guest’s designs on promotion 
but Asquith was set firmly against any thought of giving him office. Any 
knowledge of Asquith’s negative view of him and the rejection of his 
                                                          
13 Frederick Guest to Churchill, 4 August 1915, Chartwell Trust CHAR 2/67/41-43; 
Frederick Guest speech, 23 June 1915, HC Debates 1915 Vol. 72 col. 1212-1215; Johnson, 
‘The Liberal War Committee’, 410. There was a similar position to that of Mond too; see 
above, pp. 134-137. 
14 Frederick Guest speech, 23 June 1915, HC Debates 1915 Vol. 72 col. 1212-1215. 
15 Johnson, ‘The Liberal War Committee’, 419. 
16 Frederick Guest speech, 15 September 1915, HC Debates1915 Vol. 74 col. 88-98. 
17 For similarities with the position of Churchill see above, p. 111.     
18 H. H. Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 5 January 1915, 17 January 1915, in Michael & 
Eleanor Brock (eds.), H. H. Asquith – Letters to Venetia Stanley (Oxford, 1985), pp. 360, 
383. Asquith suggested that these characteristics were common to all the Guest family, and 
he disliked them all. Also see above, pp. 104-108, 126-127. 
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aspirations for promotion could hardly have assisted in encouraging political 
loyalty.    
 
The poor personal relations as well as the political criticisms assisted in 
formulating a view by the middle of 1915 that Asquith should be replaced.19 
Guest initially thought that the appropriate successor could be Churchill, 
urging him to push himself forward as a ‘powerful critic’ of the government, 
but he quickly refocused his attention on Lloyd George. This may have just 
been because momentum had built up around him but Guest’s view must 
have been influenced by the negative perceptions of Churchill’s war record 
due to the failures at Antwerp and the Dardanelles. Involvement with Lloyd 
George was a wise one for his political influence, since it brought him close 
to the centre of power, as was his wish, for the duration of the coalition 
years with his new chief at the helm.   
Guest’s support for Lloyd George from 1916 saw him ruthlessly and 
enthusiastically advancing what he saw as Lloyd George’s and the 
Coalition’s interests. His support eventually earned him the position of 
Coalition Liberal Chief Whip, and through it he assumed a leading role in 
the organisation of Coalition activity. His faithful service was, however, at 
the further expense of perceptions of his character; the Conservative, Leo 
Amery, referred to him uncivilly as one of the Liberal party’s ‘unscrupulous 
wire-pullers’, pointing to one of his various shady behind-the-scenes 
political activities.20 In the middle of 1918 he could be seen to be using his 
role to exert influence over newspaper proprietors, with private meetings to 
discuss favourable terms for support to Lloyd George and the government, 
as well as seeking to raise funds for the actual purchase of a newspaper.21 
                                                          
19 Frederick Guest to Churchill, 21 July 1915, Chartwell Trust Papers CHAR 2/767/31-32.  
20 Diary of Leo Amery, 8 November 1918, in John Barnes & David Nicholson (eds.), The 
Leo Amery Diaries, Volume I: 1896-1929 (London, Melbourne, Sydney, Auckland & 
Johannesburg, 1980), p. 242. 
21 Diary of George Riddell, 23 June 1918, Undated September 1918, 22 September 1918, 
15 October 1918, in John M. McEwen (ed.), The Riddell Diaries, 1908-1923, (London, 
1986), pp. 229, 235-237, 242, 243. Amery had been invited to one of these meeting which 
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Latterly, as other research shows, he assisted Lloyd George in the sale of 
honours and the establishment of his Political Fund.22 However, despite this 
ruthlessness and the political influence it gave, it did not seem that he was 
altogether satisfied with his situation. He complained to George Riddell that 
Lloyd George was ‘very difficult to work with’ and said that he ‘never 
received a word of praise’ for any of his efforts; he had ‘a dog’s job’.23 As a 
faithful servant he expected more reward.24 None of this could have been 
helpful to integration into his Coalition Liberal party.   
 Guest’s assistance to Lloyd George affected relations with the 
Asquithians which was damaging to his wider involvement in Liberal 
politics in the longer-term. The Asquithian section was viewed by Guest as 
an essentially opposing force rather than a separated branch of the same 
party, as was demonstrated by Guest’s pursuit of a range of means to 
ignore, discredit and eliminate Asquithian opposition. In his role as Chief 
Whip there are various examples of Guest’s actions against his Asquithian 
Liberal opponents. In Parliament, he sought to work with Conservative 
‘federalists’ about a solution to the Irish Question rather than the 
Asquithians, in April 1918, and later in the year he played a key behind-the-
scenes role in manoeuvring against them during the Maurice debate.25 Guest 
fell into bitter conflict with Asquithians about the arrangements regarding 
seats, taking an uncompromising line in promoting Coalition interests, 
culminating in the coupon arrangements; he opposed John Simon’s 
candidature at Spen Valley (1919) and sought to ensure that there was a 
Coalition Liberal candidate to challenge him.26 Guest maintained a 
disregard for Asquith whom he wished to be publicly discredited, privately 
encouraging Lloyd George cynically to engineer a situation which would 
                                                          
he described as being in a ‘real den of thieves’; see Diary of Leo Amery, 8 November 1918, 
p. 242.  
22 Searle, Corruption, pp. 365, 382. 
23 Diary of George Riddell, 30 October 1918, p. 245. 
24 For the experiences of Churchill and Mond see above, pp. 110-115, 144-147. 
25 Searle, Country Before Party p. 112; Wyburn-Powell, Defections, p. 193.  
26 Frederick Guest to Lloyd George, 6 July 1918, Lloyd George Papers F/21/2/25; Report, 
Liberal Magazine, January 1920; Report, The Times, 16 May 1920. 
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impact Asquith’s credibility with Liberal opinion.27 Some of these issues – 
particularly the coupon and Spen Valley – were significant in the narrative 
of the Asquith supporters against Lloyd George in the years that followed, 
so Guest can be seen as having played a key role in preventing unity within 
the Liberal party in the decade that followed.28  
Guest had a firm strategic reason for discrediting Asquith and his 
supporters which pointed to some more principled aspects to his thinking. 
Geoffrey Searle and Trevor Wilson have suggested that he initially wanted 
to see the recreation of a united Liberal party under Lloyd George’s 
leadership, but research for this study also suggests that he envisaged closer 
Liberal cooperation with other political parties, contemplating arrangements 
with either the Conservative party or ‘patriotic’ Labour in the run up to the 
1918 election.29 These initial cross-party ideas soon gave way to a more 
radical solution, however, in favouring the establishment of a new ‘centre’ 
or ‘national’ party involving the fusion of the Liberal and Conservative 
parties, which, by early 1922, had evolved into a Churchillian call for ‘the 
formation of a Central Party’ involving Lloyd George, Churchill and Bonar 
Law as leaders.30 These ideas were not, of course, unique to Guest’s 
position, but he was one of the most ardent advocates of fusion, proclaiming 
boldly that Conservatism and Liberalism were ‘dead letters’.31 He felt that 
fusion was the best means to preserve and extend the work of the Coalition 
and meet the challenge posed by the electoral rise of socialism and the 
partisanship demonstrated by Conservative diehards and troublesome 
                                                          
27 In the incident referred to Guest encouraged Lloyd George to invite Asquith into the 
government, believing his certain refusal would enable Coalition Liberals to discredit 
Asquith for opposing the programme of national reconstruction due to his selfish interests 
in remaining as Lloyd George’s opponent; see Frederick Guest to Lloyd George, 21 
October 1918, Lloyd George Papers F/21/2/43.  
28 See above, pp. 79-82; Wyburn-Powell, Defections, p. 193. 
29 Searle, Country Before Party, p. 113, Wilson, The Downfall, p. 131; Frederick Guest to 
Lloyd George, 21 October 1918, Lloyd George Papers F/21/2/43. 
30 Report, Liberal Magazine, September 1919; Frederick Guest to Lloyd George, 16 
January 1922, Lloyd George Papers F/22/3/37. 
31 Report, The Times, 12 February 1921; Report, Liberal Magazine, November 1921. 
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Asquithians.32 It was also forward-thinking in the sense that it anticipated a 
realignment of political forces amid electoral change. Thus, Guest’s 
advocacy of the idea of a national party was the first evidence of movement 
out of the confines of independent Liberal politics.33   
Despite efforts to define a clear political position, Guest was unable 
to avoid electoral defeat in 1922. The electoral appeal of fusion was limited 
and whilst he secured support from the coalitionist-minded East Dorset 
Liberal and Unionist associations, there was substantive opposition to his 
candidature – informed by negative perceptions of his character no doubt – 
from local Conservatives which led to an unofficial Conservative 
nomination in the election.34 Guest campaigned on a ‘Liberal and anti-
socialist’ ticket, being amongst the earliest Liberals to do so, and he pledged 
to support both Lloyd George and Bonar Law; but he finished third in a 
three-way battle pitting Liberal against Labour and ‘Independent’ 
Conservative. His total number of votes was halved on the 1918 result and 
his vote share declined by just under fifty percentage points, albeit in a three 
way fight this time.35  
 
III 
 
Being out of Parliament did not alter Guest’s enthusiasm for a new national 
party; rather, it reinforced it. Even in 1923, when Liberal reunion was re-
emerging, he continued to emphasise the redundant nature of independent 
Liberalism and the need for Liberals to work with Conservatives to build a 
‘National party’ bloc to oppose Labour and socialism.36 He was not opposed 
to Liberal reunion but he believed it focused the Liberal party’s attention 
                                                          
32 Searle, Country Before Party, p. 120.  
33 Views on fusion can be compared to Churchill’s; see above, pp. 108-111.  
34 Report, The Times, 7 November 1922.  
35 The results were Independent Conservative 49 per cent, Labour 27 per cent and 24 per 
cent for Guest. In 1918, Guest has achieved 73 per cent against 26 per cent for Labour in a 
two-way contest. The result suggests he was very unpopular too.  
36 Frederick Guest article, Lloyd George Liberal Magazine, July 1923. 
 
 
186 
 
inwardly on itself and ignored the important reality of Liberalism’s post-war 
position. Nevertheless, he found himself temporarily moving towards more 
active support for reunion, perhaps more as a tactic to get himself back into 
Parliament rather than for reasons of genuine enthusiasm; he was elected for 
Stroud constituency, with one commentator suggesting he even received 
assistance from the Labour party to secure a victory.37 The latter point 
seems rather paradoxical given Guest’s views on distinction from socialism 
and one might rightly view his position with cynicism although the 
circumstances of the 1923 election seem to provide some mitigation in both 
parties defending Free Trade interests. It also raises questions about how 
truly he was committed to anti-socialism as a point of principle; Guest, it 
seems, sought to exaggerate his anti-socialism as a means to achieve the 
effect of political distance to Labour and closeness to the Conservatives.38  
 In 1924, Guest was one of the Liberals who voted Labour into 
office; again, raising uncertainty about how truly he was committed to anti-
socialism; however, it was clear that he was soon to regret his decision, and 
he became disillusioned with any form of Liberal and Labour cooperation. 
In an open letter to Asquith in The Times he suggested he was concerned 
about a ‘temporarily concealed’ programme of nationalisation on the part of 
the Labour party, and that the Liberal party would face ruin unless it 
changed course.39 Thus, Guest unambiguously again engaged in seeking 
formal cooperation with Conservatives, with evidence suggesting that he 
was sympathetic to Churchill’s desire to create a ‘Constitutionalist’ faction 
as a means to bring together Liberal and Conservative cooperation which 
was similar to his national party idea.40 For himself, his emphasis of 
cooperation gained him support in Bristol North, where he showed an 
interest in standing for election; both Liberals and Conservatives there saw 
the advantage of a compact and he was able to stand on a Liberal ticket 
                                                          
37 Wilson, The Downfall, p. 268. Guest won a comfortable victory gaining 53 per cent of 
the vote to the Conservative 46 per cent. The likelihood would have been defeat if there had 
had been a Labour candidate. 
38 See above, pp. 46-53. 
39 Wilson, The Downfall, pp. 288-9; Frederick Guest open letter, The Times, 26 April 1924. 
40 Winston Churchill to Balfour, 3 April 1924, Balfour Papers GD433/2/19/126. 
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amid general compact arrangements between the two parties in the Bristol 
constituencies aimed at maximising a number of Labour losses.41 It also 
delivered him electoral success, gaining him fifty nine per cent of the votes 
in the straight fight with Labour in the General Election of 1924.  
After the election, Guest moved to act on a promise to Bristol 
electors to support a Conservative government but at the expense of 
supporting his own party in Parliament. This was, in his view, consistent 
with the desire to create a Liberal wing of a ‘national’ bloc but, as no 
definite programme had been identified for this undertaking, it left him 
seeming almost indistinguishable from Conservatives, despite his 
protestations to the contrary. In all this, there was much positive inclination 
towards supporting the government, having become impressed by the 
moderate Conservatism of Baldwin, and he soon began to talk in what 
amounted to Conservative language, even showing some inclination to 
accepting measures of Protection, such as the McKenna duties, and he 
emphasised similar issues to Baldwin, such as the economic interests of the 
middle-classes, financial capital and moderate social reform.42  
In contrast to Guest’s coalescence with Conservative policy was his 
separation from the Liberal party and growing disagreement with Lloyd 
George. Rather like the Asquithian rebels, although separate from them, 
Guest tried to organise resistance to the policies of the Liberal party in 
Parliament and to support the government.43 He felt the party was edging 
towards socialism and he grew suspicious that Lloyd George wanted to 
enter into a compact with the Labour party which would end any hope of 
Liberal cooperation with the Conservative party; thus, there was serious 
condemnation of Lloyd George’s land policy and response to the General 
                                                          
41 Report, The Times, 13 May 1924.  
42 Frederick Guest to Edward Grigg, 11 March 1925, Grigg Papers, MSS (Film) Grigg 
1002; Frederick Guest speech, 30 April 1925, HC Debates 1924-25 Vol. 183 col. 400-403, 
184 col. 1094-1098; Frederick Guest to Edward Grigg, 8 May 1925, Grigg Papers, MSS 
(Film) Grigg 1002; Report, The Times, 1 September 1925; Frederick Guest speech, 30 April 
1926, HC Debates 1926 Vol. 193 col. 640-643. 
43 He worked with Edward Grigg; see above, pp. 86-87.   
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Strike.44 Guest complained that Lloyd George had not honoured supposed 
commitments to ‘non fractiousness’ in his relationship with the 
Conservative government, citing undertakings made at the end of 1924 and 
a party motion moved by Edward Grigg.45 Guest also suggested that Lloyd 
George had negated the politics of the Coalition years which was the 
overarching aspect of Guest’s dissatisfaction.46 However, it is remarkable 
that none of these issues destabilised his sense of personal association with 
the party, perhaps more because his association was now so loose and so 
completely on his own self-imposed terms rather than that he was any more 
reconciled to the party leadership. 
Guest’s position irritated wider Liberal opinion in Parliament and 
within his constituency, and the controversy developed some sort of 
momentum. This can be observed from the events of the end of 1928 when, 
in mid-December, a resolution was passed by the Bristol North constituency 
party which enabled the establishment of a rival Liberal association to 
oppose Guest’s candidature.47 The new ‘Liberal and Radical Candidates’ 
Association’ received endorsement from the Western Counties Liberal 
Federation and also the national Liberal Organisation Committee; the latter 
body stating that it would not oppose a candidate being selected against 
Guest. Thus, the circumstances were created where two Liberal-labelled 
candidates would be fielded in the election of 1929; one endorsed by the 
‘official’ organs of the party and another, Guest, endorsed by the continuing 
Bristol North Liberal Association and the Conservative Association. And 
this was disastrous, with the ‘official’ Liberal candidate depriving Guest of 
                                                          
44 Frederick Guest to Lloyd George, 1 June 1926, Lloyd George Papers G/8/13/4; Report, 
The Times, 8 March 1926; Frederick Guest letter, The Times, 3 November 1926; Frederick 
Guest to Lloyd George, 1 June 1926, Lloyd George Papers G/8/13/4.  
45 Frederick Guest to Edward Grigg, 11 March 1925, Grigg Papers, MSS (Film) Grigg 
1002. 
46 Report, The Times, 3 November 1926. 
47 Report, Liberal Magazine, January 1929. 
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almost seven thousand votes which might have come to him, and leading to 
defeat of both Liberal candidates.48 
The intervention may have been justifiable, due to Guest’s behaviour 
in the 1924 to 1929 period, but this was not how he viewed it. He was bitter 
in defeat and directed abuse particularly towards Lloyd George, hinting at 
betrayal: 
 
[…] I recognise that I have merely paid the penalty for believing 
what Mr Lloyd George taught the Liberal Party between 1918 and 
1922, when on countless occasions he pointed to the Socialists as 
the chief enemies of Liberalism. I did not see anything in the 
Campbell case, the Anglo-Russian treaties or the general strike to 
make me change my mind. Nor could I detect anything in the 
conduct or programme of Mr. Baldwin which induced me to believe 
that he was more reactionary than Mr. Bonar Law, with whom Mr. 
Lloyd George worked fervently for many hardly more critical 
years.49  
 
Guest also reflected upon Lloyd George’s character, referring to his lack of 
principle, his instability and pointing to his corrupting influence over the 
Liberal party which seemed a bit hollow given his own background of 
support for Lloyd George.  Nevertheless, frustrations pent up over the last 
few years came to the fore in his feeling that a revival of the Liberal party 
was impossible with Lloyd George at its head, and he called for his 
replacement with a nobler and more moral leader, which had echoes, 
perhaps cynically, of Baldwin’s own distaste for the character of Lloyd 
George and the need to rise above his corrupting influence.50 Clearly, he 
hoped for a leader who would work with Baldwin. 
 
                                                          
48 Labour polled 49 per cent, Guest 34 per cent and the other Liberal, 18 per cent. The 
Labour vote rose by some nine percentage points on the previous election.  
49 The Times, 4 June 1929. 
50 See above, p. 20.  
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I suggest that in the interests of Liberalism, the following inferences 
may be drawn:- 
1. It is essential that a great party should cease to be so largely 
dependent upon a single source for its financial strength. 
2. It is essential that the Liberal Party should be led by a man 
whom they cannot only trust themselves, but whom other 
parties can trust to be consistent […]. 
[…] The Liberal Party contains many notable statesmen to whom 
straightforwardness is a watchword […] Surely it would be wise, in 
the present situation to consider the claims of one of them to the 
leadership, with complete indifference to any diminution of financial 
resources which such a course might involve.51 
 
Even at this late stage in his association with the Liberal party, however, 
there were still no signs that Guest would seek to join the Conservative 
party; rather he seemed to be pointing to ways in which the party could be 
purified and reinvigorated. The party was still relevant to Guest in the 
middle months of 1929. 
 
Guest’s recruitment into the Conservative party did not occur for a further 
nine months when, in an open letter to Baldwin in The Times on 24 March 
1930, he indicated his intentions.52 In the letter, he reiterated his views of 
the importance of Liberal and Conservative cooperation and the need to 
avoid a class policy. There was also emphasis on the need for greater 
standards of public morality, and there was emphasis of his flexibility over 
Free Trade, both of which seemed to be an attempt to show to Baldwin that 
he shared much in common with the Conservative party.  
 
I have for some time past found increasing difficulty in believing 
that the Liberal Party, under its present leadership, can maintain the 
high traditions and principles of the past. I have at the same time 
                                                          
51 Frederick Guest letter, The Times, 4 June 1929. 
52 Frederick Guest, Open letter, The Times, 24 March 1930. 
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been wondering whether fiscal and economic systems based on the 
facts of 25 years ago are any longer unchallengeable to-day […].  
[…] Many of the differences which divided Liberals from 
Conservatives have become obsolete. I have, as you know, spent the 
last eight years stressing their points of agreement […]. The main 
political issues have become economic, and all who care for national 
interests must take sides definitely according to their economic faith. 
It is my sincere belief that a policy of which you are now a 
protagonist is the only one which will result in the permanent 
security of working class conditions in this country, and in the 
consistent pursuit of a national and Imperial as against a class 
policy.53   
 
The reasons for this action are not absolutely clear from surviving records 
but must surely have been related to Guest’s desire to remain active in 
public life; an option which was not credible without the potential of 
association to a political party.54 Having been excluded from the Liberal 
party, his only available option was to find a way of linking himself to the 
Conservative party. One can imagine, however, that he was a reluctant 
recruit in some respects, since he would have to set aside his desire to create 
a separate national party made up of Liberals and Conservatives. However, 
he had recent form in supporting Conservatives to the degree of being more 
or less indistinguishable, and in political outlook terms his 1930 letter 
suggests he was comfortable in making that decision; the Conservative 
party might not have seemed very different from the national party he has 
been hoping for. Furthermore, it is useful to note the references in his letter 
to the economic system as part of his justification. It implies some 
significance in the best means of propagating an anti-socialist bloc. Even 
allowing for hyperbole, Guest had major concerns about the potential of too 
much intervention in the economy and society under a future Labour 
                                                          
53 The Times, 24 March 1930. 
54 This was similar to Mond; see above, pp. 149-152. 
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administration with the Conservative party seeming like the only form of 
defence against it by 1930.  
   
IV 
 
In examining Guest’s political situation an overriding characteristic was his 
lack of integration into the Liberal party. Over time he pursued political 
priorities which always placed him amid divisions within the party, not 
helped by his single-mindedness, ruthlessness and self-interest which made 
him unpopular and accentuated his separation from others. His association 
with Lloyd George brought him to the heart of the Liberal coalitionist force 
but after reunion and with Lloyd George’s changed direction he ended up 
isolated in the wider Liberal party. His largely on-going negative position in 
the party might suggest that he was likely to be one of the Liberals who 
would eventually distance himself from it but, unexpectedly perhaps, he 
remained steadfast in his desire to be a Liberal and he had to be forced out, 
in the events of 1928-9, before he looked towards any other political force. 
He had started out as a Conservative but unlike in the case of his cousin, 
Churchill, his difficulties with the Liberal party did not see him making 
similar steps to return to his former party. Joining the Conservatives only 
occurred when there was no alternative.  
 In the context of Guest’s wish to remain as a Liberal, one of the 
most intriguing aspects was his belief that whatever position he took on 
policy or electoral issues did nothing to challenge his involvement in the 
Liberal politics. This must be seen in the context of the extraordinary 
incoherent state of Liberal politics where Guest could to some degree claim 
legitimacy to be representing the real interests of Liberalism; there was no 
need to resign even if there were fundamental differences of policy and 
strategy from the leadership.55   
                                                          
55 It is useful to examine these points in the context of similar discussion of the position of 
Grigg; see above, pp. 60-61.  
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 Guest’s links with the Conservatives are partly explained in the 
context of the convergence of Liberal and Conservative politics rather than 
because he had moved to the right. After the War, Conservative politics was 
very similar to Guest’s own and his desire to create a national bloc was 
largely consistent. It seems that he genuinely believed that Liberals and 
Conservatives needed to work closely together and it was not in their 
interests to oppose each other. There is some ambiguity in whether Guest 
firmly maintained his view of the need to form a national party in the mid-
1920s or whether he wished the parties to remain separate but in 
cooperation with each other. The latter seems more likely since his 
emphasis was more on working in partnership rather than formal 
amalgamation. In this situation, he was anticipating the development of 
joint arrangements after 1931, and even beyond, in a more permanent 
compromise between the two forces. It seems likely that he would have 
sought to propagate such links within the Liberal party without joining the 
Conservatives if he had not been forced into severing his ties.  
 Being forced out of his party, one can see that he had little option 
but to seek arrangements with the other party in his proposed national bloc, 
and his justifications for joining the Conservatives must be seen in this 
context. However, in so-doing, he highlighted much of how his political 
outlook was indistinguishable from a Conservative one; this may have been 
coincidental but it was apparent nonetheless. It is useful to consider his 
relations with Baldwin. These were not close; in fact, it has been suggested 
that Baldwin was not inclined to make him overly welcome in his party and 
to make propaganda out of the recruitment of yet another Liberal into his 
party; he had concerns about Guest’s ethics and also his previous relations 
with Lloyd George.56 Nonetheless, Guest felt that Baldwin was a leader he 
could work with – he had been an admirer of Baldwin since 1924 – and he 
saw under his leadership the ability to build and safeguard a suitable 
political force for the years ahead. Guest’s expressed commitment suggests 
that in the nine after his election defeat he had thought hard about his 
                                                          
56 Searle, Corruption, pp. 365, 382. 
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position and was confident in the appropriateness of a complete 
reconciliation with his old party. 
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Chapter Six: John Simon 
 
Consideration of the career of John Simon is vital to this study.  Whilst he 
did not join the Conservative party, his alignment with it through his 
leadership of the Liberal National grouping, from 1931, means that specific 
consideration of his change in political allegiance will do much to develop 
understanding of the characteristics of Liberal National recruitment into the 
Conservative-dominated political bloc as well as more detailed 
understanding of Simon himself as an individual recruit. In terms of Simon 
specifically, it can be noted that he had, for much of his career, been against 
party compromises or coalitions, in contrast to the perspectives of other 
Liberal recruits mentioned in this study, making consideration of his 
eventual inclusion within the Conservative-dominated political bloc 
particularly intriguing. Furthermore, Simon has been identified with the 
Asquithian section of the party in the 1920s; but, in reality, looking at 
Simon as an Asquithian, except in a loose sense, is a misnomer since he was 
single-minded, not really being aligned to any particular faction within the 
fragmented body of what was Liberal opinion in the period. This sense of 
separateness played an important role in assisting dissatisfaction with the 
direction of Liberal politics over a long period of time. Importantly, Simon 
saw himself as a future Liberal leader to replace Asquith and the frustration 
of this, chiefly by Lloyd George, is an important context for his political 
perspectives after 1918 and his eventual decision to work more closely with 
Conservatives.  
 
 
I 
 
The historiography of the political career of John Simon yields a number of 
important issues to consider for this study. An impression is provided of an 
ambitiousness of character and aloofness from party colleagues, sometimes 
examined by historians in the context of his political decision-making, even 
to indicate reasons for departure from the ‘official’ Liberal party in 1931. 
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Trevor Wilson, for example, has considered the impact of long-term strain 
on his relationship with the Liberal party, pointing to his inability to 
progress within it due to the presence of Lloyd George, who had disrupted 
Simon’s political career by keeping him out of Parliament, from 1918 to 
1922, blocking his route to the party leadership, and, from 1924 onwards, by 
seeking rapprochement with Labour.1  
 A framework, provided by Wilson, helps to identify a context in 
which to place the various issues that, over a long period of time, impacted 
upon Simon’s relationship with the Liberal party, in some ways pointing to 
a disaffected political figure from even before the First World War. Various 
issues can be identified which confirm this impression, mostly by utilising 
the research of his biographer, David Dutton, but also that of Wilson and 
other historians’ commentaries. The first clear indications of disaffection 
have been detected in the pre-war controversies over naval estimates and 
Irish Home Rule, and also during wartime, following Simon’s resignation 
from the government, amid the conscription controversy and Asquith’s 
perceived failures as a war leader.2 Simon did not appear to be clearly 
aligned to either Lloyd George or Asquith, due to his feelings about them, 
and his appearance of offering a ‘radical’ opposition to the politics of 
government was rather a misleading one, since, as Dutton suggests, it was 
rather coincidental, and he tried to dissociate himself from radical opinion. 
The period after the War did nothing to mend this sense of disaffection, it 
seems, since he remained unimpressed with Asquith but yet continued to 
oppose the Coalition.3 Simon has been shown to have set himself against 
Liberal reunion which eventually threatened his potential to develop his 
leadership prospects.4 After 1923, a view emerges that Simon’s position was 
characterised by opposing the development of relations with the Labour 
party, with particular concerns about the voting of Labour into government 
                                                          
1 Trevor Wilson, The Downfall of the Liberal Party, 1914-35 (London, 1963), p. 391. 
2 David Dutton, Simon - A Political Biography of Sir John Simon (London, 1992), pp. 20-
22, 31, 34-41, 44-46; Wilson, The Downfall, pp. 106-107, 217, 251, 297. 
3 Dutton, Simon p. 54; Michael Hart, ‘The decline of the Liberal Party in Parliament and the 
constituencies’, Unpublished University of Oxford D.Phil. (1982), p. 148. 
4 Dutton, Simon, pp. 54, 61. 
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and policy over the General Strike.5 It can be seen that he also entered into 
conflict with Lloyd George in his growing influence over the party, 
particularly through the Political Fund, which further conflicted with 
Simon’s own wish to secure political advancement. This post-war situation 
was significant; Dutton suggesting that by 1926 Simon was ready to retire 
from public life altogether due to his disillusionment over various issues, 
although research for this study does not suggest that he was quite so 
disaffected. This, in part, relates to evidence that he was active in trying to 
resist Lloyd George, even looking at an alternative means to form a 
relationship with Labour to rival Lloyd George in the period between the 
1924 and 1929 elections.6  
 Research identified for this study which points to Simon’s own 
flirtation with Labour may contrast with other research but it does seem to 
back up other ideas since Dutton has also pointed strongly to Simon’s 
tendency to exaggerate his differences with Lloyd George, largely to try to 
destabilise the party leadership and bolster his own potential to lead the 
party.7 One way Dutton has shown this is in the political outlook Simon 
seemed to portray in the 1920s. As in the cases of other Liberals identified 
within the Asquithian grouping in the post-war period, Simon expounded a 
neo-Gladstonian position on politics, which no doubt suited his need to 
appear different from Lloyd George but he was soon to cast it aside, in 
1929, when a suitable replacement position emerged in the form of the 
Yellow Book proposals, underlining the sense that it was some form of 
political tactic.8 Thus, this tendency towards exaggeration suggests there are 
dangers in reading too much into Simon’s sense of disaffection from his 
party in the years preceding his resignation of the Liberal Whip.9 He was 
fighting for influence within his party, and this did not necessarily suggest 
that he was in danger of being placed outside it.    
                                                          
5 Ibid., 64-68, 75-81. 
6 See below, pp. 212-216. 
7 Dutton, Simon, p. 61. 
8 Dutton, Simon, pp. 55, 90-101; John Campbell, Lloyd George - The Goat in the 
Wilderness (London, 1977), p. 57, p. 230.  
9 This event occurred in June 1931. 
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 Dutton has not put emphasis on the longer-term issues in Simon’s 
resignation and recruitment into the Conservative party bloc; instead, he has 
focused on immediate issues concerning deteriorating views about the 
minority Labour government and alarm at the Liberal party’s move towards 
rapprochement with the Labour party. Amongst Simon’s grievances against 
Labour Dutton points to a rebuff of the Commission on India, which Simon 
had chaired, and some policy issues around the Coal Bill and the Trades 
Disputes Act.10 Dutton has shown that these issues set him on a course 
towards seeking rapprochement with the Conservative party from 1930, 
even to the extent of pointing out that there was no need for an independent 
Liberal party if it was purely to exist to prop up Labour.11 Thus, according 
to Dutton’s view, Simon gravitated to a position in which he sought to bring 
a section of Liberal opinion behind him and to set up an organisation in 
Parliament with the purpose of working closely with Conservatives. 
However, it was not just views about the Labour party which were 
important. Dutton revealed that Simon now believed compromises with Free 
Trade were needed due to the serious financial situation, so this aided his 
resolve.  
A focus on short-term considerations is not exclusive to Dutton’s 
perspective. Graham Goodlad, in his article concerning the Liberal National 
party, has given thought to Simon’s motives in seeking to work with the 
Conservatives, considering how the Liberal National party’s conception was 
a vehicle to further his own personal interests, witnessed, for example, in his 
emphasis of pushing his claim for Cabinet office above that of colleagues in 
his party.12 It is possible that he had in mind some Cabinet role before 1931, 
and Goodlad’s research does much to help to confirm that this may have 
been the case.  
The emphasis on short-term issues, however, can be seen to risk 
ignoring of possible rapprochement with the Conservative party over a 
                                                          
10 Dutton, Simon p. 104. 
11 Dutton, Simon p.105. 
12 Graham Goodlad, ‘Communications – The Liberal Nationals, 1931-1940: The problems 
of a party in ‘partnership government’, Historical Journal 38 1 (1995), 136. 
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longer period of time. Nothing has really been put in place to consider the 
impact of Simon’s pursuit of laissez faire, anti-socialism and neo-
Gladstonian politics for much of the 1920s on relations with Conservatives 
and, indeed, whether some of the motivation for his emphasis on these 
issues, in a parallel to resistance to Lloyd George, marked some kind of 
move towards the right. In the Spen Valley, Simon received no opposition 
from Conservative candidates from 1924, and whilst there could be various 
reasons for this, the circumstances might suggest some development of 
better relations with Conservatives. The only issue which has been 
considered in anything like this context is Simon’s position at the time of 
the General Strike, where it can be seen that he was talking in the language 
of Baldwin and how this aided Conservative relations, leading to his 
involvement in the India Commission, but there is much more to examine in 
this respect.13   
A final area is to consider how far electoral calculations played a 
part in Simon’s political choices. The importance of such calculations have 
been shown in Dutton’s explanation of his position in uncharacteristically 
supporting Lloyd George, in 1929, but little else has been suggested by him 
for other elections, or by other historians, for elections more generally. 
Research for this study suggests that electoral insecurity played a role in his 
political choices, certainly from the later 1920s, and more acutely after 
1931, with insecurities about the electoral position of his new party 
grouping in Parliament, particularly when the Samuelite Liberals became 
more clearly defined as the ‘mainstream’ Liberal grouping. 
 
 
II 
                                                          
13 Wilson, The Downfall; David Dutton, ‘John Simon and the post-war National Liberal 
Party: an historical postscript’, Historical Journal, 32, 2 (1989), 357-367; Goodlad, 
‘Communications’, 133-143. Research for this study shows that there was little genuine 
rapprochement with the Conservatives before 1930, despite the General Strike and the 
India Commission, but this is no reason to neglect assessment of the issue altogether. Some 
reflection on the issue is vital to appreciating Simon’s political position. 
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A mixture of influences can be used to explain Simon’s initial attachment to 
the Liberal party. He was the son of a Welsh Congregational minister, and, 
on his mother’s side of the family, there were Irish Catholic influences. 
Both probably encouraged his early but unsustained interest in Liberal-
Radicalism, witnessed from records of his early contributions to the 
Manchester Guardian and Speaker, in his pro-Boer sympathies, and as his 
parliamentary career got started, in his emphasis on Free Trade, criticism of 
landed interests, and favouring of Home Rule for Ireland.14 It also perhaps 
conditioned his response to the knighthood which went with the post of 
Solicitor-General in October 1910 – Simon had initially objected to the title.  
Other aspects of Simon’s background were, however, perhaps more 
evidence of connection to the established social elite; he was educated at 
Fettes and Oxford, and his legal training encouraged a more conservative, 
imperialist and Whig-like perspective towards politics.15 This fed into early 
suspicion of the ‘new-fangled’ nascent Labour party, with opposition to 
measures such as the ‘Right to Work’, and the reversal of the Osborne 
Judgement.16 This did not mean that he had no interest in social reform; in 
fact the opposite was true, given his enthusiasm for National Insurance, with 
evidence showing that he was very impatient for the government to defeat 
the challenge from the Lords in relation to the measure.17 It also did not 
                                                          
14 Dutton, Simon pp. 9-15; Report, John A. Simon speech, The Times, 24 November 1910, 
11 March 1911; John A. Simon to Asquith, 5 February 1910, Asquith Papers MSS Asquith 
12/111-13. 
15 David Dutton, ‘Simon, John Allsebrook’, www.oxforddnb.com (accessed 8 January 
2009). This does not make Simon by background very different from other future Liberal 
recruits mentioned in this study; see above, pp. 41-45.  
16 John A. Simon to H. H. Asquith, 5 February 1910, Asquith Papers MSS Asquith 12/111-
13; Election report, The Times, 15 October 1910; Report, John A. Simon speech, The 
Times, 29 November 1910.  
The Osborne Judgement (1909) was a landmark legal ruling preventing the trade 
unions from collecting a levy for political purposes, specifically to fund the Labour party.  
17 John A. Simon to Asquith, 5 February 1910, Asquith Papers MSS Asquith 12/111-13. 
There was a sense that Simon was in sympathy with imperialist perspectives in the 
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mean that he was anti-Labour either given that his constituency, 
Walthamstow, possessed a well-functioning pact between the Labour and 
Liberal parties.18 But it was clear that his sentiments towards a Labour 
‘class’ programme were less supportive, and thus, in this early period one 
can see early signs of a later, more oppositional position towards the politics 
of trade unionism and class politics.   
 
The early years of Simon’s parliamentary career can be seen as fairly 
harmonious ones in terms of his attachment to the Liberal party; he clearly 
possessed the confidence of Asquith as his rapid appointment to the Cabinet 
would suggest. However, this was challenged by the controversy over the 
Naval Estimates for 1913-1914 which was perhaps a precursor to the 
factious position adopted in the early part of the War.19 Simon saw the 
increased expenditure as a threat to Free Trade and a distraction from social 
reform and from the implementation of the Home Rule bill, which he had 
personal interests in pursuing.20 The threat to the Edwardian Liberal 
programme posed by Churchill, as First Lord of the Admiralty, was 
interpreted as a threat to the government itself by Simon, and he was 
suspicious of Churchill’s motives in seeking a return to the Conservative 
party. Evidence suggests that Simon discussed with Cabinet colleagues 
                                                          
government in relation to this issue. His position is comparable to those of Churchill and 
Mond; see above, pp. 97-98, 133.  
18 Simon was first elected in Walthamstow in 1906, and was re-elected three times in 
January, November (ministerial by-election) and December 1910. The pact was very 
beneficial to Simon since he could not have counted on victory had there been a Labour 
candidate. The respective vote shares for the Liberal party were as follows: 1906: 58 per 
cent; January 1910: 53 per cent; November 1910: 55 per cent; December 1910: 56 per cent.  
19 Asquith seems to have been on good personal terms referring to Simon by the nickname 
of ‘the Impeccable’ in private correspondence although towards the end of War he was 
increasingly referred to as Simon which could suggest that their relationship was becoming 
less close.  
20 Letter to H. H. Asquith signed by Lord Beauchamp, Charles Hobhouse, Reginald 
McKenna, Walter Runciman and Sir John Simon (in Simon’s hand), 29 January 1914, in 
Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill – Companion Volume 2 Part 3 (London, 
1969) pp. 1857-1858; Dutton, Simon p. 20. 
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potential ways in which Churchill’s resignation from the government could 
be secured; and, in this, he tended to take matters to extremes, revealing a 
less pleasant side to his character, with The Manchester Guardian editor, C. 
P. Scott, privately characterising Simon’s vengeful behaviour as that of a 
kind of ‘Robespierre’, being ‘out for Churchill’s head’.21 Actions such as 
these reveal the extent of his alienation from Churchill certainly, and helped 
to sour relations with members of the Cabinet, particularly Lloyd George, 
even before the onset of the War. 
  
For Simon, it was the War which started to upset his attachment to the 
Liberal party as the party entered into political territory which he viewed as 
unsupportable. As Dutton has shown, Simon was so preoccupied with 
pushing the cause of Home Rule he did not seem to be prepared for war 
when it came, seemingly having little insight into the powerful war lobby 
which had grown in the Cabinet, or indeed, the changing political climate 
which was pushing Britain onto a war footing.22 Surviving records point to a 
sense of Simon’s feeling that a section of the Cabinet, under Lloyd George 
and Churchill, had dishonestly worked behind the scenes to provoke war 
and force a war policy on the government.23  
 
He [Simon] was looking terribly worn and tired. He began at once 
by saying he had been entirely deceived about Germany and that I 
ought to know that the evidence was overwhelming that the party 
which had got control of the direction of affairs throughout the crisis 
had deliberately played for and provoked the war.24 
 
                                                          
21 Diary of C. P. Scott, 23 January 1914, in Trevor Wilson (ed.), The Political Diaries of 
C.P. Scott, 1911-1928 (London, 1970), pp. 73, 78. Also see Diary of George Riddell, 18 
December 1913, 23 January 1914 in John M. McEwen (ed.), The Riddell Diaries, 1908-
1923 (London, 1986), pp. 73-78-79. 
22 Dutton, Simon pp. 28-30; H. H. Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 21 September 1914 in 
Michael & Eleanor Brock (eds.), H. H. Asquith – Letters to Venetia Stanley (Oxford, 1985), 
p. 87. 
23 Dutton, Simon, p. 30; Diary of George Riddell, 25 August 1914, p. 89. 
24 Diary of C. P. Scott, 4 August 1914, p. 96. 
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But, of course, Simon did not resign, with Dutton revealing a mixture of 
political principles and party loyalties playing their part in this decision.25 
The importance of party loyalty is quite striking here; clearly, Simon looked 
for every way possible to justify his party’s decision, with Germany being 
presented as an aggressor, having defied Belgian neutrality, and he could 
comfortably stay and help to prevent the collapse of the Liberal government 
on this basis. However, this could be seen as an example of self-interest; 
outside the government he would have no influence at all, and his decision 
to stay could gain him some leverage in a realignment of the power-balance 
in the Cabinet if he could successfully argue a case which might someday 
command support. 
At the start of the Coalition in May 1915, Asquith moved Simon to 
the Home Office which was a promotion, but seemed a difficult one given 
that he was not a keen advocate of coalition arrangements; and it was to 
prove unhappy for Simon in that he used his influence there to resist the 
mounting pressure, led by Lloyd George, for a more vigorous prosecution of 
the War and the introduction of conscription, ultimately seeing him resign 
from the government in January 1916.26 Simon’s initial strategy appeared to 
be one of staying in the government and attracting moderate support, 
perhaps to build his own potential leadership prospects, but he ended up 
isolated, alienating Liberal opinion and not winning over those on the left, 
or the old fashioned radicals, who, despite his radical views on some issues 
in the past, were not now his natural allies; Simon’s views seemed based on 
more conservative-leaning constitutionalist and legalist arguments than a 
Liberal-Radical variety.27 Furthermore, his Liberal credentials must have 
seemed rather tainted; as Home Secretary he had accepted some state 
coercion, particularly by the introduction of censorship, and, as a Cabinet 
member, infringements of Free Trade through the 1915 McKenna Duties. 
Two potential anti-compulsionists allies – Runciman and McKenna – chose 
                                                          
25 Dutton, Simon, pp. 31-32.  
26 Dutton, Simon, pp. 33-40; John A. Simon, Retrospect - The Memoirs of the Rt. Hon. 
Viscount Simon (London, 1952) p. 106. 
27 Dutton, Simon, p. 40. 
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not to support Simon and this caused him irritation.28 Certainly, in the case 
of McKenna, there was suspicion that Simon was looking for means to seize 
the leadership of the party; his resignation was itself interpreted as a sign of 
this intention, with his freedom outside government to criticise policy now 
allowing him the ability to galvanise support amongst disgruntled 
Liberals.29 Suspicions of his character played a role here. He could be seen 
as ‘cool and remote’ which could be interpreted unfairly perhaps as cynical 
and calculating.30  
The isolation suffered as a consequence of Simon’s loss of position 
was not, however, insurmountable both in the remaining months of the 
Asquith government and after Lloyd George took over. Simon saw 
opportunities to identify a new role as part of a ‘patriotic’ opposition, setting 
himself clearly against the direction of policy pushed especially by the 
Lloyd George Liberal faction and Conservatives. This saw him forcefully 
arguing for the revival of purely Liberal principles which had been 
circumvented by the onset of war, revealed in his defence of Free Trade and 
his condemnation of Coalition policy in Ireland, particularly with reference 
to the Easter Rising of 1916.31 This new position was successful in many 
senses, with Simon genuinely seeming more like a leading Liberal.32 It even 
won him some respect from an unlikely quarter in Lloyd George, who 
latterly saw a wish to harness Simon’s potential in some way, despite their 
disagreements, through asking him to draft the Representation of the 
                                                          
28 Diary of George Riddell, 16 January 1916, p. 89. 
29 Martin Farr, ‘Winter and Discontent: The December Crises of the Asquith Coalition, 
1915-16 ‘, Britain and the World 4 1 (2011), 125.  
30 Alun Wyburn-Powell, Defections and the Liberal party, 1910-2010 (Manchester & New 
York, 2012), p. 151. There were contrary impressions; Charles Hobhouse referred to Simon 
as having ‘a most attractive personality; a ready wit, a persuasive advocate.’ He went on to 
say he was had ‘a very lovable character’ in Charles Hobhouse Diary, 23 March 1915 in 
Edward David (ed.), Inside Asquith’s Cabinet – From the Diaries of Charles Hobhouse 
(London, 1977), pp. 229-230. 
31 Wilson, The Downfall, pp. 106-107; Report, John A. Simon speech, Liberal Magazine 
May 1916; Simon, Retrospect  p. 110. 
32 This reinforced the accuracy of the impression of McKenna that Simon was looking to 
attempt to take the leadership.  
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Peoples’ Bill and to head up the Wages Awards Committee in 1918. 
However, this position was not entirely a contented one. There were limits 
to Lloyd George’s overtures towards him; certainly Lloyd George was not 
intending to draw Simon into his close political circle, and his efforts to 
define a significant political position for himself, he believed, were thwarted 
by Asquith’s poor leadership once outside of government which cast 
negativity over Simon’s stature with him being a supposed Asquithian 
sympathiser.33 It seems Simon was frustrated that following Asquith’s fall 
from power he did not resign the leadership in order for Simon himself to 
put forward a claim to take on the role; certainly his activities from 1916 
suggested he was positioning himself to do just this.34   
 
III 
 
Simon’s election defeat in 1918 partly resulted from not being clearly 
aligned to either of the Liberal factions.35 He did not receive the Coupon in 
the election, but he still claimed to be both a ‘supporter and colleague’ of 
Lloyd George and of pre-war Liberal and Radical politics, hoping vainly to 
gain some profit both for assisting Lloyd George in 1918 but also resisting 
the so-called excesses of wartime policy.36 However, instead of analysing 
the part he played in his defeat, he looked for scapegoats, finding one in 
Lloyd George and his coupon arrangement.37 However, it could not have 
been only a sense of collective betrayal that motivated him, given that 
                                                          
33 Edward David, ‘The Liberal party divided, 1916-1918’, Historical Journal 13 3 (1970), 
517; Hart, ‘The decline of the Liberal party’, p. 148.  
34 Simon was certainly not as ‘devoted’ to Asquith as he chose to present in his memoirs; 
see Simon, Retrospect, p. 106; Dutton, Simon, p. 44. 
35 The election saw a massive defeat for Simon, polling under 37 per cent in a two-way 
contest.  
36 John A. Simon, 1918 Election Address, Simon Papers MSS. Simon 119/30; Dutton, 
Simon, pp. 52-53. 
37 Simon, Retrospect p. 121. 
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Asquith was not altogether his ideal leader either; the defeat was a loss in 
prestige for Simon personally and a setback to his political career.    
The result of the defeat was that Simon, perhaps with little other 
option, fell more in line with Asquith and his supporters as he looked to 
rebuild his influence over the Liberal party. This saw a broad attack on a 
range of Coalition policies such as the cost of financing military activity in 
Russia, on Ireland, and the Safeguarding of Industries Act.38 There was also 
an attack on alleged immoral and corrupt practices of the Coalition. Simon, 
for example, pointed to Lloyd George’s unprecedented presidential style, 
which he used to illustrate what he saw as the government’s ‘contempt for 
parliamentary methods’.39 He expressed doubts about the very idea of 
coalition since, in his view, under Lloyd George it had changed the House 
of Commons from ‘being a real mirror of a variety of streams of opinion’ to 
being ‘nothing more than a unified and consistent expression of practically 
one point of view.’ There was much hyperbole in his attack too, which was 
shaped by the adversarial nature of the opposition to him by Coalition 
Liberals in the Spen Valley by-election of 1919 where he found himself 
opposed by a Coalition Liberal candidate; this election must have been, for 
him, his chance of returning to the heart of parliamentary politics, but the 
intervention led to a Labour victory.40 The attack against Simon was highly 
personal, with Simon being smeared as unpatriotic and as a traitor due to his 
‘war record’ whilst in government.41   
                                                          
38 John A. Simon, Extracts of printed speech, ‘Sir John Simon on the Misdeeds of the 
Coalition’, 6 September 1919, Simon Papers MSS. Simon 119/61; Dutton, Simon, pp. 55-
57. There are similarities with the position of Runciman here; see below, pp. 224-267.  
39 Report, Liberal Magazine, June 1919. 
40 Report, Liberal Magazine, May 1920. The result was Labour almost 40 per cent, Simon 
with almost 34 per cent, and the Coalition Liberal almost 27 per cent. 
41 Report, The Yorkshire Post ,1 December 1919 cit. Simon Papers MSS. Simon 151/1; 
Report, The Daily Chronicle, 17 December 1919 cit. Simon Papers MSS. Simon 152/57; 
Report, Liberal Magazine, January 1920; Report, Liberal Monthly, February 1920. It 
should perhaps be mentioned that the previous member for Spen Valley had been a 
Coalition Liberal, but the Liberal Association selected an Independent Liberal to replace 
him; Report, Manchester Guardian, 5 December 1919 cit. Simon Papers MSS. Simon 
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Whatever the hardships Simon suffered, it was extremely helpful to 
him in that it added to his ‘independent’ Liberal credentials, gaining him 
Liberal sympathisers, including Charles Masterman, who was moved to 
write in the Asquithian magazine, Liberal Monthly, on the subject.42 Thus, 
both by his criticism of the Coalition and his electoral experiences, Simon 
was able to identify a role for himself again, and his fortunes were to 
improve still further with his capture of Spen Valley in the 1922 election, 
following which he was elected by his Asquithian colleagues as Sessional 
Chair with every prospect, as Dutton has suggested, that he, rather than 
Asquith, would be responsible for the day to day leadership of the party 
given his appearance to offer capacity to renew independent Liberalism.43   
 Simon’s appeal for a strong independent Liberalism was not just a 
reaction to the Coalition, and has been well covered by Dutton in its re-
emphasis of traditional Liberal policies; it was a sort of neo-Gladstonian 
position, based on Free Trade, peace, retrenchment, laissez faire, and the 
conciliation of Ireland.44 It seemed, in fact, that Simon was creating a 
narrative about a Liberal position between the Coalition and the Labour 
party.45 An interesting part of this was that there was an element of anti-
socialism, which was, in some ways, a development of his earlier suspicion 
of Labour, but in the form in which it emerged it can be seen primarily as a 
means to attract Tory-minded voters; thus, in the early 1920s, he was 
                                                          
151/38. Runciman also suffered from campaigns against him by Lloyd Georgian Liberals; 
see below, pp. 224-267. 
42 Charles Masterman commentary, Liberal Monthly, February 1920: ‘Never was an 
election campaign conducted with more deliberate personal attack or malignant falsehood - 
definitely organised from Downing Street. Sir John Simon's crime was that he had been a 
Liberal all his life and remained a Liberal to-day and that he had accepted the unanimous 
invitation from a Liberal Association to become their candidate for Parliament. 
Immediately, the Prime Minister's ‘Liberal’ supporters united against him in a ferocious 
onslaught of personal abuse [...].’   
43 Dutton, Simon, p. 60. 
44 Dutton, Simon, pp. 55-69; Simon, Retrospect p. 124; Report, John A. Simon speech, The 
Times, 10 October 1921. 
45 This was not dissimilar from other Asquithian Liberals; see below, pp. 224-267.  
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starting to lean towards the right at least in terms of the presentation of an 
electoral strategy. 
 Many of the points about Simon’s political position in the early 
1920s can be seen in at extract of a speech delivered in May 1920: 
 
It is impossible to believe that a permanent alliance of Liberalism 
with another point of view which, whatever its merits, is the point of 
view which has been supported and maintained by every selfish 
interest in the State, can be a specific for preventing the growth of 
Socialism [...]. The policy of alliance is the policy most likely to 
promote, and in the minds of some people to justify, the more 
extreme Socialist doctrine. It is a course of conduct which, whatever 
else it promises, does not promise a very happy future for Liberals. 
For I will make this simple proposition: Be Coalition Liberals many 
or be they few, the future of Coalition Liberalism is Toryism.46 
 
In this speech, independent Liberalism is emphasised as a bulwark against 
socialism, which underlines an appeal to Liberals and Tory-minded voters 
on a rightward-leaning middle-class agenda. However, it is perhaps more 
significant in what it says about Coalition Liberals in dismissing their 
Liberal credentials. Simon it appears saw the two factions as being 
permanently divided.  
In relation to the point about separation, Simon had a personal 
interest in keeping the factions separate, knowing that his leadership 
position could be threatened should they reunite, and he did much to try to 
dissuade and thwart the potential for Liberal unity in the period between 
1922 and 1923 in speeches and correspondence.47 As Dutton has suggested, 
                                                          
46 Report, John A. Simon speech, Liberal Magazine, May 1920. 
47 In this respect, it is interesting to examine an exchange of letters between Simon and the 
Coalitionist Liberal, Edward Grigg, where Simon seemed to taunt Grigg as though he 
viewed him as part of an opposing force; see exchange of correspondence, Edward Grigg to 
John A. Simon, 14 May 1923, 15 May 1923, 17 May 1923, 28 May 1923, 31 May 1923, 6 
June 1923, Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 1001; also see Report, John A. Simon speech, 
The Times, 5 March 1923, The Times, 14 May 1923. 
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as long as Liberalism was divided ‘Simon’s position as heir apparent to the 
diminished throne of Liberalism seemed strong’.48 But, of course, this was 
not to be with the Liberal factions coming together in 1923, and Simon’s 
position was, once again, to be eclipsed. Had he been prepared to be more 
flexible towards the possibility of reunion in the run up to it, it is possible he 
might have been able to play a more influential role in the Liberal party’s 
policies in the years which were immediately to follow, but, as it was, he 
had displayed uncompromising anti-Lloyd George colours which left him 
isolated in 1923 and in the immediate years of the reunion itself.   
 
It would seem credible that the circumstances of the hung Parliament in 
1923 might have created an opportunity for Simon to recreate a position of 
strength; however, as Dutton has shown, he was unable to convince Asquith 
or Lloyd George in his view that support for Labour should be conditional 
on extracting concessions, such as electoral reform, mindful now of the 
potential weakness of the Liberal position.49 He did, however, support 
Labour in the crucial vote, later indicating his view that it was the ‘right’ 
decision.50 This tolerance of the Labour party in parliamentary terms 
continued after the vote too since, in the months following it, he continued 
to argue that the government should be kept in power, even trying to rescue 
it over the Campbell Case, unlike many of the Liberals who moved to 
distance themselves from Labour.51 His position appeared remarkably like 
he was trying to outflank Labour on the left, negating the sense of rightward 
drift revealed previously, with a left-leaning Liberal critique of the 
                                                          
48 Dutton, Simon p. 62. 
49 Ibid, pp. 64-67. 
50 Simon, Retrospect p. 130.   
51 Dutton, Simon p. 68; Report, Liberal Magazine, February 1924.  
The Campbell Case (1924) involved charges against a British Communist 
newspaper editor, J. R. Campbell, for alleged ‘incitement to mutiny’ caused by the 
publication of a provocative open letter to members of the military in the Workers’ Weekly. 
The decision of MacDonald’s government to suspend prosecution of the case, amid 
pressure from Labour backbenchers, eventually assisted in bringing down the government 
through a motion of no confidence tabled in the House of Commons. 
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government’s record on social reform and foreign policy.52 This, of course, 
was the position starting to be formulated by Lloyd George, and it would 
appear that Simon also saw possibilities that some relationship with Labour 
was a means to revive Liberal fortunes. It also must have related to his own 
desire to subvert the position of Lloyd George with his own critique of the 
government designed to reinforce a view that a future could rest with 
Simon’s leadership rather than Lloyd George’s.  
 
He was by way of being a friendly critic of the present Labour 
Government. It seemed to him that they had discharged some duties 
well. In many other ways they had failed very much. It was a most 
unfortunate thing that this Labour Government, which proclaimed its 
devotion to international peace and its belief in the reduction of 
armaments, should actually have made itself responsible for the 
building of five new warships, the necessity for which was not 
shown. […] With regard to old age pensions, the Liberals of the 
country were glad the Labour party were doing something to extend 
their benefits […]. A tremendously important thing was being 
handled by Mr. Ramsay MacDonald and his government in the 
settlement of the European question, and they had done the right 
thing in bringing Germany into the consultations.53 
 
It is remarkable that prospects for Liberal cooperation with Labour rested on 
the appearance of being a ‘critical friend’ of the government’s rather than 
looking to seek some kind of political compromise which demonstrated 
continuing disinterest in electoral arrangements with other parties, but also it 
seemed to contrast with Lloyd George’s suspected desire to seek some kind 
of fusion with the Labour party which had raised concerns in Liberal circles. 
There was evidence that Simon wished to identify a role for the Liberal 
party, post-1924, which safeguarded its future unlike that presented in the 
supposed policy of Lloyd George. As in the period before reunion, Simon 
                                                          
52 Wilson suggests that Simon favoured much of Labour’s programme, with the exceptions 
of the capital levy and nationalisation; see Wilson, The Downfall, p. 251.  
53 Report, John A. Simon speech, The Times, 12 August 1924. 
 
 
211 
 
was seeking to marginalise and discredit his opponent, casting doubt on his 
legitimacy to represent a Liberal position. 
The flirtation with a left-leaning approach and continuing desire to 
remain separate from other parties has not received much coverage in 
studies of Simon in this period, however, and this probably relates to some 
evidence which describes a rather different picture at a Spen Valley 
constituency level; Simon appearing to be continuing his movement 
rightward. In the election of 1923, building on his perspective in the early 
1920s, Simon emerged as a strong anti-socialist.54 And this position seems 
to have been sustained through to the 1924 election, since he received no 
opposition from a Conservative candidate which would have been unlikely 
if perceptions of him had been that he was a left-leaning Liberal, no more so 
than at a time when many Conservatives wished to punish Liberals for 
flirtation with Labour. In addressing the divergence of position here, it 
would be easy to dismiss Simon’s situation as some kind of cynical exercise 
in self-preservation through presenting two distinct faces – for audiences at 
Westminster and his constituency – although this would not be entirely fair 
especially as such claims might seem circumstantial.55 In the Spen Valley, it 
was clear that Simon had to campaign rather defensively against Labour 
attacks on his record on social reform and workers’ rights, which may have 
given an exaggerated impression of his proximity to the Conservatives.56 
And it may have been more the organisational weakness of the Conservative 
party locally that led to no candidate in 1924, rather than because Simon 
was seen as a suitable candidate to support. Indeed, whilst relations with 
                                                          
54 Report, The Cleckheaton Guardian, 2 November 1923 cit. Simon Papers MSS. Simon 
153/26; Report, The Yorkshire Observer, 21 November 1923 cit. Simon Papers MSS. 
Simon 153/44; Report, The Bradford Telegraph, 3 December 1923 cit. Simon Papers MSS. 
Simon 153/76F; Report, The Cleckheaton Advertiser, 14 December 1923, Simon Papers 
MSS. Simon 153/98. 
55 It cannot be ruled out, however, since his political positioning in the period generally 
seems very calculated to improve his own standing, as his competition with Lloyd George 
to some extent shows. 
56 Simon defended his record, but in doing so, ended up reinforcing an anti-Labour and 
anti-socialist impression; perhaps the Labour attack was designed with this in mind. 
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local Labour were clearly not good, no direct evidence can be found of any 
fraternal sentiment towards Conservatives, or vice versa, at this stage.57  
 
IV 
 
In the early years of the 1924-29 Parliament, Simon distanced himself from 
the Liberal party leadership, appalled at the manner in which Lloyd George 
gained influence through his Political Fund, although his criticisms had 
much to do with the impact this had his own leadership credentials; he was 
also dissatisfied with the direction of policy.58 Simon’s distance from Lloyd 
George saw his profile as a prominent Liberal slip, a position which was 
reinforced further by his lack of involvement in the Radical Group, which 
had assumed the main focus of anti-Lloyd George resistance; Walter 
Runciman, as the leading figure in that grouping, was also a potential future 
leadership rival to Simon and distancing himself from Runciman was an 
important calculation if he was to ever revive his own leadership goals.59 
One of the effects of his new lower profile was that, rather unusually for a 
future Liberal recruit, little active part was played in the debate around the 
contentious land proposals; instead, he seemed to take a more relaxed and 
detached perspective which pointed to Simon’s inclination to seek to build 
an alternative position between Lloyd George and Runciman. There were 
thinly veiled criticisms of the Radical Group’s Gladstonian view of politics, 
                                                          
57 This worked nationally as well as locally, with the Baldwin ally, J. C. C. Davidson, 
appearing to have no kind words to say about Simon; see John C. C. Davidson to Lord 
Stamfordham, 21 February 1923, in Robert Rhodes James (ed.) Memoirs of a Conservative 
– J.C.C. Davidson’s Memoirs and Papers, (London 1969), p. 141: Davidson pointed to the 
‘coldness and inhumanity’ Simon ‘earned on all sides’. The context of the comments is 
different from that discussed here but it does confirm an impression of how distant Simon 
was from influential Conservative politicians at this time.   
58 Report, John A. Simon speech, The Cleckheaton Guardian 17 December 1926 cit. Simon 
Papers MSS. Simon 157/29; David Dutton, ‘Lloyd George, John Simon and the politics of 
the Liberal party, 1918-1931’ in Judith Loades (ed.), The Life and Times of David Lloyd 
George, (Bangor, 1991), p. 82. 
59 Dutton, Simon p. 71; Simon, Retrospect p. 135.  
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and of Liberals who had left the party over the issue, which is perhaps a 
significant point in that there was no evidence that the land issue was 
drawing Simon into Conservative party circles.60  
 
Sir John Simon said that the Liberal land proposals were the result of 
prolonged and extensive inquiry extending over two years, and were 
based on a persistent and deliberate consideration of facts [...]. That 
was no reason why people should swallow the proposals blindfold, 
but it was a reason for people giving them careful consideration and 
study. The proposals were not put forward as a test of orthodoxy; 
they were for discussion, and no man who might feel doubtful about 
some portion or other, had any reason, if he were a liberal-minded 
man, for leaving the party unless, of course, he was seeking for some 
reason to do so.61 
 
Simon was, in fact, biding his time, awaiting an issue which could bring him 
to prominence once again, and it did not take long for that to happen; it only 
required some controversial issue to emerge which would enable him to 
develop a clear line of differentiation from his opponents that might attract 
to him, rather than them, good publicity and support. Such an issue seemed 
to emerge in the form of the General Strike.62 The Strike enabled Simon to 
offer a position in patriotic defence of the constitution and against the 
excesses of organised labour, setting out how strike action constituted ‘a 
revolutionary proceeding’.63 It seemed like a renewed right-leaning 
perspective calculated to appeal to the middle-class and to and right-leaning 
Liberals.  
                                                          
60 The criticism of the Gladstonian position of the Radical Group seems rather interesting 
given his own emphasis in this regard before Liberal Reunion; this is evidence of Simon’s 
desire for distance from Runciman. 
61 Report, John A. Simon speech, Liberal Magazine, April 1926. 
62 Report, The Times, 15 June 1926 cit. Simon Papers MSS. Simon 110/1; Dutton, Simon p. 
76. 
63 Simon, Retrospect, pp. 136-7. It is interesting that the position marked a development of 
his negative view of organised labour. 
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In all this, there was an significant consequence since, whilst his 
intervention did nothing to destabilise Lloyd George, it brought Simon’s 
position in line with that of the Conservative party; this was something that 
did not go unnoticed with the Conservative MP, Albert Braithwaite, 
pointing to the supposed ‘right, honest and straightforward line Sir John 
Simon had taken’, and he even called on him to join the Conservative 
party.64 It is not clear how much Simon had intended to position himself 
closer to the Conservatives but, given his ambitions, it seems likely that he 
now wished to rival Lloyd George’s desire to work more closely with 
Labour with an alternative standpoint. Simon’s position was, in fact, close 
to Stanley Baldwin’s, in his desire to protect the rule of law, whilst at the 
same time promoting a moderate policy to encourage class harmony in 
industrial relations.65 Thus, in the debate around the rights and limits to the 
powers of labour organisations, he painted a picture of the need for 
responsibility to the law, but at the same time, the need to promote the rights 
and freedoms associated with organisational bodies. Liberals, he seemed to 
show, could provide a tempering influence on those who would take a less 
tolerant view.  
 
It was inevitable that there should be a large body of public opinion 
in this country which said that immense powers had been entrusted 
to Labour organisations, and that if these powers were not properly 
used but abused then the conditions under which the powers were 
exercised must be reviewed. When the matter came to be discussed 
in the House of Commons it would be, he thought, of most vital 
importance that there should be Liberals there who, not pledged in 
advance to defend and uphold every contention however extreme, 
were determined to see that organised rights of Labour which were 
legitimate and necessary were preserved in full.66 
 
                                                          
64 Report, Albert Braithwaite speech, The Cleckheaton Guardian, 28 January 1927 cit. 
Simon Papers MSS. Simon 157/28B. 
65 See above, pp. 16-18. 
66 The Cleckheaton Advertiser, 4 May 1928 cit. Simon Papers MSS. Simon 158/28. 
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The position Simon adopted won him respect from Conservatives, 
and not least Baldwin himself who seemed to view him now as a similarly-
minded person, not just on labour issues but also on broader issues of 
government, witnessed in the eventual appointment of Simon to the 
Chairmanship of the India Commission in 1928.67 But whatever Simon had 
in mind for the character of cooperation with the Conservative party he was 
not seeking a compact, and he remained committed to an independent 
Liberal party. This became apparent in the circumstances of the 1929 
election, when he reconciled himself with Lloyd George to support the 
Liberal electoral programme. One of his chief considerations was to ensure 
the survival of an independent party, claiming that he saw this programme 
as one which would ‘see Liberalism returned to its rightful place in the 
nation’.68 For Simon, in fact, the bold Liberal position in 1929 was similar 
to that taken by other Liberals in 1923, and it was risky electorally, with 
some national Conservatives resolving to force the Spen Valley 
Conservative Association to put up a candidate against him, despite his role 
on the India Commission which brought with it the promise of a truce, until 
intervention from Baldwin prevented this.69 Baldwin’s intervention was a 
significant one since Simon’s involvement in the India Commission helped 
to give the Conservative government the moderate and liberal veneer which 
was important to Baldwin at this time; Baldwin had designs on Simon as 
part of his strategy to incorporate Liberals into his party. 
There was some inconsistency in Simon’s 1929 position; he had 
opposed Lloyd George and his politics, but now was seeking to support him. 
Part of this does relate to a pragmatic position in supporting a policy which 
would give the Liberal party a new role and secure its future. A second 
perspective is that it was important to his longer-term leadership aspirations; 
if Simon did not support the Lloyd George programme he would find 
himself further isolated from the party ‘mainstream’ given that much of the 
                                                          
67 John C. C. Davidson to Lord Birkenhead, 25 October 1927, pp. 273-4. 
68 Report, John A. Simon speech, The Cleckheaton Guardian, 3 May 1929 cit. Simon MSS. 
Simon 159/43. 
69 Report, The Cleckheaton Guardian, 10 May 1929 cit. Simon Papers MSS. Simon 159/50.  
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party was at least, on the surface, uniting around the programme. It is also 
significant more directly in the context of this study since it shows that the 
direction of his politics towards anti-socialism had been halted for the 
present, and despite the warming of relations with Conservatives, there was 
little to suppose that he was seeking to move in the direction of the 
Conservative party.   
 
V 
 
Mindful of his reconciliation with Lloyd George, Simon initially supported 
the line followed by his party in keeping Labour in office; and he returned 
to his 1924 Westminster position in viewing the Liberal party’s role as a 
kind of constructive scrutiniser of government policy.70 However, by 
November 1930, his patience had run out with the government, declaring it 
to have been a ‘complete failure’, with particular criticisms directed towards 
the way it had failed to deal with unemployment and control social 
expenditure, and also its intention to reverse trade union reforms brought in 
after the General Strike; the latter issue being particularly important given 
his long-term antipathy towards organised labour and strike action.71 He 
also had his personal grievances in the government’s rejection of the work 
of the India Commission.72  
Simon’s stance on the Labour government led him into open conflict 
with a Liberal party leadership now agreeing more formal terms with 
Labour. The situation was, in his view, ‘intolerable’, and he looked to 
distance himself not only from the leadership but also eventually an 
‘independent’ Liberal party, revealing his view that Lloyd George’s 
rapprochement with Labour had negated the necessity; he seemed 
thoroughly disillusioned by early in 1931, eventually resigning the Liberal 
                                                          
70 Dutton, Simon, p. 102. 
71 John A. Simon letter, The Cleckheaton Guardian, 7 November 1930 cit. Simon Papers 
MSS. Simon 161/20; Report, John A. Simon speech, The Cleckheaton Guardian, 21 
November 1930 cit. Simon Papers MSS. Simon 60/84-89.  
72 Simon, Retrospect, p. 150. 
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Whip in June.73 This move to distance himself from his party is highly 
significant given that he had always been, despite previous rifts, committed 
to the party and his reaction to Lloyd George’s position revealed a 
fundamental rethinking of his political loyalties. However, it is far from 
clear that Simon was so fundamentally opposed to Labour as his anti-
socialist rhetoric suggested, given his previous flirtation with Labour and 
support for Lloyd George’s left-leaning programme only a year prior to him 
expressing his concerns. Certainly, he was concerned about being perceived 
as being close to Labour, but it was electoral considerations perhaps which 
drew him down the extreme route of leaving his party. Mindful of electoral 
fallout from the Liberal party leadership’s support for Labour and the 
divisions of Liberal opinion in Parliament, he could not have doubted that 
any election would see punishment from the electorate for him and his 
colleagues.74 Simon’s personal situation has to be considered too. In Spen 
Valley, a Conservative candidate fielded against him would have led to 
almost certain defeat in such circumstances, taking from him a huge number 
of anti-Labour votes; he needed to ensure that no candidate would emerge.75 
The separation from the Liberal party was significant in another way 
because it saw Simon working with the Conservative party in various 
respects in building opposition to the Labour government. Evidence 
suggests that he was very interested in organising local compacts, such as in 
places like Gateshead, where he tried to secure the withdrawal of the Liberal 
candidate in the 1931 by-election, and in coordinated Conservative and 
Liberal parliamentary activity, both with the aim of destabilising the Labour 
government.76 To further these developments, Simon formed a relationship 
with Neville Chamberlain, who found Simon endearing not only in regards 
                                                          
73 Report, John A. Simon speech, The Cleckheaton Guardian, 21 November 1930 cit. 
Simon Papers MSS. Simon 60/84-89; Report John A. Simon speech, Western Morning 
News and Mercury, 2 February 1931 cit. Reading Papers MSS Eur F118101/32-5. 
74 Report, John A. Simon speech, Western Morning News and Mercury, 2 February 1931 
cit. Reading Papers MSS Eur F118101/32-5. 
75 His majority in 1929 was only four percentage points over Labour in a two-way contest.  
76 John A. Simon to Cuthbert Headlam, 2 June 1931, Headlam Papers D/He 128/24. It 
seems that Simon put pressure on John P. Dickie not to stand in the By-Election in 1931. 
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to his anti-Labour position, but also because of movement of his views on 
the issue of tariffs, with Simon now seeing a measure of protection as the 
only means to see through the burgeoning economic crisis; he was not a true 
Protectionist, but, by this approach, could be seen as a useful ally for 
Chamberlain in bringing a new tariff policy into being.77  
The end of independent Liberal politics for Simon meant pragmatic 
working with the Conservative party and agreeing a compact to which 
likeminded Conservatives and Liberals could agree upon, certainly for the 
foreseeable future.78 Simon, it seems, had become a late convert to the idea 
of a patriotic politics where Liberals and Conservatives cooperated to 
address the issues of the day on the basis of the national interest.79 However, 
Simon did maintain the need for a clear measure of differentiation from 
Conservatives, rejecting, for example, the idea of the recreation of a Liberal-
Unionist party, floated by Chamberlain, which had negative connotations in 
the assimilation of Liberal opinion within the Conservative party.80 It 
seemed Simon favoured a looser arrangement, with a separate Liberal 
organisation to work with the Conservatives in the national interest, not 
dissimilar to the arrangements between Liberals and Conservatives during 
the Coalition years after the 1918 election. 
Surprisingly perhaps, given his regular difficulties of convincing 
Liberals of his viewpoint, Simon was eventually able to construct some sort 
                                                          
77 Dutton, Simon, p. 106; John A. Simon to Rufus Isaacs, 2 March 1931, Reading Papers 
MSS Eur F118/101/38-39; Simon, Retrospect, pp. 171-2. On the tariffs issue, evidence 
shows that Chamberlain pondered the establishment of a tariff board with Simon at its head 
such was his positive impression of Simon’s views; see Neville Chamberlain to Edward 
Grigg, 23 April 1931, Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 1003. 
78 It is not clear that Simon viewed the arrangement as a permanent one; see John A. Simon 
speech, The Cleckheaton Guardian, 21 November 1930 cit. Simon Papers MSS. Simon 
60/84-89; John A. Simon speech, Western Morning News and Mercury, 2 February 1931 
cit. Reading Papers MSS Eur F118101/32-5. 
79 Philip Williamson, National Crisis and National Government – British Politics, the 
Economy and Empire, 1926-1932, (Cambridge, 1992), p. 156; John A. Simon letter, The 
Times 25 September 1931.  
80 Neville Chamberlain to Edward Grigg, 23 April 1931, Grigg Papers MSS (Film) Grigg 
1003. Runciman also was not in favour of this idea; see below, pp. 224-267. 
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of narrative around his need to create a Liberal wing of a Liberal-
Conservative partnership along national lines, and this came to fruition by 
August 1931, with him firmly in the Liberal leadership.81 But the situation 
was far less straightforward since his arguments became entangled with the 
idea of the creation of a national government. Simon was very much in 
favour of one now, but his priorities within it, on the evidence referred to, 
seemed more to maintain the compact with the Conservatives than seeking 
to renew ties with Liberals who remained within the ‘official’ party that he 
had deserted only months before. The creation of the National Government 
was something which initially masked this position, with the nuances of 
cross-party relationships being lost for the moment in the rallying of multi-
party opinion in favour of protecting the national interest. Many Liberals 
were fiercely independent and it is certainly not the case that all Liberals 
within Simon’s new grouping saw working arrangements with 
Conservatives, with the exception perhaps of electoral ones, as the critical 
priority within the government.  
 
Despite Simon’s prior intention of propagating a new cooperative Liberal 
force in the national interest, the period between 1931 and 1935, was more 
noted amongst contemporaries by a promotion of the interests of Simon 
himself at the expense of Liberal ones.82 To many onlookers it seemed like 
Simon’s self-interest had led to him away from being truly a leader of 
Liberal opinion to becoming an uncommitted Conservative, with his actions 
in government seeming to confirm this impression.83  
 In some respects, these perspectives seemed valid ones. This was 
seen to be clear in his promotion of Conservative candidates over 
‘Samuelite’ Liberal ones, for example.84 And even Baldwin, having made 
use of Simon as a ‘Liberal’ in Cabinet, seemed to have held a less than 
                                                          
81 Goodlad, ‘Communications’, 135; Williamson, National Crisis p. 213.   
82 Goodlad, ‘Communications’, p. 136; Diary of Robert Bernays, 9 November 1934 in Nick 
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83 Diary of Robert Bernays, 25 April 1934, 9 November 1934, pp. 131-2, 158. 
84 Reports, The Times, 15 July 1932, 23 October 1933, 21 July 1934, 15 October 1934.  
 
 
220 
 
favourable private impression, observing in relation to Simon’s compromise 
with Free Trade ‘that a Free Trader who turns Protectionist in middle life is 
like a teetotaller who takes to brandy after a life of abstinence’.85 However, 
the situation was not quite as straightforward with observations of Simon’s 
conduct being related much to an inability to articulate an alternative Liberal 
explanation for his own and his party’s position, both for the reason that he 
was a Cabinet minister with government responsibilities which must have 
used up much of his time, and because of the existence of the Samuelite 
Liberal faction which meant he could not speak with clear authority as a 
Liberal leader. The difficulties faced in these respects fuelled negative 
perspectives and explanations, pointing to a betrayal of Liberal politics and 
self-interest to an exaggerated degree. 
Despite all the criticism Simon faced, there was a sense that he 
actually viewed the Liberal National grouping as the ‘mainstream’ of 
Liberalism itself, a position which he felt had some major legitimacy, 
especially after the abandonment of the National Government by the 
Samuelites, leaving his Liberal faction alone as the body of opinion to 
defend national interests within the government. Simon’s perspectives in 
this regard were set out in a 1935 campaigning pamphlet:  
 
When the General Election comes, an effort will be made to detach 
from the support of the National Government Liberal electors who 
voted for it on the last occasion. I believe, on the contrary, that men 
and women who, like myself, were brought up in the Liberal 
tradition and are proud of the Liberal faith, should continue to 
support the National Government [...]. 
[…] It is not the least true to say, or to imply, that in the 
present House of Commons the Liberals are in opposition. A 
minority of those elected to the House of Commons as Liberals […] 
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have, for reasons which seem good to themselves, crossed the floor 
and called themselves the Liberal Opposition. 
But the greater part of the Liberals in the present House have 
done no such thing: they were elected as supporters of the National 
Government and they have remained steady and effective supporters 
throughout. […] 
[…] The situation, therefore, which Liberal voters will have 
to face is the following. No same person believes that the return of a 
purely Liberal administration is possible. Anyone who thinks that he 
can secure more ‘Liberal’ legislation by voting against the National 
Government is deceiving himself […].86  
 
Extracts from the pamphlet show a certain amount of insecurity, 
with Simon’s justifications seeming rather defensive, revealing recognition 
he and his party faced considerable difficulty in presenting a view that the 
Liberal Nationals were legitimately Liberal representatives. Such 
defensiveness was even more evident in private correspondence. This was 
shown, for example, in a letter of complaint to Geoffrey Dawson, as editor 
of The Times. Seemingly the newspaper had started to refer to the Samuelite 
position as the ‘Liberal position’ for which he was strongly rebuked by 
Simon.87 The departure of the Samuelites had not had the desired effect of 
reinforcing the Liberal line of Simon; rather the opposite was true: the 
Liberal party, it was being argued, was now in opposition to the 
government.  
The reaction of Simon to this continuing difficulty for him and his 
party grouping led him into a position which did much to undermine his 
Liberal credentials, and to associate him with the process of realignment by 
bolstering the Conservative party. Simon approached Baldwin about ever 
closer union with the Conservatives, even referring to the position as that of 
the ‘Liberal-Unionists’, an analogy he had wished to distance himself from 
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in 1931 but which now appeared acceptable. In 1931, it was not clear for 
how long he envisaged working with the Conservatives; by 1933, however, 
it was clear that he viewed the arrangements as needing to be permanent.88 
And it was clear that he wished to draw a sharp distinction between his 
party faction and the Samuelites; such a distinction had perhaps been drawn 
already but the manner of his reference to Liberal opposition as amongst the 
‘subversive forces’ ranged against Liberal Nationals and Conservatives 
points to his increased alienation from the Samuelites, which is significant 
in the context of this study. Moreover, the new desired compact made no 
particular reference to concessions along Liberal lines; all that appeared to 
be important was to secure an electoral agreement without any clear 
conditions. It was true that the bargaining position of Liberal Nationals for 
particular Liberal interests was rather small in a Conservative-dominated 
government, but not to have offered any challenge to the Conservatives 
seems difficult in the context of retaining a sense of distinction. Thus, by his 
action, Simon was reducing the sense that he was involved in the affairs of 
Liberal politics; in fact, his letter can be seen as an argument for 
assimilation of his grouping within the sphere of the Conservative party.  
 
VI 
 
This chapter, in surveying the greater part of the political career of Simon, 
has shown him to be a single-minded, ambitious and determined individual 
in his quest for influence in shaping political affairs. He strongly believed in 
Liberal politics and strove to seek influence to direct it, but, in doing so, he 
often found himself in conflict with others and in a position of disadvantage 
in articulating a position for the Liberal politics which commanded respect 
and support.  
 Simon had for the greater part of his time in Parliament been an 
uncompromising advocate of independent Liberal politics, with distaste for 
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electoral compromises with other parties, but his perspective suddenly 
changed at the beginning of the 1930s. He was motivated by a combination 
of factors such as despair at Labour policy and Liberal association with it, 
the financial crisis, which appealed to patriotic sentiments, and a sense that 
he might become a leader of Liberals, in fact fulfilling a long-term 
aspiration in uniting Liberal forces in pursuit of his favoured agenda.  
The Liberal National party, which Simon led and directed, in many 
senses was an achievement of efforts to create a bloc of Liberals and 
Conservatives, attaining what some Liberal recruits before him had 
originally argued for, but had failed ultimately to secure, having ended up 
joining the Conservative party instead. However, Simon was unable 
successfully to articulate a Liberal narrative due to perceptions of his self-
interest and the means by which he, as leader, sought to tie his party’s 
fortunes to the Conservative party. This problem was particularly acute 
when the Samuelite Liberals left the government and subsequently went into 
Opposition. A combination of events outside his control and his own actions 
contributed to a sense that Simon was indistinguishable from the 
Conservatives by 1935; he was not a Conservative by his own criteria, but 
he had effectively been incorporated into the Conservative party and Simon, 
therefore, was an important figure in the narrative of the realignment of 
politics in the period, particularly in the consolidation of Liberal opinion 
within a Conservative bloc. 
 
 
224 
 
 Chapter Seven: Walter Runciman 
 
A second important case study of a Liberal recruit to the Liberal National 
party is Walter Runciman, the son of the shipping magnate and Cabinet 
minister.1 Runciman is significant for this study, having spent over thirty 
years in active political involvement in Liberal politics by the 1930s. What 
was important was his prominent role in the resistance to Lloyd George and 
the means in which he tried to circumvent Lloyd George’s influence, and his 
periodic desire to work with figures outside the Liberal party, eventually 
leading him into good relations with Ramsay MacDonald and, through him, 
to become a key member of the National Government. Furthermore, whilst 
in some ways he offered the Liberal party a cosmopolitan perspective on 
affairs, he also had the capacity to be partisan and rather backward-looking, 
seeking to carve out a position for the Liberal party and himself which, in 
some senses, harked back to an earlier era. Significantly, despite resistance 
to Lloyd George and some emphasis on class harmony and anti-socialism, 
in the politics of realignment, Runciman showed very little interest in 
working with the Conservative party, and this prevented a movement into 
the Conservative-dominated political circle until well into the 1930s.  
Runciman was very significant for the early years of the National 
Government, being an important architect of the system of Protectionism 
which was introduced. For him, Protection remained a short-term tactic, and 
he saw his role as a constraint on Conservative inclination towards more 
tariff barriers. Runciman’s preference had been to retain the Liberal ‘label’, 
even after 1931, and significantly, in the context of Liberal recruitment 
issues, he only joined the Liberal National party when disagreements with 
Samuelites over government policy forced him into opposition to the 
Samuelite faction. 
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I 
 
A starting point for assessment of the relevant historiographical perspectives 
undoubtedly lies with a doctoral thesis by Jonathan Wallace, particularly his 
emphasis on Runciman’s political outlook.2 Wallace emphasises pragmatic 
business-like managerial qualities which shaped attitudes to politics, often 
over and above party political perspectives.3 According to Wallace, 
evidence for this can be observed across Runciman’s political career: for 
instance, in the support for the social welfare programme of the Edwardian 
Liberal government; in aspects of wartime policy, particularly trade; in the 
various policy positions in the inter-war period, including his eventual 
support for closer cooperation with other parties; in attitudes towards 
tackling unemployment; and also, ultimately, in the financial crisis of the 
early 1930s, which drew him into the Liberal National party.4 Furthermore, 
this pragmatism, in Wallace’s opinion, left Runciman as a rather poor party-
politician, with some tendency to seek to work with politicians outside 
Liberal politics as well as within it, and thus, presenting a ‘moderating’ 
influence on politics.5 He even suggests that it was this pragmatism and 
inclusiveness which drew him into closer association with the National 
Government in the 1930s.6  
To a certain degree, Wallace’s view of Runciman is one for which 
potential evidence can be identified elsewhere since the pragmatic 
managerial approach can be traced in other studies which comment on 
aspects of Runciman’s politics.7 It also fits within the framework of studies 
                                                          
2 Jonathan Wallace, ‘The political career of Walter Runciman. 1st Viscount Runciman of 
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Basingstoke, 1999), p. 44; Philip Williamson, National Crisis and National Government – 
British Politics, the Economy and Empire, 1926-1932 (Cambridge, 1992), pp. 504-508; 
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which demonstrate a certain cosmopolitan and imperialist emphasis 
amongst Liberals recruited to Parliament in the later nineteenth century and 
early twentieth, who were semi-detached from Liberal politics, bringing 
Runciman into the same camp as Winston Churchill and Alfred Mond, for 
example, even though they are usually seen as being distinct.8 However, 
there is doubt as to the degree to which Runciman can really be painted as a 
true non-partisan since right from the outset of his career he appeared to 
attach himself to factional interests: for instance, early connections to the 
Rosebery imperialist faction, opposition to wartime compulsion, and post-
war partisanship in the ‘guerrilla warfare’ waged against Lloyd George, and 
also in his general attitudes towards the Conservative party.9 Much of this 
partisanship was ‘Liberal’ in character, but not exclusively, with evidence of 
his more cosmopolitan characteristics also playing a role. Wallace himself 
has highlighted some of the factional interests, and these, together with 
others identified for this study, reveal that they were significant elements of 
his politics, and played their role in colouring attitudes and relationships to 
individuals and political parties.  
 A connected issue is the degree to which Runciman’s political 
outlook drew him into the Conservative bloc by the mid-1930s. Wallace 
demonstrates that Runciman’s route into the National Government was 
more to do with his friendship with MacDonald than any feeling that he 
must work with the Conservative party, something which is also borne out 
from sources identified in this study. Nonetheless, there was some coming 
together of perspectives between that of Runciman and the Conservatives 
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from the 1920s, as a result of the common emphasis on retrenchment, anti-
socialism and the promotion of class harmony, and later on fiscal questions; 
in fact, so much so that Wallace has revealed that Runciman became 
attractive to Baldwin as a Liberal to target in his agenda of widening the 
Conservative party’s appeal.10 But, as Wallace’s thesis and research for this 
study will show, this meeting of perspectives was somewhat by chance of 
events and his considerations of electoral positioning; in fact, Runciman 
argued consistently that he held Liberal principles and felt that he had 
maintained his independence from Conservative politicians, after 1931, 
even seeming to act as the balance against Conservatives in the Cabinet. 
This perception of continuity with Liberal inclinations may have just been 
perception, certainly for the time after he had been absorbed into a 
Conservative bloc, after 1932, but this is not to say that it was not heart-felt 
and unworthy of further consideration. Furthermore, research shows to some 
degree that Runciman was actually quite backward-looking, despite his 
cosmopolitan outlook, almost, it seems, wishing to see a recreation of the 
pre-war Liberal party which left him with old-fashioned prejudices against 
the Conservative party, conditioning his sentiments towards Conservatives 
and preventing rapprochement.  
 Another consideration is Runciman’s relationship to the Liberal 
party itself. Wallace discusses in some detail issues which caused him to 
become disaffected from his party over time, particularly involving 
disagreement with Lloyd George, but he tends to view Runciman’s decision 
to move out of party politics in 1930 and 1931 more in the context of 
immediate issues.11 This does seem plausible given the immediacy of 
disillusion over the performance of the Liberals in Parliament between 1929 
and 1931, but his position can be viewed in a wider context of some 
factional difficulties over a longer period, dating back to the intra-party 
conflicts of the 1920s, the conflict of wartime, and even before that. These 
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longer-term issues have been shown in this study to be generally important 
in later disaffection, and it seems unreasonable to suppose this would not 
have been so in the case of Runciman.  
And finally, there is, of course, electoral politics to consider. A 
survey of Runciman’s career reveals a series of adjustment of his political 
views, depending on the electoral situation, leading him into various 
political positions, which related to the need to gain electoral success, as an 
ambitious politician, and to support the Liberal party’s general election 
prospects.12 This saw his perspective swing in different directions at various 
points, depending on what advantage could be gained. Electoral politics can 
be seen, furthermore, to have actually conditioned his feelings towards the 
Liberal party, with periods of inactivity when he felt prospects were poor. In 
1930, it can be seen, electoral factors were significant in his decision not to 
fight another election, and it was only when he was presented with the 
possibility of electoral compromise, amid the circumstances of the ‘national 
appeal’, that he persuaded himself that it was appropriate to carry on. 
Wallace has shown before this point that Runciman had been starting to 
direct himself more to his business interests, and his Deputy Chairmanship 
of the Royal Mail.13 Runciman’s personal electoral record since 1918 had 
not been good, and years of electoral failure for himself and his party caused 
bouts of disillusion.14 The record of failure, in fact, makes it more clearly 
definable that electoral issues were important in his political choices than 
perhaps in the cases of some of the other politicians who have been 
considered in this study. 
 
II 
 
                                                          
12 This may not seem untypical of all politicians, but such changes are not always as stark 
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Runciman entered political life in some respects as a political outsider. 
Despite his nonconformist background and traditional family connections 
with the Liberal party, he can be viewed as part of the new breed of Liberals 
being recruited at this time who had a broader political outlook, having been 
associated with the Fabians, and consequently, ‘National Efficiency’ during 
his time at Trinity College, Cambridge.15 Politically, in the early years, this 
can be seen to have led him into sympathy with the Liberal-Imperialists, 
particularly in their emphasis on social reform, although Wallace has also 
shown Runciman to have been in contact with more left-leaning Liberal 
radicals and Lib-Labs.16 He also had strong connections to the shipping 
industry in the Northeast, having become a full partner in his father’s firm, 
Moor Line, in 1895, and can perhaps be seen in this context as one of the 
new business Liberals recruited into the Liberal party in the Edwardian 
period.17 This was perhaps relevant in terms of the managerial and 
pragmatic emphasis which has been detected in his approach to politics. 
 Wallace’s thesis has drawn attention to some early excursions into 
the political field at Gravesend (1898) and Oldham (1899 and 1900); these 
campaigns reflected something of the cosmopolitan politics of Runciman at 
the time with an emphasis on social reform and sometimes only a loose 
regard for traditional nonconformist grievances of the Liberal party.18 This 
political characteristic remained fairly constant over the next few years, 
being central to his Dewsbury election campaigns.19 At Dewsbury, the 
substantial support for Conservatives and Labour, consistently causing 
three-way fights at election time, left him needing to appeal across political 
                                                          
15 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, p. 19; Stephen Koss, ‘Wesleyanism and Empire’, 
Historical Journal 18 1 (1975), 105-118 - Koss’s argument that Wesleyans were generally 
more ‘imperialist’ minded than their other nonconformist counterparts may have some 
relevance here. 
16 Wallace. ‘Walter Runciman’, p. 20. 
17 Searle, ‘The Liberal Party and Business’, 29-6. 
18 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, pp. 17-31.  
19 Runciman was M. P. for Dewsbury between 1902 and 1918. 
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boundaries, and his appeal to imperialist thinking, as well as a clear 
commitment to social reform, undoubtedly helped him remain elected.20  
 
Despite the potential for conflict with the Liberal leadership, due to his 
imperialist background, following his election, in 1902, it seems that 
Runciman sought to work with the leadership to gain political favour, and 
opportunities soon emerged in his opposition to the Conservative Education 
Bill of 1902 and in his efforts in promoting Free Trade.21 All his efforts saw 
his rapid promotion, after the accession of the Liberal government, from 
under-secretary at the Local Government Board (1905), to Financial 
Secretary to the Treasury (1907) and then to President of the Board of 
Education (1908). And his continuing support for Asquith’s administration, 
from 1908, saw him retain Cabinet office in the 1910 reshuffle, where he 
was moved to the Board of Agriculture, and then on to the Board of Trade 
in 1914. The continuing presence in the Cabinet was perhaps a mark of how 
important he was perceived to be by Asquith, as a personal friend, and the 
esteem in which he was held as a capable office holder.22 A measure of all 
of this can be seen from the decision to keep Runciman in office, despite a 
number of difficulties which another leader might have resolved by 
replacing him, particularly as it saw him enter into difficult relations with 
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another, perhaps more important and influential, key Liberal within the 
government, Lloyd George. These difficulties, it can be seen, affected 
Runciman’s contentment, leaving him disaffected from colleagues, and thus, 
uncertain about his future within the government. 
 One such area of tension was over social reform. The difficulties 
initially lay in what Wallace has termed Runciman’s concern ‘to combine 
together the interests of the working and middle, against the landed 
classes’.23 It meant that, although he passionately supported social reform 
there were limitations to the support in terms of the detail, particularly 
where policy was perceived to be pandering to the interests of one specific 
group rather than for the good of all. Inclinations of this emerged even 
before Asquith became Prime Minister, but were revealed in exchanges with 
Asquith, concerning issues such as the extension of the Workmen’s 
Compensation Act to seamen and the Miners’ Eight Hour bill.24 Here, the 
attitude to both was also coloured by his concern to protect interests of the 
shipping industry, but he felt there were wider social impacts, particularly in 
the latter case, in imposing burdens on consumers. More importantly, 
furthermore, there were some concerns about the old age pensions (1908), 
implementation of ‘Living Wage’ legislation, and the People’s Budget 
(1909).25 On the issue of the Budget, for instance, he privately stated that 
there was the possibility of creating a bad precedent for the future in terms 
of spiralling social expenditure costs. 
 
My instincts may be at fault or I may have miscalculated the income 
on super tax items, but I think I am not wrong in saying that, apart 
                                                          
23 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, p. 87; Report, Walter Runciman speech, The Dewsbury 
Reporter,  6 January 1906 in Runciman Papers WR 322.  
24 Walter Runciman to A. G. Gardiner, 1 June 1906, Runciman Papers WR 14; Walter 
Runciman to H. H. Asquith, 27 February 1908, Runciman Papers WR 21.  
25 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, pp. 66, 87-96; Report, The Daily Telegraph, 15 April 
1908, in Runciman Papers WR 323; Report, The Times, 18 April 1908, in 
Runciman Papers WR 323; Walter Runciman to H.H. Asquith, 18th August 1913, 
Runciman Papers WR 82. 
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from all other considerations, we are running the risk on this 
morning’s figures of leaving a huge nest egg for our successors.26 
 
However, his reservations did not mean that he was in any mood to 
compromise on the settled budget proposals, since he was discontented over 
arrangements for the Constitutional Conference (1910).27 Runciman 
appeared set against any form of compromise with the Conservative-
dominated House of Lords, since, for him, this would undermine the 
principles with which the government had been associated in backing social 
reform, and he feared electoral consequences for the Liberal party, and, on a 
self-interested level, for him personally given the importance of it in 
Dewsbury.28  
 
The Conference which is now proceeding on the Lords question has 
from the first been unreservedly opposed by me. I have been strongly 
against any form of Conference at this stage for many reasons, but 
mainly because I believed that our representatives could not in bona 
fide enter the Conference unless they were prepared either to give 
something away or to agree to some other solution of the Lords 
question which would be acceptable to the truly Liberal politicians as 
our present proposals. Now the latter cannot be given to us by Arthur 
Balfour and the Tories, and the alternative of giving something away 
is political suicide. The merest hint of giving anything away seems to 
be unentertainable, but a Conference is the shortest cut to that 
betrayal [...].29 
                                                          
26 Walter Runciman to H. H. Asquith, 7 April 1909, Asquith Papers MSS Asquith A52-5; 
Martin Farr, Reginald McKenna – Financier Amongst Statesmen, 1863-1916 (New York & 
Abingdon, 2008), p. 112.  
27 Walter Runciman to H. H. Asquith, 7 June 1910, Runciman Papers WR 39; Runciman 
undated letter 1911, Runciman Papers WR 39.   
28 Runciman faced particular challenges to his reputation as a reformer from Ben Turner, an 
ILP activist; see Walter Runciman to Ben Turner, 9 November 1907, Runciman Papers WR 
18; Report, The Daily Telegraph, 15 April 1908 in Runciman Papers WR 323; Report, The 
Times, 18 April 1908 in Runciman Papers WR 323. 
29 Runciman note, undated 1911, Runciman Papers WR 39.  
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His objections to the Conference were so strong that he even hinted at the 
possibility that he would seek to leave the government, revealing a sense of 
great disaffection.30 
 
I prophesy that this Conference leads us into a mess, possibly into 
disgrace. I have fought it almost single-handed in the Cabinet but I 
am confident my view is held and attitude shared by Liberals 
everywhere. My fight is not yet over, and I may be driven to leave 
the Government and fight against the compromise from outside.31 
 
Significantly, in the context of this study, his position revealed something of 
the antipathy he felt towards the Conservative party; he was certainly not 
predisposed to the possibility of a coalition, unlike Lloyd George and 
Churchill, around this time. It is even possible that knowledge of coalition 
talks may have affirmed a stubborn resistance.  
Another difficulty was related to Runciman’s time at the Board of 
Education. During his time, he fostered a position in which he wished to see 
the state playing a more direct role in control of education; part of the 
reason being to encourage the development of a more egalitarian and 
meritocratic education system, devoid of class inequalities.32  
 
The words secondary [education] and middle-class came to be 
thought of as meaning the same or nearly the same thing. The 
working classes were now entering into their inheritance, and those 
schools were rapidly becoming free from that absurd social 
                                                          
30 Wallace has a different emphasis in that he sees objections to the Conference related to a 
view that Runciman wished to see the Lords reformed in return for the retention of the veto; 
see Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, pp. 103-104. 
31 Runciman note, undated 1911, Runciman Papers WR 39.  
32 M. J. Wilkinson, ‘Education controversies in British politics’, Unpublished University of 
Newcastle Ph.D. (1977), p. 625; Reports, The Times, 2 October 1908, 10 October 1908,  5 
February 1909, 11 February 1909, 26 March 1909, 11 April 1911. His position again 
appears to have been close to McKenna; see Farr, Reginald McKenna, p. 103; see above, 
pp. 74-79. 
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handicap. A class education was contrary to the essence of 
democracy.33 
 
However, this message was lost due to controversies which over-shadowed 
his preferred agenda, arising from his view that denominational schools 
should bear more costs. The idea of this left him exposed to criticism in 
nonconformist circles, and he was forced into a defensive position, which 
seemed to give the impression that he was less in favour of denominational 
education than he actually was in reality.34 Furthermore, there were clashes 
with Lloyd George over funding of university grants, and for elementary 
education.35 The problems led to some level of resentment towards Asquith, 
for the first time, who, from Runciman’s point of view, seemed disinclined 
to help him and to recognise how damaging all this was for his political 
reputation, again hinting at resignation and, not for the last time, threatened 
to return back to his business interests.36 
 
I am not going to drift along, and if my stock has in the P.M.’s view 
sunk or [is] being talked down so low that I ought to be passed over 
it is time that I got back to commerce or anything else where I would 
not be wasting the best years of my life.37   
 
This feeling did not appear to have been removed by his eventual 
appointment as Secretary of State for Agriculture. Runciman feared that it 
                                                          
33 Report, Walter Runciman speech, The Times, 10 October 1908. 
34 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, p. 81; Walter Runciman to H. H. Asquith, 25 September 
1908, Asquith Papers MSS Asquith 20/28-31; T. E. Soddy to Walter Runciman, 21 October 
1908, Runciman Papers WR 24; Report by the Agent General for New South Wales to the 
Australian Press Association in Runciman Papers WR 28; Press cutting dated 26 March 
1909 in Runciman Papers WR 28. 
35 Walter Runciman to David Lloyd George, 19 February 1910, Runciman Papers WR 35.  
36 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, p. 107; Report, Walter Runciman speech, The Times, 11 
February 1909; Report by the Agent General for New South Wales to the Australian Press 
Association, 28 March 1909, Runciman Papers WR 28.  
37 Walter Runciman to Reginald McKenna, 1 October 1911, McKenna Papers McKN3/22 
No 3, fos 78-79 in N.D. Daglish, ‘The transfer of power at the Board of education, 1911’, 
Journal of Educational Administration and History 32 2 (2000), p. 2.  
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might block a move to higher office still, sometime in the future, and he was 
suspicious that he was being pushed to one side.38 He was clearly an 
ambitious man and this put pressure on his relationship with Asquith.39 In 
no sense did he feel that Asquith, in retaining him within the Cabinet, 
recognised him as a key ally.40 He was also growing to feel that Asquith’s 
leadership qualities were poor; Runciman believed that Asquith needed to 
stand up to his detractors.  
 Most seriously of all, there were clashes with Lloyd George, and 
also Churchill, over military commitments and expenditure from at least 
1911, which again brought Runciman to near resignation; Churchill and 
Lloyd George becoming seen more as enemies than political colleagues.41 
Runciman had been an advocate of limiting military spending, earlier in the 
period of Liberal government, having praised the record of the 
administration in this respect.42 For him, too much expenditure was a drain 
on finances and risked dragging Britain into a damaging continental war 
which was a threat to the longevity of the Free Trade system. This view 
became more apparent from 1911 with commitments made towards France, 
which he felt were unnecessarily antagonistic to Germany, and risked 
dragging Britain into an expensive land conflict.43 But Runciman was not a 
pacifist; as an imperialist, he recognised that it was the Royal Navy which 
provided for Britain’s trade interests and defence against war. After 1909, 
he conceded that naval expenditure needed to be increased, and this should 
be secured at the expense of any plans for supporting land armies.  
 
                                                          
38 See above, p. 74. 
39 Daglish, “The transfer of power’, p. 3. 
40 This disaffection from Asquith in relation to his sense of perceived value was also a 
feature of the positions of Mond, Churchill, Guest and McKenna; see above, pp. 72-79, 
101-107, 133-138, 180-182. 
41 Wallace. ‘Walter Runciman’, pp. 62, 153-183; Walter Runciman to William Harcourt, 4 
September 1911, Runciman Papers WR 39. Again, parallels exist with McKenna; see Farr, 
Reginald McKenna, pp. 155-171; see above, p. 75.  
42 Report, Walter Runciman speech, The Times, 24 October 1907. 
43 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, pp. 153-165. 
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The sea is our natural element and the sooner they [Churchill, Lloyd 
George etc.] realise that we are not going to land troops the better 
will be the chances of European peace.44 
 
But even in his desire to resource the Navy there were limits, with a concern 
as to the extent of the ‘naval race’ with Germany by 1913-14, leading him to 
oppose the naval estimates of that year, acting with others to oppose the 
developing policy, including McKenna and Simon.45 This defiance of the 
‘war party’ in the Cabinet had brought the frustrations to a head, particularly 
now he was at the Board of Trade and could provide more effective 
resistance to the policy, getting in the way of Churchill and Lloyd George. 
 
Runciman’s rather disaffected state, judging from the number of threatened 
resignations and his response to rearmament, suggested that he might be one 
of the most likely first casualties in the politics of the war, but this proved 
not to be the case. Part of the reason for this renewed vigour was no doubt a 
patriotic desire to be seen to be backing British patriotic and imperialist 
interests, particularly in protecting British trade, which would be threatened 
by any German military victory.46 Like other factionalists, particularly 
McKenna, furthermore, Runciman wished to see the propagation of a naval, 
rather than land conflict which would be expensive and lead to state control 
                                                          
44 Walter Runciman to William Harcourt, 4 September 1911, Runciman Papers WR 39.  
45 Diary of George Riddell, 14 December 1913, in in John M. McEwen (ed.), The Riddell 
Diaries, 1908-1923 (London, 1986), pp. 72-73; Letter to H. H. Asquith signed by Lord 
Beauchamp, C. Hobhouse, R. McKenna, W. Runciman & J.A. Simon (in Simon's 
handwriting), 29 January 1914, in Randolph S. Churchill, Winston S. Churchill – 
Companion Volume 2 Part 3 (London, 1969), pp. 1857-1858; Wallace. ‘Walter Runciman’, 
pp. 167-169. 
46 Address by W. Runciman to the electors of Dewsbury at the onset of War, dated 1914, 
Runciman Papers WR 134.  
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of industry and military conscription.47 By remaining in government, he 
hoped to be able to steer the War in a favourable direction.48 
Arguably, however, Runciman did much at the Board of Trade 
which could be seen to have compromised the principles on which he rested 
his position.49 Under his management, various measures were adopted to 
help regulate prices, imports and exports, and to aid intervention within 
industries such as merchant shipping, railways, coal and munitions; and 
most significantly, he began to favour allied preference, working behind the 
scenes to secure a system which would secure benefit to the allies following 
victory, culminating in the 1916 Paris Resolutions.50 But it seems that 
Runciman believed undertaking these measures was necessary in a 
pragmatic sense to prevent the further diminution of a limited war, 
particularly from those who would wish to introduce a more comprehensive 
system of Protectionism and industrial and military compulsion.51 The case 
of allied preference is a good example of how he felt this was the case, with 
the threat of allied preference being interpreted as something which would 
even help to bring Germany to the negotiation table, raising the possibility 
that Runciman was really hankering after a speedy end to war with a 
negotiated peace that would ensure the restoration of the pre-war political 
and economic order.  
 
[With] its widespread degree of suffering and the prospects of ruin 
which face many of their commercial and industrial classes in the 
                                                          
47 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, pp. 153-178; Richard A. Smith, ‘Britain and the strategy of 
the economic weapon against Germany, 1914-1919’, Unpublished University of Newcastle 
Ph.D. (2000), p. 18; see above, pp. 76-77. 
48 Runciman’s motivation was not dissimilar to Simon’s; see above, p. 203. 
49 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, pp. 184-218. 
50 Walter Runciman to Lord Inchcape 29 September 1915, Runciman Papers WR 117; 
Walter Runciman to Sir Walter Runciman 28 December 1915, Runciman Papers WR 359; 
Walter Runciman to Clementel 12 February 1916 Runciman Papers WR 149;  Undated 
note July 1916 Runciman Papers WR 110.  
51 There was another close parallel to the position adopted by McKenna here; see Farr, 
Reginald McKenna, pp. 313-328. 
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future […] there must be a section of German opinion, which will 
thank God for the prospect of an early peace […].52   
 
If this was not possible, discrimination against German trade would at least 
offer the possibility of allied recovery and the maintenance of a strong 
British Empire; Free Trade was only good if benefit could be drawn for 
Britain, it seems, and this explains much of the nature of Runciman’s 
commitment to it in the period in terms of Britain’s national self-interest.53 
Runciman’s position at the Board of Trade, despite views on fiscal 
questions, was a great obstacle to the more rigorous prosecution of the War, 
favoured by Lloyd George, Churchill and the Conservatives, and this led to 
conflict again, particularly after the creation of the May 1915 coalition. 
Runciman was greatly disturbed by its formation; interestingly, not being 
particularly keen on working in what he disparagingly referred to as ‘mixed 
company’ with Conservatives, and he soon found himself becoming rather 
disillusioned again with the government, particularly with Asquith, who, by 
the end of 1915, he felt was capitulating to pressure from the 
compulsionists.54 Nevertheless, he remained where he was, in patriotic 
service to the country and perhaps also continuing personal loyalty to 
Asquith, despite all his doubts about him.55 Yet, neither this patriotism nor 
loyalty was to help him to retain his position within the Cabinet ultimately. 
                                                          
52 Walter Runciman, 19 December 1917, HC Debates 5s. col. 2087-8, in Smith, ‘Britain 
and the strategy’, p. 2. 
53 It is also interesting to view this in the context of later developments in his attitudes to 
Free Trade in the 1930s. Mond had similar motivation in supporting protection; see above, 
p. 136. 
54 Walter Runciman to Herbert Samuel, 26 May 1915, Samuel Papers A/48; Note dated 27 
May 1915, Runciman Papers WR 136; Walter Runciman to Gullard, undated October 1915, 
Asquith Papers MSS Asquith 15/71-2; Walter Runciman to Sir W. Runciman, 28 December 
1915, Runciman Papers WR 359. Also see Farr, Reginald McKenna, p. 300; there are 
parallels with the positions of Simon and McKenna; see above, pp. 76-79, 203.   
55 Walter Runciman to Thorpe, 1 July 1916, Runciman Papers WR 148. It seems that he 
was also regarded favourably by Asquith still; see H. H. Asquith to Venetia Stanley, 10 
February 1915 (two letters), in in Michael & Eleanor Brock (eds.), H. H. Asquith – Letters 
to Venetia Stanley (Oxford, 1985), pp. 424-425. 
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He opposed plans for wholesale conscription into 1916 and this undoubtedly 
contributed to his fall when the government was reconstituted under Lloyd 
George in December.56 Runciman felt humiliated by the experience, not 
even, according to some evidence, being informed that he was to be 
replaced, which reveals something of the extent of the poor personal 
relationship that existed between Runciman and Lloyd George and his 
allies.57 He must have felt very much on the outside of Liberal politics by 
the middle of the War. 
 
III 
 
In 1918, Runciman suffered the indignity of failing to be re-elected to 
Parliament; a humiliation even more severe than it might have been with 
him finishing at the foot of the poll, being beaten by both the couponed 
Conservative candidate and Labour, giving him another excuse to dislike 
Lloyd George.58 Runciman found himself in a not dissimilar position to 
Simon in being out of Parliament, and started to direct his attention to the 
same sort of oppositional tactics to oppose the government, emphasising his 
‘independent’ Liberalism, and appearing, at least on the surface, to have 
become an apostle of Gladstone and of laissez faire economics.59 This led 
him to advance an exposition of virtually every aspect of Coalition policy. 
For example, on the domestic front, he attacked public spending, demanding 
                                                          
56 Walter Runciman to H. H. Asquith, 1 December 1916, Runciman Papers WR 149; 
Wallace. ‘Walter Runciman’, pp. 218-247. Wallace has also shown something of Lloyd 
George’s attempts to completely undermine him in 1915 by intervention in the Coal Strike 
of 1915 and by pressurising ministers into agreeing to the establishment of a Wheat 
Commission. 
57 Report, Walter Runciman speech, Liberal Magazine, January 1917; Wallace. ‘Walter 
Runciman’, p. 242. Also see the position of McKenna see above, pp. 76-79. 
58 Runciman lost around two thousand votes since December 1910, managing to secure a 
mere 28 per cent of the vote, to Labour’s 30 and the Coalition Conservative’s 42.  
59 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, pp. 11, 248-254; see above, p. 207.   
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retrenchment, rigid economies and limits to taxation.60 He called for an end 
to wartime controls, and the ‘tyranny of officialdom’, which were, in his 
opinion, a disincentive for economic growth, becoming an advocate of 
middle-class and populist ‘anti-waste’ causes; and he campaigned for the 
reintroduction of Free Trade.61 Apart from domestic policy, he was very 
critical of policy towards Ireland and other military interventions abroad 
over the period, reinforcing the pacifistic element of the Gladstonian 
emphasis.62 
 The post-war political emphasis of Runciman gave an impression of 
a shift in perspective towards a ‘purist’ Liberal one in the ways outlined, 
particularly as it saw some condemnation of the very idea of Liberals being 
involved in the Coalition at all.63 But this would not appear to be quite so 
clear given that instances of appeal for state assistance can still be found 
within this period.64 Wallace exposed this Gladstonian appearance to be 
‘skin deep’, and it would seem to relate more to the electoral realities of the 
                                                          
60 Walter Runciman to Herbert Gladstone, 19 October 1919, Runciman Papers WR 177; 
Report, Walter Runciman speech, Liberal Magazine, December 1919; Report, Daily 
Record 20 March 1920, cit Runciman Papers WR 326; Report, Daily Record, 22 March 
1920, cit Runciman Papers WR 326; Report, Walter Runciman speech, The Scotsman 23 
March 1920, in Runciman Papers WR 326; Election Address to the Electors of Edinburgh 
North, dated 27 March 1920, Runciman Papers WR 186; Walter Runciman article, The 
Liberal Monthly July 1920; Report, The Times 21 June 1920. Significantly, at one stage, 
he even hinted at the possibility of the need to link old-age pensions to National 
Insurance contributions, removing a central plank of Edwardian Liberal policy, see 
Report, Alnwick Gazette, 28 October 1922 in Runciman Papers WR 327.   
61 Report, Liberal Magazine, April 1919; Election Address in the Edinburgh North 
Election, dated 27 March 1920, Runciman Papers WR 186; Walter Runciman article, The 
Liberal Monthly, July 1920; Report, The Times, 21 June 1920. 
62 Selbourne to Walter Runciman, 11 April 1918, Runciman Papers WR 169; Election 
Address in the Edinburgh North Election, dated 27 March 1920, in Runciman Papers WR 
186; Report, Liberal Magazine May 1920; Report, Walter Runciman speech, The Times, 17 
October 1922, in Runciman Papers WR 327. 
63 Walter Runciman speech, The Times, 24 November 1919; Walter Runciman speech, 
Newcastle Chronicle 17 July 1922, in Runciman Papers WR 327.  
64 Report, Edinburgh Evening Dispatch, 29 March 1920, in Runciman Papers WR 326. 
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period for Liberals anxious to carve out an identity separate from Lloyd 
George, and indeed, to gain re-election.65  
 There were a number of consequences for Runciman’s separation of 
himself from Lloyd George and his attitude towards politics which are 
important in the context of Runciman’s presence within the Liberal party. 
The first was his relationship with the Lloyd George political machine, 
which thwarted his re-election prospects, alienating him still further from 
other Lloyd George Liberal politicians.66 Lloyd George and his allies 
seemed to wish to tarnish Runciman’s reputation with slurs against both his 
personal and political character, including an attempt to implicate him in a 
plot to oust Campbell-Bannerman before his replacement with Asquith in 
1908.67 Furthermore, they also exploited, perhaps with some justification, 
his connection with the Paris Resolutions, which, in being reported so 
frequently in his Parliamentary campaigns, suggests that it must have held 
some impact upon Runciman’s election prospects.68  
 Secondly, there was the general impact of Runciman’s position on 
his general political outlook. Runciman’s emphasis became much 
conditioned by non-class attitudes to politics, which brought to the fore a 
pre-war element, but one reconstituted, as a response to the Coalition’s 
                                                          
65 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, p. 293. Runciman contested elections in Edinburgh North 
(1920), Berwick upon Tweed (1922) and Brighton (1923), before his securing of Swansea 
West in the General Election of 1924. With regards to the Berwick election, it is useful to 
bear in mind that his only opponent was a Lloyd George supporter, so it became even more 
important electorally to emphasise distinctions between the Coalition position and a Liberal 
one.  
66 He did not, however, have poor relations with all Lloyd George Liberals; see Hamar 
Greenwood to Walter Runciman 28 January 1919, Runciman Papers WR 178. His 
experience was similar to Simon’s in being a victim of the Lloyd George machine; see 
above, p. 206. 
67 Wallace draws attention to his alleged eviction of a wife of a deceased tenant on his 
Doxford estate; see Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, p. 262. Also see Report, Cardiff 
Western Mail, 31 March 1920, in Runciman Papers WR 326.  
68 Reports, The Scotsman, 29 March 1920 & 31 March 1920 in Runciman Papers WR 326; 
Report, Lloyd George Liberal Magazine, June 1921; Report, The Times, 9 November 1922, 
Runciman Papers WR 327. 
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position in forging ‘social discontent’ and no doubt fears of the consequence 
of political realignment along class lines.69 In many senses, this brought 
Runciman closer to a Conservative position, anticipating perhaps the need 
for a broader moderate force, which could bring non-socialist opinion, 
including Labour, together. But much of the emphasis here was not 
necessarily as far-sighted as might be suggested on the surface since, by the 
early 1920s, Runciman favoured Lord Grey’s leadership of the independent 
Liberal party, as Asquith’s natural successor, which reveals a more 
retrospective character to this development, as he looked back to Edwardian 
glories. Furthermore, even where it seemed more forward-thinking through 
his involvement in discussions with Gilbert Murray and Robert Cecil about 
a union of Asquithian Liberals, with Conservative and Labour moderates, it 
was still retrospective in some senses, since his support depended on Grey’s 
involvement and appeared more as a means to challenge Lloyd George, 
through building an alternative coalition, with Lloyd George’s Liberal 
detractors taking centre-stage.70  
 The failure of Runciman’s post-war attempts to challenge Lloyd 
George and to secure an Asquithian revival, one perhaps that would gain 
him election, does seem to have contributed to a retreat from frontline 
politics between 1921 and 1923, with little existing to show any real 
contribution to political activity.71 But he was not truly disillusioned; rather, 
he was biding his time for an issue to emerge to enable him to return to the 
frontline and be electorally successful. The issue which brought him back 
was the 1923 election, which galvanised him into action, even putting on 
                                                          
69 Walter Runciman to Herbert 19 October 1919, Runciman Papers WR 177; Report, 
Walter Runciman speech, The Scotsman, 23 March 1920, Report, Edinburgh Evening 
News, 25 March 1920, in Runciman Papers WR 326. 
70 Bentley, ‘Liberal Politics and the Grey Conspiracy’,  pp. 461-478; Keith Robbins, Sir 
Edward Grey - A Biography of Lord Grey of Falladon (London, 1971), pp. 321-322, 356; 
Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, pp. 256-264; Robert Cecil to Walter Runciman, 24 January 
1920, Runciman Papers WR185; Gilbert Murray to Walter Runciman, 31 January 1920, 
Runciman Papers WR 185; R. Cecil to W. Runciman, 4 July 1921, Runciman Papers WR 
190.  
71 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, pp. 264-268. 
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hold his differences with Lloyd George in the united appeal of Liberalism in 
defence of Free Trade. An extraordinary measure of this can be seen from 
Lloyd George’s offer of support to Runciman in the Brighton contest, even 
appearing on the same platform. This unlikely occurrence may have been 
mutually beneficial since it might secure for Runciman an election without 
whisperings from detractors and, for Lloyd George, a potential ally for 
schemes of intervention which he was beginning to consider. The campaign 
in Brighton showed that Runciman had become interested in state assistance 
for the unemployed through public work schemes and he also recommended 
an extension of unemployment insurance.72 Participation in the election also 
revealed that Runciman could reconcile himself to Liberal reunion, putting 
aside, for the moment, any inclination to build new political combinations 
outside the Liberal party.  
 
The months between the unsuccessful attempt to seek re-election in 1923 
and the election of 1924 were again quiet ones politically for Runciman, 
with little evidence of much commentary on politics.73 He did not, it seems, 
involve himself in the controversy surrounding the Liberals and attitudes 
towards the Labour government, and there was little in the way of any 
commentary about government policy, with the exception of some 
consideration of the implications of the Russian Treaty, but his comments 
were measured ones in comparison to the extreme anti-socialist responses 
presented by some other Liberals.74 Nonetheless, Runciman retained 
political interests and was selected as the candidate for Swansea West where 
he was to lean in the direction of anti-socialist politics, certainly as a short-
                                                          
72 Liberal candidates’ Election Address, Sussex Daily News, 24 November 1923, in 
Runciman Papers WR 328; Report, Walter Runciman speech, Sussex Daily News, 26 
November 1923, in Runciman Papers WR 328; Report, The Times, 5 December 1923. 
73 Runciman came third in Brighton behind the two Conservative candidates elected for this 
two-member borough. Interestingly, Runciman had initially been selected for Shipley but 
deserted the constituency for a better prospect elsewhere. This reflects on his ambitiousness 
and reinforces the impression of the blow in not being elected; see Report, The Times, 22 
November 1923. 
74 Report, The Times, 2 September 1924.   
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term election tactic, as he faced a difficult contest against not only Labour 
and but, indeed, the Conservative party, which had substantial support in the 
constituency too.75 Nevertheless, this anti-socialist ‘strategy’ was not really 
evidence of a change in perspective, since he continued to emphasise the 
non-class approach to politics and social reform; the conditions of the 
election even saw him, despite tendencies towards more old-fashioned 
nonconformist preoccupations with self-help, trying to outbid Labour in 
terms of the capacity of Liberals to represent the interests of the working-
classes.76 
Runciman’s renewed emphasis on social reform might have 
suggested that he could be reconciled with the developing Lloyd Georgian 
domestic policy after 1924, but this was not to be the case due to rivalry. 
Like Simon, Runciman considered himself heir apparent to Asquith, and he 
tried to take the Chairmanship of the party, as an alternative candidate to 
Lloyd George, following the election.77 Thus, in the post-election period, he 
continued to present himself as a Liberal ‘purist’, with thinly veiled 
criticisms of Liberals who had been elected with the support of 
Conservatives which are interesting in the context of his position after 1931.  
 
Some of our colleagues in Parliament were returned by arrangement 
with the Conservatives in the constituencies […] and had pledged 
themselves to give general support to the Conservative Government. 
I don’t criticise them for that, and as honest men we must not ask 
them to betray in the House of Commons the pledges they gave 
outside, but the Liberal Party cannot be revived by compromise or 
by becoming a bargaining counter in the game of politics. The 
                                                          
75 Election Address for the Swansea West Election dated 29 October 1924, in Runciman 
Papers WR 199. The result of the contest in 1924 saw him finally return to Parliament, but 
with a slim majority of only 845 over Labour and 1,709 over the Conservatives. The 
percentage polls were 36, 33 and 30 respectively.  
76 Report, Walter Runciman speech, South Wales Daily News, [precise date unknown] 1924 
in Runciman Papers WR 329. 
77 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, p. 273.  
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Conservative and Socialists alike are foes, and the Liberals can 
compromise with neither.78 
 
This might have been a useful tactic in trying to bring together that remnant 
of Asquithian Liberalism which had survived the debacle of the 1924 
election, but it was hardly a tactic which would endear him to a substantial 
section of the party elected without Conservative opposition, and therefore, 
no doubt played into the hands of Lloyd George’s election bid. 
Evidence points to Runciman’s desire to wrestle control of the 
organs of power from Lloyd George, and reconstruct the party without his 
influence; this position no doubt influenced by his own prejudices against 
Lloyd George and the recent experience of the Asquithian rout of 1924, 
which was blamed on him. Thus, the failure of his election bid led him into 
an alternative strategy, opting for separation, creating his Radical Group - ‘a 
party within a party’ - with energies channelled to thwarting Lloyd George’s 
influence.79 The chief manifestations of this can be seen in factional 
opposition to Lloyd George’s position with regards to issues such as the 
General Strike, and land policy.80 The land issue is one which has been seen 
as significant in alienation of Liberals from the party, although separation 
meant this was less of an issue for Runciman; but it is interesting to note 
how he used it to berate former Lloyd George supporters who opposed it, 
with particular criticism of Alfred Mond’s decision to break with the party 
at this time.81    
 Relations with Lloyd George were soured further after Asquith’s 
departure from office at the end of 1926. Runciman was concerned about 
the consequences of Asquith’s departure, believing that it would justify a 
                                                          
78 Report, The Times, 11 December 1924. 
79 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, pp. 282-284; Wilson, The Downfall, pp. 315-346; Hart 
‘The decline of the Liberal party’, p. 254. 
80 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, p. 285; Walter Runciman to H. H. Asquith, 31 August 
1925, Asquith Papers MSS Asquith 34/221; Report, Walter Runciman speech, The Times 
27 January 1926; Report, Walter Runciman speech, Liberal Magazine, February 1926.  
81 Report, Walter Runciman speech, The Times, 27 January 1926; Report, Walter Runciman 
speech, Liberal Magazine, February 1926. 
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take-over of the party by Lloyd George. He thus became a founder member 
of the Liberal Council, which completed a total separation of Runciman 
from Lloyd George, with Lord Grey being considered de facto leader in his 
role as President of the Liberal Council.82 This was, of course, another 
development with retrospective characteristics, with Runciman even trying 
to give it some philosophical justification with the publication of his 
pamphlet: Liberalism As I See It (1927), which combined the taste for all 
things Gladstonian with the desire to promote class harmony and judicious 
social reform.83 Moreover, there was an electoral dimension to this 
resistance now, with the thwarting of the election of a Liberal candidate, 
backed by Lloyd George, at Tavistock (1928), being a good example.84 It 
also saw Runciman decide to desert Swansea in favour of St Ives, where the 
Lloyd Georgian influences were much less. 85 
 In the context of this study, the Liberal Council’s work brought 
Runciman close to a Conservative position, but there was little difference in 
character to his involvement other than the greater formality to the 
factionalism now. Runciman continued to recognise the political advantage 
that could be gained by appealing to middle-class voters and the need to 
avoid their shift to the Conservatives, and, indeed, in many cases, given the 
1924 debacle, to win back Liberal voters. He was very confident that this 
could be achieved, certainly in Cornwall, where he made public his view 
that the results of the next election should be as good as they were in the 
1906 landslide.86 Thus, for him, the Liberal Council’s role was also to 
identify a means to overcome the electoral weaknesses of the Liberal party, 
significantly, needing to compete against the Conservative party as the chief 
                                                          
82 Report, Western Morning New,s May 18 1929, in Runciman Papers WR 331.  
83 Walter Runciman, Liberalism As I See It, in Runciman Papers WR 212. 
84 Report, South Wales Daily Post, 16 February 1928, in Runciman Papers WR 218; 
Report, The Times, 8 December 1928. 
85 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, p. 291; ‘C.M.’ to Walter Runciman, 27 January 1926, 
Runciman Papers WR 204; Report, South Wales Daily Post 10 February 1928 in Runciman 
Papers WR 330. 
86 Report, The Times, 8 December 1928. 
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adversary. He continued to be unfavourably disposed to the Conservative 
party in any case with partisan distinctions remaining strong.87 
 
[...] I can only say that I have been a Liberal all my life, and I shall 
remain a Liberal to the end. I am convinced that what the country 
requires to-day is a Liberal Government, acting on a sound Liberal 
policy, with sober finance, Free Trade and a constructive foreign 
policy in the foreground. I see no prospect of these essentials being 
obtained through the agency of the Tory Party.88 
 
 
IV 
 
Despite the support for Lloyd George’s loan-financed unemployment 
proposals in 1929, Runciman’s position was not a clear reconciliation. The 
campaign had seen a certain amount of distance from central organisation, 
still preferring to work outside ‘official’ organisation and he continued to 
refuse to acknowledge the leadership of Lloyd George.89 Furthermore, the 
cooperation which existed soon evaporated, following the 1929 election, 
with Runciman’s initial retreat from frontline politics, and then, towards the 
end of the year, a renewed interest in resistance to Lloyd George’s 
policies.90 This resistance was, however, rather different in character to that 
of the mid-1920s since he again began to look for ways of cooperating with 
individuals outside the Liberal party, as he had done in 1921. Unusually for 
a future recruit, it was with MacDonald with whom Runciman appeared to 
                                                          
87 Walter Runciman to Sir Ernest Benn, 13 December 1928, 18 December 1928, Runciman 
Papers WR 220-221; Report, The Times, 25 April 1929 (this report revealed great criticism 
of the record of Churchill as Chancellor of the Exchequer).  
88 Walter Runciman to Sir Ernest Benn, 18 December 1928, Runciman Papers WR 220-
221.  
89 Report, Western Morning News 18 May 1929, in Runciman Papers WR 331.  
90 Runciman gained a narrow victory over the Conservative party in St Ives in 1929, with 
43 to 40 per cent of the vote respectively in a three-way contest. The retreat may have 
related to an element of disappointment at Liberal election results. 
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want to work, partly hoping to bring him closer in understanding to the 
position of the Liberal Council over issues such as the Coal Bill and the 
1930 budget, where he became frustrated by the position adopted by Lloyd 
George, and wished to present an alternative Liberal perspective, no doubt 
to rival Lloyd George’s own overtures to Labour.91 In some ways, 
Runciman’s behaviour saw him working almost as an independent member 
of the Commons, without a party, but, in other ways, this resistance to Lloyd 
George seemed to be a continuation of the partisan 1920s resistance.92 
 Whatever the character of Runciman’s position in 1929 and 1930, it 
was clear that it was leading him into deeper alienation from the Liberal 
party, so much so that he intimated that he wished to withdraw from party 
affairs, in private saying that he could ‘no longer be comfortable in the 
Liberal party’.93 Wallace has suggested that he was courted as a potential 
recruit by both Labour and Conservative politicians, but Runciman 
continued to be unimpressed by alternative party-groups, so there seemed no 
sense that he could actually be recruited into another party, even at this late 
stage of his association with the Liberal party.94  Significantly, there was 
considerable criticism of the Conservative party, which, in leaning towards 
Protectionism, created a barrier to any possible rapprochement.95 
Importantly, he did seem to respect Stanley Baldwin and younger, more 
liberal-leaning Conservatives, which suggests that he might have sought to 
cooperate with them, as well as MacDonald, had it not been for the policy 
differences. Possibly, a body of opinion involving Runciman and the Liberal 
Council with MacDonald and moderate Conservatives might have been a 
possible alternative political combination for Runciman to align himself 
                                                          
91 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, pp. 309-331; Wilson, The Downfall, p. 340; Williamson, 
National Crisis, p. 34; Walter Runciman to Sir Robert Hutchinson, 6 March 1930, 
Runciman Papers WR 220-221; Walter Runciman letter, The Times, 18 December 1930.  
92 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, pp. 310-314. 
93 Walter Runciman to Henry Fitzherbert Wright, 25 November 1929, Runciman Papers 
WR 220-221.  
94 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, pp. 310-314. 
95  Walter Runciman to Henry Fitzherbert Wright, 25 November 1929, Runciman Papers 
WR 220-221.  
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with, but in the period between the 1929 election and the onset of the 
financial crisis, it does not seem he viewed this as desirable, probably 
because of his continued sense of a wish to remain true to Liberal politics as 
much as the policy distinctions mentioned.96 Thus, with no comfortable 
home in party politics, it seems that Runciman made a decision to retire 
from politics altogether, taking on new duties as Deputy Chairman of the 
Royal Mail, a post which MacDonald had secured for him.97 
 
It is likely that Runciman would have continued with his plan to retire from 
politics if it had it not been for the possibility of the establishment of a 
national government in 1931; but events changed the situation. The National 
Government brought opportunities to exercise business and managerial 
skills in a more technocratic form of government than a party government, 
and it seems that Runciman felt his skills – both business and previous 
Cabinet ones - suited the political climate.98  
Runciman’s ambitions were, however, frustrated by the leadership of 
the Liberal party, in the immediate crisis of September 1931, because he 
was excluded from office by Samuel, who selected Lord Crewe, rather than 
Runciman, to serve as one of the Liberal ministers.99 Runciman did not take 
this latter point well, and this marked a further deterioration of relations 
with the Liberal party, but it did not deter him from pursuing his ambition, 
with a presentation of an ever more independent position and a certain 
amount of leaning on MacDonald, which eventually secured for him 
                                                          
96 Wallace suggests that Runciman was not in favour of the idea of a Liberal-Unionist style 
split; see Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, pp. 310-14. Also see above, pp. 215-216. Simon 
also rejected the idea, at this stage at least.  
97 G. Oliver Luff to Walter Runciman, 20 February 1931, Runciman Papers WR 245. Luff 
wrote of his disappointment that Runciman was planning to stand down as indicated in the 
national press. The position Runciman was offered underlines the cordiality of the 
relationship with MacDonald, both politically and personally. 
98 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, p. 326. 
99 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, pp. 325-336; Herbert Samuel to Walter Runciman, 29 
August 1931, Runciman Papers WR 215. Samuel appears to have mistakenly believed 
Runciman would not have wished to take office; a view conditioned, perhaps, by 
Runciman’s previous desire to retire. 
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Cabinet office on MacDonald’s recommendation rather than Samuel’s, with 
a return to the Board of Trade. Significantly, Runciman, in his attempt to 
secure office, did not appear to try to form any close association with the 
Simonites or the Conservative party which might have helped him, and it 
reveals something of the character of Runciman’s position and evidence that 
he was not intending to seek rapprochement with the Conservatives as a 
priority.      
 As historians have shown, Runciman’s entry into the government 
was intended as a ‘balance’ to the Conservative interests.100 He was no 
longer strictly a ‘party’ Liberal, but his Liberal credentials seemed strong 
and his independence from the Samuelites would perhaps give him more 
leverage in appealing to Conservatives along moderate policy lines. For 
himself, furthermore, he could exercise freedom from party constraint and 
pursue politics in the national interest, making use of his business talents, 
and perhaps coalescing in bringing all moderate opinion together as had 
been his intention in the period immediately before the National 
Government was established. However, the strength of Runciman’s hand in 
these regards was to be tested and weakened in the years to come with an 
appearance of close proximity to the Conservatives.101    
As a minister, Runciman played a key role in guiding the 
government towards Protectionism as a response to the challenge of 
economic difficulty and economic nationalism.102 He saw tariffs as a 
pragmatic ‘emergency’ measure, and at no time did he believe that he had 
changed his ‘political faith’; rather, in a similar way to which he had 
justified the application of Protection during the First World War, he 
                                                          
100 Wallace, ‘Walter Runciman’, p. 338; Wrench, ‘Very peculiar circumstances’, pp. 81-82. 
101 Runciman was to suffer a similar sense of a loss of credibility as a Liberal that Simon 
did, despite his intentions of remaining true to the Liberal faith; see above, pp. 219-222. 
102 Williamson, National Crisis, pp. 504, 506; Wrench, ‘Very peculiar circumstances’, p. 
71; Walter Runciman to A. P. Laurie, 14 September 1931, Runciman Papers WR 245; 
Walter Runciman to Ramsay MacDonald, 21 December 1931, Runciman Papers WR 245; 
Walter Runciman to Sir Walter Runciman 5 July 1934, Runciman Papers WR 360. 
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believed there was consistency with Liberal politics.103 In many senses, this 
was a position of strength, given the dominant Protectionist view in the 
Cabinet, and the mild nature of some of these measures compared to those 
which might have been introduced by a wholly Conservative government.104 
However, as comforting as it this might have seemed from Runciman’s 
perspective, he was increasingly appearing close to the Conservatives in his 
arguments, not least because Neville Chamberlain and Stanley Baldwin 
supported them, even if they came at the issue from a different angle of 
Protectionist interest.105  
The proximity problem became more apparent after Runciman’s 
complete division from the Samuelites from 1932; firstly, very significantly 
by his resignation of membership of the Liberal Council, which ultimately 
did not support his view on the use of tariffs, and, of course, by not 
following the Samuelites into the opposition benches in 1933.106 Runciman, 
furthermore, eventually decided to associate himself with the Simonites, 
substituting the Liberal Council faction for this new grouping, which from 
the point of view of appearance of proximity alone was an error of 
judgement since it meant that he was to share in the fate of the faction in 
                                                          
103 W. Runciman to Wilfred Auty 30 September 1931, Runciman Papers WR 245; Wrench, 
‘Very peculiar circumstances’, pp. 152-153; Script of Runciman Speech, B.B.C. Radio 
broadcast, 23 November 1933, Runciman Papers WR 265. 
104 Walter Runciman, undated note 1932, Runciman Papers WR 215; Extract from 
a B.B.C. broadcast by Runciman on November 23 1933, Runciman Papers WR 
265; Williamson, National Crisis, p. 506; Wrench, ‘Very peculiar circumstances’, 75. The 
mildness upset Conservatives like Leo Amery who became very antagonistic to Runciman 
because moderation; see Leo Amery to Beaverbrook, 10 August 1932, Diary of Leo 
Amery, 16 August 1932, 4 May 1933, 25 May 1933, 25 July 1933, 23 July 1934, 7 October 
1934, in John Barnes & David Nicholson (eds.), The Leo Amery Diaries, Volume II: 
1929-1945, (London, Melbourne, Auckland & Johannesburg, 1988), pp. 250, 252-
253, 293, 295, 301, 384, 387.  
105 Diary of Robert Bernays, 6 April 1933, in Nick Smart (ed.), The Diaries and Letters of 
Robert Bernays, 1932-1939: An Insider’s Account of the House of Commons (Lewiston, 
Queenston & Lampeter, 1996), p. 67. 
106 Walter Runciman to V. Phillipps, 4 March 1932, Runciman Papers, Runciman Papers 
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seeming more akin to being an uncommitted supporter of the Conservative 
party. In the 1935 election, Runciman recommended that voters support a 
Conservative, rather than the Liberal, Isaac Foot, in a neighbouring Bodmin 
division, despite some suggestion that Samuelites agreed not to oppose 
Runciman in St. Ives.107 Such action further highlighted the difficulties in 
presenting himself as a Liberal, with an appearance of disloyalty and 
betrayal.   
Yet despite Runciman’s recruitment into the Simonite camp there is 
little to suppose he shared Simon’s thinking, beyond the need for a compact 
for the 1935 election. His speeches in this period all point to the short-term 
nature of arrangements with Conservatives amid the crisis, so there is little 
to suppose he was much interested in the Liberal-Unionist style arrangement 
Simon had latterly come to support. Some sense of this, for example, was 
gained from the text of a speech for a radio broadcast, not long after the 
Samuelites crossed the floor.  
 
I have thrown my whole weight in to the service of the National 
Government, and of the country as a whole. You put us into office to 
see you through the crisis. We will not leave the ship while the storm 
lasts, and we ask all of you, whether Liberal, Labour or 
Conservative, to join in the general effort to secure an early return to 
the prosperity for which we are striving.108 
 
The maintenance of this short-term perspective does much to help support 
Runciman’s credentials as a Liberal. This is all in contrast to Simon who, as 
has been seen, appeared to have totally dissociated himself from the 
Samuelites, by 1935, in favour of working with Conservatives. Runciman’s 
relationship had not been good with Samuel, after 1931, and he probably 
liked his detachment from that faction, but there is no sense, on the evidence 
found, that he deliberately wished to separate himself from Samuel and his 
                                                          
107 Report, Western Morning News, 12 November 1935, Runciman Papers WR 278; Isaac 
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colleagues beyond the degree of separation achieved in 1931 when 
Runciman entered into government with the support of MacDonald.     
 
 
V 
 
Walter Runciman had a long career as a Liberal politician, with involvement 
in a broad range of issues affecting Liberal politics, particularly in the 
context of political realignment. Despite commitment to the Liberal party, 
Runciman was not a good team player, since he ended up involved in 
various intra-party disputes and became central to party disunion in the 
1920s; in fact, there was much truth in his characterisation by Campbell-
Bannerman, even if many years earlier, as a ‘pugnacious sectional 
partisan’.109 Overall, he never seemed wholly satisfied with the direction of 
Liberal politics with various issues emerging early in his career that caused 
him disaffection, with the quarrels of the Edwardian period and wartime 
providing a wider context for relationships thereafter, particularly in leaving 
him alienated from Lloyd George, whose influence over Liberal politics he 
sought to thwart. Some of Runciman’s perspectives were shaped by political 
calculations, informed by his own difficulties in gaining election, and his 
ambitiousness in seeking to secure for himself some important leadership 
role.  
 Runciman had, in parts of his career, sought to work with members 
of other parties, but he was never interested in being absorbed within a 
Conservative bloc, his Liberal instincts being anti-Conservative. From 1930, 
his desire to work with MacDonald had the consequence of separating him 
from the Liberal party, and he became more like an independent member of 
the House of Commons thereafter; nevertheless, he did not seek to join an 
alternative party, having had in mind that he might leave politics, but 
eventually he fell in with the Simonite faction. His involvement with the 
Simonites and his ministerial duties after 1932, however, started to lose him 
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visible association with the Liberal political ‘label’, his work on tariffs 
bringing him unintentionally close to the Conservatives. Alongside his 
Liberal associations were consistent patriotic instincts and a managerial 
character, the latter being informed by his business interests, and he quite 
properly saw his work as a minister as a short-term, pragmatic and business-
like approach, at a time when party political responses needed to be 
minimised for the good of all.   
As a postscript to this discussion, it is important to point out that the 
direction of politics, by the middle of the 1930s, was not conducive to the 
continuing presence of a self-confessed, committed Liberal, at the frontline 
of the politics of the National Government, and Runciman was eventually to 
find himself excluded from Neville Chamberlain’s new government, 
following his succession (in 1937), effectively forcing Runciman into 
retirement. For Chamberlain, Runciman must have seemed an uncertain 
ally; despite his work on tariffs, he was too soaked in Liberal factionalism, 
and his usefulness was less as Chamberlain tried to make his government 
more uniformly Conservative.  
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Conclusion 
 
This study set out to examine the issue of recruitment of Liberal politicians 
into the Conservative party in order understand a neglected aspect of Liberal 
party decline and its place the wider realignment of British political forces 
in the early part of the twentieth century. It has recognised that although 
much existing research can be examined in the context of Liberal 
recruitment of the period, more extensive and specific examination of the 
topic is necessary.  
 In developing a more detailed and systematic assessment, the 
Introduction advised that the study would centre on some critical issues 
about the character of recruitment and where it sits in the realignment of 
politics as a whole. For these reasons, Liberal recruitment has been 
examined in the context of underlying social and cultural issues, such as 
class, in emergence of shared political priorities between Conservatives and 
Liberals, and in assessment of the impact of internal Liberal party factors, 
particularly in views about the leadership of the party. There has also been 
assessment of collective and unique personal circumstances, such as 
electoral concerns, and relevant personality characteristics to do with 
ambition and self-interest. It has provided evidence to understand the place 
of recruits within the changes in the wider party system, and how their 
changes in party allegiances affected realignment. 
In completing these tasks, the case study approach adopted has been 
invaluable, since this has greatly enabled detailed assessment of collective 
and unique aspects of recruits’ political characters and the circumstances of 
their recruitments. Alun Wyburn-Powell noted in his study that he had 
provided a narrative of the decline of the Liberal party from the point of 
view of the Liberals themselves and this study has also provided such a 
narrative, although one which is more specific to the Liberal to 
Conservative recruitment, recovering the voices of Liberal recruits from the 
past who have a story to tell.1 None of this would have been possible had it 
                                                          
1 Alun Wyburn-Powell, Defections and the Liberal Party, 1910-2010 (Manchester & New 
York, 2012), p. 191. 
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not been for the quality of the primary sources available which have enabled 
appreciation of ideas in politics, personalities and understanding of 
interaction of recruits with themselves and other contemporaries in political 
and personal life. The language in such sources has enabled assessment of 
nuances of human behaviour and motivation.  
 Some critical points emerge from Chapter One, in comparative 
assessment, to show that there were common circumstances that linked the 
recruits. The chapter has shown that recruitment was reactive to events, and 
possessed both short-term and long-term dimensions, which illustrates the 
benefit of assessment of experience over many years as well as issues in the 
immediate period of changes of party. Overall, a sense of the collective 
challenges to involvement with the Liberal party and attractions of working 
with the Conservatives has been made clear.  
The case study chapters on specific individuals have been beneficial 
in profiling a number of politicians discretely, examining both major 
political figures and some more minor and less well-known ones. These 
chapters get close to the specific character of the individual recruit, with a 
number of important points noted that influenced their individual political 
perspectives and choices about party allegiances. Some of the issues 
regarding the motivation of recruits are very unique and it has been 
important to highlight such experiences separately to avoid the 
circumstances of their political affiliations being lost in more general 
discussion.  
 
In terms of overall findings, it is possible to draw together some unique 
points about the recruits both individually and collectively. Many of these 
points are important in the context of Liberal party decline since they 
provide a more local and personal dimension, providing a level of insight 
which has been missing from the majority of substantive studies of Liberal 
party politics in the historiography.2 These studies in focusing often 
exclusively on policy differences, or societal change can be seen to be too 
reductionist; a more holistic assessment has revealed many more factors that 
                                                          
2 Of course, Wyburn-Powell’s study is an exception; see Wyburn-Powell, Defections. 
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need to be considered. Some of these have been shown to connect to 
political change and policy differences discussed in the historiography, but 
even so there are still dimensions to acknowledge which have hitherto been 
neglected.  
Thus, in examining the key findings then a first point to mention is 
recruitment’s social character. The study – actually building on the detail of 
Wyburn-Powell’s research – has shown that amongst the cohort of recruits 
there were middle-class professional and business interests, as well as those 
of an established elite. It is very difficult to draw together empirical 
evidence, but when one compares the character of the recruits to those of the 
wider electorate it seems there is a good deal of similarity. In the wider 
electorate, it has been seen that these interests in society were increasingly 
attracted to the Conservative party and it has been suggested that the 
position of Liberal recruits correlates with this situation; this seems obvious 
given the Conservative party’s refocus on the values of the middle-class, in 
particular, as part of its electoral appeal and the Liberal party’s inability to 
any articulate values strongly – not least middle-class ones – due to its 
policy divisions and electoral decline. So, in a sense, the suggestions made 
show that recruitment has an undercurrent of class motivation, connecting it 
to the politics of class alignment, which has a certain amount of irony, given 
that, electorally at least, many Liberal recruits in the years leading up to their 
recruitment were trying to avoid class politics for electoral reasons.    
 In regards to the other, more substantive characteristics of 
recruitment, much has been made of the development of closer ties between 
Liberals and Conservatives – the so-called convergence of Liberal and 
Conservative politics – and a number of substantive findings have been 
presented. On the electoral side, it was shown that pursuit of anti-socialism 
was not evidence of ideological commitment to the politics of the right; it 
was more of an electoral strategy, often superficial, in order to gain 
Conservative votes after 1918. It must be seen in the context of electoral 
uncertainty, with Liberals unable to gain enough support to win on the 
strength of their party label alone, and it was used inconsistently; for 
instance, some Liberals retreated from it – such as Churchill, Mond, Simon, 
Runciman and Aske – when Liberal fortunes seemed revivable in 1923 or 
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1929. This study has shown that some Liberal recruits were even amongst 
those Liberals who used anti-socialism alongside anti-Conservative 
strategies to circumvent the development of class politics, adopting a middle 
position between Labour and Conservative. Thus, pursuit of anti-socialism 
should not, in itself, be taken as evidence of definite and unambiguous 
alignment with the Conservative party. However, where anti-socialism was 
utilised, it often assisted in costing Liberals their independence from the 
Conservatives, making them seem indistinguishable in emphasising the 
same political issues or, most importantly of all, in arguing for electoral 
arrangements between the two parties. Active anti-socialist strategies 
directly assisted the integration of politicians such as Churchill, Greenwood, 
Young, Guest and Grigg into the Conservative party. Some Liberals wished 
to retain their Liberal identity very firmly, despite agreeing to anti-socialist 
compromises, but this was no guarantee that integration would not occur 
with politicians, like Aske, being metaphorical prisoners in an anti-socialist 
camp due to their reliance on anti-socialism to avoid difficult triangular 
contests. Young, Guest and Grigg all tried to retain their ‘Liberal’ label in 
their electoral appeals, despite their anti-socialism, but this proved to be 
unsustainable.   
Convergence has also been seen in the emphasis of the desire for 
national government, or for the creation of a national party. Many recruits 
connected to philosophical and cultural thinking, rooted in Victorian 
conceptions of politics, in favour of building political combinations outside 
of the party system to avoid class conflict, with a patriotic, imperialist and 
business-like managerial approach to the running of political affairs.3 This 
                                                          
3 This study has recognised, in particular, the relevance of contributions by Geoffrey Searle, 
Martin Pugh, David Powell and Martin Wiener in drawing attention to relevant intellectual 
and cultural issues associated with the ideas. See Martin Pugh, ‘Left in the Centre? Lloyd 
George and the Centrist Tradition in British Politics’ in Judith Loades (ed.) The Life and 
Times of David Lloyd George (Bangor, 1991), pp. 17-27; Martin Pugh, Lloyd George 
(London & New York, 1988); Geoffrey Searle, Country Before Party – Coalition and the 
Idea of ‘National Government’ in Modern Britain, 1885-1987 (London, 1995); David 
Powell, British Politics, 1910-35 - The Crisis of the Party System (Abingdon, 2004); Martin 
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made them ill-suited to twentieth century party politics, accounting for part 
of their discomfort in the Liberal party and also for involvement with the 
Conservative party, which, certainly after 1918, was in many ways pursuing 
an agenda akin to that of a national government. Such explanations have 
particular relevance in discussion of the political aspirations of Churchill, 
Young, Guest and Grigg. However, not all advocates of national government 
conceived of it as a virtuous form of government which should be practiced 
at all times; often, particularly in the case of Liberal Nationals, it was 
perceived simply as a short-term patriotic response, such as in wartime or in 
the national crisis of 1931, and cannot, therefore, be fully associated with 
integration into the Conservative party.  
 Of major consideration in the context of convergence is the figure of 
Stanley Baldwin, who appears fundamental to the integration of Liberal 
recruits into the Conservative party or bloc as a whole. His moderate, liberal, 
classless and non-partisan approaches were attractive. Out of all the Liberals 
concerned, it seems that really only Runciman’s recruitment into the bloc 
lacked significant association with Baldwin. Most others had definite 
sympathies for him, with some even having developed more personal 
contact with the Conservative leader in the period before their move into his 
party. But it was not just in terms of policy that he was attractive; the values 
that lay behind Baldwin’s politics were also important. Of particular 
significance were the ethical dimensions emphasised, which offered a moral 
compass missing in the Liberal party. Contrasts were made with Lloyd 
George whose morals were called into question, and this contrast has been 
shown to be important in recruitment, particularly in the cases of Mond and 
Guest.  
However, there is a sort of unexpectedness in these associations. 
Baldwin was really a figure from within the party system, despite all the 
outward appearance of being otherwise, and his desire to conciliate Liberals 
was certainly not completely fraternal; it was more political and self-
interested in breaking the Liberal party to the electoral benefit of his party – 
                                                          
J. Wiener, English Culture and the Decline of the Industrial Spirit, 1850-1980 (Cambridge, 
2004). 
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a strategy which was successful judging from all the evidence. A measure of 
the importance of the strategy can be seen from the way in which he targeted 
particular Liberals – like McKenna and Simon – for conciliation, whilst 
others were not actively approached at all; for example, in the case of Guest, 
Baldwin was reluctant to welcome him into his party due to doubts about his 
ethical character and the damage he could bring to the Conservative party. 
Some of the success for Baldwin was related to events as much as his 
character or politics; there was a certain amount of luck which was not of his 
making in bringing him recruits. He was able, for example, to benefit from 
the fall of the Coalition which meant that recruits such as Churchill, Young 
and Guest, who were uncomfortable with party politics, suddenly had to 
adapt to a renewed party system, finding that the Conservatives were more 
appropriate to work with than lots of Liberals. He benefited from a refocus 
of some Liberal opinion on middle-class economistic concerns for 
retrenchment and financial stability when Liberal politics was deemed to be 
unable to pursue suitable policies without Conservative aid. He found that 
he could benefit from perceptions of him as a patriot too, meaning that more 
partisan opinion was eventually prepared to cooperate with him, at least in 
the short-term, in 1931 when many Liberals rallied to support the National 
Government and remained allied to Baldwin through the years of the 
National Government thereafter. Overall, a coherent and united separate 
Liberal party position might have prevented movement towards him, but 
without it Baldwin and his party reaped the benefits.     
For some Liberal recruits, working with the Conservatives seemed 
easier and more comfortable than for others on account of previous 
associations with the Conservative party, certainly in the cases of Churchill, 
Guest and Grigg. Churchill and Guest were, arguably, always ill-placed in 
the Liberal party having only become involved when the Conservatives 
retreated into ‘diehardism’ at the turn of the century, and Grigg was a 
Liberal Unionist in former times, with his main interest in the Liberal party 
having been mainly motivated by Lloyd George and relevant social policies 
– certainly not Liberal party dogma. This ill-placed involvement is best 
illustrated in the position of Churchill where there is clear evidence to 
support Richard Toye’s suggestion about his progressive move back to the 
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Conservatives.4 This relationship to his former party demonstrates clearly 
how he was ill-positioned as a Liberal (although it is not clear that he would 
have been any better positioned as a Conservative due to general difficulties 
in working within the party system).  
There is a wider point about the relationship to political parties to 
make. Evidence shows that loyalty to a party was often based on individual 
assessments of the use of that party for getting things done, with loyalties 
based on immediate electoral programmes rather than some deeper innate 
feeling of tribal association for the long-term. Many of the Liberal recruits’ 
fragile associations with the Liberal party through retreat into factions, 
disloyalty to the leadership and movement out of the party altogether can be 
seen in this context.  
Internal factors have also been seen to be critical in Liberal 
recruitment, not so much in them causing changes of allegiance, but in their 
helping to loosen the associations to the Liberal party. Problems were due to 
difficult relationships, sometimes characterised by ill-feeling built up over 
many years, as well as immediate issues which led to decisive steps in 
seeking extrication from the party. One outcome of long-term difficulty has 
been shown to be factional conflict, which was a particularly destructive 
influence on associations. This began before the First World War, 
intensified during it, and left a legacy of two separate factions which 
remained in constant disagreement until the 1930s. Factional conflict has 
been shown to have motivated McKenna’s move out of politics directly, 
whilst in Simon, Runciman, Mond, Churchill, Guest, and Grigg’s cases, it 
encouraged separation from party colleagues, and played a role in assisting 
their moves out of the party eventually, since such division discouraged a 
sense of full integration into the party body. Not all Liberals were keen on 
participation in factional conflict, however, particularly further away from 
high politics; some, like Lambert, tried to resist it, with the failure to secure 
greater unity of purpose causing disillusion, and leading him to become a 
rather detached figure from his party.  
                                                          
4 Richard Toye, Lloyd George and Churchill (London, 2008), p. 238.  
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Another issue, straddling both longer-term and immediate tension, 
has been shown to be the negative perceptions of the party leadership, with 
both Asquith and Lloyd George’s leadership qualities being brought into 
question, with resulting disaffection. In terms of Asquith, he seems to have 
carried some influence in the positions of Churchill, Mond and Guest in 
seeking relations with other parties. Asquith even possessed difficult 
relations, at times, with his own supporters, with McKenna’s position in 
retreating from politics, after 1918, partly inspired by Asquith’s lack of 
leadership skill and support for him in crises. In Runciman and Simon’s 
cases, he was an encouragement to their leadership aspirations; Asquith’s 
own failures in leadership saw them looking for opportunities to replace him 
which assisted in souring relations with Lloyd George who was a rival to the 
title of leader.  
However, ultimately, it was perceptions of Lloyd George which have 
been shown to be of the greatest importance. Negative perceptions surfaced 
even before the First World War as poor relations with Simon, Runciman 
and McKenna reveal, but it has also been seen that he was not completely 
trusted by his own supporters, such as Churchill, Mond and Guest. In the 
supporters’ cases, it has been shown that he never seemed to offer them the 
respect that they believed he owed them for their support, and this was a 
source of tension, assisting in destabilising their relationship with him and 
the Liberal party over time.5 By the mid-1920s, Lloyd George’s reputation 
was suffering further due to his various political methods which led to a 
general sense of his untrustworthiness even amongst those who had 
supported him over many years. Mond and Guest felt rather disillusioned by 
his tactics, in Mond’s case in his disagreement over land policy, and for 
Guest, in the manner of his unseating in his constituency. One particular 
issue about Lloyd George was his switch from supporting closer relations to 
the Conservatives to ties with Labour instead, which brought him into 
conflict with these colleagues, in particular, over the policy and political 
strategy matters. Lloyd George and his Labour links affected perceptions 
within the party after 1929 too, with other Liberals becoming concerned 
                                                          
5 Toye, Lloyd George and Churchill. 
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about his propping up a controversial Labour government, eventually 
helping to push some of his remaining supporters into a renewed factional 
struggle against him; this faction has been shown to have had links to the 
split in the party after 1931, which suggests Lloyd George’s policy had some 
kind of role in the circumstances that enabled this to happen.   
Behind all these divisions there was a good deal of self-interest, 
disingenuousness and opportunism. Self-interest tended to lead to 
exaggerated views on divisions over policy and strategy issues, particularly 
in the cases of Simon and Runciman in their sectional partisanship, in the 
1920s, to further their leadership ambitions; they were not as opposed to 
Lloyd George as it would seem. Generally-speaking, divisions within the 
party were exaggerated to propagate relationships with Conservatives and to 
justify the legitimacy of changing party. Guest was the most disingenuous of 
recruits in this regard, trying to exploit Lloyd George’s ethical deficiencies 
when he had, during his time as Coalition Liberal Chief Whip, played a key 
role in working to manipulate politics cynically to his and Lloyd George’s 
advantage.   
A final point has been consideration of personality traits, the 
characteristics discussed building on issues mentioned by Wyburn-Powell.6 
A number of the recruits were widely disliked and were seen as 
untrustworthy or too nakedly ambitious – particularly Churchill, Mond, 
Guest, and to some degree Simon. In politics, a substantial degree of 
outward presentation of congeniality is necessary for winning friends and 
for political progression, and it is useful to note the number of times sources 
demonstrate that this was not the case for some of the recruits, with 
underlying character traits having real impact on their level of integration 
into Liberal politics as well as their prospects for achieving political office. 
They were often isolated, which caused resentment and encouraged seeking 
of political allies outside of Liberal politics, bringing them into greater 
proximity to Conservatives.  
 
                                                          
6 Wyburn-Powell, Defections, p. 19.  
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Some overarching conclusions can be drawn, arising from the discussions, 
which help to understand Liberal recruitment specifically in the context of 
realignment of politics, and perhaps provide some of the most significant 
findings of this investigation.  
 Examination of collective and individual experience has shown, 
firstly, the reactive nature. With the exception of Churchill, it is hard to find 
any evidence that Liberal recruits were actively seeking ways to join the 
Conservative party in the period before their recruitment. It was usually the 
case that recruitment occurred due to an event or series of events sometimes 
spanning over some years, which put pressure on involvement with the 
Liberal party and encouraged relationships with Conservatives to the 
eventual point of formal links.  
A second point relates to the contemporary incoherence of the 
Liberal party due to disputed and ineffective leadership. What the 
circumstances of incoherence meant were that Liberals who wished to 
position the party close to the Conservatives could quite legitimately claim 
that this was in the best interests of Liberal party. In normal circumstances a 
party might have a clear leadership and direction, with firmer boundaries in 
terms of a range of policies and tolerance of proximity to other parties; but 
in the case of the declining Liberal party there was little direction and the 
boundaries were blurred. Thus, it becomes difficult to present Liberals who 
positioned themselves close to the Conservative party as having become 
essentially Conservatives in the run-up to their recruitment. They may have 
seemed indistinguishable in some cases but to dwell on this point alone 
ignores the fact that what a Liberal was is open to debate; proximity to the 
Conservatives does not mean they were definitely not Liberals.  
In relation to this point it needs to be acknowledged that the 
problems of the Liberal party were part of a wider situation affecting parties. 
In any transition of party politics from one party duopoly to another there is 
always going to be fluidity in the boundaries between parties. There were 
signs of fluidity in the other parties’ boundaries too; indeed, it has been 
shown that some eventual Liberal recruits looked even to bring elements of 
other parties onto a more Liberal political footing – particularly the so-called 
Labour and Conservative ‘moderates’. Thus, one should not see these 
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weaknesses as being unique to the Liberal party; it was more that the various 
other problems affecting Liberal politics prevented the Liberal party from 
taking advantage of being able to integrate people from other parties into its 
sphere after 1918 so that it became the chief casualty. There is a contrast 
here with the Edwardian period when the party showed signs of adapting to 
political changes, and had itself attracted recruits (Churchill and Guest 
amongst them).       
A third point relates to the sense that Liberal recruits played a role in 
their own party’s demise through choices they made to enter into 
disagreement and present outward disunity and ultimately to change party 
affiliations. There may have been justification in their actions due to 
consistencies with their values and outlook on politics, and they were 
influenced by force of events and personal circumstances, but from the point 
of view of their former party’s future they did much individually and 
collectively to undermine it.  
A fourth point to make relates specifically to the position of the 
Liberal National party. Not unlike other recent studies, particularly David 
Dutton’s research, emphasis has been placed on the essentially Liberal 
aspect of this grouping and its frustration of the development of a two party 
duopoly.7 This aspect of the investigation has not yielded anything uniquely 
different from Dutton’s perspective, but it has added more detail. It has 
highlighted the dilemma as to how to treat Liberal Nationals and whether 
they might be seen as recruits at all. Wyburn-Powell has claimed that most 
Liberal Nationals, due to their essential affinity to Liberal politics, should be 
excluded from association with change of party. However, as the 
phenomenon of recruitment is multifaceted (and not exclusively about 
whether or not Liberal politics was abandoned) it is clear that Wyburn-
Powell’s view is misplaced. All Liberal Nationals, whatever the character of 
their motivation in working with the Conservatives, seem as central to the 
politics of realignment as any other Liberals who worked with 
Conservatives, and their exclusion from consideration would leave gaps in 
understanding. No doubt views about Liberal Nationals will continue to be 
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debated as historians continue their re-evaluation of their position in the 
1930s and beyond.   
 
It is useful to conclude with some observations about the state of Liberal 
politics which led to recruitment of Liberals into the Conservative party. 
This study has shown that the Liberal party, between the middle of the First 
World War and 1935 especially, was so lacking in coherence that it is hardly 
surprising there were recruitments to the Conservatives (and indeed Labour 
too). The divided leadership and entrenched views from 1916 onwards 
meant difficulties in formulating a coherent policy or strategy for Liberal 
politics. In this situation, it is hardly surprising that Liberals started to fight 
amongst themselves, which irreparably damaged their ability to work with 
each other. A most critical point lies with the view that working so closely 
with the Conservatives – to the point of seeming indistinguishable – was a 
legitimate form of Liberal politics. Better leadership and the development of 
shared perspectives on policy and strategy should have arrested or 
moderated this development, even allowing for the fact that some recruits 
were not partisan and tended towards working with politicians outside the 
party, and ensured that recruits were guided away from separation and 
towards a more recognisable Liberal way forward. The long process of 
movement from the Liberal party shows that a number of Liberals were keen 
to retain their links with the party, with evidence of them looking for all 
manner of different ways of doing so, even in the months and weeks before 
their decisions formally to align with Conservatives; somehow these 
different approaches needed to be harnessed within the body of Liberal 
politics but a lack of uncontested and legitimate leadership made this 
impossible.  
The divisions in Liberal politics and haemorrhaging of support for 
the Liberal party did, however, assist in a triumph of sorts since the process 
of recruitment of Liberals into the Conservative party, as connected to 
divisions and exploited by Conservatives leaders, actually assisted in 
liberalising the Conservative agenda, pulling the party onto more moderate 
and liberal political territory. The historiography of British politics in the 
nineteenth century shows that this liberalising of the party had actually 
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already begun before the period of this study, especially through 
incorporation of Liberal Unionists into the Conservative bloc.8 However, a 
major contribution of this thesis has been to show that the later incorporation 
of Liberals into the Conservative party was more rather more significant, 
particularly at a time when the Liberal party was weakened and unable to 
recover electoral support, leaving the Conservatives appearing as the major 
representatives of moderate and liberal opinion. The Conservative party 
went on to become the most successful political party in modern British 
politics, with the widening of Conservative support to incorporate former 
elements of Liberal political opinion in this period seeming of critical 
significance in laying the foundations for this development. 
                                                          
8 The most recent detailed exposition of the impact of the Liberal Unionist on Conservative 
politics come from Ian Cawood’s study of Liberal Unionist politics; see Ian Cawood, The 
Liberal Unionists – A History (London & New York, 2012), pp. 242-252.  
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Simonite Liberals, 1931-5.
MPs Constituency Comments Mentioned by Wyburn-Powell
Allen, W Stoke on Trent Burslem Served 1931-5. Stood as a National but becomes a Simonite
Aske, Sir RW Newcastle upon Tyne East Elected in 1931 and 1935
Barrie, Sir CC Southampton Elected in 1931 and 1935
Blindell, J Holland with Boston Elected in 1931 and 1935
Brown, AE Leith Elected in 1931 and 1935 Y
Burgin, EL Luton Elected in 1931 and 1935
Campbell, G Burnley Served 1931-5. Stood as a National but becomes a Simonite
Collins, Sir GP Greenock Elected in 1931 and 1935
Curry, AC Bishop Auckland Elected as Simonite but later joins Samuelites
Davies, EC Montgomeryshire Elected in 1931 and 1935
Dickie, JP Consett Served until 1935
Dodd, JS Oldham Elected in 1935
Edge, Sir W Bosworth Elected in 1931 and 1935
Elmley, Viscount Eastern Norfolk Elected in 1931 and 1935
Fildes, Sir H Dumfriesshire First elected in by-election in 1935. Elected again in 1935.
Furness, SN Sunderland Elected in 1935
Granville, EJ Eye Elected in 1931 and 1935
Harbord, A Great Yarmouth Elected in 1931 and 1935
Henderson-Stewart, JEastern Fife First elected in 1933. Elected in 1935
Holmes, JS Harwich Elected in 1935. 
Hore-Belisha, L Plymouth Devonport Elected in 1931 and 1935
Hutchinson, Sir R Montrose Served until 1932 Y
Jones, L Swansea West Elected in 1931 and 1935
Kerr, CI Montrose First elected in 1932 and again in 1935
Lambert, G South Molton Elected in 1931 and 1935
Leckie, JA Walsall Stood as a National in 1931 but becomes a Simonite. Elected in 1935.
Llewellyn-Jones, F Flintshire Elected as Simonite but later joins Samuelites
Mabane, W Huddersfield Elected in 1931 and 1935
Macdonald, Sir M Inverness Elected in 1931 and 1935
Macpherson, JI Ross & Cromarty Elected in 1931 and 1935
Magnay, T Gateshead Elected in 1931 and 1935
Millar, JD Eastern Fife Served until 1933
Morris-Jones, JH Denbigh Elected in 1931 and 1935
Morrison, Dr. GA Combined Scottish Universities Elected in 1935. Recruited to the Samuelites
Norie-Miller, F Perth First elected in by-election in 1935
Peters, SJ Huntingdonshire Elected in 1931 and 1935
Pybus, PJ Harwich Served until 1935
Ramsay, TBW Western Isles Served until 1935
Runciman, W St. Ives Elected in 1931 and 1935
Russell, RJ Eddisbury Elected in 1931 and 1935
Shakespeare, GH Norwich Elected in 1931 and 1935
Simon, Sir JA Spen Valley Elected in 1931 and 1935 Y
Soper, RJ Barnsley Served until 1935
Strauss, EA Southwark North Elected in 1931 and 1935
Summersby, CH Shoreditch Served until 1935
Wallace, J Dunfermline Served until 1935
Appendix A: 
Source: Craig, F. W. S., British Parliamentary Election Results 1918-
1949, (3rd. Ed.) Parliamentary Research Services (Chichester, 1983) 
